

NEW AFRICAN HISTORIES

# A COUNTRY OF DEFIANCE

Mapping the Casamance in Senegal



MARK W. DEETS

## A Country of Defiance

# NEW AFRICAN HISTORIES

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# A Country of Defiance

*Mapping the Casamance in Senegal*



Mark W. Deets

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*In Loving Memory*

*of my son*

*Dillon Wales Deets,*

*1997-2021*



# Contents

List of Illustrations	ix
Acknowledgments	xi
Abbreviations	xvii
Chronology	xix
Introduction	
<i>A Spatial Discourse of Grievance</i>	1
<i>Chapter 1</i> The River	30
<i>Chapter 2</i> The Rice Field	63
<i>Chapter 3</i> The Forest	95
<i>Chapter 4</i> The School	121
<i>Chapter 5</i> The Stadium	153
Conclusion	179
Notes	185
Bibliography	253
Index	275



# Illustrations

## FIGURES

I.1. Map of Senegambia	2
I.2. Mamadou “Nkrumah” Sané, 2012	3
I.3. Map of Lower Casamance	4
I.4. Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, December 1982	5
1.1. Map of Senegambia by Guillaume de l’Isle, 1707	36
1.2. Mungo Park’s exploration of West Africa, 1810	37
1.3. Map of Reis’s Concession, 1895	45
1.4. Flyer on “the Particulars” of Reis’s Concession	46
1.5. Hand-drawn map of Casamançais ethnicities by Lt. Col. Sajous, 1943	48
1.6. Hand-drawn map of Casamançais agriculture by Lt. Col. Sajous, 1943	49
1.7. Map of Senegalese national administrative reform, 1984	53
2.1. Rice field south of Kandialang, 2014	65
3.1. Silk cotton tree near “sacred forest” of Diabir, 2014	105
4.1. Front gate of Lycée Djignabo, where Idrissa Sagna was shot during student strike	134
4.2. Assane Seck, class photo, 1950s	141
4.3. Assane Seck and Emile Badiane, date unknown	143

5.1. Players plead with Bakary Sarr after controversial call in 1980 Coupe du Sénégal	154
5.2. Fans and police rush onto field after 1980 Coupe du Sénégal	155
5.3. Wrestling match <i>avec frappe</i> between Gaye and Yékini, April 22, 2012	175
5.4. Girls wrestling in Diembereng during Festival of the Rice Fields, 2014	176

#### TABLES

1.1. Territorial reforms in the Casamance, 1890–1944	51
4.1. Senegalese schooling rate by region since 1964	134

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“The Casamance always has been and always will be the country of defiance.”

—Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor

I was a burned-out Marine helicopter pilot teaching history at the U.S. Naval Academy, wondering what I would do in postmilitary life, when I excitedly told my colleague Elizabeth Knutson, a French studies professor, about the history, culture, and politics of the Casamance conflict in southern Senegal. We were on a trip to investigate the possibilities of French-language study in Senegal for midshipmen from the academy. The Casamance conflict was a subject with which I had become fascinated while serving as the U.S. Defense and Marine attaché to Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde, with a short stint in Mauritania. I had arrived in Dakar in January 2005, one month after the December 2004 peace accord had been signed. The U.S. ambassador and the country team were heavily engaged with the rest of the international community in Dakar in negotiations between the Senegalese government and the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC). Elizabeth noted my passion on the subject and then suggested that I write a dissertation about it. A few years later, I retired from the Marine Corps, went to Cornell University, and did what Elizabeth

Knutson said. This book is the product of the research that followed one colleague speaking a few encouraging words to another.

Frankly, it seems unjust that my name is the only one on the front of this book. As with many scholars before me, I find myself at a loss for words when I think about the enormous debt of gratitude I feel to all those, in addition to Elizabeth, who helped me bring this book to fruition. Friends and colleagues in Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, France, Portugal, and the United States encouraged me and supported me along the way.

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# Abbreviations

ANFOM	Archives Nationales de France, Section Outre-Mer / National Archives of France, Overseas (i.e., Colonies and Departments) Section
ANS	Archives Nationales du Sénégal / National Archives of Senegal
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française / French West Africa
BDS	Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais / Senegalese Democratic Party
CAF	Confédération Africaine de Football / Confederation of African Football
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine / African Financial Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSF	Fédération Sénégalaise de Football / Senegalese Soccer Federation
GBAF	Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces
GNRS	Gambian National Record Service
GoS	Government of Senegal
IFAN	Institut Français/Fondamental d'Afrique Noire / French Institute of Black Africa (Dakar)
MAC	Mouvement Autonome Casamançais / Movement for Casamançais Autonomy
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance / Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance
NGO	nongovernmental organization

OAU	Organisation of African Unity
RTS	Radiodiffusion Télévision Sénégalaise / Radio-Television Senegal
SAF	Senegalese Armed Forces
SFIO	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière / French Section of the Workers' International

# Chronology

- 1446: Portuguese explorer Álvaro Fernandez leads first European mission to the Casamance
- 1500s: Floup (Jola) migration to the Lower Casamance, displacing the Bainouk
- 1645: The Portuguese establish a trading post at Ziguinchor
- March 29, 1828: French Navy sends mission to survey the possibilities of commerce along the Casamance River
- January 22, 1836: Cession of the island of Carabane to the French for a trading post on the Casamance River
- March 24, 1837: Cession of trading post at Sédhiou to the French
- December 1849: Emmanuel Bertrand-Bocandé establishes French colonial presence on the Casamance as first *résident* at Carabane
- 1850: “Mandinkization” of Jola communities in Lower Casamance begins
- 1877–93: Maraboutic Wars led by Foday Kaba and Foday Sylla ravage northern Casamance
- 1884–85: Imperial representatives meet from November to February at Berlin Conference and agree on colonial borders of Africa
- May 12, 1886: The French-Portuguese Convention delineates the southern border of the Casamance with Portuguese Guinea; the Portuguese cede Ziguinchor to the French
- August 10, 1889: The French-British Agreement delineates the northern border of the Casamance with The Gambia
- 1890: Joint Anglo-French Boundary Commission begins demarcating the northern border of the Casamance with The Gambia, occasionally harassed by Foday Sylla’s forces; the French establish a colonial administration for the territorial entity called “the Casamance”
- May 17, 1906: French forces kill Jola rebel Djignabo Bassène at Séléki

- 1914: Blaise Diagne begins recruiting Casamançais (and other West Africans) for service in the Tirailleurs Sénégalais during First World War
- 1921: French missionaries establish soccer club, Jeanne d'Arc, in Dakar; Lamine Guèye graduates from University of Paris; French create colonial forestry management service
- 1935: Emile Badiane graduates as valedictorian of his class at École Normale William Ponty
- 1942: Jola rebellion in Kabrousse led by priestess Aline Sitoé Diatta; Diatta arrested and eventually imprisoned in Timbuktu, where she dies
- 1942–47: Augustin Diamacoune Senghor attends boarding school at Ngasobil
- 1944: Revolt of Tirailleurs Sénégalais at Camp Thiaroye
- 1945: Lamine Guèye elected mayor of Dakar
- 1946: Passage of “Lamine Guèye Law” granting French citizenship to people in most of France’s overseas colonies
- 1947: Meeting of 120 “literate notables” in Sédhiou to discuss formation of new political party to represent the interests of the Casamance
- 1948: Léopold Senghor breaks from SFIO to found his own party, the BDS
- November 20, 1948: Casamançais nationalist Victor Diatta found dead on beach in Dakar
- April 14, 1949: Emile Badiane, Ibou Diallo, and other “literate notables” found the original MFDC to represent Casamançais interests
- 1954: Emile Badiane abandons the MFDC to join Senghor’s BDS; original MFDC dissolves
- January 23, 1955: Lamine Guèye visits supporters in the Casamance, his convoy is ambushed during campaign for Territorial Assembly; four dead, dozens injured
- 1956: Augustin Diamacoune Senghor ordained as priest in Catholic Church
- 1957: Lycée Djignabo founded in Ziguinchor
- April 4, 1960: Senegal and Mali obtain independence from France as Mali Federation
- August 20, 1960: Senegal and Mali separate into two nation-states; Mali Federation dissolved; Léopold Senghor becomes president of independent Senegal
- 1960: Soccer club Foyer de Jeunes de Casamance established from combination of colonial predecessors

- 1961: President Senghor creates Ministry of Youth and Sports
- 1964: Mamadou Sané departs Senegal for Paris; Father Diamacoune departs for seminary in Belgium; Senegalese national domain law passes
- 1967: Diamacoune begins broadcasting children's radio program as "Papa Kulimpi" on Radiotélévision Sénégal (RTS)
- 1968: Sané participates in demonstrations in streets of Paris
- 1969: Casamance Sporting Football Club, known as "Casa-Sports," founded from combination of smaller soccer clubs in the Casamance: Union Sportive de Casamance, Galéa FC, and Foyer de la Casamance
- December 22, 1972: Emile Badiane dies in Dakar under mysterious circumstances
- 1975: Structural adjustment programs begin about the same time as decreasing rainfall amounts across region
- July 10, 1979: Casa-Sports wins Coupe du Sénégal against Jaraaf
- December 1979: Student strike begins across Senegal
- January 1980: In Paris, Mamadou Sané publishes first issue of separatist magazine, *Kelumak*
- January 11, 1980: Student Idrissa Sagna shot by Senegalese security forces outside Lycée Djignabo
- August 3, 1980: Casa-Sports loses controversial final match of Coupe du Sénégal to Jeanne d'Arc; riots follow the match; Jules-François Bocandé banned from Senegalese soccer
- August 23, 1980: Father Diamacoune gives controversial speech at Dakar Chamber of Commerce, suggesting legacy of Aline Sitoé Diatta called for Casamançais "independence"
- January 1, 1981: Abdou Diouf becomes president of Senegal
- April 8, 1982: First meeting of Mamadou Sané and Father Diamacoune at Kafountine; Diamacoune agrees to serve as spokesman for contemporary version of MFDC
- December 23, 1982: Arrest of Father Diamacoune
- December 26, 1982: MFDC supporters march on Ziguinchor, lower Senegalese flags from Senegalese government buildings, followed by mass arrests
- 1983: GoS investigation into fate of Aline Sitoé Diatta determines that she died of scurvy in Timbuktu in 1944
- December 6, 1983: Three Senegalese gendarmes murdered near Diabir

- 1984: GoS administrative reforms remove the name “Casamance” from the official administrative map of Senegal and divide the region into two administrative regions, Ziguinchor and Kolda
- 1985: Christian Roche publishes *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920*, based on his PhD thesis completed in 1975; Bocandé returns from soccer ban to lead Senegalese team in Africa Cup of Nations tournament
- January 2, 1988: Father Diamacoune released from prison
- February 1990: Diamacoune declares the independence of the Casamance
- June 14, 1990: Diamacoune arrested again
- May 31, 1991: Ceasefire signed between Government of Senegal (GoS) and MFDC at Bissau (Guinea-Bissau); later that year, fighting resumes
- April 17, 1992: Ceasefire signed at Cacheu (Guinea-Bissau)
- August 12, 1992: Father Diamacoune released from prison
- September 1, 1992: Fighting resumes
- July 8, 1993: Ceasefire, broken three days later; MFDC and GoS agree to arbitration of historical and legal questions by Jacques Charpy surrounding colonial origins of the Casamance
- July 22, 1994: Army lieutenant Yaya Jammeh seizes power in The Gambia
- 1995: Father Diamacoune publishes *Casamance: Pays du refus* in response to Charpy’s findings
- 1997: GoS publishes *The Truth about Casamance*; Seynabou Male Cissé and other Casamançais women found women’s peace movement
- 1998: Senegalese Armed Forces intervene in Guinea-Bissau civil war to cut off links between forces of General Ansoumana Mané and MFDC
- 1999: Ceasefire signed between GoS and MFDC in Banjul; fighting resumes
- 2002: Senegal defeats France, the reigning World Cup champions, in first round of World Cup soccer championship, with J-F Bocandé as assistant coach
- December 30, 2004: Peace accord signed between GoS and MFDC in Ziguinchor
- March 2006: Conflict resumes as SAF and Guinea-Bissau Army attack MFDC positions in Guinea-Bissau
- May 1, 2014: Ceasefire signed between GoS and MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio

# Introduction

## *A Spatial Discourse of Grievance*

“*Bútajabu buhonkoroort, (butajoorut).*” (Fúlup Jola)

“*La lutte n’est même pas encore annoncée, (nà même pas encore débuté).*”  
(French)

“The fight is not even announced yet (let alone begun yet).”

—Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance*

THIS BOOK is a spatial history of the Casamance conflict in southern Senegal, a relatively low-intensity separatist conflict that began in 1982 and has continued intermittently to the present. More than five thousand people have died in this conflict.<sup>1</sup> The Casamance is the region of Senegal lying south of The Gambia (figure I.1). I trace the origins of the conflict back to the start of the colonial period in a handful of contested spaces and places where the seeds of nationalism and separatism took root. Each chapter examines the development over time of a piece of the imagined Casamançais nation: “The River,” “The Rice Field,” “The Forest,” “The School,” and “The Stadium.”

In various ways, modern separatist leaders referred to each of these spaces to form a *spatial discourse of grievance* that transformed space into place, rendering a separatist nation from the separate pieces where a




FIGURE I.1. The Senegambia. Map by Peter Philps, made with Natural Earth and GADM, June 2022.

particular Casamançais identity sprouted and emerged. However, not every Casamançais identified with these spaces and places in the same way. Many have refused to tie their beloved Casamançais culture and landscape to the project of separatism, revealing a second layer of counter-mapping below that of separatist leaders like Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor and Mamadou “Nkrumah” Sané.<sup>2</sup>

They first met at one-thirty in the afternoon on April 8, 1982. Sané (figure I.2) could barely contain his enthusiasm to greet the firebrand priest about whom he had heard so much: Father Diamacoune. The modern Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, MFDC) crystallized out of this meeting between two well-educated men—one a Christian from the south bank of the Casamance River (Diamacoune), the other a Muslim from the north bank (Sané). After growing up in the Buluf region (northwest of Bignona) of the Casamance, Sané left Senegal in 1964 to continue his university education in Europe. Sané passed through Mauritania and Morocco and landed in Paris in 1966. He participated in leftist agitation in the streets of Paris in 1968, an experience that profoundly marked his political outlook.<sup>3</sup>

Father Diamacoune also left Senegal in 1964, but he left to attend seminary in Belgium. After his ordination, Diamacoune returned to the




FIGURE 1.2. Mamadou “Nkrumah” Sané in 2012. Source: Dakaractu.com.

Casamance to take up his duties with the Catholic Church. In 1967, he began broadcasting a children’s radio program on Radio-Television Senegal (RTS) that ran until 1980. Diamacoune used the radio program to criticize the 1964 national domain law in Senegal, which led to land seizures without compensation for the development of tourism in Ziguinchor, the regional capital. Lacking a cadastral survey, the Senegalese government, led by President Léopold Senghor until 1980, redistributed land parcels to bureaucrats and “autochthones,” many of whom ironically came from northern Senegal, with ties to the *nordiste* mayor of Ziguinchor.<sup>4</sup>

As separatist sentiment boiled throughout the 1970s, Diamacoune used his RTS radio program to denigrate the “little Wolof,” the “little Serer,” and the “little Toucouleur” from “Senegal”—meaning northern Senegal—as “strangers” to the Casamance.<sup>5</sup> He placed these northern ethnic groups in opposition to the Jola, the majority ethnic group of the Lower Casamance. Over time, Diamacoune, who went by the nickname “Papa Kulimpi” on the radio,

began to construct a discourse of grievance that cast Senegal as something “other” and “separate” than the Casamance.<sup>6</sup> In Paris, Sané’s wife, Mariama, told her husband about the intriguing views of Papa Kulimpi she had heard on RTS while growing up in the Casamance and as Diamacouné’s student at the primary school Sacré-Cœur of Ziguinchor.<sup>7</sup> As tension and grievances mounted in the late 1970s, Sané decided he had to return to the region to meet Diamacouné. That sentiment grew after 1980, when Diamacouné gave speeches in Ziguinchor and Dakar, arguing that historically the Casamance had never been and could never be a part of Senegal (figure I.3).<sup>8</sup> From Paris, Sané agitated for Casamançais independence. With other Casamançais expatriates living in France, he formed a Jola cultural association called Esukolal and began to publish the journal *Kelumak*, advocating for the particularity of Casamançais culture. But he knew that he needed a committed local stakeholder in the Casamance. He flew back to Senegal in search of Diamacouné. He finally tracked down the elder man in Kafountine.<sup>9</sup>

Diamacouné played the benevolent host to his well-traveled guests in a reception room in his quarters provided by the Catholic diocese. Received initially by Diamacouné’s niece, Sané and his companions, Marcel Bassène and Mamadou Diémé, waited for the priest to join them. Diamacouné (figure I.4) entered the room wearing his clerical robes and greeted the men with a hearty “*Safoul!*” in Jola.<sup>10</sup> Diamacouné’s niece offered the visitors some




FIGURE I.3. The Lower Casamance. Map by Peter Philps, made with Natural Earth and MapCruzin, June 2022.



FIGURE 1.4. Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor in December 1982. Source: *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 31, 1982, 6.

drinks. Sané impressed his host by choosing palm wine instead of the other sugary, processed drinks that had been offered.<sup>11</sup> Sané explained that he and the others intended to revive the “original MFDC” from its short existence in the 1950s as a regional political party to form a modern movement seeking the independence of the Casamance.<sup>12</sup> Sané later recalled, “The priest was proud of me for my patriotism so he got up out of his chair and embraced me without saying a word.”<sup>13</sup> The modern MFDC was born.<sup>14</sup>

The months following this important meeting were less peaceful. After taking oaths in a “sacred forest” near Diabir, a neighborhood west of the airport on the southwest edge of Ziguinchor, hundreds of (perhaps a thousand) separatists marched into Ziguinchor on December 26, 1982, to remove the Senegalese flags flying over government buildings around the city. The marchers were led by a group of older women, and by most accounts, the marchers were unarmed. They arrived at the governor’s building, lowered the Senegalese flag, and replaced it with a white flag.<sup>15</sup> Senegalese intelligence services, catching a tip on the planning days before, had arrested Sané on the twenty-first of December and Father Diamacoune on the twenty-third.<sup>16</sup> At the march on the twenty-sixth, Senegalese security forces—primarily from the National Police and the Gendarmerie Nationale—greeted the separatists with sporadic nonlethal force, wounding a few here and there but killing none.<sup>17</sup>

A more focused response came in the days following the march as security services arrested and jailed some of those who had attended the march or otherwise demonstrated separatist sympathies. When separatists planned another meeting for the same sacred forest near Diabir almost a year later, the Senegalese government sent gendarmes to break up the meeting. This time there were no women in the sacred forest, and the separatists were armed.<sup>18</sup> They greeted the gendarmes with a flurry of violence that left four of the gendarmes dead, their corpses mutilated. The Senegalese mustered a more forceful response weeks later, attacking a separatist position near the village of Mandina Mancagne, near the southeast side of Ziguinchor. The MFDC rebels, who took up the name of Atika (meaning “warrior” in Jola) under the command of a French colonial army veteran, Sidy Badji, scattered into the forest and awaited the delivery of weapons promised by Sané in the lead-up to the march.<sup>19</sup> The weapons did not appear; the rebels started the conflict armed only with clubs, machetes, and bows and arrows.<sup>20</sup> Badji, arrested along with many others at the start of the conflict, confronted Sané in Dakar’s prison about the long-awaited weapons. When Sané responded that there were none, Badji exclaimed, “Nkrumah! You have sacrificed the people!”<sup>21</sup>

The other rebels remained in the bush. The Senegalese Army, a modern professional army equipped with assault rifles, mortars, and artillery, and supported by fixed-wing and rotary-wing combat aircraft, hounded the rebels along the southern border with Guinea-Bissau, where the rebels sought refuge in the forest.<sup>22</sup> Eventually—especially after the conclusion of the Cold War flooded Africa with weapons—the rebels acquired AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and mines. Over time, what started as an asymmetrical fight favoring the Senegalese Army became a bit more even.<sup>23</sup> But the rebels still depended to a great extent on the sanctuary they could find across the borders with The Gambia to the north or more frequently with Guinea-Bissau to the south—implicating Senegal’s neighbors in the conflict.

That fateful march of December 26, 1982, was followed by forty years of sporadic, low-intensity conflict that killed more than 5,000 people, displaced over 60,000, affected 90,000 by land mines<sup>24</sup> (including about 500 civilians killed or maimed by them),<sup>25</sup> and left 800,000 living in a state of insecurity.<sup>26</sup> Though the combatants agreed to ceasefires in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, and 2014, as well as an alleged “peace accord” in 2004, a real and lasting peace (as of 2022) remains elusive.<sup>27</sup> While the violence has steadily lessened since 2004—despite sporadic bursts of violence in 2006 and 2008—to a condition referred to as “neither war nor peace,” the conflict has earned

the ignominious title of “Africa’s longest-running civil conflict.”<sup>28</sup> Many have considered the conflict a stain on Senegal’s frequently cited record as one of Africa’s few stable democracies without interruption by a coup d’état since independence in 1960. From where did that stain emerge? How and why did the competing identities of the Casamance conflict come about?

#### A FINGER IN THE SIDE OF SENEGAL

At first glance, they appear to have emerged from the colonial partition, more or less set in place at the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, when European imperial powers met to divide the territory of the African continent among themselves.<sup>29</sup> For centuries before the Berlin Conference, the Casamance had been a “borderland” par excellence, a frontier of empires not only European (Britain, France, and Portugal) but also African (Mandinka, Soninke, and Wolof).<sup>30</sup> Since colonialism ended in West Africa, the borders of The Gambia (see figure I.1), an Anglophone nation-state completely surrounded (except on its western, Atlantic coast) by Francophone Senegal, have often been characterized as an iconic case of how “artificial” colonial borders left African leaders with the “curse” of building nations for states based on the borders inherited from colonialism.<sup>31</sup>

These leaders then enshrined those borders at the 1963 opening summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, essentially agreeing to leave the borders intact for fear of what might come about if they began to tinker with them.<sup>32</sup> Besides, these leaders stood to benefit from leaving the borders in place. By 1960, they had fought long and hard to take over the governors’ palaces and state houses of the colonizers.<sup>33</sup> They were not about to easily surrender these trappings of power; thus, most had no interest in creating states with new borders. Many were willing to change the names of these new countries but not the borders.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, OAU leaders followed up the 1963 border consensus with the 1964 Cairo Declaration, enshrining the principle of *uti possidetis*—the idea that Africa’s borders were inviolable as prescribed at that time and could not be changed—to avoid future conflict.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, some delegates felt wary of brewing trouble. At his speech to the delegates in Cairo, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah argued,

Serious border disputes have broken out and disturbed our Continent, since our last meeting. Fortunately, good sense and African solidarity have prevailed in all those instances. But the disputes have been smothered, not settled. The artificial divisions of African States are too numerous and irrational for really permanent and harmonious settlements to be reached, except within the

framework of a Continental Union. . . . I said a little while ago, and I repeat, that the real border disputes will grow with the economic development and national strengthening of the African States as separate balkanised governmental units. That was the historical process of independent states in other continents. We cannot expect Africa, with its legacy of artificial borders, to follow any other course, unless we make a positive effort to arrest that danger now; and we can do so only under a United Government.<sup>36</sup>

Nkrumah's calls for a united African federation were never seriously considered, and Africa's "balkanization" continued in various places around the continent—including the Senegambia. The matter of the borders of The Gambia and the Casamance had indeed been "smothered, not settled."

The OAU border "consensus" resulted in what one Senegalese official described as "the Gambian finger perpetually poking Senegal in the side."<sup>37</sup> In this West African version of Thongchai Winichakul's "geo-body of a nation," The Gambia takes on the shape of a human index finger, poking Senegal (and West Africa) in the side on its western coast and establishing a lock-and-key sort of geo-body.<sup>38</sup> The colonial partition was more than an annoying poke, however.<sup>39</sup> Senegalese and Gambian leaders tried to overcome this geographical legacy—and its associated social and economic legacies—through the Senegambia Confederation, created in 1982. This attempt at subregional cooperation and nation building did not survive the competing interests of elites in both postcolonial states, so the confederation dissolved in 1989.<sup>40</sup> Problematic colonial borders may have been a necessary cause of the Casamance conflict, but they alone do not sufficiently explain the conflict's spatial history.

Thus, I perform here a spatial discourse analysis of the conflict. What I am calling the *discourse of grievance* of Casamançais separatism developed during the 1970s, a decade of growing crisis in West Africa. The optimism of independence from colonial rule and the expected subsequent economic development in the 1960s became the disappointment of economic and environmental disaster, along with civil conflict, in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>41</sup> Decreasing rainfall amounts in the Casamance led to drought and increased desertification from the encroachment of the Sahel into the forest belt of West Africa. Decreasing rains meant lower crop yields, adding pressure to a region that had seen catastrophic effects from famine in places like Ghana and Mali, especially in 1972–74, "West Africa's worst year of famine."<sup>42</sup> In addition to the energy crisis that affected most of the world at the time, some of the economic malaise came from the onset of structural adjustment, a

series of stringent economic programs imposed by Western donors bilaterally or multilaterally through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.<sup>43</sup>

At the more local level in the Casamance, in addition to the imposition of a nordiste mayor of Ziguinchor from Saint-Louis, Casamançais felt increasingly disappointed by the postcolonial dispensation of partnership and union with Senegal. The good jobs expected by Casamançais men, especially those with formal education, had not appeared.<sup>44</sup> On top of that, Dakar seemed to be attracting more and more Casamançais women to work as maids. For some men, union with Senegal seemed to have brought about a male crisis deepened by the flight of Casamançais women to Dakar.<sup>45</sup> Added to the exploitation of Casamançais women's labor was the exploitation of Casamançais land after the Government of Senegal passed the 1964 national domain law, enabling nordistes to more easily buy up Casamançais land for development and tourism—creating more jobs for, according to the separatists, other nordiste migrants to exploit at the expense of hard-working Casamançais.<sup>46</sup> All these conditions added up to a sense of crisis for the Senegalese state, and some Casamançais once again began looking for other options besides remaining in union with Senegal.

I took an interest in the Casamance conflict during my service as a military diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Dakar.<sup>47</sup> As stated earlier, the Senegalese government and the MFDC had signed a peace accord in December 2004, shortly before my arrival in January 2005. But negotiations for peace were to continue after the signing of this accord. During this assignment, therefore, it became my official duty to accompany the U.S. ambassador to meetings with the international community in Dakar involved in the Casamance peace process.<sup>48</sup> I also individually attended meetings with the Senegalese Armed Forces and the MFDC. Over time, I found it curious that no one at these meetings ever pulled out a map, showing what the particular territorial claims of the separatists were.<sup>49</sup>

Instead, I heard repeated references—a discourse, in other words—to particular social spaces where Casamançais felt something different from their fellow Senegalese. One former senior Senegalese official told me that to understand the Casamance conflict, I needed to understand what occurred in the *bois sacré*, the sacred forest—like the one where separatists gathered before the 1982 march into Ziguinchor.<sup>50</sup> Having no idea what occurred in a sacred forest or why, I was intrigued.<sup>51</sup> I later discovered that Father Diamacoune had posited Casamançais identity based on the “sacred forest shrines through which the Senegalese did not pass.”<sup>52</sup> I found it odd that a Catholic priest had asserted a separatist identity based not on opposition to Islam

(Senegal was 95 percent Muslim in 2016) but on the local Jola beliefs of traditional religion.<sup>53</sup> Over time, I began to notice repeated references to other sacred spaces to the Jola, such as the rice field and the Casamance River. And I began to notice a discourse, especially from Father Diamacoune and other separatists, about Senegalese exploitation of these spaces. For example, Diamacoune stated:

The Senegalese, worthy heirs of the white colonizers, marvelously and radically surpassed their former colonial masters. To conquer our resistance, they dedicated themselves to *wiping out our forests*, which are simultaneously natural fortresses and sources of subsistence thanks to the fruits, flowers, leaves, roots, and tubers, etc. Moreover, they strove to *occupy and destroy the natural traditional rice fields*, which, year in and year out, with a regular rainfall produced sufficient quantities of rice. This self-sufficient agriculture rendered the Casamançais freer and more independent. This was not pleasing to the new occupants, whose eyes sparkled with greed at the people of “the *land of the rivers*,” and stood to benefit from a policy on dams, with mountains of plans, files, and projects, giving birth to achievements both derisory and revolting. If this policy succeeds, *the natural rice fields* controlled by the population *will be replaced by dams* in the hands of Senegalese masters capable of starving us.<sup>54</sup>

In addition to Father Diamacoune, many other Casamançais harbored similar sorts of grievances linked to the same kinds of natural spaces. One Ziguinchorois claimed, “We watched powerless, in the name of the law, as our lands were allocated to *marabouts* who very quickly became big planters and growers of groundnuts. These *nordistes*, under the protection of their parents or their buddies in the Administration, were exploiting the forest and fishing wherever they wanted, even in certain areas prohibited by tradition.”<sup>55</sup> One of the rebels explained that their typical operating environment placed them “at the same time in the forest and close to the river and the rice fields.”<sup>56</sup> These spatial references formed a large part of the natural environment of the Casamance. I heard other references to the built environment in the Casamance, especially the football stadium. I learned that the nationalist elites—peers of Senghor who began to think of “the Casamance” in nationalist terms—absorbed quite specific ideas about African history, culture, language, and politics in schools. Over time, I began to see that what became the separatist discourse of grievance went beyond the political imagination of one Catholic priest.

Eventually, all these spaces, especially the “natural” spaces like the river, the rice field, and the forest, were rendered as places of belonging for the Casamançais in ways allegedly incomprehensible to other Senegalese.<sup>57</sup> According to the separatists, these other Senegalese were exploiting and destroying these Casamançais places. One separatist explained, “We felt invaded by the new arrivals who, even though they lived among us Casamançais, despised to the maximum our realities. They very quickly became rich thanks to the fishing, farming, plantations, and business and took no interest whatsoever in our culture, made no effort to learn our languages, and while they were mostly Muslim, they considered those of traditional religion as impure and savage individuals.”<sup>58</sup> Some of these Casamançais began to feel “invaded” as if those from northern Senegal were “transgressing” into the sacred spaces and places of the Casamance. While Timothy Cresswell’s notion of spatial transgression is normally thought of as rebels transgressing on the order of the state, Casamançais separatists claimed that the Senegalese state was transgressing on *their* order—the order of the non-state Casamançais—and that Senegal, like the former colonial power, had “seen like a state” to impose order in ways that alienated the land and labor of Casamançais.<sup>59</sup> Imposing order on bodies and resources and determining who belongs where is a process that I define as *mapping*. I consider the repeated references to these spatial markers through a discourse of grievance against the Senegalese state to constitute *discursive mapping*.

In this book, therefore, based on evidence from oral, material, and archival sources collected in Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, France, and the United States, I argue that the MFDC discursively mapped the Casamance with particular spatio-cultural symbols: The River, The Rice Field, The Forest, The School, and The Stadium. These spatial icons became contested spaces operating on a dialectic between “space” and “place” to impose order on bodies and resources while also determining who “belonged” where. I argue that the manifestation of identity in these *spaces* turned them into *places* where Casamançais felt more Casamançais and a bit less Senegalese. Whether a “natural” space like a forest or a “built” space like a classroom or a soccer stadium, these contested spaces took on elements of *place*—and became icons of the nation making territorial claims by their discursive power. Hence, while one might reasonably expect a separatist movement making a territorial claim to define that claim with a map, the conflict has produced relatively few maps. Rather, Casamançais separatism depended on a degree of territorial ambiguity, especially regarding the eastern border of the Casamance.<sup>60</sup>

In the place of colonial and postcolonial cartography, separatists depended on a discourse about space and place to designate belonging against

a Senegalese “other.” They employed cultural markers to construct these spaces as “Casamançais.” These cultural markers were *the spaces and places themselves*, infused with meaning for identity formation through various cultural forms and practices: oral histories, proverbs, agricultural practices, religious rituals, masking ceremonies, and sporting traditions. As we will see, these cultural practices converted “a forest” into “a sacred forest,” which was then rendered by Casamançais nationalists as “The Sacred Forest” and became a place for separatist speeches and agitation.<sup>61</sup> They converted “a stadium” into a Casa-Sports football club meeting space, rendered by separatists as a place for the listing of separatist grievances and the construction of separatist agitation. These activities converted this space into place, so that it became “The Stadium.”<sup>62</sup>

My conception of discursive mapping, though similar to Christopher Gray’s notion of “cognitive maps” in Gabon, shows that the cognitive maps in the heads of Casamançais resulted from historical and political discourses that were relatively recent arrivals to the Casamance. The spaces of imagining were not entirely new—indeed, modern Casamançais conceptions of the river and the forest, for example, can be traced back to the precolonial period—but some of the ways that Casamançais thought about these spaces were new, as I show in the rest of this book.<sup>63</sup> Whereas Gray distinguishes between the precolonial cognitive maps of people in western Gabon and the French colonial mapping that led to modern “territoriality,” I argue that Casamançais discursive mapping was a modern response to colonial and postcolonial state mapping. As in colonial Gabon, it was counter-mapping by nonstate actors against state mapping by state actors. In short, Casamançais separatists counter-mapped the nation with cognitive maps.<sup>64</sup>

It would be wrong, however, to claim that the MFDC successfully defined each of these spaces in a monolithic fashion that rendered them objects of nationalist and separatist inspiration. In fact, these spaces were not monolithic. Different people experienced them in different ways, regardless of what the separatists said. Yet, for many, when Father Diamacoune referred to “the sacred forest shrines through which the Senegalese did not pass,” most Casamançais knew exactly what that meant. And they knew why someone from northern Senegal could not fully understand it. Even though Father Diamacoune himself, as a devout Catholic, never went through the sacred forest male initiation, he was still capable of mobilizing it for separatist ambitions.<sup>65</sup>

After he became associated with the MFDC, Father Diamacoune and the Catholic Church maintained a rather ambiguous relationship. After his arrest in December 1982, church leaders were quick to demand that he be

treated humanely while in prison, but beyond that, they never really made statements of deep support for Diamacoune or his chosen cause. In his first statement following Diamacoune's arrest, the bishop of the Diocese of Ziguinchor, Augustin Sagna, set the tone for official Catholic responses to the cause of Casamançais separatism. He reminded priests that their first duty was to administer the Eucharist and to avoid all conduct that could "introduce trouble" and peel their attention away from that first duty. He concluded by a heavy moral reference defining to whom their flock truly belonged: "They are not *your* people, like your property or your goods. They are the people of God, those whom the Savior acquired by the act of Creation and conquered by the blood of His Son."<sup>66</sup> By this heavy-handed moral reference, a tone that permeates the entire communication, Sagna expressed his displeasure with Father Diamacoune's political activities with the MFDC. But neither he nor any other church leader ever directly condemned them. Thus, Diamacoune was free to help build and propagate the discourse of grievance that many Casamançais began to feel and discuss in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

To demonstrate the ways that separatists sought to transform space into place in the social spaces often referred to in this discourse, I capitalize their names—for example, "The River" and "The Stadium"—to indicate times and places where separatists sought to assert a separatist identity through them. These assertions sought to bring nationalism and separatism into these places, where some people felt especially "Casamançais." Some felt "Senegalese" while others felt more "Jola" or "Mandinka" or "Serer," for example. Some could feel all these identities at the same time. And some felt that nationalism—most often referred to as "politics" by my informants—had nothing to do with these everyday spaces where they spent much of their lives.

This is not to say that these spaces became capitalized (by me) places in a linear, irreversible, monolithic fashion whereby every person asserted a separatist identity. The spatial assertions of the separatists could only go so far because these social spaces were always spaces of diverse people and identities. Certainly, there were stadiums or rice fields where nationalism and separatism made little or no appearance—where various identities coexisted at the same time, in the same space. Thus, in this book, when spaces like "the stadium" are not capitalized, then I refer to that space as "a stadium," full of multiple identities like any other and relatively devoid of nationalist sentiment. While some Casamançais separatists may have tried to convert these spaces into places of separatist discontent, they succeeded only sparingly and intermittently. But these few successes were

enough to make The Stadium a contested terrain for the cultural identity of the nation.

Spatial historians have occasionally been accused of fetishizing space—of being more fascinated by space than the people who lived in it. Of course, a forest is just a group of trees until human beings start to live in it. What made these spaces special were the practices and rituals of the people who lived in them. Perhaps this is merely a distinction of emphasis, but I do not base the argument of this book on practices and rituals. I assume that the human beings in the social spaces analyzed in this book bring their cultural practice and rituals to these spaces, but I am more interested in how they use the spaces as means of imagining the nation. For example, I could focus on the sacred forest initiation ceremonies that take place in the forest, but there is more to the attachment of various Casamançais to the forest than the sacred forest ceremonies. I try to capture all the varied cultural forms and practices and focus on how Casamançais have used them to make the forest special—to make it a *place* of Casamançais belonging and Senegalese othering.

Thus, I posit these spaces as the “cultural artefacts” by which the nation was imagined, to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase.<sup>67</sup> Although I start every chapter with a Jola proverb, I am not pointing to proverbs, hymns, and artwork as the things that did the primary work of imagining the nation. Rather, I am pointing to *the spaces themselves*. I do that because many Casamançais told me that they felt something special in or near those particular spaces, somewhat like Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of social practice.<sup>68</sup> Simon Schama’s conception of landscape or Michel de Certeau’s conception of *terroir* may be useful here as well.<sup>69</sup> In the experience of these Casamançais, they felt something in these spaces that made them different from the Senegalese of northern Senegal. Thus, place emerged from the combination of space and cultural practice—together. However, these “spatial sentiments” do not seem to have emerged as much from the constructed spaces like the school and the stadium as they did from the “natural” spaces of the river, the forest, and the rice field. Why?

To help answer this question, there is a second part to my argument, because not everyone living in the Casamance accepted the ascription of these spatial icons to a separatist identity. While nationalists appealed to Casamançais, particularly Jola, culture to “map” the nation, ordinary Casamançais corroborated, contested, or ignored nationalist assertions in accordance with their own interests. Though the MFDC’s discourse of grievance counter-mapped against the mapping practices of the colonial and post-colonial states, ordinary Casamançais exhibited a second layer of counter-

mapping apart from that of separatist elites. *Counter-mapping* is mapping by subaltern groups (therefore sometimes referred to as “ethnocartography”) against previous hegemonic mapping, normally by a modern state or an international organization of states like the United Nations.<sup>70</sup> In essence, these ordinary Casamançais counter-mapped against the assertions of the separatists to claim that they could inhabit these social spaces as Casamançais and Senegalese *at the same time*. These ordinary Casamançais refused to be mapped.

Though events in the contemporary Casamance conflict appear throughout this book, it is not intended to provide a complete narrative history of that conflict. Rather, I focus on the origins of the conflict through the region’s spatial history. In doing so, I join Jean-Claude Marut in a geographical analysis of the conflict. But while Marut, especially in *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (The Casamance conflict: What the guns say), is interested in the larger national and regional geopolitics of the conflict, I am more interested in the ways that ordinary people identified with the spatial discourses of the separatists, or not, at the local level.<sup>71</sup> I am interested in ways these people sought to “map” back—to counter-map—against the hegemonic forces shaping their lives. In short, this book began with Casamançais themselves, as they told me why they felt they were different from other Senegalese when they were near a rice field or a forest. Thus, in addition to the political imagining of a Catholic priest, the chapter titles in this book came from the many oral history informants who told me about their political identification as Casamançais.

#### MAPPING/COUNTER-MAPPING THE NATION

This book asserts two primary lines of argument related to the literature on spatial history and nationalism. First, in the field of spatial history, I argue for a more diverse and complex notion of counter-mapping. While the MFDC counter-mapped against the cartographic practices of the colonial and post-colonial states, many ordinary Casamançais counter-mapped against this separatist mapping. This reveals a second layer of counter-mapping apart from elite nationalist/separatist counter-mapping against the Senegalese nation-state. Most of the literature thus far on counter-mapping has focused on the inequalities and the “aporia” between state mapping and subaltern counter-mapping.<sup>72</sup> While fellow Africanists Julie MacArthur and Keren Weitzberg have likewise discussed the diverse ways that Africans counter-mapped against colonial cartography, these scholars focus on groups trying to stake a claim to the postcolonial nation: MacArthur focuses on the development of the Luyia in western Kenya to become the largest ethnic group in

Kenya, while Weitzberg renders Kenyan Somalis as thoroughly Kenyan despite their links to a broader cosmopolitan Somali diaspora.<sup>73</sup> Unlike these Kenyan cases, the MFDC, as a case of postcolonial separatism, was trying to exit the nation in Senegal, not join it. Nevertheless, the diversity of identities involved in each of these cases of counter-mapping—whether in western Kenya, northern Kenya, or southern Senegal and whether trying to join the nation or exit from it—demonstrates the importance of these diverse notions of space and place in the social spaces concerned.

It should be clear by now that the distinction between *space* and *place* is central to my argument. I define *space* as a physical domain of three dimensions for human action. But as I demonstrate throughout this book, one should remain skeptical of objective definitions of space. As Henri Lefebvre cautions, “Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology or politics; it has always been political and strategic.”<sup>74</sup> Thus, when I refer to the space analyzed in each chapter of this book as a “social space” (The River, The Rice Field, The School, etc.), I mean the physical space containing the interactions of human beings involved in social relations. These human interactions bring meaning to the physical, three-dimensional space to eventually transform the “space” into “place.” As Yi-fu Tuan explains, “‘Space’ is more abstract than ‘place.’ What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value.”<sup>75</sup> Thus, I define *place* as space with meaning. That meaning can only appear with the passage of time. Indeed, place is space with *history*. And spatial history only emerges from the lived experiences of human beings within space, transforming that space into place.

Space, however, once transformed into place, does not remain stagnant. As Doreen B. Massey has urged us to remember, places also change with time. Massey asserts that synchronic constructions of place “fail to realize, or to admit . . . that places are always already hybrid.”<sup>76</sup> Hence, she argues for a conception of space and place as “envelopes of space-time,” acknowledging that we cannot separate space from time. Because space and place change with time, I refer to their operation across a given space and over a given time as a *space-place dialectic*. The operation of this dialectic, however, does not preclude the operation of simultaneous, multiple imaginings by various Casamançais. Thus, as noted earlier, I argue for multiple spatial imaginings not only over time but *at the same time*. When I want to emphasize this spatial hybridity in the Casamance, I occasionally refer to *space-places*.

I apply Massey’s concept of space-place envelopes to the Casamance, regarding each of the spatial icons in this study as a contested space with

meanings that changed over time for the various actors working, playing, and living in it. I argue that as separatists “staged” these spaces as “Casamançais,” they counter-mapped the Casamance against Senegal in the minds of Senegambians and made these places cultural representations useful to those trying to define the nation on both sides of the conflict.<sup>77</sup> This type of discursive mapping worked in a similar fashion to other types of mapping and counter-mapping.<sup>78</sup> Like Winichakul’s notion of the national geo-body, it tied—or attempted to tie—an imagined cultural identity to a particular territory. For the separatists, it formed a discursive border of belonging between “them”—the nordistes—and “us”—the Casamançais.

This would be just another postcolonial take on colonial mapping if it were not for two different levels of counter-mapping that I highlight. The separatist elites of the MFDC performed the first level of counter-mapping against the cartographic practices of the colonial and postcolonial states. Ordinary Casamançais performed the second level, by refusing to accept the assertions of the separatist elites that being Casamançais meant one could not also be Senegalese. Therefore, ordinary Casamançais counter-mapped the Casamance through the everyday practices of their lives—whether near the river or in the rice field, the school, the forest, or the stadium. They found ways to live together that did not necessarily require the rejection of Senegalese identity.

#### ANOTHER WAY OF IMAGINING THE NATION

My second line of argument engages the historical literature on nationalism. Following 1885, nationalism became the means of making claims on the colonial and postcolonial states in Africa. African political leaders believed that nationalism held the proverbial keys to “the political kingdom.”<sup>79</sup> These leaders, however, could not dictate the terms of nationalist imagining. Like other nationalists, they had to appeal to certain cultural representations to make their territorial claims, but the meanings of those representations were seldom accepted by all social groups in the nation.

Since nationalism—as a claim to power within a particular territory by a particular group of people—is about space and human beings, it provides a vehicle for discussing how human beings imagined the nation with references to particular spaces and places. While “imagining” the nation required Casamançais to think of themselves as part of a larger nation—whether Senegalese or Casamançais or both—the success of the nationalist project depended on the success of local imaginings. The contested spaces I examine in this book became the places where Casamançais nationalism either succeeded or sputtered. Therefore, I argue that space itself constituted and

functioned as another means of imagining the nation. This is a fundamental though unstated assumption behind the arguments of MacArthur and Weitzberg: spatial imaginings should be added to the diverse nonprint forms of national imagining that Africanists have illuminated.

My argument builds on a robust literature on nationalism. Many scholars concur with Benedict Anderson that nations have been “imagined” into existence through particular “cultural artefacts.”<sup>80</sup> Scholars disagree, however, over who got to imagine the nation, what the particular “cultural artefacts” were, and how they facilitated nationalist imagining. Imagining the nation was often viewed as an elite project. But African nationalists who failed to build political will across social boundaries eventually found themselves marching at the head of a proverbial parade with no band members—which occasionally proved to be a dangerous position.<sup>81</sup>

Thus, in addition to the work of Anderson, my project builds on the work of scholars of nationalism focused on non-elite roles in nationalist imaginings. I endeavor to show how and why ordinary Casamançais chose to corroborate, contest, or ignore the separatist discourse. Anderson’s notion of “print-capitalism” may have performed some of the work of imagining the nation—especially among the educated, literate male class of nationalist elites—but low literacy rates in most of the formerly colonized world dictated other means as well.<sup>82</sup> Elizabeth Schmidt demonstrates why these nonprint means of imagining the nation were important. She argues that in late-colonial Guinea, the nation was neither dictated “from above” by colonial elites nor imagined “from below” by grassroots activists. Rather, elites joined subaltern social groups to form “a broad-based ethnic, class, and gender alliance, trumping rivals that were constrained by their narrow ethnic, regional, and elite male focus.”<sup>83</sup> Elites needed ordinary Guineans and vice versa. Ziad Fahmy provides a model of how this cross-class, cross-gender, multiethnic imagining might have worked in his examination of nationalist discourse in colonial Egypt through what he calls the “media-capitalism” of music, radio, and vaudeville, performed in colloquial Egyptian Arabic.<sup>84</sup>

These cultural forms—instead of print-capitalism—became the means of transmitting the imagined nation to ordinary people. Marissa J. Moorman argues that aural representations like these humble “the bombast of nationalist politics by locating patriotism not on the battlefield or in the political arena but in the practices and sounds that permeate everyday life, such as music.” Moorman asserts that being Angolan is “less about knowing where one is located physically than about knowing where one is historically and culturally.”<sup>85</sup> This book builds on these histories of the nation utilizing nonprint sources to complicate the narrative of elite attempts to

“map” the nation in the heads of Casamançais. To suggest that the MFDC was merely a creation of the spatial imagination of Father Diamacoune and other separatist leaders would be to dismiss the diverse ways in which ordinary Casamançais thought about their communities and identities.<sup>86</sup>

In referring to the participation of “ordinary Casamançais” in the nation-building project, I echo Fahmy’s conception of “ordinary Egyptians.” Like Fahmy, I use “ordinary Casamançais” in an expansive, capacious manner. By this term, I mean anyone who was *not* from the typical identity of the nationalist elites: missionary-educated or state-educated men with access to the resources of the state or the church. This definition of nationalist elites ignores the perceptions, ideas, and contributions of large social groups: women, peasants, fishermen, animists, gay men and women, the urban poor, and so forth.<sup>87</sup> Admittedly, “ordinary Casamançais” encompasses a large population in comparison to the separatist elites. But that is part of my point: Casamançais nationalism ultimately sputtered because it could not convince these “ordinary Casamançais” on the river, in the rice field, in the forest, et cetera, to join the separatist movement. Ultimately, therefore, the separatist identity was not capacious enough.

Admittedly, the identity of the “separatist elite” was not monolithic either. While most separatists demonstrated certain common characteristics—formal education, for example—that does not mean they agreed on their objectives or how best to pursue them. Some collaborated with the Senegalese state while some resisted. Some resisted more than others. Some sacrificed more than others. Those seen as collaborating too much with the Senegalese were derisively labeled as the “Casamanqués” (the “pseudo-Casamançais” who were missing something) by Father Diamacoune and other critics.<sup>88</sup> For these hard-liners, anything short of complete independence for the Casamance was unacceptable.<sup>89</sup> For the Senegalese state, anything was negotiable except for the independence of the Casamance. Regardless, the separatist elites would be the ones doing the negotiating on behalf of the MFDC.

Though the separatists referred to the five social spaces analyzed in this book to discursively map the Casamance, they had to depend on cultural practices already in place. They could not “stage” the nation in these spaces in only one monolithic fashion—the way that Carola Lentz describes in her analysis of national commemoration during the fifty-year Jubilee celebrations in Africa after 2010. Lentz claims that commemoration organizers “had to stage the various ceremonies and rituals that were to mark the occasion in spatial terms.” This staging made commemoration a contentious exercise because of the need to forge a nation that reflected on “how the

composite parts of the country—the various administrative regions and/or different ethnic groups making up the national population—were to be represented.” And although this contention “rarely call[ed] into question the nation-state’s boundaries [unlike the Casamance], the sense of national belonging [was] not evenly distributed in spatial terms.”<sup>90</sup>

My argument goes a step beyond that of Lentz. I argue that not only was there a difference in spatial imaginings between regions or ethnic groups, but there was also a diverse set of imaginings within specific ethnic groups and within particular spaces. In other words, regardless of how the Senegalese state or the MFDC tried to “stage” national space, ordinary Casamançais still imagined the nation in various ways over time and at the same time. Separatists attempted to paint these spaces one color, but ordinary Casamançais brought their own colors of paint to the project of imagining the nation.

Though ethnicity is an important factor in the Casamance conflict, I have chosen to focus on the construction of the nation instead of ethnicity. Others have sufficiently analyzed ethnicity in relation to the conflict.<sup>91</sup> While ethnicity has been an important factor, it has not been the sole factor driving the conflict. Like Martha Wilfahrt, “I do not deny that ethnicity is a relevant social category for Senegalese. Individuals describe themselves along ethnic lines and they invoke ethnic stereotypes and categories, but it has never mapped neatly onto national political cleavages.”<sup>92</sup> The Senegalese government has sought to label Casamançais separatism as a case of Jola “tribalism,” surely aware of the connotations of this term in modern Africa.<sup>93</sup> A former Senegalese police commissar said, “The MFDC, in its tracts, pretends to be a regional and multi-ethnic movement, but certain clues suggest that it’s a Jola movement.”<sup>94</sup> Separatists and government officials alike have spoken of an alleged Jola dream of a transnational “Jola Republic” formed along the axis of “the three Bs”: Banjul (in The Gambia), Bignona (in Senegal), and Bissau (in Guinea-Bissau).<sup>95</sup>

There is more to Casamançais nationalism, however, than a simple case of “tribalism” or “ethnic nationalism.” Ethnicity may have played a role in imagining the Casamance—as it did in Senegal, to cite Mamadou Diouf’s “Islamolo” model of the Senegalese nation—but so do religion, gender, and socioeconomic class.<sup>96</sup> I have chosen to focus on nationalism because it is a more comprehensive unit of analysis that corresponds with all of the spatial and social factors that have been important to the formulation of a separate Casamançais identity.

How does nationalism change when it becomes separatism? Separatism may be best thought of as a particular type of nationalism. Perhaps it

becomes smaller in terms of a territorial claim, but separatists often must appeal to numerous diverse groups considered part of their nation. Like other nationalist groups, they may also need to seek the support of other regional powers. In the Casamance, the MFDC appealed to ethnic (Jola, Mandinka, Manjak, Mancagne, Balanta, etc.) and regional identities (e.g., The Gambia, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau) to make the case for the need for an independent Casamance. The “three B’s” of the “Jola Republic” spreading across Senegal, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau is the most vivid example of this, but there have been other appeals to ethnicities that were considered part of the Casamance, while others were rendered as “strangers” to it. Therefore, I exchange the terms *nationalism* and *separatism* throughout the book, depending on the scope of the context under consideration. But in general, I consider separatism to act as a type of nationalism.

#### THE CHALLENGES OF THEORIZING REBELS AND SEPARATISTS

Separatist movements often defy or at least complicate categorization. In his book *Warfare in Independent Africa*, William Reno does not directly mention separatists in his rebel typology, which includes anticolonial rebels (e.g., the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde in Guinea-Bissau’s independence war), majority rule rebels (e.g., Zimbabwe African National Union / Zimbabwe African People’s Union in Zimbabwe), reform rebels (e.g., Front for National Salvation in Uganda), warlord rebels (e.g., National Patriotic Front of Liberia in Liberia), and parochial rebels (e.g., Oodua Peoples Congress in Nigeria).<sup>97</sup> Perhaps the closest of these to separatists would be the reform rebels, but in Reno’s examples, these rebels are trying to reform the state they have, not separate from it. The cause of parochial rebels may be too limited to be included in the need for separatists to build a strong coalition that can carry the separatist movement to independence.

These coalitions have often implied some kind of involvement from neighboring states. In these cases, separatists have had “a harder time getting material and diplomatic backing, compared to reform/anti-apartheid rebels who did not challenge the existing configuration of international boundaries.” Thus, “mutual vulnerability may have been at play,” according to Reno, as “support for separatists in another state opens the door to others supporting separatists in one’s own state.”<sup>98</sup> This has certainly been the case in the Casamance, where the support of Guinea-Bissau or The Gambia has often been essential to MFDC operations against Senegalese forces. Beyond these regional neighbors, however, international support for the Casamance conflict has never been a decisive factor. It never gained the

attention of international powers in the Cold War or the Global War on Terrorism—despite the occasional comparisons of the MFDC to “terrorists” made to me by Senegalese military officers.<sup>99</sup>

One of these cases of African rebels stands out. I concur with Reno that Biafra was “a partial exception that helps illustrate the rule.”<sup>100</sup> Biafra was an unusual example of an African civil war that involved two conventional armies fighting against each other in combat rather than the typical case of insurgents versus the state’s armed forces. As Reno explains, “It was more like the U.S. Civil War: the national army splitting apart and the two sides fighting.”<sup>101</sup> Only a handful of states granted formal international recognition to Biafra’s declaration of independence, most importantly Haiti, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, and Gabon. As Samuel Fury Childs Daly contends, “Most African states were against Biafra’s independence, recognizing that they, too, were diverse countries where secession movements might manifest like they had in Nigeria.” As might be expected from a group of leaders who agreed to leave Africa’s colonial borders in place at independence, the OAU “took an especially firm stance against Biafran independence.”<sup>102</sup> There were no one-size-fits-all solutions to African independence claims, but in general, the principles of the 1963 OAU consensus in Addis Ababa and the 1964 Cairo Declaration held firm: African international borders were sacrosanct and were not to be touched.

Despite these challenges to categorization, Lotje de Vries, Pierre Englebert, and Mareika Schomerus have recently analyzed the construction of African separatist identities in an edited volume called *Secessionism in African Politics*. The book’s editors break down African secessionist movements into four types. First, there is “aspiration”—those who wish to become independent states, such as the Tuareg in Mali and Niger. Second, there is “grievance”—those caught in a “postcolonial muddle,” who may even be looking to the possibilities of being recolonized, such as the Comoros. Third, there is “performance”—those who perform secessionism to gain concessions in the present, such as the Casamance in Senegal. Finally, there is “disenchantment”—those successful secessionist movements that find themselves disappointed with the postcolonial/postsecessionist dispensation, such as South Sudan.<sup>103</sup>

In his chapter on the Casamance in *Secessionism in African Politics*, Vincent Foucher claims that the separatist movement was merely one of several ways for the “Casamance to be.” Foucher apparently does not accept Englebert’s assignment of the Casamance to the third category of mere “performance.”<sup>104</sup> Foucher’s focus on a menu of choices available to Casamançais nationalists resonates with Séverine Awenengo Dalberto’s argument that

union with Senegal was one choice on a menu of postcolonial dispensations under consideration by Casamançais elites like Emile Badiane at independence.<sup>105</sup> Taken together, union with Senegal and full-on separatism appear as equally possible—though seemingly polar opposite—choices available to Casamançais nationalists. To accept Englebert’s notion of the MFDC rebellion as “performance” would be to elide the disparate motivations of the various factions of the MFDC, especially after the movement splintered in 1990. It also diminishes the very real violence that many Casamançais have experienced—at the hands of both rebels and Senegalese troops—since 1982.<sup>106</sup> Perhaps separatism was only a “performance” for some separatists—but not all of them. Regardless of their objective, they tried to convert many of the spaces of everyday life in the Casamance into places packed with cultural meaning tied to separatism.

#### SOURCES AND METHODOLOGIES

This book depends on a variety of archival, cartographic, material, and oral sources. I utilized the colonial and national archives at the Archives Nationales du Sénégal (the Senegalese National Archives in Dakar), as well as the Gambian National Record Service and the National Center for Arts and Culture in Banjul, for many of the cartographic and documentary sources that show how the colonial and postcolonial states mapped the Casamance. I examined the archives of the Catholic Diocese of Ziguinchor to analyze much of the communication and correspondence between Father Diamacoune and various actors in the MFDC, the Catholic Church, the Senegalese government, and some nongovernmental organizations. I added texture to these sources with documents from the private archives of Ansoumana Abba Bodian, one of the early separatist agitators along with Diamacoune, and those of Jean-Claude Marut, a French political geographer who has devoted much of his adult life to studying the Casamance conflict.

One of the most important of these sources from Marut became the namesake for this book: *Casamance: Pays du refus* (Casamance: country of defiance). Marut scanned page-by-page and then emailed to me this long essay that Father Diamacoune wrote in response to the findings of French archivist Jacques Charpy during the 1993 ceasefire. The Senegalese government and the MFDC agreed during the ceasefire to a “testimony,” or a sort of arbitration, of the legal and historical questions surrounding Casamançais union with Senegal. In other words, historically speaking, was the Casamance a part of Senegal or not? Charpy found that it was. Diamacoune devoted 170 pages to demonstrating that it was not. This source has proven to be of inestimable value to me and other scholars of the Casamance conflict.

Nearly as useful for access to the thoughts and political discourse of Diamacoune, Sané, and other separatists are the works by René Capain Bassène, a young Jola man from the Casamance who sought to understand the conflict amid which he grew up. Bassène compiled primary source interviews and written testimonies of actors in the conflict into two books that were useful for this project: *L'abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: Par lui-même et par ceux qui l'ont connu* (Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: by himself and by those who knew him) and *Casamance: Récits d'un conflit oublié (1982–2014)* (Casamance: tales of a forgotten conflict). Taken together, these primary sources have given me a solid base for analysis of the discourse of grievance used to counter-map the Casamance against Senegal, a discourse fused together by separatist elites but also accepted or contested by ordinary Casamançais who provide many of the testimonies in the second book.

But I have also placed the human beings who make up the nation into the contested spaces nationalists defined according to their own interests. I combined social history methodologies and social history approaches to nationalism with spatial history's focus on the politics of space. Spatial historians have been criticized for fetishizing space so much that they forget about the human beings living there.<sup>107</sup> I overcame this challenge by employing oral histories from ordinary Casamançais as well as elites who inhabited the spaces I examine.

One of my largest contributions with this book—I hope—consists of providing a history of Casamançais separatism directly while incorporating the viewpoints of ordinary Casamançais. That is not to say that I eschewed elite histories related to the conflict. I incorporated them, too. But I intentionally set out to incorporate as many non-elite viewpoints as possible. To do so, in addition to the work of Bassène, I relied on oral histories collected by myself as well as those collected by other researchers and deposited at the Gambian National Center for Arts and Culture in Banjul. To access the thoughts of Diamacoune and other separatist leaders, I depended on sources held by the Catholic Diocese of Ziguinchor, the sources published by Bassène, and oral interviews with still-living nationalist actors.

I utilized oral sources to gain the perspective of ordinary, non-elite Casamançais, who mostly wanted to be left alone to live their lives without interference from the Senegalese state or the MFDC. While much of the narrative of the separatist struggle in the Casamance comes from elites competing over the resources of the postcolonial Senegalese state, I tried to obtain as many non-elite voices as possible. I pushed out of the urban

centers of Dakar and Ziguinchor to interview peasants and lower- to middle-class Senegalese citizens in small towns and rural villages. Though a man, I tried to obtain access to the voices of women. I had more success gaining access to elite women rather than poor, peasant women, who often told me they had little to say that would be important enough for my research. Yet when I stayed around long enough to hear these women conversing with others in their communities, I discovered that they did care about politics—at least at a local level. And their viewpoints were of great interest to a researcher of nationalism and spatial history.

The reader will note that several of my oral history interviews come from unnamed informants. When referring to informants who signed a written consent agreement in accordance with Cornell University's Institutional Review Board policy on human subject research, I use their name in these pages. But some informants felt too threatened by the current security situation in the Casamance, with an ongoing separatist conflict, to agree to be cited by name. Therefore, I have guarded the anonymity of these sources while providing some explanation for the position and authority of the informant to speak on the matter in question. I maintain a list of each informant by name.

This distinction between named and anonymous informants also provided a point of analysis between elite separatists and non-elite, ordinary Casamançais. The elites did not seem to care who knew they were supporting separatism. Some of them, like Bertrand Diamacoune (Father Diamacoune's younger brother), for example, had already spent time in Senegalese jails and felt that the Senegalese state could do little else to them.<sup>108</sup> But ordinary Casamançais still harbored fears of what security forces might do to them if they were found to be speaking with a Western researcher about the ongoing conflict. Thus, I have guarded their security and their confidence.

No source base is perfectly able to cover every angle. But I employed as many different types of sources from as many different perspectives as I could. This diverse source base was critical to my analysis of the nation not only “from below” and “from above” but in many ways “from the middle,” where everyday Casamançais negotiated the meanings and practices of their lives in relation to a multitude of forces, values, and interests. Finally, this diverse source base enabled me to address why the MFDC never achieved independence for the Casamance, allowing me to show why the organization's discursive counter-mapping failed to fire the imaginations of ordinary Casamançais trying to earn a living, raise their children, worship their gods, and contribute to their societies.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE ARGUMENT

Instead of organizing this book strictly chronologically, I organized it spatially to show how the Casamance was mapped *in* Senegal despite the separatists' discursive mapping through their spatial discourse of grievance. In general, the narrative moves from precolonial mapping and cartography ("The River") to postcolonial identity formation ("The Stadium") and its associated struggles and conflict. Within each chapter, I narrate this history chronologically as much as possible. I try to demonstrate change over time in the book overall as well as in each chapter, but in some ways, this book may be better thought of as a collection of tightly related essays rather than a conventional history that starts in one time and ends in another. I leave it to my reader to decide what is gained and lost in telling the story of Casamançais separatism this way. Since people experience their social and political worlds as an itinerary through a series of places, this book reflects that experience in its organizational form.<sup>109</sup>

Chapter 1, "The River," sets up the rest of the book by examining how "the Casamance" came to be. It looks at the process of colonial competition in the Lower Casamance during the precolonial and early colonial periods as this region evolved from a space of cultural and economic exchange between Africans and Europeans to a space largely defined by European navigation and mapping of rivers. French colonial officials referred to the Upper Guinea Coast as *les Rivières du Sud*, or the "Southern Rivers" area.<sup>110</sup> Regardless of what Europeans called it, the Casamance River came to define the region that took its name, this ribbon of simultaneous connection and division. The river connected the Lower Casamance to commerce and cultures farther upstream. But it also became a marker of sorts—a marker of cultural identity and diversity—within the Casamance itself. On a metaphorical level, the river also symbolized the source of life in the Casamance, where every meal begins with rice and is often joined by fish. Every rice field and every fish need water. In the Lower Casamance region of Senegal, that water came from the Casamance River.

Because the water flows from the river to the rice field, the second chapter, "The Rice Field," examines that space of special importance for the cultural identity of the Casamance. Louis-Vincent Thomas called the Casamance a "civilization of rice."<sup>111</sup> Rice has been the staple of the diet in the Casamance for the entire period under consideration here. It was also a primary good exploited by colonial authorities and trade houses. But it was more than that. In the Jola cosmology, rice may be even more sacred than the water that nourishes it. The Rice Field is also a space of gender formation. Nearly all Jola (if they grow up in the Lower Casamance) spend time in the rice field. They pass many long hours there together planting, tending, and

harvesting. A gendered division of labor takes place: men dig and irrigate the rice field, and women plant, transplant, and then harvest the rice.<sup>112</sup> Cultural mixing with Mandinka—Mandinkization—has changed this gender dynamic, though, as Mandinka men seldom work in their rice fields, considering it “women’s work.”<sup>113</sup> Regardless of who produces it, rice has been the staple of not only the Casamançais diet but also the Senegalese diet. Rice imports from Southeast Asia provide a larger percentage of Senegalese rice than the Casamance.<sup>114</sup> But no other region of Senegal grows rain-fed rice like the Casamance. And no other region has produced a separatist conflict tied to the cultural identity surrounding The Rice Field.

My third chapter, “The Forest,” examines the development of a discourse that emerged with the separatist conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. Like The Rice Field and as indicated by the former government minister whose statement about the “sacred forest” first catalyzed my interest in this research, The Forest has been a place of strong attachment for all ethnic groups in the Casamance. It has been a place of mystery and imagination, where Casamançais schoolchildren were told that “the spirits” live. Casamançais forests have also been targeted for colonial and postcolonial economic exploitation. In fact, exploitation of The Forest became one more component of a “discourse of grievance” pronounced by Diamacoune and other separatist leaders. The Forest has been especially important to the gendering of the Casamançais nation through the male initiation ceremonies called *bukut* (on the north bank of the Casamance) or *kahat* (on the south bank).<sup>115</sup> These ceremonies have changed with the homogenization of forests in the Casamance. This homogenization has reduced the diversity of sacred forest shrines in the Casamance into a monolithic version of “The Sacred Forest.” But just as there were no natural, monolithic ethnic or religious traits of “Casamançais” identity, there was no such thing as *The Sacred Forest*. Rather, there were diverse forms of sacred trees, groves, or forests tied to individual villages and towns making these shrines *their* sacred forest. Thus, I analyze these Casamançais spaces to see how they were used to imagine, represent, or contest the nation over time.

My fourth chapter, “The School,” examines a social space where nationalism began to take root during the late colonial and early postcolonial periods. Numerous Africanists have examined the development of the nationalist elite through missionary education. I do not plan to replicate their work. Rather, I am interested in the manner in which Casamançais schools acted as spaces of discipline that taught the meaning of citizenship and a particular interpretation of national history. In many ways, the contemporary debates about Casamançais identity began in those classrooms. And the debate has continued to the present.

My fifth chapter, “The Stadium,” examines another social space where the nation was manifested and contested through the lenses of soccer and wrestling cultures in the Casamance. Many Casamançais regard Casa-Sports, the regional soccer club, not as their club team but as their *national* team.<sup>116</sup> Casa-Sports has played an important role in the Casamance conflict as well. When separatists first began to meet in Ziguinchor during the late 1970s and early 1980s to discuss the need to assert autonomy from Senegal, they met at the Casa-Sports home stadium (now named for Aline Sitoé Diatta).<sup>117</sup> Many observers attribute the start of the violence to a hotly contested national soccer championship between Casa-Sports and Jeanne d’Arc, a team from Dakar, in 1980. Senegalese intelligence services reportedly sought to penetrate the Casa-Sports membership and, once the violence began, targeted Casa-Sports for arrests and reprisals.<sup>118</sup> Yet Casa-Sports to this day has its own section in the national soccer stadium of Senegal, cheering on Les Lions du Sénégal. How could a soccer club so focused on not being a part of Senegal appear so prominently in the Senegalese national soccer stadium?

For Casamançais from Casa, the answer is simple: those soccer fans are not *real* Casamançais. To them, a real Casamançais wrestles; he or she does not play soccer. Thus, I include a section in chapter 5 on the history of wrestling heroes like Double Less and the contemporary Balla Gaye 2, who appears on the cover (see explanation below). I look at the wrestling stadium also as a place of national formation, as a place where the nation has been constructed as well as negotiated. Gender also operates in the wrestling stadium, because although women learn to wrestle as young girls, few continue to wrestle as adults. Why? Have Casamançais women lost anything from their exit from the wrestling arena? What are these claims tied to identity and authenticity about? Why have wrestling personalities become so influential in the Casamance?

#### ABOUT THAT COVER PHOTO . . .

The subject of chapter 5 brings me to the photograph on the cover of this book. Taken by Joe Penney at the 2012 wrestling match between Balla Gaye 2 and Yékini, another Senegalese wrestling star, the photograph was later published in the *New York Times*. As mentioned, the title of this book, *A Country of Defiance*, comes from an English translation of Father Diamacoune’s 1995 essay, *Casamance: Pays du refus*. Though Balla Gaye 2 has never been considered a separatist, I decided to use this image on the cover for a couple of reasons. First, perhaps most obviously, the wrestler displays a look of defiance. Second, he personifies in some ways the complexity of the

identities analyzed in this book: he claimed Casamançais roots as the son of Double Less, who was a famous Senegalese wrestler in the 1970s and 1980s, yet Balla Gaye 2 grew up in Guediawaye, a suburb of Dakar. Thus, he is really Dakarois! Somewhat similar to the Casamançais maids living and working in Dakar that Vincent Foucher wrote about, Balla Gaye 2 is about as Senegalese as they come, yet he and many Casamançais proudly claim his Casamançais roots when doing so suits them.<sup>119</sup> Though Balla Gaye 2 is not also Jola—the ethnic group considered to be at the heart of the rebellion—the fact that he is Mandinka makes his suitability as a representation of Casamançais defiance more complex, as it calls into question MFDC claims to a multiethnic separatism.

However, Balla Gaye 2 never had anything to do with separatism: in some ways, the opposite is true, for he represents Casamançais assimilation into Senegal—something similar to what I suggest with my subtitle, *Mapping the Casamance in Senegal*. My hope is that these complex relationships and identities become clearer in the rest of the book.



Colonial interests fashioned the borders of the Casamance; indeed, they brought “the Casamance” into being. But the ordinary people who found themselves living in this new polity did not easily acquiesce to colonial mapping. Rather, they counter-mapped their own interests at the local level along The River and in The Rice Field, The Forest, The School, and The Stadium. When separatists tried to tell these Casamançais they were no longer part of Senegal, some agreed. But some of them counter-mapped against the separatists, refusing to be corralled into a Casamançais nation as much as they refused to be corralled into Senegal.

Ultimately, the development of these space-places provides a sort of discursive mapping indicating who belongs in the nation and who does not. Yet just as there were Casamançais who found wrestling a more authentic expression of their identity than soccer, there were those who identified with these space-places more or less than others. Many of these space-places held particular cultural importance for the Jola; some were equally relevant to Mandinka and other ethnicities in the region. Regardless, the contested development of these spaces into places determined, to some extent, how far the separatist movement would travel. In the end, the answer was not that far. Yet it went far enough to kill more than five thousand people and to catalyze horrific brutality by all sides in the conflict.<sup>120</sup> My hope is that this book will draw attention to the workings of power in these space-places and to the people who made their lives there.

# 1 ~ The River

*“Diin òmahujo áhujaariite.”* (Júaat Jola)

*“Où ne peut-on pas boire de l’eau?”* (French)

“Where can one not find water to drink?”

—Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance*

SALIF SADIO was in a tight spot. After João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira returned to power in 2005 as president of Guinea-Bissau (he had been living in exile in Portugal following the 1998–99 civil war), he coordinated with the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) in an attack on Sadio’s position in the forest of Mandina Mandioka, on Senegal’s southern border with Guinea-Bissau.<sup>1</sup> Vieira wanted to punish Sadio for supporting his nemesis in the Guinea-Bissau civil war, the army general and armed forces chief of staff charged with trafficking weapons to the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC), Ansumana Mané. Sadio and his forces had been positioned near Mandina Mandioka for almost a decade. It was time to eject them and reassert Bissau-Guinean sovereignty in the area. In a coordinated operation, the Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces (GBAF) would drive Sadio and his men out of the forest and to the north—into the gun sights of the SAF waiting for them on the other side of the border.<sup>2</sup>

No plan survives contact. The intense fire from the GBAF did send the MFDC forces scrambling to the north, but they evaded a major confrontation with the SAF through their intimate knowledge of the forests, mangrove swamps, and inlets and tributaries of the Casamance River. They crossed the Casamance from south to north, entered the winding swamps, *bolongs*, and tributaries on the north bank of the river, and shifted their operation from Front Sud to Front Nord, taking up positions along the southern border of The Gambia.<sup>3</sup> The frustration of Senegalese officials was palpable. Sadio was considered the last of the hard-liners among the rebel leaders. Senegalese officials believed that if they could kill or capture Sadio, the conflict would be over.<sup>4</sup> But as he had many times before, Sadio wriggled out of their grasp. They had him! But he got away again. He did so through detailed understanding of the forest and the river—and the people who lived there. But the river was much more than a battlespace; it was also The River: a place of nationalist/separatist imagining.

A few years after the Casamance conflict began, the MFDC published a manifesto of sorts, titled “La voix de la Casamance” (The voice of the Casamance), explaining the etymology of the word *Casamance* in reference to the rivers of the region:

The word “Casamance” finds its origins in the name of the country where Jola-Kasa is the primary language: *kasamu Aku*, in other words, “the country of waterways,” even more precisely: “the country emerging from the great waters” (the Casamance River is called, in fact, “Kawungha,” derived from the word *Hasamu*, which means “river,” signifying the “great river”). Thus, it’s the country of the Jola *par excellence*, which includes the Rivers Gambia, Casamance, Cacheu, and Geba, etc. *Kasamu Aku* is in our days once again a name much more in use among our Jola brothers in Guinea-Bissau. The [Portuguese] Governor Honorio Pereira Baretto, posted to Bissau in the middle of the 19th century, noted that, according to what he read in the old Portuguese documents, the Casamance was the first river along the West African coast ascended by the Portuguese. It was in 1645 that Gonzalo Gamboa Ayala founded the trading centers of Farim and Ziguinchor. Of the latter, the Portuguese have a motto that is very significant for the Casamançais resistance: “*Invicta Felix!*” [Happy Invincible!]<sup>5</sup>

This explanation demonstrates at least two important things about the MFDC’s discursive counter-mapping of the Casamance.

First, this mapping began with the Casamance River itself, as the primary geographical feature defining this “country of waterways,” or what the French often referred to as *les Rivières du Sud*, the “Southern Rivers” area.<sup>6</sup> The mapping also began with the river because of its importance to cultures across the Casamance. Just as important to imagining the Casamance as a country apart from Senegal was the river’s neighbor to the north, the Gambia River, the river explored, mapped, and eventually colonized by the British in the middle of Senegal. As the Portuguese colonized the area surrounding the Cacheu River, the next river to the south of the Casamance, colonial mapping of rivers largely came to define the mapping of modern nation-states in this part of the world. This mapping separated the Casamance from the rest of Senegal and brought a Lusophone influence to Ziguinchor and other communities along the south bank of the Casamance River.<sup>7</sup>

Second, this genealogy of the name *Casamance* has been contested. The primary group of people who support this claim to the Jola origins of the word have been mostly Jola—and largely those Jola associated with or sympathetic to the MFDC. Regardless of whether this etymology points to a case of ethnic nationalism, most scholars of the Casamance believe that the name of the river and the region came not from Jola origins but from the arrival of the Portuguese along the river in the fifteenth century. Portuguese documents claim that the explorer Álvaro Fernandez “discovered” the Casamance River in 1446.<sup>8</sup> In this history, the name results from a meeting of European and African empires. At the time, the Portuguese learned from the people of Mandé origins living along the banks of the river that *mansa* was the Mandé word for “king.” Casa was the area just west of modern Ziguinchor inhabited by the “Cassanga” people. Thus, the local people referred to the “Mansa” of Casa, the local ruler established by the Mandé migration from the inland Mali Empire.<sup>9</sup> Eventually, the area became known to the Portuguese and their mixed-race descendants in the region as “the Casamance,” centered on the wide river that brought travelers to “a verdant and mysterious country, the most remarkable but also the most troublesome country in Senegal.”<sup>10</sup>

As much for its beauty and “trouble,” the Casamance also became known for its cultural mixing in a borderland formed by the meeting of empires both African and European (as I explain later in this chapter). It eventually earned a reputation as a crossroads of sorts, one linking the Sahel to the Guinean region. It became known as a Senegambian melting pot, causing some contemporary Senegalese to call it “the most Senegalese region of Senegal” because it brought together ethnic groups from all over the Senegambian region—Wolof, Fula, Toucouleur, Serer, Manjak, Mancagne, and Balanta, just as much as Jola and Mandinka.<sup>11</sup>

Yet in the Senegalese national imagination, the Casamance gained a reputation for *difference* from the rest of Senegal—difference based (in comparison to the dry, brown, and gray landscape of northern Senegal) on the beauty of the Casamance River and the lush green forests, the intricate webs of mangrove swamps, and the wide rice paddies surrounding the river and its tributaries. It was also a difference based on a history of resistance to foreign control of the river.<sup>12</sup> The contemporary Senegalese government has coded this difference as “natural,” repeatedly referring to the “Casamance, a natural region of Senegal.”<sup>13</sup> But what was “natural” about it? Why would a government engaged in an ongoing separatist conflict refer to the separatists’ region as “natural”? And why would the separatists seem to agree?

The geography of the Southern Rivers area has become a central component of the contested discourse between the MFDC and the Senegalese government since the separatist movement began to gain traction with Casamançais in the late 1970s. Since the Casamance—like The Gambia nearby—was formed on the geography of a river, this chapter examines how the Casamance River became an icon for the imagination of the Casamance in opposition to Senegal.<sup>14</sup> In short, how did geography and cartography around this river affect these imaginings? If postcolonial separatist elites found this geography beneficial to separatism, how did ordinary Casamançais think about and practice identity relative to The River, a cultural icon of the Casamance? To the French and, later, the Senegalese, the Casamance River was a stream of economic resources. To the MFDC, it was a symbol of separatism. Yet for some Casamançais, though they appreciated various material and cultural aspects of the river, it remained simply a river, having little to do with politics. Though state mapping may have hardened identities in the region, it did not determine them. In other words, Casamançais found ways to shape and maintain their own identities, regardless of the influences of outside forces like explorers, missionaries, and colonial powers.<sup>15</sup> While separatists like Father Diamacoune counter-mapped against the idea of the Casamance as the southern region of Senegal, some ordinary Casamançais counter-mapped against the national imagining of the separatists, revealing the second layer of counter-mapping while effectively denying nationalist elites like Léopold Senghor and Father Diamacoune complete control over defining “the nation.”

In this chapter, therefore, I argue that while colonial and postcolonial mapping transformed the Casamance River from a borderland stream into a separatist enclave, ordinary Casamançais related to the river in their own ways, based on local values and interests. The mapping of the Casamance River started with surveying equipment and maps, which produced an

enclosed strip of Senegal sandwiched between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. A century later, separatists counter-mapped with a form of mapping that was more discursive, to the point where postcolonial rumor and myth held as much power as colonial cartography. Thus, The River became one of the first spatio-cultural symbols to be employed by Diamacoune and other separatists to counter-map the Casamance against the cartographic practices of the colonial and postcolonial states. But not everybody in the Casamance experienced the river in the same way.

#### THE PRECOLONIAL RIVER IN A SENEGAMBIAN BORDERLAND

The Casamance River is not unlike other rivers along the Upper Guinea Coast. While it originates in the southeastern part of Senegal, it is fed by the Futa Jallon Plateau in what is now eastern Guinea (see figure I.1). This massif covers about 31,000 square miles (50,000 square kilometers), from the base of the Gambia River south to the modern borders of Sierra Leone. The terrain to the south of the plateau is mountainous and feeds the Senegal and Niger Rivers as well as the rivers of the Southern Rivers area. Rapid waters and steep waterfalls can be found in the vicinity of the plateau, but these waters calm by the time they reach the flat coastal plain of the Upper Guinea Coast, where the Lower Casamance is located.<sup>16</sup> Contemporary visitors to the Casamance by maritime transportation enter the 2-mile-wide (3.2-kilometer-wide) mouth of the Casamance River from the Atlantic Ocean. After running a course of about 190 miles (300 kilometers), advancing past the towns of Ziguinchor, Sédhiou, and Kolda, the river's strength and breadth reduce to a fraction of those near its mouth. It is also fed by the Soungrougrou River west of the town of Sédhiou and, as already mentioned, is sandwiched between the Gambia River to the north (in modern Gambia) and the Cacheu River to the south (in modern Guinea-Bissau).

Well before the arrival of Europeans, life in what is now the Lower Casamance had been centered on the Casamance River. The river served as the primary source of life in the region: it not only brought water to the rice fields while providing fish and seafood for the diet of those living on its banks but also served as a transportation and communication artery bringing commerce to the region.<sup>17</sup> Commerce brought foreigners and, eventually, migration—much of it forced migration—to other parts of West Africa and to the rest of the Atlantic world. As much as serving as a material conduit of humans and their commodities, the Casamance River became an important cultural symbol to the people on its banks. Scholars of the Upper Guinea Coast have demonstrated the fluid and hybrid nature of these precolonial cultural and economic exchanges.<sup>18</sup> Throughout these changes, the river

remained a source of life supporting a “civilization of rice” garnished with fish and the “fruit of the sea.”<sup>19</sup> But with such social, economic, and, eventually, environmental changes, this civilization could not remain the same.<sup>20</sup>

Contrary to the notion of a static Africa that saw little change until Europeans appeared, changes were already in motion before the arrival of Fernandez and the Europeans who followed.<sup>21</sup> Scholars and contemporary Casamançais consider the Bainouk the “original inhabitants” of the Casamance. The Bainouk quickly secured a place as middlemen in regional trade in beeswax, ivory, animal hides, rice, and—increasingly—slaves. Over the course of the sixteenth century, however, the Floup (eventually called the Jola)—through conquest, slave raiding, marriage, and cultural absorption—replaced the Bainouk in the middleman role. Though scholars disagree about where the Floup came from, there is no disagreement on their migration into what is now the Lower Casamance or on their displacement of the Bainouk.<sup>22</sup>

Increased interaction with Europeans influenced the fortunes of many Senegambians. The Bainouk clearly benefited from their role facilitating trade with the Portuguese. But other Europeans soon appeared to compete with the Portuguese: French, British, Danish, and Dutch traders. Whereas the Bainouk had established their reputation in trade, the Floup appeared hostile to “strangers,” earning a reputation as fierce but “uncivilized” warriors.<sup>23</sup> Since the Bainouk were closely tied to trade with the Portuguese, their fortunes diminished with those of the Portuguese in the region, as British and French traders established commercial relationships primarily with the Mandinka along the Gambia River. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Floup had established themselves in most of the area now considered the Lower Casamance. As they did so, the commercial center of gravity in the region shifted north, away from Cacheu.<sup>24</sup>

European engagement in the Casamance took time. It certainly was not immediate. In 1645, the Portuguese established the first permanent European commercial presence on the Casamance River at Ziguinchor. They were able to do so only after befriending allies farther south along the Cacheu River—after 1588—then spreading north into the Casamance and Gambia River regions. Thus, Portuguese penetration of the Lower Casamance took almost sixty years. And that penetration was limited. Floup hostility still prevented Europeans from making inroads into the region via the Casamance River. In fact, no other European power would make significant incursions along the Casamance until the French Navy began to probe the mouth of the river again in 1827.<sup>25</sup>

By that time, the precolonial Casamance had been transformed into a borderland where goods, people, and cultures were exchanged in a dynamic

trading environment driven by transatlantic and trans-African—including trans-Saharan—trade.<sup>26</sup> Dutch, British, and French traders followed the Portuguese, appearing in Senegambian coastal trading centers in the centuries that followed to compete with the Portuguese settlers (known locally as *lançados*). But the Portuguese and their mixed-race descendants remained the principal link of European commercial ties to the region for at least two centuries, despite the ups and downs of the Portuguese Crown. Through a process of biological and cultural mixing (*métissage*), a new merchant class of mixed Luso-African origins arose in the region, becoming known as the “Portuguese.”<sup>27</sup> From the trading base at São Domingo near the Cacheu, these “Portuguese” intermarried and traded with the local inhabitants, including the Bainouk, the Floup, the Mandinka, the Balanta, the Manjak, the Papel, and the Mancagne. The offspring of the lançado-African unions were also known as *filhos de terra* (“sons of the land” or “sons of the soil”), with strong commercial ties to Cape Verde.<sup>28</sup> They embodied the cultural mixing prevalent in the precolonial borderland along the Casamance River.

The dynamic nature of these identities changed with the intensification of French commercial activity and colonial mapping during the second half of the nineteenth century. Before that time, “the Casamance” does not appear on any European maps in the precolonial period except to refer to the Casamance River. A 1707 map by Guillaume de l’Isle, cartographer for France’s King Louis XIV, is representative of the early European maps (figure 1.1).<sup>29</sup> One notes the depiction of the African “kingdoms” (*royaumes*), from north to south, of the “Royaume des Foules” (Fula Kingdom), the “Royaume



FIGURE 1.1. Map of Senegambia by Guillaume de l’Isle, 1707. Source: David Rumsey Historical Map Collection, <https://www.davidrumsey.com>.



FIGURE 1.2. Mungo Park's Exploration of West Africa, 1810. Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin.

des Jalofes” (Wolof Kingdom), and the “Royaume de Mandinga” (Mandinka Kingdom). There is no such kingdom or country as “the Casamance.” However, the juxtaposition of *Portugais* (Portuguese) along with “les Bagnous” (Bainouk) and “Feloupes” (Floup) in the vicinity of the Casamance River speaks volumes about colonial distinctions between European “nations” and African “ethnic groups.”<sup>30</sup>

Like de l’Isle, a British explorer of West Africa, Mungo Park affixed ethnic labels to the territory surrounding the Casamance River to note which ethnic groups lived where. In 1795, Park explored the Gambia River and its surrounding territory on his way to explore the Niger River system. In his memoirs published after the journey, he displayed a map of West Africa, noting that the “Feloops” surrounded the area around the Casamance River (figure 1.2).<sup>31</sup> I address the European fascination with ethnicity later in the chapter, but for now, the point is that as of the publication of this map in 1810, there was no such thing as a “natural region” or nation known as “the Casamance.”

The rest of the nineteenth century marked the decline of Portuguese power on the Casamance River and increasing tension between the French and the British as the French established a permanent presence on the Casamance River and the British did the same on the Gambia. The fortunes of Africans also rose and fell with new commercial activity in this borderland.

Whereas European traders had mostly grafted themselves onto existing Senegambian trade networks since the late fifteenth century, intensified colonial competition in the late nineteenth century proved more disruptive to local societies, economies, and political arrangements. By this time, the focus of European trade had shifted north in the Southern Rivers area—from the Portuguese trading centers on the Cacheu River to the French and British trading centers along the Casamance and Gambia Rivers.

Hence, African and European political and commercial rivalries played out together. The Bainouk, as the region's traditional middlemen, watched their fortunes plummet throughout the nineteenth century along with the decline of the Portuguese Crown at home and abroad. Weakened by domestic political divisions and Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese "could do little more than make formal protests" over French and British incursions into the Casamance, territory the Portuguese for centuries had considered part of "Portuguese Guinea."<sup>32</sup> The Mandinka stepped in to replace the Bainouk as the middlemen of the region and to reap the reward as the principal interlocutors with the growing number of French and British traders. The Floop/Jola (by this time, they were increasingly referred to as the "Diola/Jola") also benefited. This process of Bainouk decline and Mandinka and Jola ascension in the commercial history of the region took place over the course of about 150 years. And it had spatial ramifications: by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Jola and Mandinka had pushed the Bainouk out of the area surrounding Sédhiou, the commercial center.<sup>33</sup>

To some extent, however, the Jola and Mandinka did not push the Bainouk out as much as they married them out. As Peter Mark claims, "Cultural transformation in the Casamance has long been a far more complex process than simply successive waves of conquerors replacing earlier inhabitants." Rather, successive cultural groups established a degree of hegemony in an area by incorporating members of the earlier group into the new group's families and cultural groupings "by means of marriage, adoption, and assimilation."<sup>34</sup> In the Lower Casamance, increasingly Jola through marriage, migration, and trade, this assimilation occurred via the Casamance River and its associated waterways.

For European trade along the Casamance, Portuguese misfortune meant opportunity to the French and the British. The French were especially eager to replace the Portuguese along the Casamance River to counter British influence along the Gambia River.<sup>35</sup> A decade after the French Navy had begun to explore the mouth of the Casamance River in 1827, the French officially began to cement their position on the Casamance by sending an expedition from Gorée to stake out the possibilities for a more permanent

commercial presence. Commandant Victor Dagonne, commander of the Gorée garrison, led the expedition and reported that Portuguese commerce at their last remaining enclave on the Casamance—Ziguinchor—“posed no threat to increased French activity in the region.”<sup>36</sup> He also recommended the establishment of French entrepôts at Carabane and Sédhiou because of the trade potential in wax, ivory, animal hides, and rice (see figure I.1).<sup>37</sup>

Dagonne’s report was one of the first to refer to the Floup as the “Jola” or “Yola,” the term used by Wolof sailors who accompanied the French to the Casamance as interlocutors with the indigenous population.<sup>38</sup> Eventually, the French would impose a form of “indirect rule” in the Casamance through the Wolof or the Mandinka, who had experience with their own states prior to the arrival of Europeans.<sup>39</sup> Early historians of colonial Africa considered “indirect rule” to be the distinctly British policy of colonial rule, while the French policy of “assimilation” was associated with “direct rule,” especially in settler colonies like Algeria. But the French also ruled indirectly through local authorities, as this case of the Wolof in the Casamance demonstrates.<sup>40</sup> By 1850, Emmanuel Bertrand-Bocandé, the French *résident* at Carabane, wrote, “The first name [Floup] was given to them by the Portuguese; it is by the name of ‘Jola’ that the Wolof sailors from Gorée and Gambia designated them. In their language, the Aiamats, the Floups, and the Jola are all the same people.”<sup>41</sup> Regardless of what they were called, European outsiders eventually lumped together the distinct sociolinguistic subgroups of the Lower Casamance into one “Jola” ethnic group. Despite the differences between a north-shore Jola from Buluf or Fogny and a south-shore Jola from Casa, they demonstrated the capacity to unify against foreign threats.<sup>42</sup>

With the establishment of Carabane in 1836–37, the French effectively cut off Portuguese trade with the Bainouk and the Jola. Jola on both banks of the river began to bring their surplus rice to Carabane to trade for iron, cloth, cattle, and guns.<sup>43</sup> This early trade marked the beginning of Jola production for the market. Eventually, the Jola offered palm oil, rubber, and ground nuts as well, according to European demand. Because the British lubricated the machinery of their Industrial Revolution primarily with palm oil and were reputed to pay better prices than the French, north-shore Jola often found it more profitable to produce palm kernels and make the voyage to Bathurst (Banjul). Since the French lubricated their industrial machinery primarily with peanut oil, other Jola grew ground nuts and traded with the French on the Casamance.<sup>44</sup> This trading arrangement suited both parties until the Jola began to interfere with other French commercial activity in the last half of the nineteenth century.

Therefore, by the time of the Berlin Conference (1884–85), the Casamance—though it was not called that initially—had existed for centuries as a borderland region where goods, people, and cultures were exchanged in a political economy dominated by the mixed-race “Portuguese.” Ziguinchor, essentially Portuguese and Senegambian since 1645, officially became French by the May 12, 1886, agreement between the French and Portuguese governments.<sup>45</sup> The Luso-African bourgeois class of Ziguinchor were less than thrilled with this agreement. But once the finality of the agreement became clear, they rushed to gain access to the French colonial state. Meanwhile, the Jola fled to escape it. These opposite reactions to the intensification of French colonial rule could be seen in the communities’ reactions to military recruitment to serve France in the First World War. While the “Portuguese” welcomed the opportunity to prove their value to the colonial state so they could later make demands of it, the Jola refused to support the French in any way.<sup>46</sup>

If the Casamance River formed a space of Senegambian and Atlantic connection, it also served as a line of division. While it connected those downriver to those upriver and vice versa, these links were not always peaceful, as the late nineteenth-century raids of Mandinka *marabouts* Foday Kaba and Foday Sylla—coming from the east—revealed.<sup>47</sup> The River also divided to a certain extent those on the north bank from those on the south bank. This division results from the history of Islamic conversion in the region. The raiding of Kaba and Sylla, along with that of Wolof leader Ibrahima Ndiaye, did not convince the Jola in Fogny to convert to Islam. Nor did it prevent them from doing so, as many Casamançais eventually found it in their best economic and social interest to convert. As Vincent Foucher explains, “In Lower Casamance, Islam developed ‘from below,’ and the *marabouts* there were never able to gain as much power and influence as their counterparts in north Senegal.”<sup>48</sup> By 1945, in any case, a majority of north-bank Jola had converted to Islam. The Casamance River seemed to limit the *marabouts* to these Jola communities on the north bank. The raiding *marabouts* like Kaba, Sylla, and Ndiaye were popular with European powers only as far as they complicated the colonial conquest of other European powers.<sup>49</sup> But the *marabouts* also complicated colonial mapping of the Casamance.<sup>50</sup>

At this point, we should distinguish *territory* from *territoriality*, a term used by scholars to describe some of what I have been calling “discursive mapping.” *Territoriality* describes a sense of “what is mine” and “what is yours.” As anthropologist Daniel J. Gelo notes, paper maps may not always be the best way to describe this notion. He argues that rather than a map, “a verbal description of territorial principles (as evinced in subsistence practice, language and cognition, oral tradition, and historical evidence of actual

locations and activities), reconstructed from native and nonnative sources and augmented by statistics and several visual representations, is more likely to capture *territoriality*.<sup>51</sup> Because colonial mapping rarely took into account indigenous mapping, it did not acknowledge that Africans already had their own borders. Colonial powers, aware of divisions among Africans, exploited these divisions to impose colonial order. But at the same time, colonial powers rarely gave indigenous people credit for mapping those divisions in their own minds and in their own ways.

In analyzing the political and social histories of the precolonial Casamance, I refer to the Casamance as a “borderland.”<sup>52</sup> This term holds an array of meanings for historians. Of course, borderlands are formed near borders, but recent historiography asks, Whose borders? Who gets to define those borders? How do they define them, and why do they define them that way? In 1999, John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen attacked an article by Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron. Adelman and Aron had argued that a borderland was not the same thing as a frontier or a “zone of contact” between different peoples or civilizations. The first historian to use the term *borderland*, Herbert Eugene Bolton, in reference to the development of the U.S.-Mexico border, emphasized “a site of imperial rivalry.”<sup>53</sup> Thus, Bolton’s interpretation required the meeting of competing imperial powers, according to Adelman and Aron. Such was certainly the case in the precolonial Casamance as European colonial powers—especially France, Britain, and Portugal—competed for commercial influence in the region. But what about “the peoples in between,” as suggested by Adelman and Aron’s subtitle? People living in the Casamance also influenced the formation of this borderland.<sup>54</sup> Did their influence not also matter to it?

Wunder and Hämäläinen protested that Adelman and Aron’s focus on empires erased indigenous people from the map. They portrayed the arguments of Adelman and Aron as claiming that “borderlands are places of European imperial rivalry. . . . Once the rivalry is over, borderlands can become bordered land, where national borders are defined, and indigenous peoples are swallowed up by national cultures.”<sup>55</sup> Similar to the way in which Wunder and Hämäläinen showed that Native Americans influenced these border-making processes in North America, the precolonial Casamance demonstrates how Africans did the same. The social and cultural identities of the people living in the Lower Casamance certainly changed over this period from about 1450 to 1850, but they were not “erased from the map.” If anything, they became fuzzier and more interdependent. But maps seldom account for such hybridity and change over time. Maps of the Casamance were no different in this regard.

Foday Sylla threw the map back into the hands of Captain Arthur Herbert Kenney of the Royal Engineers. Sylla might as well have thrown it in Kenney's face. Kenney was the British commissioner to the 1890 British-French Boundary Commission. The commission had been charged with demarcating the boundary between The Gambia and Senegal following the 1884–85 Berlin Conference and the 1889 treaty between Britain and France agreeing on the division between Senegal and The Gambia.<sup>56</sup> The British called Sylla “the military adventurer who considers himself the Emir of Combo, [oppressing] the Jolahs as he finds convenient.”<sup>57</sup> Indeed, Sylla and his fellow Mandinka Muslim marabout Foday Kaba had spread terror throughout Jola communities in Fogny, the area of the Casamance north of Bignona, while conducting slave raids under the guise of jihad. But the raids had little to do with Islam and were instead poor justification for the pursuit of booty and plunder.<sup>58</sup> Sylla's marauding had begun to interfere with the activities of the boundary commission, which had drawn the southern boundary of The Gambia along the San Pedro River and thereby divided Combo—Sylla's “country”—in half.<sup>59</sup> The commissioners had given Sylla the impression that the border would not interfere with his “sovereignty” in Combo.<sup>60</sup>

But in fact, it did, and everybody involved knew it—despite official British discourse. In December 1890, Sylla sent an armed party to the surveyors to order them to halt the survey immediately. The commissioners refused and determined that a rapprochement was needed. Hence, Sylla arrived on horseback at the location of the surveyors, accompanied by a party of a few hundred armed men, to assert his position. Clearly, from the thrown map, the meeting did not go well. Kenney later protested to the administrator of The Gambia:

Foday Selah [Sylla] exhibited intentional insolence towards the Commissioners before his followers. His manner when addressing the French Commissioners exhibited disdainful hauteur, and he was on several occasions insolent towards me. He asked so many questions as to how the boundary was fixed in London that I thought it best to produce the map, when he flung it back into my hands with a very rude gesture. He asked how the Queen knew the extent of his country and whether she would come to see the spot she had agreed to limit her protection to. He treated me as if he thought me acting in the French interest and responsible for a treaty handing over part of his country to France. He said I was not straightforward, saying smooth words and cutting his country in two. He

did not attempt to conceal before the French commissioners his dislike to the French. I would beg your Excellency to be pleased to express to the French Commissioners your regret that they should have been so badly received by the King of a Country under British Protection. I would also beg to recommend that in case Foday Selah does not make complete submission to your Excellency a sufficient escort to ensure respect towards the Commission should be sent with it, when it returns to Native Combo to lay out the Southern Boundary.<sup>61</sup>

Of course, Sylla posed numerous pertinent questions that Kenney and the other commissioners could not answer without prevarication.

This prevarication resulted in part from the imperial machinations at the Berlin Conference, attended exclusively by representatives of European empires (including the Ottomans), plus an American “observer,” without a single African representative.<sup>62</sup> But the objective of the conference was to preserve peace between the colonial powers, not between Africans, nor between Africans and Europeans. After the conference, Britain’s foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury, remarked, “We have been . . . drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet have ever trod. We have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other . . . only . . . hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.”<sup>63</sup> According to Lord Salisbury, however, this rather banal exercise had not been unprofitable. To the contrary, “whatever superficial incongruity there might have been in those partitions of the unknown, it has had this one solid practical merit—that it has removed possible causes of quarrel from those members of the different nations who, on account of their very adventurous and gallant and self-devoted lives, are too apt to push with undue ferocity the claims of their respective countries against each other.”<sup>64</sup> It may have seemed wonderful to Europeans that they were working out their quarrels over the African continent peacefully, but European “partitions of the unknown” were not unknown to Africans—neither the territory being partitioned nor the potential effects of those purportedly incongruous partitions. And Africans certainly knew that little would be worked out peacefully between themselves and the Europeans.

Though Africans were not invited to participate at Berlin, they were aware of what was happening to their territory, if not to their entire continent. Contrary to the popular notion that Africans were duped into accepting arbitrary and artificial borders that divided their people, Sylla was not duped.<sup>65</sup> He knew very well what was happening and expressed his

displeasure at having his country split in two by a colonial border. He also understood what European mapping of his country implied, which is probably why he threw the map back at Captain Kenney. Although Kenney insisted he was not “cutting [Sylla’s] country in two” or “handing over half of his country to the French,” that is exactly what was happening, and Sylla knew it.

Kenney’s letter could serve as an abstract for a treatise on colonial mapping practices in West Africa, as across the colonial world at the time.<sup>66</sup> As in Timothy Mitchell’s colonial Egypt, either colonial officials would get their way or the colonized faced the specter of British (or French, German, etc.) force of arms.<sup>67</sup> Colonial mapping backed up by colonial troops did not necessarily freeze previously fluid environments where people freely exchanged cultural and economic goods in borderland zones like the Casamance. But the mapping certainly catalyzed a new political economy. In the Casamance, it changed the river into the central geography of a new economic order. This river was more than a stream of cash, however; it also attracted colonial interest for its natural beauty.

Even those with an “imperial gaze” remarked upon the beauty of the Casamance River while surveying its “riverscape” for colonial potential.<sup>68</sup> Captain Alfred Hippolyte Lenoir, for example, of the French naval infantry, visited Sédhiou in June 1884, shortly before the Berlin Conference. His report was published in the *Bulletin de la Société de géographie commerciale de Paris* later that year.<sup>69</sup> The bulletin’s title makes clear Lenoir’s purpose in visiting the Casamance: commerce.<sup>70</sup> Lenoir, nevertheless, referred extensively to the Casamançais reputation for natural beauty. While addressing his report to metropolitan commercial interests, Lenoir remarks, “Sédhiou and the Casamance will certainly interest you a bit, but today I don’t have time to provide much detail on the riches and the beauty of this river, for there is nothing comparable in the rest of Senegal. As much as the river has a sad and naked appearance, the shores appear welcoming with splendid vegetation.” Ultimately, however, Lenoir reveals that the beauty of the Casamance River interests him mostly for what it can produce. He bemoans, “What a shame that the indigenous people do not know how to extract from a soil so fertile all of the products that we know how to produce in France. What are they missing? Better ways of farming.”<sup>71</sup> The Casamance was for centuries afflicted by foreigners like Lenoir who came to the Casamance, became enraptured by its natural beauty, and then became enraptured with the idea of exploiting its natural resources. The Casamance River was a source of beauty and a source of wealth at the same time. But the Jola had worked out over centuries how best to reap an abundant harvest from its resources.<sup>72</sup>

If the French appeared more interested in what the Casamance could do for them than in what they could do for the Casamance, the Lenoir voyage confirmed that French administrators had more than sightseeing in mind for the Casamance. The Royal Belgian Geographic Society also picked up the news of Lenoir's voyage. It reported, "Mr. Lenoir believes that once we have established some secure and easy means of communication—regardless of whether they are rapid—a considerable quantity of products from the region that separates the Casamance from Senegal, which remain to the present without buyers, will have an assured flow to Saint-Louis by the Senegal [River] and to Gorée by the Southern Rivers area. Moreover, French manufactured products will find a huge market in Senegambia."<sup>73</sup> As opposed to the innate characteristics of "the natural Casamance," this report reveals how the Casamance River has long been socially constructed and mutually constituted as a haven of natural solitary beauty and as a cache of natural resources for capitalist production.

In some ways, the French colonial state made "the Casamance" what it is today while making the Casamance River a space of division by mapping bodies and resources along the riverbanks for colonial production. The latter implied mapping the natural resources of the Casamance while simultaneously nearly erasing the human beings living in the Casamance from the map. Though situated on the northern bank of the Gambia River instead of the Casamance River, the sale of "Reis's Concession" (figure 1.3) in 1895 is representative of this colonial commodification of bodies and resources along the Senegambian coastline during the late 1800s.




FIGURE 1.3. Reis's Concession, 1895. Source: Senegalese National Archives, 10D1 0069 Delimitation of the Guinean and Gambian borders with Senegal, 1895.

The flyer for the sale of Reis's Concession announces, "West Coast of Africa, in the Crown Colony of Gambia, Descriptive Particulars, Plan & Conditions of Sale of a Tract of Land about 7 square miles, on the north bank of the River Gambia, known as 'Reis's Concession.' The Lands produce Mahogany, India-rubber, Palm Kernels, etc. and offer an opportunity of creating A TRADING STATION of an exceedingly promising kind, which Messrs. E. & H. Lumley have received instructions to sell by auction . . . on Tuesday, the 15th of January, 1895, at two o'clock precisely."<sup>74</sup> E. and H. Lumley ran Lumleys Auctioneers and Land Agents at "St. James's House" in London. At least the Lumleys could be precise about the time and place of the sale. The "particulars" of the sale did not offer more precision (figure 1.4): "Particulars. The Estate is situated on the North side of the River Gambia, and comprises




FIGURE 1.4. Flyer on "the Particulars" of Reis's Concession. Source: Senegalese National Archives, 10D1 0069.

about seven square miles, that is to say, seven miles long and about one mile wide, and extends from Albreda to Sicca Point. It is distant about seventeen miles from Bathurst [contemporary Banjul], the capital of the colony.” While describing the physical geography of the property, the flyer mentions, “There are on the estate two native villages,” along with “a Large House on concrete foundation at Sicca Point, which occupies a prominent position. There are also labourers’ huts and a mahogany shed.”

All of this infrastructure—which included the human beings living on the estate—was available for the production of, in addition to the previously mentioned agricultural products, rubber. The flyer continues, “A great number of rubber trees (*Landolphia Florida*, indigenous to the soil) are to be found scattered over the Estate.” The British and French focus on rubber production in the Senegambia, seeming to look so promising in the late nineteenth century, subsided, in favor of other agricultural products like rice, peanuts, and cotton. Another page of the flyer claimed,

The Estate occupies an excellent position for Trade, or the establishment of a Factory. . . . The trade is partly cash but chiefly bartering. A very large profit can be made upon certain articles of daily consumption and common use, such as Rice, Tobacco, Sugar, Kola Nuts, Cheap Essences, Tinned Goods, Gin, Rum, Kerosene Oil, Matches, Candles, Ready-made Clothing, Cheap Drapery, Hosiery, Tin Ware, etc. There is a good depth of water at Sicca Point, which renders the landing and shipping of goods and produce safe and easy. The transport of goods from Bathurst to the Estate and vice versa may be performed at a moderate cost by purchasing large canoes, and employing them for that purpose instead of cutters. . . . There is big Game for the Sportsman, and plenty to shoot on the Property and in the adjoining Country—Leopards, Crocodiles, Monkeys, Deer, Hippopotami, and occasionally Lions are to be found. The opportunity of creating a trade station here is unequalled.<sup>75</sup>

That humans were forgotten or erased from the picture—except for their capacity for labor—in favor of flora and fauna demonstrates the links Henri Lefebvre forged between space and capitalist production.

Lefebvre’s analysis focuses on the spatial practices of states to argue that space is defined by capitalist interests. The liberal state, to Lefebvre, has destroyed “natural space” and replaced it with “abstract space”—space easier to control and map. He asserts that “nature is now reduced to materials on which society’s productive forces operate.”<sup>76</sup> Thus, the state has

taken the varieties of space that distinguished place and produced a homogenized template by which taxes can be levied, troops raised, and business conducted. Indeed, these activities are fundamentally what states do.<sup>77</sup> To Lefebvre, “business” drives the meaning of space in the modern era, and the state is merely its vassal. As he explains, “This abstract space depends on vast networks of banks, businesses, and great centers of production. There also is the spatial intervention of highways, airports, and information networks.” In this space, Lefebvre claims, “the cradle of accumulation, the place of richness, the subject of history, the center of historical space—in other words, the city—has exploded.” Therefore, space as a whole enters into “the modernized mode of capitalist production: it is utilized to produce surplus value. The ground, the underground, the air, and even the light enter into both the productive forces and the products.”<sup>78</sup> As the Reis Concession estate sale demonstrates, colonial officials mapped goods and products together with human beings to produce the largest possible profit.

Colonial officials in the Casamance tried to literally map this production onto ethnicity. They brought the human beings back into the picture for the purpose of leveraging ethnicity to yield the best agricultural production from each area of the Lower Casamance. Two hand-drawn maps of the Lower Casamance by Lieutenant Colonel Albert Sajous, the *commandant de cercle* in Ziguinchor in the early 1940s, illustrate this exploitation. The first denotes the primary ethnic group in each zone, along with a pie chart illustrating the ethnic breakdown of the area (figure 1.5). The second notes the same ethnic groups in the same zones but in the pie chart notes the agricultural production of each zone (figure 1.6).<sup>79</sup>




FIGURE 1.5. Hand-drawn map of Casamançais ethnicities by Lieutenant Colonel Albert Sajous, 1943. Source: Senegalese National Archives, 2G 43-75 Rapport annuel ensemble—1943, “Rapport annuel du Commandant de Cercle, Ziguinchor.”




FIGURE 1.6. Hand-drawn map of Casamançais agriculture by Lieutenant Colonel Albert Sajous, 1943. Source: Senegalese National Archives, “Rapport annuel.”

For example, Sajous’s first map—his ethnicity map—shows that the area immediately southeast of Ziguinchor was primarily inhabited by Bainouk, though there were also Jola and other “diverse” ethnicities in the area. Sajous’s second map, which seems to complement the first, shows that for the same zone, rice was the predominant agricultural product—about 35 to 40 percent, according to the pie graph. Millet, peanuts, forest products, and other “diverse” products made up the rest of the resources targeted for colonial extraction in this area.

These maps point to the ways colonial officials viewed the human beings they found in their new colonies: they did not regard Casamançais as citizens of a nation-state, with the natural rights thought to mark Western civilization, but rather as colonial subjects intended for economic exploitation to the benefit of the metropole.<sup>80</sup> Hubert Deschamps, the governor of Senegal while Sajous was the commandant de cercle in Ziguinchor, made this point clear to the residents of Oussouye in 1943. While visiting on a tour of the Casamance, Deschamps declared, “You are our subjects, just like everybody else in Senegal, so you must submit to the same discipline. And what do we ask of you? The tax, a bit of rice, a small number of men for military conscription. In return, we bring you peace, medical care in our hospitals, and our manufactures.”<sup>81</sup> Deschamps made French intentions clear. Colonial officials marked Africans by tribe not only to “divide and conquer” but also to allot and assign them to specific tasks of labor for agricultural production.

Colonial powers mapped ethnicity onto production to benefit the metropole, not the colony.<sup>82</sup> Eric Worby refers to this mapping of ethnicity as ethnocartography in his analysis of the power in colonial naming and mapping of ethnic groups in the former Rhodesia.<sup>83</sup> Worby coined the term *ethnocartography* to denote the “use of tribal maps to represent relations of political power over social space.” Worby contends that ethnocartography has been “an important means through which academic constructs have been used as instruments of colonial domination.” Furthermore, “by fixing names to discrete territories, such maps served to both encode and represent the implicit, silent vantage point of the colonial state in relation to the subjects over which it presumed or desired to hold authority.”<sup>84</sup> The purpose of this authority was the production of a political economy that would benefit the metropole. When it became clear that such a political economy was not worth the cost of its construction, colonial powers in Africa began to decolonize.<sup>85</sup> Postcolonial African states sought to replicate these political economies so much that Frederick Cooper has argued that the only thing that changed at independence was the nationality of the people in the buildings.<sup>86</sup> Otherwise, the administrative and economic institutions in the buildings continued to operate as before.

#### THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN POSTCOLONIAL MAPPING

Along with this colonial cartographic history went a rather complex administrative history. Estelle Nicol well elucidates this complex history. She makes an important argument about the tenuous position of the Casamance vis-à-vis the rest of the Southern Rivers area to the south of Dakar. The Casamance was close enough for the French to assign an administrator to help manage the Casamance, on the other side of the Gambia River, yet far enough and “separate” enough to be thought of as different and separate from the rest of Senegal—having, in some ways, more in common with the rest of the Guinea Coast to the south than with Dakar to the north. It was also rather different and separate from the rest of the Southern Rivers area protectorates.<sup>87</sup> As we shall see, French settlers in the Casamance felt this difference and separation as much as the Jola, Balanta, Mandinka, and other Africans who had lived there for centuries.<sup>88</sup> Thus, the Casamance was in a class of its own as the French colonial regime in the Senegambia solidified. Table 1.1 provides a summary of these administrative changes, as the existence of the Casamance as an administrative entity of the colonial administration waxed and waned.

TABLE 1.1. TERRITORIAL REFORMS IN THE CASAMANCE, 1890–1944

Decision 7/19/1890	Divides the Casamance into two <i>cercles</i> (regions): Upper and Lower Casamance
Decision 5/25/1891	Reunion in one cercle around Sédhiou
Decision 4/25/1892	Re-division into two cercles
Decision 5/11/1895	Constitutes the Casamance into districts, preserving division into two cercles and implementing distinction between country of direct administration and country of protectorates
Decision 9/21/1899	Defines limits of the two cercles (Sédhiou and Lower Casamance), the district, and their components
1/1/1904, 4/11/1904	Casamance consists of one cercle divided into eight regions and administered by the residents under the authority of the superior administrator of Sédhiou: Fouladou (Hamdallahi), Mandinka country (Sédhiou), Kiang and Kabada (Medina), Balantacounda (Yattacounda), Fogny (Bignona), Jola country of Brin-Seleki-Bayot, Floup country (Oussouye), Komba (Diebaly) <sup>1</sup>
Decree of 6/1/1907	Division into two cercles: cercle of Lower Casamance (Ziguinchor, Oussouye, Fogny), which includes two <i>escales</i> , or ports of call (Zozor, Carabane); cercle of Upper Casamance (Sédhiou) formed from three <i>circonscriptions</i> , or residences (Balantacounda, Sédhiou, Fouladou), and an <i>escale</i> (Sédhiou)
Decision 6/1/1907	French Combo detached from the residency of Ziguinchor and attached to Bignona
Decree of 9/22/1909	Transfer of cercle <i>chef-lieu</i> (headquarters) to Ziguinchor; creation of residence of Kian and surveillance posts of Velingara and Diouloulou; Yattacounda changed from residence to surveillance post; canton of Bliss transferred from Oussouye to Fogny; division of territory into six administrative residences: Fouladou (chef-lieu Kolda), Sédhiou, Ziguinchor, Oussouye, Fogny, Khian
Decree of 5/10/1912	Division of the Casamance into three cercles: cercle of Lower Casamance (Ziguinchor) formed from three residences (Fogny, Ziguinchor, Oussouye); cercle of Middle Casamance (Sédhiou) formed from three residences (Inor, Sédhiou, Yattacounda); cercle of Upper Casamance (Kolda) consisting of one residence (Kolda)
Decree of 11/23/1912	Maintains the three cercles; organizes the administration in the Casamance
Decree of 11/20/1917	Divides cercle of Lower Casamance into three cercles: Ziguinchor, Kamobeul (with subdivision of Diembering), and Bignona (with subdivision of Diouloulou as headquarters) and removing subdivisions of Sindian, Balandine, and Oussouye
Decree of 12/6/1918	Determines territories constituting subdivision of Oussouye
Decree of 12/4/1920	Removes division of French West Africa into protectorates and territories of direct administration

Decree of 2/25/1922	Creates province of Oussouye in cercle of Kamobeul, dividing Oussouye into three <i>cantons</i> : Pointe Saint Georges, Floups, Elinkine
Decree of 4/3/1922	Creates canton of Bainouk in cercle of Ziguinchor
Decree of 9/6/1922	Grants the Casamance a superior administration divided into five cercles: cercle of Ziguinchor: Wolof grouping—Bainouk canton; cercle of Bignona: canton of the Djougouttes; cercle of Kamobeul: province of Oussouye, cantons of Pointe Saint Georges, Elinkine, Floups, Brin-Seleki, Diembering-Kabrousse; cercle of Sédhiou: cantons of Kabada, Darang, Kian-Fogny, Kian-Vitang, Pakao-Soukondou, Souna-Balmadou, Brassous-Mandingue, Brassous-Peulh, Boudhie-Yacine, Pakao, Balantacounda; cercle of Kolda: cantons of Patiana, Pakane, Pata, Kamba, Kandiaya, Mamboua, Niampaio, Kamalo, Gumura, Patin Nord, Patin Kibo, Fridou, Coudora
Decree of 10/3/1923	Removes subdivisions of Yattacounda, Inor, and Diembering, whose territories are attached to Sédhiou and Ziguinchor
Decree of 10/13/1930	Modifies territorial limits of cercles of Bignona and Ziguinchor
Decree of 12/13/1934	Deals with administrative reorganization of the Casamance
Decree of 3/30/1938	Removes cercle of Bignona and joins it to Ziguinchor; removes subdivisions of Diouloulou and Oussouye
Decree of 4/23/1938	Removes subdivisions of Diouloulou, Oussouye, and Inor and joins them to subdivisions of Bignona, Ziguinchor, and Sédhiou
Decree of 10/26/1939	Divides the Casamance into two cercles: cercle of Ziguinchor, consisting of three subdivisions (Ziguinchor, Bignona, Sédhiou); and cercle of Kolda, with subdivision of Velingara
Decree of 12/19/1940	Defines cercle of Ziguinchor: subdivision of Ziguinchor, consisting of province of Oussouye and cantons of Diembering-Kabrousse, Floups, Pointe Saint Georges; subdivision of Bignona, consisting of cantons of Bignona, Bliss-Karones, Djiragones, North and South Djougouttes, Fogny-Combo, North and South Kadiamoutayes, Kalounayes, Narangs; subdivision of Sédhiou, consisting of cantons of Balantacounda, Boudhie, Brassous, Fogny, Kabada, Pakao-Tilibo, Souna-Balmadou, South Yacine. Defines cercle of Kolda: subdivision of Kolda, consisting of cantons of Fouladou, Guimaro, Katnako, Manboua, Pata; subdivision of Velingara, consisting of cantons of Kantora, Pakane, Patiana, Patim-Kandiaye.
Decree of 7/7/1943	Creates subdivision of Oussouye in cercle of Ziguinchor
Decree of 5/13/1944	Removes cercle of Kolda, establishing it as subdivision; defines the Casamance as a cercle formed of six subdivisions: Oussouye, Bignona, Ziguinchor, Sédhiou, Kolda, and Velingara

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<sup>1</sup> Capitals of these colonial regions are placed in parentheses.

*Source:* Based on Dominique Darbon, *L'administration et le paysan en Casamance: Essai d'anthropologie administrative* (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1988), 63–66.

The regime instituted in 1944 remained in place until the administrative reforms of 1984, instated by the Senegalese state after the violence of 1982 and 1983 in and around Ziguinchor.<sup>89</sup> The French colonial state mostly did not view the Casamance as a political entity separate from Senegal. Though numerous colonial officials referred to the Casamance, the Colonial Geographical Service in some cases did not. Its 1941 report, for example, denoted separate maps for Ziguinchor and Tambacounda, not one map for “the Casamance.”<sup>90</sup> Jean-Claude Marut notes that near the end of the colonial era (1958), the administrative map of Senegal did not include a region labeled “the Casamance.”<sup>91</sup> In fact, it was not “distinguished from the other regions (cercles) of the colony of Senegal.”<sup>92</sup>

Nevertheless, some French residents of the Casamance clearly thought of the Casamance in separate terms well before independence. Jules Florent Malbranque, for example, wrote a document in 1939 linking Casamançais “development” to its “autonomy.” He titled the twenty-page document “Développement de la Casamance, lié à son autonomie.”<sup>93</sup> Despite the lack of a region named “La Casamance” on the 1958 map, many Senegalese thought of the Casamance as a region different from the rest of Senegal. Besides, other maps did label the Casamance as “the Casamance.”<sup>94</sup> And colonial policy had vacillated between treating the Casamance as one entity and dividing it into two or three districts (see table 1.1). In 1944, shortly before independence, the Casamance was again reduced to one administrative region, governed from Ziguinchor, with six subdivisions in Bignona, Kolda, Oussouye, Sédhiou, Velingara, and Ziguinchor (figure 1.7).<sup>95</sup> This “Casamance” did not



FIGURE 1.7. Senegalese national administrative reform, 1984. Source: Dominique Darbon, *L'administration et le paysan en Casamance: Essai d'anthropologie administrative* (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1988), 7.

extend to the Falémé, as Father Diamacoune would later claim, merely to the Gambia River. No one at the time thought the Casamance extended all the way to Kédougou in Sénégal Oriental (Eastern Senegal), despite the later claims of separatists that it did.

Yet it would be erroneous to assert or imply that French colonial officials considered the Casamance a separate colony from Senegal. Though they established a separate colonial administrative position—an *administrateur supérieur* (superior administrator)—to handle Casamançais affairs rendered more difficult by distance and geographical separation by the Anglophone colony of The Gambia, this administrator reported to the governor of Senegal, not directly to the governor-general of French West Africa.<sup>96</sup> Hence, the French never considered the Casamance to be a separate colony from Senegal. If they intended to divide and conquer, they also knew they needed to preserve stability for trade along the axis of the Casamance River. In 1938, the superior administrator of the Casamance reported, “The reason that militates in favor of the administrative unit of Casamance (that is to say a single district) is that the three constituent districts constitute a geographical and physical entity with a natural link, the river.” Therefore, it was necessary to “also coordinate and unify all matters relating to relations with neighboring foreign colonies . . . and maintain the export trade flow that is done naturally from East to West.”<sup>97</sup> While the policy of conquest was “divide and rule,” the policy of postconquest consolidation was more like “unite and maintain stability.”

The Senegalese state reinforced this mapping and the divisions it brought about through the administrative reform of 1984, dividing the Casamance into smaller administrative regions—less than two years after the violence began in Ziguinchor. Separatists later decried the 1984 administrative reforms for wiping the name *Casamance* off the Senegalese map while changing the names of Casamançais administrative regions to *Ziguinchor* and *Kolda* (see figure 1.7 for the Casamance before the reforms). They pointed to how the Senegalese government prohibited the word *Casamance* and sent a “military governor” to take over the region of Ziguinchor.<sup>98</sup> To many Casamançais, whether they were part of the MFDC or not, this reform in 1984 appeared to be an attempt to divide Casamançais following the marches and the violence of December 1982 and December 1983 in and near Ziguinchor.

Thus, Senegalese postcolonial mapping of the Casamance River system continued to build on the legacy of French colonial mapping. State officials in both eras sought to “see like a state” by qualifying and quantifying space in imprecise terms while claiming scientific accuracy and objectivity thought

to be inherent to the practice of cartography at the time.<sup>99</sup> French colonial officials, especially, sought to tie bodies to resources by limiting mobility for the purposes of exploiting regular sources of labor, then taxing the profits from that labor. The colonial and postcolonial states, however, encouraged ties with Dakar to the extent possible to cement the links of Casamançais to the Senegalese state.

#### COUNTER-MAPPING THE CASAMANCE VIA THE RIVER

Land of romance and of rhythms that adorn mangroves and rivers, hospitable, welcoming, and smiling, this “green and beautiful Casamance in the clear moonlight,” as was affectionately sung in the villages for many generations, is suddenly and brutally projected onto the stage, suddenly becoming, paradoxically, “the rebellious Casamance.”

—Oumar Diatta, Casamançais journalist

Because of the freedom by which numerous groups of Africans and Europeans came, went, and mingled in the area, many Senegalese have claimed that this “rebellious Casamance,” far from being rooted in difference with Senegal, was, in fact, “the most Senegalese part of Senegal.” Nouha Cissé, the former principal of Lycée Djignabo and former president of the soccer club Casa-Sports, saw the Casamance River not as a space of division but as “*un espace fédérateur*”—a unifying space that brought people together in various ways.<sup>100</sup>

To counter what they viewed as the “Wolofization” of their nation, however, separatists like the Diamacoune brothers and Mamadou Sané began to limit who could be unified in this federating space.<sup>101</sup> They began to obfuscate the borders of the Casamance to turn away “the little Wolof, the little Serer, and the little Toucouleur” as “strangers” to the Casamance.<sup>102</sup> They could not easily blur the international borders to the north—demarcated by the Anglo-French Boundary Commission at the start of the colonial era—or to the south. Neither could they move or obfuscate the western border of the Atlantic Ocean.

But they could move or obfuscate the eastern border. Thus, Bertrand Diamacoune claimed that the original Casamance went as far east as “the Falémé River”—the modern border with Mali—and as far north as the town of Matam on the Senegal River.<sup>103</sup> Bertrand’s brother, Augustin, also claimed that the Casamance—*la Grande Casamance*—stretched “from the Atlantic to the Falémé,” a chunk of territory that coincided with the borders of the Catholic Diocese of Ziguinchor.<sup>104</sup> In *Pays du refus*, the essay he wrote during the 1993 ceasefire, Father Diamacoune argued, “The country that constitutes the geographical, historical, and political Casamance stretches from

the Atlantic Ocean to the Falémé, a tributary of the Senegal River.<sup>105</sup> It is doubtful that a Jola Catholic priest would have had much influence in the primarily Mandinka and Fula Muslim Middle and Upper Casamance, not to mention a town in the Senegal River valley like Matam. It is more doubtful that any resident of Matam ever considered herself or himself Casamançais.

Statements such as these, however, beyond the role that waterways played in the separatists' historical territorial claims, reflect the lengths to which separatists were willing to go to claim a more glorious past for the Casamance—a past with a spatial dignity gradually chipped away, in their view, by the Senegalese state. The separatists may have modeled this argument after Léopold Senghor's model for Senegal, since the spatial grandeur of Senghor's vision of a "French-speaking African nation" had been diminished in the decolonization process.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, many separatists believed that Senghor so doggedly held on to the Casamance because he could not tolerate further attrition of the territory for his Senegalese nation-state, originally envisioned by Senghor as a Francophone Black African federated nation-state that would remain part of the larger French Union but was later reduced to the Mali Federation (Senegal and Mali) and then to Senegal as a separate, independent nation-state.<sup>107</sup>

The separatists also expanded the definition of "the Casamance" to counter accusations of Jola tribalism. If separatist leaders, most of whom were Jola, left the territorial definition of the Casamance at the level of the Lower Casamance—roughly the area between the Atlantic and the Soungrou River and inhabited principally by Jola—then Casamançais nationalism would appear to be no more than Jola ethnic nationalism. As Jean-Claude Marut notes, "Even if all the Jola [were] not fighting for independence, the large majority of those fighting for independence [were] Jola, and the rebellion [was] rooted and conducted only in the Lower Casamance, the Jola homeland."<sup>108</sup> Putting it more succinctly, a journalist claimed, "Not every rebel is a Jola, but every Jola is a rebel."<sup>109</sup> This statement is false, but the ambivalence of the MFDC discourse on ethnicity led to a conflation of "Jola" and "Casamançais" identities. As noted earlier, some Casamançais spoke of a "Jola republic" based on "the three Bs": the towns of Banjul (The Gambia), Bignona (Senegal), and Bissau (Guinea-Bissau).<sup>110</sup> Such a republic would make separatism more of a concern for the neighboring countries of The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, as it was for Senegal.<sup>111</sup>

The separatists responded to accusations of tribalism in three ways. First, they claimed it was Jola "nature" to sit back and listen to all viewpoints before making a decision and committing to a cause. But once a Jola commits, they claimed, he—this stereotypical Jola was always gendered as

masculine—committed “all the way.”<sup>112</sup> When the other ethnic groups saw the Jola level of commitment, according to the separatists, they were content to step back and allow the Jola to lead.

Second, some separatists claimed that the other ethnic groups agreed to Jola leadership during their last “sacred forest” meeting before the fateful December 1982 march into Ziguinchor, acknowledging that the Jola were the most committed to the cause because the specific grievances the separatists listed against the Senegalese state were rooted primarily in the Lower Casamance, where the Jola lived.

Finally, though it often annoyed or offended the other ethnic groups, there were some Jola among the more committed separatists who claimed “autochthony” for the Jola as a mandate for Jola leadership. Father Diamacoune made The River an essential part of this claim. He employed the imagery of The River—a riverscape—to lay claim to Jola leadership of the MFDC while also constructing a multiethnic Casamançais nation.<sup>113</sup> Diamacoune used the multiethnic Casamançais to counter the government’s accusations of practicing “tribalism.” He narrated a particular history of the “migratory waves” that brought the ethnic groups of the Lower Casamance into the area to make the case for Jola autochthony, even though the Bainouk had been accepted as the autochthones of the Lower Casamance for generations.

#### THE MULTIETHNIC CASAMANÇAIS “RIVER”

Mamadou Diouf argues that this construction of the Casamançais nation was essential for the construction of a multiethnic Casamance in opposition to the “Islamization” of the Senegalese nation. Diouf accuses Father Diamacoune of intentionally fostering the conflation between “Jola” and “Casamançais” with a precolonial history that posits the Jola at the center of a multiethnic Casamançais “river”: “The concept of mixing and migratory waves’ confluence into a single great river helped the Abbé [Father/Priest] Diamacoune . . . to mask ethnic diversity and merge difference: he took the Joola [Jola] culture as a common denominator without saying so . . . to produce the Casamançais, unique, essential, and radically different from the Senegalese and from his own remarkable ancestors.”<sup>114</sup>

The construction of this multiethnic “river” may also have been an attempt by Diamacoune to elide the historical factionalism among the Jola, who were, at least in part, a colonial creation and often characterized by infighting and constant warfare, typically living in a siege mentality during the precolonial era because of the high prevalence of slave raiding in the region. Consequently, factionalism has ruled the Casamance, and there has

never been great agreement among scholars on the definition of a Jola identity.<sup>115</sup> The “doyen of Diola [Jola] ethnographers,”<sup>116</sup> Louis-Vincent Thomas, observes, “One cannot speak of the Jola except in the plural. . . . Each [group] has appreciable socio-cultural and linguistic differences, as well as obvious antagonisms. But all of them, conscious of belonging to a common group, know how to close ranks and present a unified front to foreign aggressors.”<sup>117</sup> According to Diamacoune, the Senegalese were “foreign aggressors,” but whether the Jola could “close ranks” to join a multiethnic coalition to resist “Senegalese colonialism” remained—despite Diamacoune’s nationalist discourse—an open question beyond his death.<sup>118</sup>

Diamacoune constructed the Casamançais multiethnic river in “migratory waves” centered on the all-important Jola wave. These waves were “composed of multiple stratifications that are overcome and eventually covered over and mixed.” The first wave was the Jola wave coming from Gabu, a region in eastern Guinea-Bissau. The Jola wave was “the oldest, the largest even, and longer than the territory that extends from the Falémé to the Atlantic, [which] can be considered as the ‘the shared trunk of several branches.’” Sharing this Jola “trunk” were the Bainouk, Manjak, Mancagne, and Balanta.<sup>119</sup> Diamacoune placed the Jola, commonly thought to have migrated to the region from the kingdom of Gabu, a subentity of the Mali Empire, on par with the original inhabitants, the Bainouk, whose numbers, as discussed earlier, were diminished by the Jola migration, as well as other demographic pressures.<sup>120</sup> Following this first wave were the Mandinka, completing the Mandé subgroups, who “covered the Casamance territory, more or less from the Falémé to Soun Grougrou . . . thus the Upper and Middle Casamance,” and “finally the ‘Fula’ wave, which extends from the Falémé all the way [to the west] to engulf an eastern part of the Middle Casamance.”<sup>121</sup>

Diamacoune joins these migratory waves into a great multiethnic river, therefore, to construct a multiethnic Casamançais nation on his terms:

Thus [the Senegalese government] goes so far as to wish to make the Casamance problem simply a “Joola” [Jola] affair; this is inaccurate, it could be rigorously explained with reference to the extent and precedence of the ethnic stratifications, or even by the decisions taken by the Assembly before 25 December 1982 [the sacred forest meeting near Diabir], with people of all ethnic groups, religions, backgrounds, and political views together, which marked the start of the current events in the Casamance. The demonstrators had set off from Falémé to participate, at

Ziguinchor, in the march by more than a hundred thousand Casamançais on 26 December 1982, with people of all ethnic groups, religions, backgrounds, and political views together. Those who have gone through and followed closely the genesis and the progress of the events in Casamance know very well why the burden of this struggle rests especially on the Diola [Jola] country, and also why this war of national liberation was at first restricted voluntarily to the Lower Casamance Zone. . . . With its propagandistic manipulations of local and outside opinion, Senegal spoke of a supposed demand for a “Diola Republic” by the demonstrators of 26 December 1982. The Senegalese operation tended to get the Casamance into trouble with the surrounding countries. Let no one be mistaken about it.<sup>122</sup>

Thus, Diamacoune implies, the Jola did not seek a leadership role in the Casamance, but neither did they shy away from it, as they were the first to assert a truly authentic but multiethnic Casamançais identity. He also accuses the Senegalese government of fomenting security concerns with Senegal’s neighbors—The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau—to enlist their help against the rebels. Thus, this Senegambian borderland became, as explained by Oumar Diatta above, a zone of rebellion, defined by colonial and postcolonial mapping of the Casamance River and the surrounding river system, in a way that elided factionalism not only among the Jola but also the other ethnic groups of the Casamance. This elision was necessary to construct a unified Casamançais identity against the Senegalese “other.” The MFDC needed the elision to counter-map the Casamance apart from Senegal. But such a unified multiethnic river of anti-Senegalese Casamançais separatism never existed, no matter how hard MFDC ethnic entrepreneurs like Diamacoune and Nkrumah Sané tried to bring it into being.

The discursive nature of this counter-mapping avoided engaging the Senegalese state too much on its terms while making similar spatial claims. It also demonstrated the difficulty of engaging states on their cartographical terms. Nancy Peluso, Joel Wainwright, and Joe Bryan examine contemporary indigenous counter-mapping in response to efforts of state capitalism to control or exploit natural resources in spaces to which indigenous people have traditionally held property rights of some kind—like in the Casamance. Peluso examines these rights in response to forest mapping in Indonesia by “state land managers and supporting international institutions, such as the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], the World Bank, Worldwide Fund for Nature, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.” She

finds that “local groups can claim power through mapping by using not only what is on a map, but what is not on it” and that a key aspect of such a challenge is “the re-insertion of people on resource maps.” In this fashion, maps effectively “pose alternatives to the languages and images of power and become a medium of empowerment or protest.”<sup>123</sup>

But postcolonial counter-mapping is not sufficient to correct injustices wrought by colonial mapping. In 2009, Wainwright and Bryan examined indigenous counter-mapping and the law to determine whether attaining justice for indigenous land rights under the contemporary legal systems in Nicaragua and Belize was possible. The results of their investigation were complex and rather ambivalent. They discovered an “aporia”<sup>124</sup> in the nature of the claims and the legal systems in which they had to be made: “Notwithstanding the creativity expressed through these projects, they remain oriented by the spatial configuration of modern politics: territory and property rights.” Wainwright and Bryan claim that this “spatial configuration” both “accounts for” and “limits” the power of indigenous cartography. They conclude, “This impasse is not a contradiction that can be resolved; rather, it constitutes an aporia for which there is no easy or clear solution. Nonetheless, it must be confronted.”<sup>125</sup>

This aporia represents what I call “the postcolonial conundrum”: indigenous people in the formerly colonized world must construct identities through concepts like “ethnocartography” and “discursive mapping” because the tools of cartography have largely been controlled by the state. Thus, with what has been left to them, indigenous people have counter-mapped the nation in their own ways. Those in Nicaragua and Belize claimed their rights to property “based on customary use and occupancy.” In each case, indigenous persons won in court to correct “state-sanctioned practices that have characteristically resulted in the displacement, dispossession, and destruction of indigenous livelihoods.” However, Wainwright and Bryan have also discovered that “these successes have met unexpected limitations and produced unintended effects that complicate their translation into justice.” In short, they argue, “these strategies do not reverse colonial social relations so much as they rework them.”<sup>126</sup> Reworking social relations has been the goal of the MFDC since 1982. But Wainwright and Bryan do not provide much hope for those with such a goal. Their frustration on this point is palpable.

Contemporary legal systems may change somewhat to accommodate forms of customary law, but more fundamental change is hard to imagine. And two wrongs do not necessarily make a right. Alienating those of particular descent—such as Wolof in the Lower Casamance—from “their lands” based on indigenous counter-mapping may satisfy the vengeance

of those wronged by colonial and postcolonial mapping in the first place. But it will not posit a durable solution to the problem—as Wainwright and Bryan acknowledge.<sup>127</sup>



Colonial mapping not only brought the Casamance into being by demarcating colonial borders separating it from the rest of Senegal but also made the Casamance River the central piece of that geography. Thus, mapping and The River in the Casamance have been closely linked since the conclusion of the Berlin Conference in 1885. But the diplomats in Berlin did not have the last word. Africans also influenced the mapping of their continent. Whether it was Foday Sylla in Combo in 1890 or Father Diamacoune during the ceasefire of 1993, Senegambians influenced how people thought of particular spaces and places in what became Senegal and The Gambia. These Senegambians influenced “who belonged” where and when through their own interpretations of the histories and geographies that defined the Casamance.

These “influencers,” however, like the colonial power, did not have complete autonomy to write the story or map the territory the way they wanted. Ordinary, “everyday” Casamançais also influenced these processes, especially after the advent of the Casamance conflict, as they chose to corroborate, contest, or ignore elite mapping of “their” country. If separatist elites chose to transform the Casamance River from a space of unification into a symbol of rebellion, ordinary Casamançais split over whether to ratify this national imagining or reject it altogether. Of course, there were many people in between. Plenty of people sympathized with the separatists, especially after feeling the sting of northern cultural arrogance or experiencing an exploitation of the Senegalese state.

What becomes clear after talking to contemporary Casamançais on the ground is that the Casamance River has come to mean more to them than a ribbon of blue on the map or a stream that must be crossed to reach another part of Senegambia or the Upper Guinea Coast. They respect the river as a sacred source of life and as a powerful resource for transportation, irrigation, hygiene, and, on occasion, destruction. But they also consider it one more space that has been exploited for the benefit of Senegalese and the loss of Casamançais. Thus, along with The Forest, The River emerges less as a “natural” space with only a materialist meaning than as a different kind of natural space, a space packed with meaning. When contemporary Casamançais talk about the Casamance River, they talk about a space of familiarity and belonging; in other words, they talk about “place.”

In the next chapter, we turn to another one of these spaces packed with meaning and to one of these ordinary social groups—peasants—to examine how the phenomena examined in this chapter (mapping and The River) affected the life of the peasant. Doing so allows us to do more than link The River to The Rice Field; it allows us to show how the peasant employed agency in pursuit of her or his interests. It shows that regardless of how the MFDC portrayed the peasant as an icon of Casamançais culture, and particularly of Jola culture, the peasant possessed the power to contest this portrayal. The links between these two chapters hence exist not only in the mind of an American historian of the Casamance but also in the links between the bureaucrats who built and managed the dam of Affiniam and the peasant Casamançais rice farmer. The Casamançais “civilization of rice” starts with water. But it also depends on the labor of the peasant to mold the earth and the water into a form that produces rice, the dietary staple of the Casamance.

## 2 ~ The Rice Field

*“(Eketai) efulenfulen másink.”* (Pointe Saint Georges Jola)

*“La mort a commencé par le bas de la rizière.”* (French)

“Death started from the bottom of the rice field.”

—Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Joola de Casamance*

THE RICE field between Kandialang and Mandina Mancagne has seen more than its share of the Casamance conflict. It is a rice field that separates by about half of a mile (approximately one kilometer) these two villages on the southeast side of Ziguinchor. In December 1983, separatists from the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) met in the forest near Mandina Mancagne to plan their assault on Senegalese security forces massing in Ziguinchor following the December 6 murder and mutilation of four Senegalese gendarmes.<sup>1</sup> The gendarmes had tried to break up a separatist meeting in the “sacred forest” of Diabir almost a year after the fateful march, planned in that location, that ignited the separatist violence. But this time, another group of rebels planned to assault Ziguinchor from the Casamance River, debark from a location near the port, and attack security forces in the city from the north while other rebels massing

in the forest outside of the rice field infiltrated the city from the south. The rebels' pincer movement likely startled Senegalese forces, but the rebels attacked with "guns, bows and arrows, and bush knives" against the modern combat power of the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF)—automatic rifles and machine guns, mortars, artillery, armored personnel carriers, and combat aircraft. The clash of these forces left "at least 19 dead and 80 wounded."<sup>2</sup> The Casamance "question" had become a civil war.<sup>3</sup>

That war was developing a rather asymmetric character favoring the SAF, but the MFDC hoped to counter the weapons asymmetry with their intimate knowledge of the Casamançais operating environment. For generations, this knowledge had transformed "space" into "place," and as much as children in the Lower Casamance found themselves growing up in or near a river or a forest, they also found themselves in a rice field. The MFDC took this common experience and endeavored to transform that rice field into The Rice Field—a common cultural symbol, or icon, of the Casamançais nation.<sup>4</sup> Following the repulsion of the MFDC assault on Ziguinchor in 1983, rebel forces disappeared into the forest. Senegalese security forces tracked many of them to other parts of the Casamance, resulting in mass arrests and incarceration, if not torture and death.<sup>5</sup> As quickly as violence in the Casamance began, it somewhat subsided after 1983, after the Senegalese state had arrested and imprisoned the primary MFDC leaders, including Father Diamacoune, Mamadou Sané, and many others.<sup>6</sup> Following his release from prison in 1988, Diamacoune emerged to declare the independence of the Casamance in 1990.<sup>7</sup> Shortly thereafter, separatist violence reignited and then sporadically intensified, waxing and waning for the next three decades.

The rebels returned to Mandina Mancagne in 1997. They began lobbing mortar rounds into Ziguinchor, targeting the Senegalese Army's Fifth Battalion, based on the northwest side of Kandialang. In one day of fighting, the Senegalese Army lost twenty-five soldiers to the MFDC mortar assault.<sup>8</sup> The SAF responded with their own mortars and artillery and took up defensive positions in Kandialang following the displacement of many villagers to Colobane and other neighborhoods on the northwest side of Ziguinchor, away from the fighting.

Hence, the rice field south of Kandialang literally became a contested space for the identity of the Casamançais nation, as direct and indirect fire flew over the rice field in each direction, killing and maiming Senegalese on both sides of the rice field and on both sides of the conflict.<sup>9</sup> Eventually, the Senegalese Army outflanked the rebels in Mandina Mancagne and drove them out of the village—but not before the MFDC planted land mines on the roads leading out of the village to cover their retreat.<sup>10</sup> One Senegalese



FIGURE 2.1. The rice field south of Kandialang, uncultivated since August 3, 1997, “the day the war came to Kandialang.” View south from Kandialang. The village of Mandina Mancagne is behind the tree line to the left. Photograph by author, April 2014.

journalist for Radio France Internationale, Demba Ndiaye, later recalled, “Tens of Mandina Mancagnes exist all over the Casamance, villages that have lived in the flesh twenty years of war, chasing thousands of villagers from their homes and their rice fields and scattering their livestock, those not already decimated by the war. It will be necessary, once peace has returned, to take some years to heal wounds, to revive once again a region that is a sort of Senegalese El Dorado, but is today murdered, disfigured, fed up, and famished even though it was called in another life the granary of Senegal.”<sup>11</sup> Casamançais villages that, like Mandina Mancagne, “lived in the flesh” the impact of the war also “lived in the flesh” rice production. The conflict threatened the reputation of the Casamance as “the granary of Senegal” because it threatened those producing the rice in the rice fields.

Those familiar with Casamançais culture were not surprised that the conflict quickly moved from the streets of Ziguinchor to the edge of a rice field.<sup>12</sup> After all, Casamançais devoted much of their land not covered by forest or mangroves to rice production. Rice was the staple of the Senegalese diet, and the Casamance was the richest rice-producing region in the country. Though farmers in the Senegal River valley east of Saint-Louis also grew

rice, they did so mostly with irrigation. In the Casamance, rice was grown under “diverse ecologies,” but that was the only region where “rain-fed” rice was possible—at least until rainfall amounts began to plummet in the 1970s.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the Jola had been known for their expertise as rice producers for generations. Archaeological evidence suggests that the Jola and their predecessors have been practicing wet rice cultivation in the region for at least a thousand years.<sup>14</sup> Thus, scholars have noted the connections between the agrarian cultural identity of the separatists and the political economy of rice production in the Casamance.

These connections between the cultural identity and the political economy of the Casamance led to the production of an iconic Casamançais rice peasant, an allegedly authentic “son of the soil” or “son of the Casamance,” repeatedly posited by Father Diamacoune as the embodiment of the Casamançais nation. Because of this rice peasant’s cultural distinctiveness, he—except in a few cases, this iconic peasant was typically male—could not remain in the nation of Senegal.<sup>15</sup> This peasant emerged from an equally iconic place in Casamançais culture and history: The Rice Field. The Rice Field brought together the cultural characteristics that distinguished the Casamançais rice peasant from other Senegalese citizens and the political economy that allegedly made the Casamance *le grenier du Sénégal*, or “the rice basket of Senegal.”

In this chapter, I argue that this essentialized rice peasant emerged from the essentialized rice field through two transformative periods in Casamançais history. The first period occurred between 1850 and 1920, when three social processes made the rice field a refuge and a symbol of Casamançais “authenticity.” The three processes were colonization, Islamization, and Mandinkization. Each process brought about social and cultural change over time that produced the postcolonial particularism of the separatist movement. The year 1850 marked the intensification of French colonization in the Casamance shortly after Emmanuel Bertrand-Bocandé took up duties as the French *résident* of Carabane, the island trading center in the mouth of the Casamance River; 1920 marked the end of Jola resistance to the conquest and the consolidation of exclusively French colonial rule.<sup>16</sup> The second transformative period occurred between 1970 and 1990, when increasing pressure on Casamançais land combined with the disappointment of Casamançais, especially elites, with the postcolonial dispensation following the first ten years of Senegalese independence. The year 1990 marked the intensification of the Casamance conflict following the release of Father Diamacoune and other separatists from prison and Diamacoune’s declaration of Casamançais independence. These changes transformed

the Casamançais rice peasant into an iconic, disgruntled separatist. And they transformed the Casamançais rice field into an iconic place—The Rice Field—to be contested by Casamançais on both sides of the conflict.

It may be tempting to view these two periods, which roughly coincide with the start and end of formal colonialism in Senegal (1885–1960), as privileging colonial agency over that of Senegalese. Though both forms of agency played important roles in producing the modern forms of the Senegalese and Gambian nation-states, this chapter is not about agency. It is about the changes over time that led to the separatist movement in the Casamance. The history of the Casamance is not only a French or a British story any more than it is only a Senegalese story or a Gambian story or a Wolof or Serer or Jola story. It is a story of complexity and heterogeneity. That is why I strive to demonstrate the complexity in the processes of Islamization, Mandinkization, and colonization along with the changes brought on by the postcolonial neoliberal crisis in Africa. These exogenous factors were not all that shaped Casamançais identity, but they brought changes to the Casamance that separatists like Father Diamacoune and Mamadou Sané were quick to exploit with their version of Casamançais history and geography.

If this periodization privileges colonial history, the fact is that colonial mapping and administration produced “the Casamance” as we know it today. If The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau did not exist as historically produced, postcolonial states, then neither would the Casamance. The Casamance would not exist without colonialism. That does not mean, however, that colonialism was the only important social process involved in producing the contemporary situation in the Casamance.<sup>17</sup> In the end, Casamançais interpreted in their own local ways the social, cultural, economic, and political changes that took place over the century that followed the 1884–85 Berlin Conference. In the ways that they occurred in and around the rice field, those changes are the focus of this chapter.

#### A CIVILIZATION OF RICE: PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, COMMUNITY

For centuries, rice has served as the staple of the diet in the Lower Casamance. Louis-Vincent Thomas called the Casamance a “civilization of rice.”<sup>18</sup> Especially for the Jola, cultivating rice was “a duty.”<sup>19</sup> A meal without rice was not a meal. This “civilization of rice” originated in the rice field, where the rice was grown. But the rice was consumed, of course, at home with family and friends—in community. Hence, rice built community. The MFDC depended, at least in part, on this sense of community in The Rice Field to construct a Casamançais nation.

Rice was not just a source of nutrition to the Jola. It was sacred.<sup>20</sup> In fact, it was as sacred to many Casamançais as the water of The River or the trees of The Forest. The Jola viewed rice as “a gift from Emitai [the Supreme Being] to the ‘first ancestors.’”<sup>21</sup> Rice was sacred not just because wet rice cultivation requires copious amounts of time and hard work or because it fostered a unique culture; rice was sacred because growing it right was a matter of life and death. To the Jola, “the end of work means death.”<sup>22</sup> Thus, many rice fields had their own spirit shrines nearby, where the shrine’s priest prayed for good rains and a bountiful harvest every year.<sup>23</sup>

This fusion of the physical and metaphysical in The Rice Field became an important means for the MFDC to foster Casamançais nationalism. It enabled the imagination of the nation in a place closely tied to Jola cosmologies. As Olga Linares has argued, rice production brought together the spiritual and the material in the Casamance. She contends this fusion was important because “these two ways of looking at the human condition—the ideological and the productive—are deeply connected.” Linares believes that the Jola approach to rice agriculture should be considered a “moral system,” with its own “body of legitimating ideas and beliefs.” Moreover, Linares argues, “The ways in which human beings organize themselves to act upon the physical environment are ideologically structured, and ideologies in turn are forged in interaction.” Linares claims that this system consists not only of “the forces and relations of production” but also of “a body of beliefs and ritual practices.” She asserts that these beliefs “may go under various labels—ideology, religion, superstructure—but the point to remember is that they are at one and the same time social responses and ways of organizing the natural world.” Therefore, these productive processes “are never value-free or neutral, but always informed by vested interests, personal motives and power relationships.”<sup>24</sup>

Linares is correct about the importance of this ideological fusion in the Casamance, but she did not know when she published *Power, Prayer, and Production* in 1992 the degree to which the MFDC would validate her argument.<sup>25</sup> After all, to most Casamançais, there was little difference between the physical and the metaphysical. The Rice Field was spiritual and material at the same time. More importantly, the two were mutually constituted in the Lower Casamance. Rice production depended on the spiritual world of spirit shrines, while the spirit shrines depended on the production of rice to maintain their power. Hence, the fusion of these two worlds enabled the nationalist project of making the nation *real* to Casamançais.

The fusion of the physical and the metaphysical in The Rice Field in the late 1970s made it a contested space shortly before the ignition of the conflict

in 1982. This contestation resulted from the delayed implementation of the 1964 national domain law in Senegal, the onset of twentieth-century climate change, and increased pressure on the land from the migration of northern Senegalese to the Casamance in search of cultivable land. To many Casamançais, this space had always felt like “place.” It was a place where they belonged. They recalled with fondness helping their mothers as young boys or girls plant and transfer the rice shoots into the rice field. Once the boys were old enough, they recalled helping their fathers dig and prepare the rice field for planting, cultivation, and irrigation with a peculiar spade known as the *kayendo* (pronounced “kye-yen-doo”).<sup>26</sup> The *kayendo* is a type of fulcrum-shovel that has become an important cultural icon to the Jola.<sup>27</sup> The use of the *kayendo* became so prevalent in the Lower Casamance—even beyond the Jola—that separatists seized on it, too, as a symbol of Casamançais cultural particularity.<sup>28</sup>

Rice cultivation in the Casamance has typically followed many well-defined steps, worked out over centuries of practice. In many ways, each step of the process has been gendered because of the gendered roles of the community involved in accomplishing them. Joanna Davidson aptly simplifies this “gendered division of labor.” She explains, “A married man and his unmarried sons are responsible for preparing the *butonda* [rice paddy] for rice planting, and a married woman and her unmarried daughters are responsible for transplanting rice seedlings and harvesting ripe rice.”<sup>29</sup> To the extent that a nation has been imagined as a community of both genders in the Casamance, it was first imagined in *The Rice Field*. In Jola families at least, both genders contribute to the process of producing rice; thus, both play a role in providing food for the family.<sup>30</sup> Both feed the family; thus, both help imagine the community.

The nearly continuous process of cultivating rice among the Jola of the Casamance typically consists of the following steps. First, men and women build and nurture the nurseries where rice seedlings will sprout and initially grow. With their *kayendos*, men dig and form the embankments containing the nursery, then dig the ridges and furrows where the rice shoots will grow. Men brace the *kayendo* on their knee while digging and lifting large clods of dirt. The men also broadcast and plant the rice seed. The women weed the field and fertilize it with manure from the family’s cattle. Four to six weeks after planting, the young rice shoots are removed from the nursery and transferred to the fields, where they are replanted. About a week before transplanting, the men prepare the fields by building the embankments, then ridging and furrowing. One of their greatest concerns once the shoots have been transplanted is controlling the salinity of the water in the

rice field. They keep brackish water out by the construction of large dikes. If one of these dikes fails, the entire crop will be lost. They keep fresh water in by a series of sluices and canals. After the rice grows and the water in the field dries up, the rice will be ready to be harvested. Harvesting the rice is normally a community task, as farmers are eager to gather their crop before nature can destroy it. Thus, it behooves the community to unite and perform this task together.<sup>31</sup>

In this way, Casamançais have long performed community in the rice field. Men and women, young and old, play their roles in the process leading to a bountiful harvest of rice. When it is time for harvest, the community displays communal bonds that not only make the harvest possible but also make the community possible, as immediate family members often do not provide enough labor to harvest the crop in a timely manner.<sup>32</sup> As René Capain Bassène explains, “The land in Jola country is a collective good: it belongs to the family or to the village. The farmer cannot just do whatever he wants, even if he is the owner. Land is inherited by autochthones and only occasionally given to strangers.”<sup>33</sup> Thus, rice farmers turn to “work associations” to complete the harvest and other time-sensitive tasks. Work associations are often based on the *hank*, which can refer to the “common residence” formed around an “open area or courtyard as a physical space bearing a proper name (Elufbajat, Hekeniin, Hujok, etc.), to all the men and their unmarried sisters residing around this space, or only to the male household heads occupying tightly clustered buildings surrounded by a common wall or fence.”<sup>34</sup> These work associations based on the *hank*—legacies of the Jola’s collective land tenure—provided a degree of social organization ripe for exploitation by separatists.<sup>35</sup>

Their labor-based performances transformed the rice field into The Rice Field, a cultural icon ripe for exploitation by the MFDC. They provided the means by which the social structure of the conjugal family unit expanded to the extended family, the compound, the village, the region, and finally, the nation.<sup>36</sup> They transformed the *space* of the rice field into the *place* of The Rice Field that nearly everyone in the Casamance knows intimately as a place of belonging.<sup>37</sup> While the cultivation process just described comes from research and scholarship on Jola societies, similar processes have developed in other ethnic communities in the Casamance where rice forms the staple of the diet, such as the Mandinka, the Balanta, the Mancagne, the Manjak, and the Papel.<sup>38</sup> Thus, like The River and The Forest, The Rice Field constitutes an incredibly flexible and powerful symbol for national belonging in the Casamance. The MFDC has used it to imagine the nation not just in Jola societies but across the Casamance.

According to this discourse, Casamançais “know” rice; Senegalese do not. Several oral history informants confirmed this sentiment. A man from Fogy claimed:

I have spent a lot of time in the rice field because it's there that we [men] cultivate so that the women can transplant the rice shoots. Moreover, we help the women, after they harvest the rice, to carry it to our homes. I can say that in northern Senegal there are not many rice fields and that in the Casamance, the rice fields are very important, not only because they provide us sustenance but also because that has been the case since time immemorial for our grandparents. The rice field is the basis of the definition of the Casamance. . . . For me, the rice field is a space of equality for men and women, and you know, all that one earns in the rice field one brings home to eat with one's family.<sup>39</sup>

Indeed, numerous informants suggested that eating homegrown “paddy rice” with one's family was part of what it meant to be Casamançais. To them, eating “sack rice” meant not only participating in the modern market economy but also not really being Casamançais. Bertrand Diamacoune remembered, “My papa never ate rice sold in the boutiques [small shops] because for him, the rice sold in the boutiques had a bad odor. And he was not the only one who thought that; many people from the village thought the same thing.”<sup>40</sup> Diamacoune then explained why it mattered to eat rice that was “Casamançais”: “For me, if there is no link between the nationalist movement and the rice fields, that's not good, because the rice fields permit us to live as much as the river. For me, the majority of the other ethnic groups [in the Casamance] that have followed the actions of the Jola have now become more professional than the Jola with fishing, the cultivation of rice, the planting of orchards, the planting of trees, etc.”<sup>41</sup> Bertrand Diamacoune suggested that the other ethnic groups were taking these symbolic spaces emerging largely from Jola society and making these spaces their own. Coming from a man who often seemed to conflate Jola ethnic nationalism with Casamançais nationalism, this statement points to the importance of The Rice Field as a place of common experience between ethnic groups in the Casamance. Thus, just as The River became *un espace fédérateur*, separatists like the Diamacoune brothers posited The Rice Field in much the same way.<sup>42</sup>

Along with this multiethnic character, other agricultural spaces joined The Rice Field as places where the nation was performed. The Rice Field in the Casamance was not always indicative of the Casamance as a “civilization

of rice” as much as “civilizations of rice” . . . and other things. In other words, “the rice field” has always been plural, even though Thomas’s “civilization of rice” model privileges Jola rice agriculture over that of other ethnic groups in the region. In fact, nearly every ethnic group along the Upper Guinea Coast developed a civilization of rice because rice was the staple of their diets. Thomas’s unit of analysis, however, was the Jola, which is why he fashioned the Jola in particular as constituting a civilization of rice. Indeed, the Jola are the majority ethnic group of the Lower Casamance, where all of the separatist violence has occurred. Like the Jola, other ethnic groups of the Lower Casamance also tapped and drank palm wine and grew peanuts and millet. In fact, they often looked forward to drinking some palm wine at the end of a long day in the rice field. In this way, cultivating rice and drinking palm wine were closely linked.<sup>43</sup>

At least for the men. One often finds a group of men in the contemporary Casamance sitting around, drinking palm wine, and talking loudly about sports, politics, women, and so forth—like men in just about any other contemporary society. But one seldom finds a group of Casamançais women doing the same thing, unless they are working while they talk—and usually without the palm wine. The women simply do not have time to waste. Many Casamançais women wake up early to walk to the river or to the nearest water source to fetch water for the morning’s cooking and cleaning. They take care of the young children while the men prepare to go to the rice fields. Then they join the men in the rice fields to work. After a hard day of working in the rice field, as the men unwind drinking palm wine, the women prepare dinner while watching the young children. In the meantime, they may need to fetch more water. After serving the family dinner, they clean up from the meal. They collapse onto a mat at the end of the day, hoping to catch a few hours of sleep before waking up to start the same routine the next day.

Such a routine has allowed few Casamançais women time to play a large role in public life. Nevertheless, many have—the Jola priestess Aline Sitoé Diatta being the most famous example. But even this limited public role represents a change over time for Casamançais women. Women in the precolonial era participated on an equal basis with men in village palavers to discuss situations affecting everyone in the village.<sup>44</sup> Colonization, Mandinkization, and Islamization eventually reduced female participation in these community discussions. Colonization eventually brought Christian ideas about the abolition of slavery, which left women to cover the subsequent labor shortages, and proper gender roles that drove women out of the public square.<sup>45</sup> Mandinkization eventually drove men out of the rice field and into

the peanut field, dividing the space for an agricultural “imagined community”: in Mandinka society, men tended to the peanut fields while women tended to the rice fields. Islamization eventually separated, spatially, men and women by gender while privileging male clerical leadership.<sup>46</sup> Thus, in most of the spaces where a nation could be imagined, men were left increasingly alone to do the imagining; women were increasingly relegated to the hank to oversee domestic life.

While the “civilization of rice” may have been more diverse than its title might suggest, it was a civilization that linked together various groups of people in the Casamance so that they could “imagine” themselves as a single community, “inherently limited and sovereign.” As Benedict Anderson explains, “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”<sup>47</sup> In the Casamance, this “communion” took place, first, in the rice field, then around a bowl of rice. Even if a family in Casa did not know a family in Combo, they “knew” The Rice Field together. Through The Rice Field, they were linked, especially against “invaders” and “strangers” from the north and the east.<sup>48</sup>

#### 1850–1920: ISLAMIZATION AND THE MANDINKIZATION OF THE CASAMANCE

The Rice Field first began to take shape as a place of Casamançais cultural distinction along with ideas about nations and nationalism during the late nineteenth century, as European colonialism steadily spread across the African continent. Concurrent with this colonization, Islam spread to the Lower Casamance from Muslim traders coming from northern and eastern Senegal. These trade networks also began to influence the ethnic identity of the Lower Casamance, as Jola and Bainouk traders increasingly found it in their interest to adopt Mandinka cultural markers along with Islam.

Mandinkization allegedly marked a process of significant change in the Lower Casamance, thought to affect religious practices, land tenure, gender roles, and agriculture. This process was initiated along with the colonization and Islamization of the region after 1850, with a resulting “social structure in mutation.”<sup>49</sup> Much like the process of ethnic mixing that took place when the Jola absorbed and replaced the Bainouk in the Lower Casamance during the seventeenth century, the Mandinka increasingly absorbed and replaced the Jola during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.<sup>50</sup> In fact, caught between the expansion of the Jola from the coastline to the south and west and that of the Mandinka from the east, the Bainouk seemed to disappear after 1600—though not completely. They can still be found in the Lower Casamance as well as in the wider diaspora, but over time, they surrendered

their position as middlemen in the changing borderland along the Casamance River to the Jola and especially to the Mandinka.<sup>51</sup>

This absorption and hybridization was partly cultural and partly economic. While the Jola, Manjak, Mancagne, and Balanta focused their agricultural activity on rice production, the Mandinka focused on the production of peanuts for trade with the French, especially after 1850 in the area surrounding the French trading post at Sédhiou.<sup>52</sup> The Senegambian region's increasing involvement in international trade meant that more farmers tried to substitute peanuts for rice—the growing seasons for these two crops were virtually identical—even though peanuts were not the dietary staple that rice was. Though these farmers had less rice on hand after the harvest, they had more currency for purchasing imported rice, grain, and other goods.<sup>53</sup> Thus, the market facilitated the Mandinkization of the Lower Casamance.

Mandinkization also affected the type of rice grown and consumed in the Lower Casamance. In 1850, the French *résident* at Carabane, Bertrand-Bocandé, reported that Casamançais grew two types of rice: red rice and white rice. Red rice, of the type *Oryza glaberrima*, also became known as “African rice,” because it was considered indigenous to West Africa, particularly the Upper Guinea Coast. Over time, it became less desirable than white rice for commercial trade because of the quality and quantity of the yield. The Portuguese introduced white rice to West Africa after bringing it from East and Southeast Asia. From the family *Oryza sativa*, white rice became known in the Casamance as “Portuguese rice” or, because of the Mandinka role in international trade in the region, as “Mandinka rice.” Eventually, red rice was also referred to as “old rice” or “Jola rice.”<sup>54</sup> These changing labels demonstrated the flux of identities involved in rice production and commerce in the Casamance borderland.

Along with this change in economic activity, many Jola increasingly found it in their interest when trading with Mandinka to become Muslim like the Mandinka, Wolof, and Toucouleur from the north and east. Linares asserts that “the first Manding families were welcomed because they were in a position to lead the local inhabitants in the learning and practicing of their new religion.”<sup>55</sup> In other words, the Mandinka could help the Jola learn how to be Muslim, and being Muslim implied improved opportunities for trade and commerce, especially for Jola who matched their new religion with the cultivation of a new cash crop: peanuts.

Increasingly, Mandinkization implied that the rice field had to give way to the peanut field and that women had to give way to men. Whereas Casamançais farmers had focused on rice production for centuries, by

1975, when discussions about Casamançais separatism began to gain frequency and volume, peanut production outpaced rice production, as the Casamance produced 134,030 metric tons of peanuts and 86,510 tons of rice. While Casamançais increasingly cultivated peanuts for the market, many of them grew rice for the purpose of subsistence.<sup>56</sup> The Mandinka gender division of labor between the rice field and the peanut field sent men from the peanut field to the market while relegating women to the rice field and the domestic sphere. But shifting crop production also implied that fewer Casamançais (as a percentage of total population) were focused on producing rice for the Casamançais diet. Ignoring the possibility of growing enough rice to feed all of Senegal, Casamançais—partly because many Jola refused to sell their rice—barely grew enough to feed themselves.<sup>57</sup> As Jean-Claude Marut quips, “If there is a ‘rice basket of Senegal,’ it’s in Thailand, not in the Casamance!” Mandinkization initiated this move to increased importation of rice for the Senegalese diet, with imports now supplying about 80 percent of Senegalese rice.<sup>58</sup>

The success of this Mandinkization seems surprising, given the manner in which it started in the second half of the nineteenth century. Two Mandinka warlords—Foday Kaba, from the kingdom of Pakao, a country to the east of the Soungrougrou River, in what is now considered the Middle Casamance, and later, Foday Sylla, from Gunjur in what is now southwestern Gambia, used Islam as an excuse for raiding and forcefully converting Jola villages in Fogny (the area south of Combo and north of Bignona on the north shore of the Casamance River) between 1877 and 1893.<sup>59</sup> The “raiding *marabouts*” from Pakao and Gunjur killed or enslaved hundreds of Jola. They terrorized numerous Jola villages in the region.

They freely pillaged the Jola until they ran afoul of colonial interests. In 1890, Foday Sylla began opposing and harassing the surveying activities of the British-French Boundary Commission. Before the survey began (as noted in the previous chapter), the surveyors had told Sylla that the colonial border would not divide “his country” of the Combo. As the border took shape, however, it became clear that the border did in fact divide his country. The British eventually chased Sylla out of the area, into exile in Saint-Louis in northern Senegal. But the inroads to the area for other Mandinka were not so easily undone. The Lower Casamance—at least on the north bank of the river—was becoming more and more Muslim and more and more Mandinka. That meant more and more peanut cultivation.

Paul Pélissier was the first scholar to note this social process of Mandinkization among the Jola. What is most striking is not the transformation of certain Jola cultural traits but the transformation of social structures.

Again, the link between the cultural and the social, between the metaphysical and the physical, appears to be real and significant to people on the ground. Pélissier explained:

The Jola, hard-working and after profit, essentially anxious to accumulate rice and to augment their cattle, have borrowed from the Mandinka, not only their religious conceptions, but also their lifestyle and their hierarchy of values. These peasants, rustic and concrete, have become, in the image of their models, contemplative and attached to long words. Real wealth is no longer based on material things; their love of work and sense of land have singularly diminished. At the same time, women have assumed in this new society a role comparable to the one occupied by women among the Mandinka.<sup>60</sup>

This last sentence implied a regression for Jola women's participation in the public sphere.<sup>61</sup>

Linares suggests that we should not be surprised by such social change. She also questions the uniformity of these social categories, as there are always exceptions to identities. She claims that "no one ever carries a single identity. Members of all societies simultaneously hold a whole range of identities in the same way as they occupy a number of statuses and play a variety of roles."<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, scholars of the Lower Casamance concur that Mandinkization brought significant social and cultural changes to the region. There may be exceptions to monolithic categories of identity, but these categories had meaning to those Casamançais on the ground. And the categories appeared to manifest in material ways. Beyond religion and the dominant crop type, how else did Mandinkization affect Jola identity? And why did it matter to the separatist movement?

It matters because rebelling against peanut production became congruent with rebelling against colonial rule. Mandinkization became integrated with colonization and Islamization. Once the colonial authorities forged what David Robinson calls their "paths of accommodation" with Sufi marabouts from the Senegalese peanut basin, resisting peanut production—especially south of the Casamance River where Islamization and Mandinkization failed to expand as rapidly as in Fogny—became synonymous with resisting the assertion of a Senegalese national identity.<sup>63</sup>

Eventually, however, Mandinka were accepted as "Casamançais" in a way that other Muslim migrants were not. Because of their increasing presence over centuries of trade and cultural exchange, separatists viewed the Mandinka as "Casamançais." But they labeled the Wolof and Toucouleur as

“strangers,” even though many Wolof families had also been living and trading in the Casamance for generations.<sup>64</sup> The nearly simultaneous advances of Islam and Christianity in the Casamance compelled Father Diamacoune to assign the traditional beliefs of “the sacred forest” to Casamançais national identity instead of Christianity, as one might expect from a Christian cleric. That way, he could avoid dividing the Casamançais nation between Christians and Muslims.<sup>65</sup> He could avoid alienating the majority of Mandinka.

Mandinkization implied that Jola could not reject the Mandinka without rejecting themselves. Because Mandinkization occurred partly through biological mixing, it became a very intimate process. It was not a political phenomenon that became domestic. It was a domestic phenomenon that became political, as more Mandinka and Jola married one another. Yet its political usefulness to the modern MFDC was also limited because of this process of internalization. In addition, by 1982, when the Casamance conflict began, the Mandinka had been in the Lower Casamance for centuries. The Wolof and the Toucouleur, by contrast, had not—at least not in large numbers. Moreover, the Mandinka social structure, while more hierarchical than that of the Jola, was not as hierarchical or as monolithic as the Wolof and other ethnic groups from the north.<sup>66</sup> Consequently, Jola land tenure practices—allegedly damaged or ignored by the Senegalese state, according to the MFDC—more closely matched those of the Mandinka than those of the Wolof and Toucouleur.

Finally, one must question the extent of Mandinkization overall in the Lower Casamance. Though the area around Sédhiou has certainly been known for more than a century as Mandinka country, most of the Lower Casamance was not. It was firmly regarded as Jola, even north of the river in Fogny, Buluf, Thionk-Essyl, and Combo. Thus, Mandinkization does not appear to have changed the primary identity of the Lower Casamance to the same extent as the earlier Jola and Mandinka absorptions of the Bainouk. Linares’s assertion that “no one ever carries a single identity” continues to appear apt. Nationalist movements seldom deal in such nuance, however.

While the majority of Jola separatists did not directly demonize the Mandinka, they tended to demonize peanuts, the cultivation of which was closely tied to the Sufi marabouts of northern Senegal. A Dakar billboard in turn tied peanut production to the Senegalese president in the 1990s, Abdou Diouf, who was certainly demonized by Diamacoune and other separatist leaders. The billboard read, “Peanuts: The Revolution of Abdou Diouf.”<sup>67</sup> Diamacoune and the MFDC made their message clear: Diouf’s revolution should be resisted in the Casamance. A real Casamançais—an “authentic son of the Casamance”—grew rice. The ethnic implications of this discourse

were clear but seldom directly stated by anyone except the Senegalese government, which often accused the MFDC of advancing Jola “tribalism.” Nevertheless, the MFDC tied Casamançais “authenticity” more to (Jola) rice production than (Mandinka) peanut production.

#### 1850–1920: COLONIZATION AND NATIONALISM IN THE CASAMANCE

It would be erroneous, however, to deduce that only separatism brought conflicts over the proprietorship of rice fields to the Casamance, as if people living in the Casamance never found reasons before independence to argue over who had the right to certain tracts of land. While colonization largely contributed to conflicts over land, it did so primarily in the areas where the colonial state maintained some sort of presence. In areas where the colonial presence was less prominent, Africans still found reasons to contest proprietorship over land—as demonstrated by the Maraboutic Wars led by Foday Kaba and Foday Sylla.

Hence, Africans and Europeans—neither of which were monolithic categories in the Casamance—both contributed to conflicts over land. Several incidents in 1914 demonstrated that both contributed to confrontations over rice fields. One related to a riot between two villages in the Department of Oussouye—a Jola village called M’Lomp and a Wolof village called Loudia—that led to seven people being injured. The riot developed over who had the right to particular rice fields. Most of the correspondence on the matter consisted of telegraph traffic between the administrator of the *cercle* of Ziguinchor, M. de Coppet, and the superior administrator of the Casamance, M. Richard Brunot. The French arrested four of the perpetrators and sent them to prison for various terms, most of about one year.<sup>68</sup>

Another incident, which took place in 1913, related to a disagreement between the governments of France and Portugal over the rights of farmers from Portuguese Guinea to farm rice fields in Fouladou, on the French side of the border, particularly in relation to the village of Faquino. The Portuguese Guinean farmers had been allowed to do so in the past, as long as they paid a tax on their rice harvest. But evidently they stopped paying. French colonial officials were trying to figure out how to reinstitute the tax and how much to charge. The officials decided they needed to meet with Portuguese representatives to work out any future problems over the border. According to M. Maclaud, the superior administrator, it would be a simple matter of properly demarcating the border so that local villagers knew which rice fields were in Portuguese Guinea and which were in Senegal. Indeed, he noted that the border was, in fact, marked in the area but that it was also in need of an intermediary mark so that people on both sides of the border

would know for sure where the border was. Maclaud also noted, however, that there were natural impediments to properly surveying and physically demarcating the border.<sup>69</sup>

Clearly, colonial boundaries played a role in this confrontation. Though Africans could find reasons to fight one another on their own, colonialism often complicated matters. As with the Casamance River, colonial mapping had an effect on the rice field—or at least on the social relations that took place in or around it. And just because a border was clearly marked did not mean that people on either side of the border would necessarily comply with the limitations it implied. Clearly an important factor in the colonial period, land tenure would also become an important factor in the late 1970s in fueling the Casamance conflict, as discussed later.<sup>70</sup>

That these three processes—Islamization, Mandinkization, and colonization—took place simultaneously in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Casamance matters because of what they produced together: nationalism. Of these three, colonization was the necessary condition required for nationalism to take root in the Casamance the way it did. As colonial elites studied the histories of European nations in missionary and colonial schools, colonialism changed the meaning of the rice field to represent a particular Casamançais cultural identity in opposition to the recently arrived exogenous forces of Islam, Christianity, and peanut production. As these men increasingly defined a Senegalese and/or Casamançais nation in their own interests, Casamançais women increasingly found themselves pushed out of the village palaver and back into their houses.<sup>71</sup> Some were pushed there because Mandinka men refused to grow rice when they could sell peanuts to the French and buy rice from the market. Some were pushed there because Mandinka men had turned to producing peanuts for the market, and these men considered growing peanuts as men's work and growing rice as women's work. But even for Jola families in which both genders still worked the rice fields, men dealt with external markets while women dealt with feeding the family at home. Women found themselves increasingly excluded from politics—until a Jola priestess began praying for rain.

#### RESURRECTING A PROPHETESS:

##### ALINE SITOÉ DIATTA AND THE JOLA REBELLION OF 1942

To construct the postcolonial Rice Field as a place for performing a Casamançais national identity, Diamacoune resurrected a history from the middle of the colonial era regarding colonial rice requisition during World War II. He gave a speech in 1980 at a conference at the Dakar Chamber of

Commerce delineating Casamançais grievances against the Senegalese state while commemorating the events surrounding the emergence in 1942 of Aline Sitoé Diatta. Diatta was a Jola priestess from Kabrousse—a village in the far southwest corner of the Casamance—who gained a following from Jola all over the Casamance and northwestern Portuguese Guinea for the success of her rain ceremonies following a long period of drought in the early 1940s. After Diatta began her rain ceremonies, the rain began to fall, saving the rice crop that had appeared to be doomed to failure that year. Like many Jola women at the time, she had migrated to Dakar to perform domestic service for a French family. But after receiving a vision directing her back to her native village to become a prophet for a particular shrine, she was struck lame. According to tradition, her lameness was punishment for her not returning to the Casamance when divine revelation first directed her to go.<sup>72</sup> Finally, Diatta returned “home” in 1942 and began to preach for the shrine. A colonial report characterized the essential points of her “doctrine”:

- The rain, without which there will be no abundant harvest, will only fall if you follow my orders.
- I received these orders from God, who I see every night and who struck me with an infirmity because I was afraid for a long time to speak to men in his name. [A separate footnote to the text of the report states, “This woman, still young (25 to 30 years old), is lame from an irreparable dislocated right knee, after an accident a few years back. She can only move with the assistance of two canes.”]
- All those who do not obey me will be struck by God to whom I will refer them.<sup>73</sup>

None of these doctrinal aspects bothered colonial officials as much as the interpretations of this doctrine. Aline Sitoé claimed that this doctrine implied the following: “Based on the prestige she acquired from obtaining abundant rains, followed by an excellent rice harvest (the preceding year having been dry), she prescribed, along with her following of sorcerers and henchmen, to stop obeying the White Man, to stop providing him with military recruits, to stop providing him with forced rice purchases for the constitution of his reserves, and to stop maintaining the roads so that he can control what’s happening in the region.”<sup>74</sup> In short, Diatta preached resistance to the colonial regime. Before things could tumble too far out of their control, colonial officials sent a detachment of troops to Kabrousse in December 1942 to arrest Diatta and seventeen of her male companions. They shipped Diatta to prison at Kayes, in Mali.<sup>75</sup> After being transferred to another prison in Timbuktu, Diatta died in 1944 from scurvy.<sup>76</sup> In any case, she was never

heard from again, transforming her into a martyr for the modern MFDC's burgeoning separatist movement in the late 1970s, as detailed by Father Diamacoune at his chamber of commerce speech in 1980.

Before explaining the importance of the symbolism of Diatta to what Father Diamacoune referred to in his speech as "Casamançais autonomy," he took advantage of the need to place her story "in context" to recount three hundred years of a long Casamançais history, starting with the establishment in 1645 of the Portuguese trading post at Ziguinchor.<sup>77</sup> Finally, after about twelve pages of this history, Diamacoune got to Aline Sitoé, stating that she was called by "the Sky" to transmit a message to "all people, in all places, but especially to her compatriots in the Casamance."<sup>78</sup> After recounting the story of her message to resist colonial requisitions of men and rice, which led to her arrest and exile, Diamacoune noted other prophetesses who followed in the tradition of Diatta.<sup>79</sup> He claimed that Al-oendisso Bassène, when she was arrested, cried out, "The Casamance for Casamançais! All strangers get out!" Diamacoune concluded, "With these historical milestones considered, we can see that colonial domination has never been easily exercised in the Casamance. But once that national independence was gained in a Senegalese context, should we assume the sudden death of Casamançais resistance 315 years old? The question remains. History will give us the answer. What I know is that there are awakenings that shake the world."<sup>80</sup> Thus, Diamacoune sought to equate Aline Sitoé's resistance to the French with MFDC resistance to the Senegalese, intentionally comparing the "colonialism" of France to that of Senegal. He tied the exploitation of Casamançais rice and conscripts in 1942 to, allegedly, that of 1980. As the sacred source of life in the Casamance, The Rice Field became a potent symbolic weapon when wielded by Diamacoune.

But the Senegalese government was not about to surrender Diatta or her memory to the MFDC. Instead, President Abdou Diouf answered Diamacoune's call from the Dakar Chamber of Commerce with an investigation to determine what happened to "the Senegalese Joan of Arc" after she was sent to Kayes, positing her as a heroine for all of Senegal, not just the Casamance.<sup>81</sup> After all, she waged her resistance against the French colonial state, not against the independent Senegalese state. Diamacoune argued that they were one and the same. But Diouf, in what the editors of *Sud-Weekend* called a "pathetic" attempt to call for peace in 1999—at the height of one of the most murderous times of the conflict—quickly realized that history was a field ripe for contestation. If the MFDC could contest Senegalese history, then Senegal could contest Casamançais history—at least as written by the separatists. The editors lamented, "Obviously, the history

taught in Senegalese schools up until now has not really contributed to the construction of the nation based on a historical reality accounting for the degree of mixing and of osmosis of populations, which has taken place over the course of centuries in Senegambia.”<sup>82</sup> The Diouf regime tried to blunt MFDC criticism of Senegalese history for focusing on anticolonial Muslim leaders from the north at the expense of Casamançais history. Contesting the discourse surrounding Diatta’s arrest and disappearance enabled the Diouf regime to do that. In effect, the Senegalese state and the MFDC contested the symbolism of Diatta’s life.

Whether Diatta was an icon of Senegalese or Casamançais nationalism, to Anne McClintock, such a symbolic role for women is typical. She argues, “Women are typically construed as the symbolic bearers of the nation, but are denied any direct relation to national agency.”<sup>83</sup> In spite of the historical agency Diatta demonstrated through her anticolonial resistance, Diatta’s death enabled elite men representing the Senegalese state and the MFDC to squabble over the symbolism of her life—and her death. These men were arguing—and later fighting—over the honor of a woman, with virtually no other women in the argument.

Yet, just as they do in rice fields all over the Casamance, women have played important roles in the Casamance conflict, taking up the mantle of Aline Sitoé Diatta to act politically. A women’s association brought about a resolution during the standoff in 1980 between striking students, separatists, and the Senegalese government during a nationwide student strike that led to riots and the death of Idrissa Sagna, a young student from Ziguinchor.<sup>84</sup> Women—some of them topless to shame their husbands and sons into peaceful action—led the procession during the separatist march in Ziguinchor in 1982, pouring cool water on the ground to symbolize their allegedly peaceful intentions.<sup>85</sup> And women like Seynabou Male Cissé have led the push for peace in the Casamance, forming associations like the Platform of Women for Peace in the Casamance, as discussed later in this chapter.<sup>86</sup>

#### THE RICE FIELD IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

All over Africa, 1960 was a year of hope, as many African nations obtained independence from colonial rule. Senegal was no different. Ignoring the short union with Mali in the Mali Federation, Senegalese national leaders chose April 4, 1960, as the date to be remembered for Senegalese independence. Quickly, nationalist leaders had to learn how to govern nations of great diversity and weak national unity. Frederick Cooper wrote that the only thing that changed at independence was that a few Black men replaced a few

White men in African state houses and presidential palaces. Otherwise, the colonial regime—politically and economically—remained mostly intact.<sup>87</sup> Senegal had largely been operating with autonomy since the introduction of the French Union Territorial Assembly in the late 1950s.<sup>88</sup> Thus, that the new, independent Senegalese government looked to the Casamance as its “rice basket,” just as the French had, may have seemed perfectly natural.

Ironically, the Senegalese government contributed to making The Rice Field an icon of the Casamance. Shortly after independence, Prime Minister Mamadou Dia published the “First Plan for the Development of Senegal,” charting a future course for the new independent Senegalese state, based on the Senegalese version of “African socialism.” He requested 400 million U.S. dollars in foreign assistance from Western leaders like U.S. Vice President Lyndon Johnson, in Dakar in 1961 to mark the first anniversary of Senegalese independence.<sup>89</sup> Dia, along with President Léopold Senghor, distinguished this “Senegalese socialism” from European socialism by its African identity, depicted as inherently “agrarian.” It was “African, because it will not trample on the spiritual values of Africa (religion holds an important place in African life), and agrarian, because, currently, only the agricultural sector is entirely in the hands of nationalists.”<sup>90</sup> Rice production was an important aspect of this plan for national consolidation. More than any other crop in Senegal, Casamançais rice production combined the material and the spiritual in a way that resonated with “Senegalese socialism,” derived from Senghor’s philosophy of *négritude*. Senegalese, including Casamançais, fashioned this ideology as “African” and “agrarian.” Thus, the Casamance was eventually fashioned as *le grenier du Sénégal*, or “the rice basket of Senegal.” Even though the Casamance became a rice importer, this image of the Casamance as the principal rice-producing region of Senegal remained.<sup>91</sup>

Postcolonial Casamançais elites like Emile Badiane and Assane Seck supported the construction of this image of the Casamance. To them, it was not a question of Senegalese “exploitation” of Casamançais rice for Senegalese profit. Rather, they seemed pleased to have something to offer for the construction of the Senegalese nation.<sup>92</sup> While Senghor needed them and the votes of Casamançais and other Senegalese from the former *indigénat* (French West Africa outside of the Four Communes—Dakar, Saint-Louis, Rufisque, and Gorée) to defeat Lamine Guèye, his political rival from the Four Communes, Badiane and Seck needed Senghor to facilitate their routes to political power.<sup>93</sup> At the time, this relationship between elites of the different regions of Senegal was considered by both sides as mutually beneficial. There was little question of exploitation. And there was little question of the Casamance not remaining part of Senegal after independence.

This fact did not stop the MFDC from constructing history to suit its own purposes in the postcolonial era. Indeed, the author of “La voix de la Casamance’ . . . une parole diola” (“The voice of the Casamance” . . . a Jola discourse) argued that Senegal had “condemned the Casamance to economic death.”<sup>94</sup> The MFDC had published this manifesto in 1985, with an introduction by French scholar Dominique Darbon, who called it “the foundational document of the Casamançais nationalist movement.”<sup>95</sup> The document was likely written by Diamacoune.<sup>96</sup> Ironically, Diamacoune and other separatist leaders conflated the icon of the Casamançais rice peasant with the formation of the nationalist elite during the late colonial era. The MFDC’s historical memories of Badiane, in particular, memorialized him as a peasant martyr for the Casamance. Badiane died in 1972 under mysterious circumstances. The Senegalese state never declared the cause of his death, and it has never appeared in any Senegalese newspapers.<sup>97</sup> The MFDC nearly elided Badiane’s reputation as one of the most intelligent students in all of French West Africa, leading to his outstanding effectiveness as a Senegalese statesman, by emphasizing his background as a peasant and a rice-grower. Indeed, recent publications continue this trend, though rendering Badiane’s legacy in equal terms of peasant, educator, and man of state.<sup>98</sup> But, the MFDC quipped, Badiane’s contributions to the Senegalese nation were only ignored because, after all, “recognizing others is not a Senegalese virtue.”<sup>99</sup> The MFDC constantly demonized Senegal while valorizing only particular Senegalese leaders whose actions seemed agreeable to MFDC purposes.

Thus, in addition to Badiane, the MFDC claimed none other than the first prime minister of Senegal, the Muslim Wolof leader Mamadou Dia, as an early sympathizer of Casamançais separatism, despite his role in campaigning for acceptance and funding of the “First Quadrennial Plan for the Development of Senegal.” The MFDC asserted:

Everyone knows how the important part of the Casamance in the First Plan, developed when Mamadou Dia was president of the council, was sabotaged. . . . The part of the Casamance in the first quadrennial plan has been sabotaged to the point that Mamadou Dia, well placed to know and to say, could speak of “the Casamance, a region betrayed.” The Senegalese pushed this betrayal to the point of cynicism by recruiting some Jola peasants to go and cultivate the rice fields of the Senegal River valley. So much for the rice fields of the Casamance, which are more spread out and easier to manage.<sup>100</sup>

According to this discourse, the Senegalese were exploiting not only the space of The Rice Field for agricultural production but also the bodies that

labored therein, stealing them away from the Casamance to produce rice in the Senegal River valley! That Dia was later imprisoned following what Senghor considered an attempted coup made Dia another martyr and an exceptionally effective symbol of “Senegalese betrayal.”<sup>101</sup> In fact, it is hard to imagine MFDC affinity for Dia without this shared history of “betrayal.”

Thus, the actions of late-colonial Senegalese nationalists like Senghor, Badiane, and Dia effectively linked The Rice Field as a symbol of the Casamance in the early colonial period—through Islamization, Mandinization, and colonization—to separatism for men like Diamacoune and Sané in the postcolonial period. The separatists quickly pounced on the opportunity to use this symbolic Rice Field to tar the Senegalese nation as “other” and as a nation of “strangers.” They necessarily turned to history to establish this link, as demonstrated by the discourse of grievance formulated in the late 1970s.

#### 1970–90: LAND, LOSS, AND GRIEVANCE

The second transformative period in the construction of The Rice Field as a spatial symbol of the Casamance began about ten to fifteen years after Senegalese independence. This construction resulted from a confluence of factors that emerged from the increasing connectivity of the Casamance to the rest of the world—connections in the making since the precolonial period that found a new intensity and pace in the early 1970s. If the MFDC fashioned The Rice Field as the place for the demonstration of this peasant identity, then it fashioned the tourist resort hotel as the place of the peasant’s betrayal. Along with the confluence of other factors in the 1970s, a burgeoning tourist trade emerged as Europeans discovered the beautiful white beaches, the lazy marshlands, the verdant rice fields, the tall, striking palm and silkcotton trees, and the welcoming smiles of Casamançais. The Casamance had much to offer European tourists, especially during the long winters of northern Europe. As French historian Christian Roche explained: “The Casamance leaves no one unaffected when it appears for the first time in the eyes of the traveler. Whether one comes to the Casamance for tourism or for professional reasons, it leaves a lasting, indelible impression. Its generous natural beauty, illuminated by a striking sun eight months out of the year, the softness and gentleness of its populations are some of the good things searched for by the man tired of the nefarious aspects of industrial life.”<sup>102</sup> The question was who would profit from helping tired Europeans escape “the nefarious aspects of industrial life.”

To many Casamançais, it should have been them, since it was their climate, their beaches, their land, their river, and their cuisine—on a bed

of rice—that the Europeans came to enjoy. Even those with colonial ties believed that those who labored to produce a product should benefit from its production and marketing. In his 1942 exposé explaining the “advantage and necessity” of Casamançais “autonomy,” Jules Malbranque quipped, “The riches of the land belong almost solely in the arms of those who cultivate it.”<sup>103</sup> John Lonsdale later echoed this sentiment in the context of the Kikuyu “moral economy” related to Kenya’s Mau Mau conflict.<sup>104</sup> Lonsdale argued that “fathers worked for their sons,” building capital in land through hard work to prepare the land for planting. Jola rice farmers were reported to have a similar sort of “moral economy” based on the labor to clear and develop the land.<sup>105</sup> This was also the argument presented by Casamançais separatists, built on the culture of Jola work regimes.<sup>106</sup>

For example, a high school English teacher named Ansoumana Abba Bodian took up the cause in the 1970s of the residents of Kadior, a neighborhood near the center of Ziguinchor. A French resort company named Socitour took advantage of Senegalese efforts to enforce the confusing 1964 national domain law, effectively expelling dozens of residents from their homes.<sup>107</sup> Bodian, in a letter to the gendarme commander of Ziguinchor, protested that this was a “seditious” act effectively “entombing” the residents of Kadior “while living.” He claimed that the alienation of the residents of Kadior from their land was worse than anything experienced under “colonial rule.” He queried, “Why must [Socitour] pull us out of our famous underdevelopment by expropriating us from the fruit of our sweat? Can they not install themselves somewhere else better suited for plantations?”<sup>108</sup> Bodian’s letter epitomizes the kind of documents written by Casamançais separatists forming their discourse of grievance against Senegal: protesting their exploitation, placing all blame on the Senegalese and/or the French, featuring the innocence of the Casamançais involved, and highlighting at all times the colonial nature of the transaction.

But few Casamançais rice peasants in the 1960s and 1970s were well prepared to interact with European tourists from industrialized economies. By contrast, traditionally pastoralist traders and merchants from northern Senegal, like the Wolof and Toucouleur—increasingly prevalent in the Casamance because of environmental pressures in the north—were. To many Casamançais, northerners seemed to be getting all the best jobs in the tourism sector, cheating the Casamançais once again out of something good that should have belonged to them.

Father Diamacoune contributed to this discourse, peppering *Pays du refus* with accounts of lands seized by “northerners.” For instance, he claimed:

Some lands in and around Ziguinchor have been snatched from their legitimate owners to construct: the entrance to the Emile Badiane Bridge, the SODIZI [the Ziguinchor Industrial Company], the bus station, a wood treatment factory, the Aline Sitoé Diatta Stadium, the Socitour Hotel, and so on, in order to give them to certain Senegalese northerners. “They took everything from us!” revealed the voices of some crying mothers, with all of their modest livelihood, with no compensation—alas, we must state. All of their lands. Often to the profit of Senegalese. Sometimes, the entire landholdings of Casamançais have been seized in order to offer them to newly arrived Senegalese—fields, houses, trees, etc.—all of these without the least compensation.<sup>109</sup>

Statements like these combined with actual conditions on the ground from climate change, desiccation, desertification, and migration to form a discourse pitting “authentic” Casamançais against thieving northern Senegalese. The MFDC asserted that life was hard and getting harder for Casamançais, while Senegalese “migrants” grinned on their way to the bank. The separatists pitted Casamançais decline against Senegalese profit. This discourse resonated with many Casamançais.

Thus, leaders of the MFDC quickly made The Rice Field one of the cultural symbols of difference with Senegal and the Senegalese. In his 170-page essay largely devoted to explaining Casamançais identity in opposition to that of Senegal, Father Diamacoune mentioned “rice” (*le riz*) or “rice field” (*la rizière*) fifty-two times. The largest chapter in his essay, 103 pages long, is entitled “Identité Casamançaise” (Casamançais identity). The majority of the references to rice or rice fields appear in this chapter. In most instances, Diamacoune referred to The Rice Field to explain how the French or the Senegalese—the MFDC considered them equal colonial partners in the Casamance—had exploited Casamançais rice fields for the benefit of Dakar or Paris or both.<sup>110</sup>

As noted earlier, there could hardly be a more sacred spatial symbol to Casamançais. For many Casamançais, the rice field held particular importance for their identity, regardless of what Father Diamacoune or any other member of the MFDC said. In other words, this spatial symbol was not entirely the discursive construction of the separatists. Ordinary Casamançais had also forged their own ties to this space-place. For many of them, the rice field was not a male-gendered place for realizing the nation in political terms. Rather, it was a space of social equality as men and women played equally important roles in producing rice for their families.

One Casamançais refugee in The Gambia claimed: “The rice fields provide a foundation for what it means to be Casamançais. . . . For me, the rice field is a space of equality for men and women. All that we earn together in the rice field we bring home to eat together as a family.”<sup>111</sup> Work together. Eat together. These activities in The Rice Field—contrasted against life in northern Senegal—provided the communal bonds by which the Casamançais nation could be imagined.

Therefore, violation of The Rice Field, like the alleged violations of The River and The Forest, was tantamount to sacrilege. Diamacoune explained, “It is important to underline that, among the Casamançais in general and the Jola in particular, the land is inalienable: it cannot be sold.”<sup>112</sup> On a personal level for Diamacoune, this resentment likely began with his interaction as a young boy with colonial troops, who burned his uncle’s beard off in front of the whole village of Senghalen (Diamacoune’s native village, west of Ziguinchor) in 1933. The uncle was the village chief, and the French apparently thought humiliating him in front of the villagers would serve as an example for others who failed to render the prescribed quota of rice for colonial troops.<sup>113</sup> In any case, Diamacoune often equated Senegalese “colonialism” with such narratives from the French colonial era.<sup>114</sup>

In a section of “La voix de la Casamance” with the heading “Senegalese Colonialism,” the MFDC claimed that Senegal was “bent on occupying and destroying the natural and traditional rice fields, which year after year, with an average annual rainfall, have produced rice in sufficient quantities. This self-sufficiency made the Casamançais freer and more independent. . . . The natural rice fields, of which the people have control, will be replaced by dams in the hands of Senegalese masters capable of starving us.”<sup>115</sup> Thus, from the earliest foundations of the modern MFDC, separatists posited The Rice Field as a space of contestation and dams like the one at Affiniam as examples of the Senegalese marring the natural landscape of the Casamance.<sup>116</sup>

Separatists countered calls for peace with “evidence” from the Affiniam dam. In fact, very little evidence exists for the claim that the Senegalese government built the dam at Affiniam to dry up and destroy Casamançais rice fields, as the MFDC claimed in its manifesto, “La voix de la Casamance.” The MFDC portrayed the Affiniam dam as the means by which “Senegalese masters capable of starving us” would destroy not only The Rice Field but also the Casamance and, ultimately, Casamançais.<sup>117</sup>

But rumors and discourse do not rely on facts. This rumor—that the Senegalese built the dam to dry up Casamançais rice fields—quickly spread to other parts of the Casamance. It fit nicely with Diamacoune’s discourse of grievance against the Senegalese state. But those with local knowledge

of Affiniam knew this part of the discourse of grievance was a lie or at least inaccurate; Senegalese officials intended the dam to “play an important role in developing agricultural and hydraulic resources in the region.”<sup>118</sup> Since its completion in 1988, thanks to financial assistance from the government of China, the Affiniam dam had functioned as planned, with the capacity of holding 23 million cubic meters of water, capable of irrigating about 5,600 hectares of land.<sup>119</sup> A Senegalese government document explained,

Senegalese agriculture has known since the 1960s a series of droughts, leading to an accrued desertification marked by agricultural production that has become more and more unstable. The poor character of this rainfall dominated the country’s agriculture, rendering it random, and constituting a serious handicap. Great hope emerged for the Casamance, judged capable of producing a surplus of cereal production (principally in rice) thanks to the recuperation and the development of vast areas of salty marshlands. This hope was founded on a series of studies with the principal idea of the construction of anti-saltwater dams and seawalls. These permit as well the total desalinization of protected zones after a few rainy seasons and the retention of fresh water for the irrigation of agricultural fields. The persistent drought since the 1970s has considerably degraded the environment for rice agriculture in the southern zone. . . . In response to the deterioration of these fields, the Senegalese government has constructed the Dam of Affiniam, the fruit of its cooperation with the Democratic Republic of China.<sup>120</sup>

Casamançais farmers were correct that their fields were drying up, but the Affiniam dam had nothing to do with it.

Instead, twentieth-century climate change brought decreasing rainfall amounts to the Casamance starting in the late 1970s, concurrent with separatist tensions.<sup>121</sup> Average annual rainfall amounts decreased precipitously in the Casamance in the second half of the twentieth century, dropping from 1,522 millimeters for the period 1918–69 to 1,189 millimeters for the period 1970–2003. In the realm of extremes, years with more than 2,000 millimeters of rainfall were fairly frequent before 1970 but nonexistent since then, while years with less than 1,000 millimeters of rain have steadily climbed since 1970.<sup>122</sup> These facts, coupled with the increasing salinization of the Casamance River—again because of climate change—added up to visual evidence in the rice fields that made the separatist claims about the Affiniam dam seem credible.

The links between this visual evidence in the environment and the centrality of rice agriculture in Jola identity made the increasing desiccation of Casamançais rice fields appear like an attack on Jola personhood and community. As Joanna Davidson argues, Jola view their rice agriculture “not simply as a means of sustenance, but also as integrally tied to their conceptions of personhood, social relations, ritual obligations, and collective cultural identity.”<sup>123</sup> Jola grew rice. Rice gave them life. Forces that hindered their ability to grow rice hindered their ability to live. To many Jola in the Lower Casamance, the Senegalese state, in one way or another, was behind many of the forces hindering their ability to live. To them, their rice fields were drying up because Senegal wanted to kill them.<sup>124</sup>

Other evidence for this sentiment came from land seizures in the 1970s, mostly by migrants from northern Senegal. These “strangers” to the Casamance—mostly Wolof, Fula, and Toucouleur—were blamed for a host of social ills. One journalist, Peter da Costa, noted progress in 1991, countering claims of Casamançais oppression at the hands of “Senegalese”: “The government has gone some way towards alleviating the north-south divide. Land transfers to ‘enterprising’ Wolofs and Fulas from the north have been halted. Agricultural investment has put the region on the road to fulfilling its potential of being the nation’s rice bowl.”<sup>125</sup> That the Casamance failed to be “the nation’s rice bowl,” according to the MFDC, was not because of climate change, structural adjustment, or international markets; it was only because Senegal was bent on exploiting the Casamance for Senegal’s benefit.

But the eyes of Affiniam locals beheld different evidence, pointing to different conclusions about the dam and the intentions of the Senegalese government. Lolo Badji, president of the Association of the Parents of the Students of Affiniam, asserted:

The Dam works, contrary to what people say. I do not understand why people advance these notions that the Dam doesn’t work. If the Dam really didn’t work, then people would not be working there, as they are. If you come to the Dam yourself, you will meet these people, including the Director. The increasing salinization and the desiccation of the soil are the reasons for the construction of the Dam of Affiniam. During the 1970s, there was an extensive drought in Senegal that caused enormous damage in Senegal, including the southern region of the Casamance. In order to remedy this damage, the state, after some reflection, decided to construct a new dam to fix the problem caused by the drought. In the area of Fogny [the region north of Bignona], this drought caused the population that

cultivates and harvests the rice to see diminished yields. Thus, we had to think of a better policy to remedy the problem, and so the state constructed the Dam of Affiniam to come to the aid of the population of Affiniam. To me, this Dam has really helped the population of Fogny in as much as it helps avoid flooding after heavy rains. Do not believe the lies of the people who think that the Dam does not work; it works just fine.<sup>126</sup>

Other villagers from Affiniam—including the former chief of Affiniam, the director of the dam, and pirogue operators that moved people and goods across the Casamance River between Affiniam and Ziguinchor—provided similar testimonies.<sup>127</sup> According to those with local knowledge of the matter, the MFDC and its sympathizers were spinning a web of lies. The dam at Affiniam worked fine; it was performing exactly as planned by Senegalese and Chinese officials in the 1970s.<sup>128</sup> To these locals, the dam showed that the Casamance could benefit from being part of Senegal. And that is exactly why the MFDC spread specious rumors about it. As Peter da Costa noted in 1991, “In Dakar . . . the prognosis is bleak. Economists forecast no immediate end to the crisis that is exacerbating unemployment, and bureaucrats in Dakar view the prospect of an independent Casamance as inherently unrealistic.”<sup>129</sup> In other words, the potential for conflict appeared to be infinite, leading to the current situation often described as “no peace, no war.”<sup>130</sup>

#### WOMEN BEYOND THE RICE FIELD

If there is such a thing as a “power couple” in the Casamance, it would be Nouha and Seynabou Male Cissé. As the former principal of Lycée Djignabo, founded in 1957 and perhaps the most prestigious *lycée* in the Casamance, and as the longtime president of Casa-Sports, *the* regional soccer club in the Casamance, Nouha Cissé embodied two of the other social spaces I contend were contested terrain for imagining the Casamançais nation: The School and The Stadium. Nouha met Seynabou when they both started teaching at Lycée Djignabo in the 1980s. They were later married. As the Casamance conflict wore on in the 1990s, both became active in trying to find a peaceful solution. Seynabou partnered with three other female teachers at Djignabo in 1997 to form a nongovernmental organization (NGO) called USOFORAL (“let’s join hands”), renamed in 2010 the Plateforme des Femmes pour la Paix en Casamance (Platform of Women for Peace in the Casamance). The organization rallied 210 local civil society organizations advocating dialogue and peaceful resolution of the Casamance conflict. Since its inception, forty thousand women have participated in its marches, rallies, and

conferences.<sup>131</sup> One of the organization's first acts was to write a letter to the Government of Senegal and the MFDC, which read in part:

The women of Senegal, and of Casamance in particular, always forcefully intervene when the situation seems hopeless. . . . We estimate in effect that no one better than we who have given life understands the price of a life. Every time that a shell falls, it explodes and tears apart the insides of a woman, like the painful contractions of childbirth. Have we given birth to sit aside powerless at its destruction? Don't you see these families displaced, ravaged, and exploded? To put an end to all this forever, we exhort you to peace.<sup>132</sup>

That Casamançais women forcefully intervened only “when the situation seem[ed] hopeless” reflected some of the gender inequalities in the political life of the Casamance. Women were allowed to help cultivate rice but restricted from full participation in the public life of the nation. If they had been allowed to participate more fully, perhaps they could have helped preserve peace before the situation came to seem hopeless, as demonstrated by the women of the Platform for Peace.

Seynabou Male Cissé and her friends followed their letter with a campaign to convince Casamançais village women that they could make a difference for peace. Their philosophy was “it begins with me.” If Casamançais women could make peace at the individual level, then perhaps their village could find peace. If their village found peace, then perhaps their subregion could find peace. And if their subregion could find peace, then perhaps the entire Casamance could make peace. The challenge for these well-educated elite women who taught at the region's most prestigious lycée was to reach the mostly illiterate women in the villages. Thus, they decided to ask the village women to draw pictures of their experiences and ideas about the conflict.

In one village west of Ziguinchor, a woman drew a picture of a turtle. Male Cissé and her colleagues were puzzled. They looked at the picture and thought that the poor, uneducated village woman misunderstood the assignment or that she was crazy. But then they asked her why she drew a picture of a turtle. The woman responded that when she was a girl, there were turtles all over the Casamance “because turtles like water, peace, and tranquility.” Since the conflict began, all the turtles around her village had disappeared because they do not like loud noises like gunfire and exploding mortar shells. She drew a turtle because she wanted peace so the turtles would come back. Regardless of whether the turtles came back to the rice fields of the Casamance, Male Cissé and her colleagues were humbled and

profoundly moved.<sup>133</sup> This story demonstrates that the power of The Rice Field rested not only in the ways that the MFDC fashioned it as a symbol of difference and rebellion with Senegal but also in the ways these women fashioned it as a symbol of peace.



Because of the importance of rice over the past century to the political economy and cultural identity of the Lower Casamance, the MFDC constructed The Rice Field as a flexible symbol to attract various Casamançais to its separatist cause. For many Casamançais—whether man or woman, whether Jola, Mandinka, or Balanta, whether Christian, Muslim, or animist—this symbolic icon resonated as a place distinctly Casamançais that was exploited in one fashion or another for the benefit of the Senegalese *nordistes*. The historical factors that came together in the late 1970s to form a swirling vortex of decline—global climate change, developing transportation and communication technology, the end of the Cold War, structural adjustment programs, and migration of northern Senegalese to the Casamance and migration of Casamançais to northern Senegal—had been developing since the late nineteenth century. Clearly the region’s material history alone cannot explain the resonance of The Rice Field with various Casamançais. This history is important, but it is incomplete without an account of The Rice Field’s importance to the metaphysical cosmologies of Casamançais. Indeed, as I argue in the case of The Forest as well, these cosmologies are what made The Rice Field a flexible and useful symbol for the MFDC. It helped the MFDC link what Casamançais experienced in “reality”—the denigration of Casamançais culture, the exploitation of Casamançais natural resources, the personal and communal insults—at the hands of “Senegalese” to the ideological assertion of a peculiar Casamançais identity that pointed to the need for separation from Senegal.

The MFDC construction of The Rice Field in such a manner, however, elided the ways in which the Casamançais relationship with the rice field changed over time, particularly during the period 1850 to 1920 and again from 1970 to 1990. These changes resulted from social and economic processes like Mandinkization and colonization and from environmental processes like climate change and the desertification of northern Senegal. These material processes affected and were informed by the metaphysical cosmologies of Casamançais, which also changed over time with the economic and cultural exchanges of Atlantic trade, colonialism, and Islamization. The culmination of these processes in the late 1970s allowed separatists to encourage a new kind of national “imagining” for the Casamance, an imagining not as

the southern region of Senegal but as the independent nation-state of the Casamance.

Yet the separatist elites did not entirely succeed in fostering such a national imagination. Ordinary social groups imagined their communities in their own local ways. For those left relatively unaffected by French or Senegalese designs on their rice fields, imagining a community much beyond the local level was difficult. For some, even if they were affected by French or Senegalese actions, they were content to live as Jola or Mandinka or Balanta, and so forth in the region of the Casamance, in the nation-state of Senegal. The toll exacted by violence in the Casamance conflict—from armed groups and land mines in or near their rice fields—convinced them that the national imagination they could most easily support would be the one that would bring them peace. Then, they could “leave the politics to the politicians” and get back to doing what they loved, what they *had* to do as Casamançais: cultivating their rice fields, tapping their palm trees, and gathering their families around a large bowl of rice and *yassa poisson*, washed down with some cool palm wine.<sup>134</sup> For quite some time, that scene was what life was all about in the Lower Casamance. The Casamance conflict disturbed it. Thus, Casamançais were eager to imagine the nation in whatever fashion would get them back to that scene as quickly as possible.

### 3 ~ The Forest

*“Kámiraati eñaan mañoiyo.”* (eer Jola)

*“C’est parce qu’on ignore ce qui s’y passe qu’on se précipite dans le bois sacré.”*  
(French)

“It’s because one does not know what happens there that one rushes into the sacred forest.”

—Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance*

ANSOUMANA ABBA Bodian remembered the night he became a rebel. It was December 25, 1982. On that Christmas night, he met other separatists in a “sacred forest” near Diabir, on the southwest edge of Ziguinchor.<sup>1</sup> After being expelled from other public spaces in the city by Senegalese security forces, the separatists met in the forest to discuss their grievances against the Senegalese state and what actions they might take to gain their independence. They took oaths near a spirit shrine to gain independence for the Casamance or to die trying.<sup>2</sup> The forest provided cover from the surveillance of Senegalese security forces, but more importantly, it attached moral and spiritual authority to their undertaking. On the following morning (i.e., December 26), the rebels began their fateful march into Ziguinchor to lower

the Senegalese flags flying in front of government buildings across the city, an action met by force from Senegalese police and gendarmes. In front of the Governor's Office, Bodian walked toward a group of policemen with his hands up. One fired his weapon and removed part of Bodian's finger.<sup>3</sup>

That this act of rebellion originated in a forest has often been noted in accounts of the Casamance conflict. That the conflict continued in the same forest a year later when separatists murdered and mutilated four Senegalese gendarmes sent to prevent another meeting in the same place has also been noted. The same goes for the fact that the separatists rallied with their weapons a few days later in a forest south of Ziguinchor to begin their resistance and retribution for the violence and imprisonments that followed the Senegalese crackdown.<sup>4</sup> Besides explaining much of the Casamançais landscape, how did The Forest become such an important place to the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC)?

Except for one detailed ethnography published in 1969 by Jean Girard, one sees relatively few references to "sacred forests" or "the sacred forest" in the Casamance until the start of the conflict.<sup>5</sup> In the 1980s, Christian Roche, often citing the work of Girard, occasionally referred to "the sacred forest" while becoming the first scholar to treat the Casamance as its own polity. In 1987, Jos van der Klei became the first to focus on the role of Casamançais sacred forests as forms of "popular political action" enabling the MFDC to counter state "hegemony."<sup>6</sup> Since then, more and more of the contemporary analysis of the Casamance conflict has alluded to "sacred forests" or "sacred groves" thought by numerous academics, journalists, and politicians to represent Casamançais identity and particularity. Though the Senegalese government has participated in the discourse as well, this discourse has largely echoed that of the separatist movement.<sup>7</sup> What explains the symbolism behind this discourse and the timing of its development?

In this chapter, I argue that separatists constructed The Forest as the most potent spatial symbol of Casamançais nationalism because of its prevalence in the Casamançais landscape vis-à-vis the rest of Senegal and because of its reference to flexible polytheistic beliefs. As with the other spatial symbols analyzed in this book, colonialism contributed much to the construction of The Forest as a symbol of separatism. In many ways, the mapping of the Casamançais nation began with the actions of the colonial state. As colonial Senegal, and then postcolonial Senegal, sought to "see like a state," it imposed new spatial regimes on the landscape of the Casamance.<sup>8</sup> This imposition made The Forest an especially ripe field for harvesting separatism from the grievances of Casamançais.

"SEEING LIKE A STATE" IN THE CASAMANCE:  
THE FRENCH COLONIAL STATE

As with their other colonies, French colonial officials viewed the Casamance region of Senegal with an eye toward what they could take out of it—what they could extract from it for the profit of businesses in France. In this regard, the French differed little from the other colonial powers around the world at the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>9</sup> This extraction required colonial control—fixing and regulating—of Casamançais bodies and resources in space. James C. Scott has referred to this requirement for state fixing and control as “legibility.”<sup>10</sup>

A similar process of making the country legible played out in the Casamance. French colonizers created the Casamance and then made it legible in a certain order: first, they created *juridical space* through numerous treaties with local rulers and other European powers; second, they created *secure space* (“secure” depending on whom you were) by “pacifying” it through military conquest in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century; and finally, they made *productive space* for industries in the metropole.<sup>11</sup> Like secure space, productive space may be closely aligned with components of juridical space, such as a state. But productive space may extend beyond or across juridical space as well. And while juridical space may be strengthened by the existence of the other two kinds of space within its borders, it is not a prerequisite of the other two. Secure space and productive space may exist before and exterior to juridical space. Accomplishing the first task—establishing the juridical space of Senegal and the Casamance—implied establishing not only international borders but also regional borders (districts) for internal governance. Thus, the creation of Senegal required the acquisition and patching together of indigenous territories and the fixing of borders to form a juridical Senegalese space.

As they became aware of the natural resources to be found in the Casamance, colonial (and postcolonial) officials sought to transform the Casamance into productive space. In the same vein, Louis-Vincent Thomas in 1958 noted the colonial need for three types of “order” for rendering Casamançais space legible.<sup>12</sup> These order types in turn enabled the “knowing” of the indigenous other, his or her culture, and his or her environment. In addition to “geographic order” and “ethnographic order,” Thomas considered the importance of “administrative order”:

The French authority had to deal with some significant challenges in accomplishing this task [the “pacification” of the territory]. In the first place **geographic order**. The Lower Casamance being a long

corridor between two foreign colonies [Portuguese Guinea and British Gambia], it is possible to traffic arms with impunity [threatening secure space]. Moreover, the forests, the mangroves, the multitude of small streams render the penetration of this territory quite difficult, especially during the rainy season.—Then **ethnographic order**. The Diola [Jola] are strong, courageous, and independent but proud and begrudging, capable, when excited, of extreme hatred, the most violent anger, and treachery. They lived, during this era, in a state of anarchy, and their villages went to war with one another under the most futile pretexts. Finally **administrative order**. For a long time, France has had no clear plan for governing the Casamance. The government in St. Louis, whether because of insufficient means or because of a lack of understanding, seemed disinterested in this new territory [the Casamance].<sup>13</sup>

The imposition of each of these three “orders” eventually brought *disorder* to the Casamance; indeed, each of them helped to produce the contemporary conflict in the Casamance. The primary concern for colonial officials was facilitating capitalist economic activity in the region—activity they could control and from which they could benefit. Thus, rendering the colonies “legible” meant establishing infrastructure and transportation links to facilitate commerce. But the French and the British could not begin to exploit productive space in the Casamance until they dealt with the lingering challenges to secure space by anticolonial forces like those of Lat Dior or Djignabo Bassène. Lat Dior, a famous anticolonial military leader, fought the French colonial conquest in northern Senegal while Djignabo Bassène did the same in the Casamance.<sup>14</sup> Once rebellious forces like these were “pacified,” French colonial leaders secured space, turned it into productive space, and converted formerly rebellious bodies into productive bodies—bodies that could provide labor for colonial companies.

Classifying forests and agricultural lands helped them do that. Like the other colonial powers at the time, the French introduced “scientific forestry” (a term also used by Scott) in their colonies, “which, they believed, was necessary for resource control and social engineering.”<sup>15</sup> Scientific forestry was the “civilizing mission” in the woods. Thaddeus Sunseri explains the implications of “scientific forestry” to the colonized: “Scientific forestry meant claiming tropical forests and woodlands for the state, making them into protected reserves, evicting their peasant and pastoral populations, and imposing managed exploitation of trees and resources.” This approach to forestry ideally meant “transforming the tropical landscapes according to

a European model, whereby intensive agriculture would be layered with intensive plantation forestry, replacing slow-growing tropical hardwoods with fast-growing exotic softwoods, especially pines and eucalyptus.” As for the people who might happen to live in or near these forests, Sunseri explains, “Peasants evicted from forests would be transformed into forest workers, producing the timber and wood fuel necessary for colonial development, cutting firebreaks around forests, and planting and tending trees on plantations.” In regard to the agricultural activities previously performed by these peasants, colonial scientific forestry, it was thought, would save the Africans from themselves: “At the same time, African subsistence agriculture would be transformed into intensive cash crop farming. Colonial foresters saw the . . . African landscape as devastated by generations of African misuse, and thus regarded fire-using peasants and pastoralists as the chief enemy of scientific forestry.”<sup>16</sup> In French West Africa, “scientific forestry” began when the governor-general issued a “general order” on April 12, 1921, creating regional agricultural inspectors charged with “controlling the concessions given in agricultural and forest domains.”<sup>17</sup>

To help the regional agricultural inspectors, the French classified forests as a part of this process of fixing and regulating Senegalese space. Since forests covered a majority of the Lower Casamance, the French designated much of the Casamance as *forêt classée*, or “classified forest.” In some ways, this classification system resembled the twentieth-century national park system in the United States, making these woods into a state forest. Designating a forest as a *forêt classée* bounded the forest and designated who could gain access to it and the activities they could perform there. Colonial officials and businesses targeted the Casamançais forest for the production of rubber, timber, cashews, palm kernels, palm oil, palm wine, African locust beans, and various kinds of fruit.<sup>18</sup>

A former colonial official living in the Casamance, Jules Florent Malbranque, could barely contain his excitement at the possibilities of this “newborn” colony. In 1939, he noted that the possibilities for development in the Casamance made having its “autonomy” vis-à-vis the rest of Senegal “advantageous”: “The Casamance, in spite of its age, is a newborn, who has awakened to a new active life. One must take care of the newborn with love, aligning all action with its development, which shows considerable potential.”<sup>19</sup> While the colonial state set aside land for preservation, it also set aside land for exploitation. In other words, the ultimate object of the preservation was exploitation.<sup>20</sup>

For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. In response to the colonial government’s efforts to “see like a state” in the Casamance,

individual Casamançais contested these efforts in their own local ways. For this reason, James Scott's thesis on seeing like a state is incomplete without his follow-on book, *The Art of Not Being Governed*. In some ways, the Jola people of the Lower Casamance were like Scott's mountain people of Zomia in that they remained relatively untouched by the modern state until the early twentieth century. Like the history of Zomia, Jola history was mostly a "history of deliberate and reactive statelessness."<sup>21</sup> Scott claims, "This is the history of those who got away, and state-making cannot be understood apart from it." As the French began to impose their colonial regime on the Casamance, which included the classification of forest land, the forest began to appear as a terrain of "friction" and as "a refuge for state-fleeing people, including guerrillas."<sup>22</sup> The state may have classified the forest, but Casamançais *knew* the forest. To them, it was not a bounded *space* for regulation and control; it was a *place* of familiarity and belonging.

This chapter of Casamançais history also demonstrates that deforestation in the Casamance goes back further than the 1970s.<sup>23</sup> It has a longer history, dating from at least the beginning of the colonial period (i.e., 1885). Yet colonial forces were not alone in bringing it about. In fact, colonial officials viewed forest classification as a means of *reforestation* rather than *deforestation*. They made reforestation part of the "civilizing mission" in Senegal. They made bounding, regulating, and preserving the forest part of what it meant to be "modern" in the Casamance. Many Casamançais agreed with the principles behind the new ways. Others found such limitations inconvenient if not violent to their way of life.

Nevertheless, Africans demonstrated agency in acting upon their environment. They used the forest for their own purposes. From the forest, they claimed firewood, wild game, various kinds of fruit, and perhaps most importantly for the cultural identity of the Jola, palm wine. Rice farmers typically enjoyed palm wine at the end of a day in the rice fields, but palm wine went with various social and religious occasions as well.<sup>24</sup> In any case, Casamançais often consumed palm wine in the social spaces examined in this book, especially the forest and the rice field. In 1922, a former *administrateur supérieur* of the Casamance wrote, "From November to July, one can say that the Lower Casamance is almost entirely and continuously under the influence of palm wine."<sup>25</sup> Another colonial official later commented on this statement, arguing, "That's a huge exaggeration. At all times, palm wine is considered sacred; it is consumed at all shrine ceremonies. But one must admit that even though this wine is absorbed before complete fermentation, it is a sugary drink with an agreeable taste. (The dregs are very nuanced.) Preventing its consumption is a problem impossible to resolve, but

the subsequent interruptions by drunks full of palm wine arriving in Ziguinchor every morning is a significant problem.”<sup>26</sup> The consumption of palm wine was—throughout the period under consideration in this book—and remains an important cultural marker of Casamançais society, especially in relation to the teetotaling Muslims from northern Senegal. “Casamançais” drink palm wine; “Senegalese” do not.

People showing up in Ziguinchor every morning drunk on palm wine was a relatively small problem, however, in relation to wood cutting that impinged on colonial exploitation of the forest. In 1935, the governor of the colonies published a *circulaire* to put in place measures to “fight against the effects of deforestation in Senegal and . . . to make the cultivators understand the dangers posed by further deforestation of their country.”<sup>27</sup> In 1938, the governor-general of French West Africa argued for the collective punishment of indigenous persons who set forest fires, a law allegedly in effect since the establishment of the *indigénat*.<sup>28</sup> After all, the French were merely enforcing “customary law” on the matter, reporting that indigenous Casamançais communities themselves punished the setting of forest fires because the fires endangered the entire community.<sup>29</sup> Customary law became fuzzier concerning cutting, though, as Casamançais used the forest timber for various purposes—from heating fuel and weapons to ceremonial objects.

All of this cutting meant that the forest continued to shrink throughout the colonial period. Pierre Grosmaire, chief of forest inspections in the Casamance, hopefully declared in 1942 that “the regulation of Casamançais forests is a sustainable activity.” Nevertheless, he noted that “for several years now, the forests continue to burn and regress.” He argued, “These forest fires must be prevented at any cost—at least for the *forêts classées*, which must become the definitive forests of the future since the rest have been designated for agriculture.”<sup>30</sup> The French classified Casamançais forests as “the definitive forests of the future,” glossing over the fact that forest classification brought a larger profit to French businessmen than Casamançais.

Hence, Grosmaire wrote of a French future more than a Casamançais future, or at least of a mixed future in which dominant French interests defined “modernity.” Grosmaire further argued: “For the future, with the aim of guiding the orientation and control of the exploitation of the forest riches of the country, it is indispensable to multiply the means of action of the Service of Waters, Forests, and Hunting in personnel and materiel. . . . We would like to see the Service of Waters, Forests, and Hunting receive the place it deserves in a country where the forest is the greatest of all riches and it covers seven-tenths of the surface.”<sup>31</sup> Grosmaire requested more resources for the

Ministry of Water and Forests at a time of great uncertainty in the French Empire, as the French state had come under control of the Vichy regime. It was also a time that pointed to more uncertainty ahead as African and French elites began to negotiate the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in the postwar French Union.

Nevertheless, Senegalese political leaders like Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor did not necessarily demand a halt to French regulation and control of Senegalese forests as much as a share of the profit. They demanded the right to have an equal say in the dispensation of their natural resources, as citizens of a French-speaking “Negro-African civilization” that maintained some sort of political connection to France.<sup>32</sup> Senegalese nationalists viewed the Casamançais forest in ways quite similar to their French counterparts: space to be regulated and controlled for the good of “the nation,” though great uncertainty remained as to how that nation would be defined.

#### SEEING LIKE A SENEGALESE STATE

One of the first challenges for postcolonial state leaders in Africa was to escape “the Black Man’s Burden”—the legacy of the colonial partition—in building their postcolonial nations.<sup>33</sup> Senegalese leaders like Guèye and Senghor debated the best way to overcome this legacy. Although they considered the best form of postcolonial governance—whether to remain part of a federated French Union, for example—no nationalist from 1945 to 1960 thought of a postcolonial future for the Casamance as an independent nation-state. Neither Guèye nor Senghor, and most importantly, not Emile Badiane, Victor Diatta, or Ibou Diallo—the three primary founders of the original MFDC—seriously considered the idea of an independent Casamance nation-state.<sup>34</sup> Though they sought autonomy in social, political, and economic affairs, they did not completely reject French culture or institutions. And they carried on the idea that French technocracy could provide the best “modern” solution to the problems of Senegalese governance.<sup>35</sup> They applied this technocratic approach to governance of Senegalese forests as well.

First, however, they marked the transition to political independence by planting trees. Senegal and Mali emerged from the colonial era as the only remaining partners of the French Union in the former French West Africa. Guinea’s Sékou Touré and the Ivory Coast’s Felix Houphouët-Boigny had already peeled away pieces from Senghor’s vision for a French-speaking Black African national federation based on the political structure of French West Africa.<sup>36</sup> To mark the negotiated independence of the new Mali Federation,

consisting of Mali and Senegal, on June 20, 1960, the new minister of the rural economy and cooperation, Joseph M'Baye, declared that "each Senegalese should plant a tree of Independence."<sup>37</sup>

This new campaign would expand a similar campaign begun in 1959, designating "a day of urban planting" (of cassia and neem trees) and "a day of village plantings." The new Senegalese government designated the planting of trees of independence as not simply a right but a duty for each "citizen." M'Baye asserted that each Senegalese citizen was "morally bound to plant on this occasion a 'tree of Independence.'" And he advised Senegalese officials that it was "desirable" that government officials "set the example for everybody else by planting their tree in their neighborhood." M'Baye and other Senegalese officials intended the planting of trees to symbolize "the faith of the country in its destiny and the importance of the tree in its economy."<sup>38</sup> The new government became quite concerned with measuring the progress of this initiative. The commandant de cercle in Ziguinchor later reported that of 260 neem and cassia trees planted in the streets of Ziguinchor, 180 were still living.<sup>39</sup> While planting trees to mark independence surely made symbolic reference to the planting and new growth of independent African nations, it also addressed the practical need to halt the deforestation of Senegal by starting its reforestation.

To that end, the urban planting campaign would be followed by "forest weeks" in the countryside. Whereas individual tree planting had been aimed primarily at citizens in cities and towns like Ziguinchor, the "forest weeks" would integrate the rural countryside into the national celebration with "village forests of Independence, reforestation camps, [plantings in] avenues and neighborhoods in the towns, and plantings in the villages." Reforestation camps would be established all over Senegal, with Sédhiou designated to host the camp for the Casamance. The "life of the camp, from the first to the fifteenth of August, [would] be centered on the tree and on the forest" and would be managed by a "committee of reforestation." M'Baye charged this local committee with "organizing the work and later assuring the continuity of the indispensable maintenance and protection required for the nurturing of the trees."<sup>40</sup> Officials like M'Baye thus tied reforestation to nation building.

Senegalese officials began to view the forest in other ways, often resembling the "imperial gaze" of the former colonial power.<sup>41</sup> Shortly after independence, they embarked on a new campaign of classification and declassification of the "forest domain."<sup>42</sup> M'Baye explained the imperative for classification and declassification: "Forest classification is essentially a *juridical regime* that imposes on a topographically defined parcel of land

certain regulations from the regulatory police for particular objectives.”<sup>43</sup> M’Baye wrote that classification and declassification of rural spaces “should permit the country to engage a path of modern and adapted rural development, permitting the integral and judicious use of the resources of our soil, following the proper utilization of our lands . . . and the plans that must promote in the Senegalese countryside a new, expansive, and dynamic economy.” M’Baye claimed that the objectives of this classification were “either directly utilitarian: a) forests of timber production for artisanal and combustible purposes, production of wood charcoal for heating; b) forested pastoral pasturage; c) high-yield plantations: teak, filaos, etc. Or, for protection—forming a perimeter of restoration—the preservation of live dunes or of zones of intense erosion . . . [for] the conservation of non-arable lands. Or, for particular ends—National Parks . . . The classification is, to continue, a discipline that the inhabitants of a country impose on themselves for the joy of collective rural well-being, to the benefit of all.”<sup>44</sup> Such classification surely made perfect sense to well-educated bureaucrats like M’Baye, as well as elite Senegalese politicians like Senghor, Abdou Diouf, and Mamadou Dia. Ordinary Senegalese viewed it differently, however, as I discuss below.

Senegalese officials intended forest classification and development to benefit the new, independent Senegalese nation-state by further integrating the “fragments” of the Senegalese nation while providing a profit for parastatal, neocolonial businesses.<sup>45</sup> These officials viewed Senegalese forests as potential resource depots for such development. Thus, they revived the idea of producing rubber from Casamançais forests. Doing so was not a new idea. The French made a serious attempt at extracting rubber from the Casamance from about 1890 to 1905, with little to show for their efforts.<sup>46</sup> The rubber found in the Casamance came from “wild rubber” vines called lianes hanging on larger trees like the silkcotton (the *fromager* in French).

French merchants eventually found this rubber, while not of insignificant value, to be inferior in quality and quantity to that found in other parts of West and Central Africa, such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, and the Congo. Throughout the rest of the colonial period, a few colonial officials floated the idea of reviving rubber production in the Casamance, but these calls largely fell on deaf ears.<sup>47</sup>

By 1960, however, the new Senegalese state was ready to try again. Grosmaire wrote to M’Baye to encourage the Senegalese state to invest in the development of rubber production in the Casamance to supplement its peanut production. Grosmaire quoted a report from the commandant de cercle in Bignona, who claimed during a tour of Kartiack



FIGURE 3.1. Silk cotton tree near the “sacred forest” of Diabir. Photograph by author, 2014.

(a village west of Bignona) that he “came across a shareholding peasant farmer with 300 kilograms of rubber, one of the incontestable riches of the Casamance.” Grosmaire claimed that the rubber trade never grew because it had been displaced “by the commercialization of peanuts at the same time and the unsuitability of the furnished material [i.e., the rubber].” He urged, “If it truly was unsuitable, with the technology of today, it seems

that the problem can be resolved.”<sup>48</sup> Thus, argued Grosmaire, the quality would be as good as rubber traded in Conakry and on the rest of the Upper Guinea Coast.<sup>49</sup> More importantly, he continued, the interruption of rubber production from Southeast Asia under the control of imperial Japan between 1940 and 1946 made rubber production elsewhere in the French Empire a strategic imperative.<sup>50</sup> Grosmaire calculated that given current (1960) market conditions, the Casamançais peasant could expect to earn about 50 or 60 CFA francs per kilo from participating in the production of rubber.<sup>51</sup> He noted, “This price certainly does not assure him of a fortune, but earning 60 francs in a village is better than earning nothing.”<sup>52</sup> He admitted that the quality was not as good as rubber from Nigeria, “but the prices are not the same,” because Nigerian rubber earned 185 CFA francs per kilo at the Port of Dakar. Clearly, Grosmaire considered Casamançais rubber a niche product for a niche market. He concluded, “By this distinction, the rubber of Casamance has a chance. The contacted company BATA is interested in the product and envisages buying *all* of the possible production in the Casamance.”<sup>53</sup> Business appeared to be booming for certain postcolonial companies, most with ties to France. No Casamançais rubber farmers, however, became as rich.

What remains rather opaque to the historian is how ordinary Casamançais received the state classification of their forests. It certainly is not clear that the inhabitants of the Casamance imposed forest regulation “on themselves for the joy of collective rural well-being” (as M’Baye declared). And some may have found it ironic that M’Baye claimed that the state intended forest regulation for “the benefit of all” when they did not see much benefit from it. In fact, many likely found themselves dispossessed of natural resources they thought were theirs.<sup>54</sup> Complaints of colonial and postcolonial officials regarding the wanton burning of the forest by Casamançais indicates that some did not follow the regulations concerning proper forest usage. Apparently, ordinary Casamançais resisted or ignored state regulation of their forests. To further his point, M’Baye appealed to Senegal’s “forest patrimony” and threatened those who might endanger it: “This Forest Domain is a collective national treasure, and no Senegalese citizen conscious of his responsibilities could possibly consider dismembering it or dissipating its value only to satisfy his individual appetites of the moment.”<sup>55</sup>

Such language, along with the planting of trees to mark the birth of the new nation, made the forest a very moral space in the Casamance. This moral and cultural character could therefore be mapped onto Senegalese state territory. Such mapping resulted in some parts of Senegal gaining more attention from the newly independent Senegalese state than others.

This difference in turn led to different perceptions of the benefits of participation in the Senegalese nation-state.<sup>56</sup>

M'Baye also cautioned against the unequal distribution of development assistance in the immediate postcolonial future, claiming that it had created a real "interior frontier cutting Senegal in half from the northwest to the southeast." He found this situation quite "worrying because it pits different ethnic groups against each other." And it portended a future "internal agricultural colonization" by the valley regions with "their good lands apt for agriculture." M'Baye specifically mentioned the southern region of the Casamance: "In the case of an agricultural colonization of the Southern Senegalese by modern mechanical methods, one is led to a particular form of peasantry. Here, the sloped fields will result from the classified forests inserted in the river plain by intensive mechanized agriculture."<sup>57</sup> Like French colonial officials before him, M'Baye took up the discourse of less "evolved" people and regions of Senegal in need of "modern" agricultural methods and forest management. Missionaries and colonial officials had often referred to the Casamance as the least "evolved" region of Senegal.<sup>58</sup>

Awareness of these "internal colonizations" motivated Prosper Michel Akanni in 1961 to write of "a new scourge: regionalism" in the newspaper *Afrique Nouvelle* (New Africa):

The fact that one comes from the north or from the south is not proof of superiority or inferiority; and, like racism, regionalism is a sort of complex supported by mediocre spirits with questionable arguments. The African "regionalist" is most of the time a troubled, jealous, or ambitious individual who thinks, before his neighbor better placed than him who comes from afar, that it would be preferable for each individual to stay home and mind his own business. . . . What a huge mistake! Because the well-being and the liberty of the African people is based on their fraternal traditions. . . . The prejudiced regionalist is a leaven of division. Yet division is a permanent factor of domination and domination represents insecurity and a constant threat to world peace.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, the classification and development of Casamançais forests led to the thorny question of representation. Who would get to represent the interests of the Casamance in these matters? Who would get to represent the local communities in these matters? Why?

The new Senegalese state was placing its faith in modern approaches and techniques for agricultural development, but M'Baye acknowledged that the real sticking point would not come over "modern" or "traditional"

forms of agriculture but rather in “designating the representatives of the interested collectivities.” M’Baye believed more was at stake than present interests:

On the threshold of our independence and masters of our destinies, we are accountable for our national forest heritage, not only vis-à-vis our fellow citizens but also vis-à-vis the generations to follow. . . . The Law and the forest regulations must be the sovereign expression of the general will. They must not in any case be instruments of propaganda, of division, of agitation, and of outbidding. But they must be for maintaining rural peace and in the interest of the public, they must always be considered as the law supreme which is imposed on the Government as well as the Citizens.<sup>60</sup>

Such egalitarianism sounded good to most Senegalese, especially those outside the former Quatre Communes who formed the center of Senghor’s political bloc.<sup>61</sup> Actually bringing that equality about, however, presented difficult challenges, especially for a culturally distinct region with elites looking to express their disappointment with the postcolonial dispensation.

CONSTRUCTING THE SACRED FOREST:  
FROM THE FORÊT CLASSÉE TO THE FORÊT SACRÉE

In response to all this fixing and classifying, the contemporary MFDC two decades later contested the “exploitation” of Casamançais resources by constructing “the Sacred Forest” as a place of Casamançais particularity and resistance. It changed the meaning of “the forest” in the Casamance from a utilitarian rendering of uniform space full of trees for production and state control—the *forêt classée*, or state forest—to a culturally charged “place”—the *forêt sacrée*, or Sacred Forest—where Casamançais particularity emerged against “Senegal.” It emerged against the Islamo-Wolof version of “Senegal,” a model of national identity Senghor called “Sénégalité” and Mamadou Diouf describes as ethnically Wolof and religiously Muslim.<sup>62</sup> I argue that it did so, despite the practice of Islam by many in the MFDC, because it provided a flexible religious and ethnic symbol for linking Casamançais culture to the separatist movement. To be clear, I am not claiming that an actual state forest became a sacred forest. Rather, I am trying to point to the larger, comprehensive state process of categorizing, controlling, and exploiting—mapping, if you will—the natural resources of the Casamance and how Casamançais responded with their own identity-forming counter-mapping in those spaces, rendering place (the sacred forest) out of space (the state forest).<sup>63</sup>

As the Casamance conflict developed in the 1980s and intensified in the 1990s, Diamacoune and other Casamançais nationalists made the Sacred Forest a central component of the array of cultural symbols intended to counter-map the Casamance, to create a sense of cultural belonging against the Senegalese “other.” The Forest constituted a particularly apt spatial symbol for the nationalist project, as “historically, a settlement’s political independence was established by the erection of an initiation shrine in a male sacred forest.”<sup>64</sup> Thus, in 1990, when the conflict intensified along with a wave of post–Cold War civil conflicts across Africa, Diamacoune claimed: “I do not totally pardon those from Casamance who were [Léopold] Senghor’s companions from the first. They put too much trust in Léopold and the Senegalese. They simply forgot that those Senegalese have not passed through the same sacred forests as we of Casamance have.”<sup>65</sup> At one point, Diamacoune even suggested that the Sacred Forest could provide agents of a divine project to achieve independence for the Casamance: “Even if you kill every Casamançais, God will raise up the stones and the trees, and they will wrest Casamance’s independence from Senegal.”<sup>66</sup> Though hyperbole, this statement expressed the spiritual, nationalistic attachment to the Casamance that Diamacoune hoped to achieve through repeated references to the Sacred Forest. The MFDC partly staked its claim to cultural difference with Senegal on the distinctness of the Sacred Forest in the Senegalese landscape.

It also insisted that this moral character buttressed its claims in national and international law. In their plans for independence, Mamadou “Nkrumah” Sané and other separatist leaders agreed, “The Casamançais forest must remain a national patrimony. . . . It should no longer be considered as only a source for the provision of wood for the consumption of energy or for the needs of the artisan or industrialist.” Rather, they proposed to create an institution that could ensure the “good integrated management and good planning of the forest” to “limit its exploitation to strictly domestic, artisanal, industrial and leisure needs.”<sup>67</sup> Sané and company also wrote that the sacred forest not only “protected” the environment but also formed the moral foundation upon which would rest Casamançais commitments to the international community once independence was achieved. They claimed, “The existence and the relatively important number of ‘sacred’ forests and places, beyond the mystical character attributed to them, play a large role in the protection of the environment of the Casamance.” Based on this heritage, the separatists wanted to create a new “Casamançais Environmental Charter” to produce a “harmonious ecological image.”<sup>68</sup> This “harmonious ecological image” was clearly meant to portray a favorable image of a Casamançais nation.

This discourse demonstrates how separatist leaders like Diamacoune and Sané made The Forest into the most important, most sacred, most distinctly Casamançais spatio-cultural symbol to counter-map the Casamance against Senegal. Though these spaces did not hold the same meaning, northern Senegal also had rivers (the Senegal and Saloum Rivers, for example), rice fields (in the Senegal River valley, especially near Rosso), schools (Dakar and Saint-Louis especially), and stadiums (especially near Dakar). But northern Senegal did not have forests. In Senegal, the forest was and remains a uniquely Casamançais space. Discursively, then, the Sacred Forest allowed the MFDC to posit the Casamance as a *place* of difference and nostalgia, where “true Casamançais” belonged and Senegalese “strangers” did not.

The Sacred Forest lent metaphysical support to the ambiguous MFDC material, territorial claim, which lacked, as discussed in the introduction, a detailed map staking out exactly what the claim was. Thinking of the Casamance as “sacred” made Casamançais nationalism not only “in the head” but also “in the heart, in the soul.” As Casamançais (especially the Jola) drew boundaries around the sacred, they necessarily referred to “secret” practices—such as the sacred forest male and female initiations—that excluded “strangers” foreign to the Casamance. Ferdinand de Jong notes the relationship between the French words *sacré* and *secret* in this context.<sup>69</sup> Secrecy was needed to protect the sacred, and the sacred was needed to maintain some kind of power against the rapid social and economic changes coming to the Casamance after 1850.<sup>70</sup> The Casamance became not just a *space* made “legible” by allegedly arbitrary colonial borders or exploited for its natural resources by modern, impersonal, juridical states like France and Senegal.<sup>71</sup> Instead, it became a “fatherland,” a sacred *place* to which people in the extensive Jola diaspora returned to reconnect with family, the natural environment of La Verte Casamance, and the ancestors.<sup>72</sup> Whether consciously or not, nationalists have depended on this dialectic between space and place to make territorial claims.

For example, Father Diamacoune tied the symbolism of the Sacred Forest to the green landscape of the Casamance. He focused on different types of trees in northern and southern Senegal as “natural” symbols of Casamançais difference.<sup>73</sup> As noted by Mamadou Diouf, he contrasted the imagery of the Senegalese baobab with the Casamançais palm tree. The first is a stark image of a crooked gray tree on a dusty, barren, brown Sahelian landscape. The second is that of a tall, straight, fruitful tree in a verdant, lush forest landscape. The moral analogy was intentional. Diamacoune associated deforestation and desertification with the alleged “inequality and

violence” of the Senegalese state, in contrast with the “harmonious symbiosis of the land’s rich hummus [*sic*] and the fertile wind of the open sea,” as well as “the forest, the solidity, and the rituals and initiations of sacred forest shrines through which the Senegalese did not pass.” The contrasting imagery distinguished “Senegalese inequality” from “Casamançais democracy and egalitarianism.”<sup>74</sup> Diamacoune utilized this imagery and the repeated phrase of “the sacred forest shrines through which the Senegalese did not pass” to distinguish between what he claimed were polar opposite national characters.

With such contrasting images, Diamacoune attempted to establish who belonged in the Casamance and who did not. He tried to construct spatial symbols that would resonate with ethnic groups from southern Senegal while excluding those from northern Senegal. Diamacoune posited the Casamance as exclusionary to some ethnic groups from northern Senegal but inclusionary of others, such as the Mandinka and Fula—the two primary ethnic groups he needed in order to patch together La Grande Casamance from Upper (Fula), Middle (Mandinka), and Lower (Jola) Casamance—to avoid charges of Jola “tribalism.”<sup>75</sup> Diamacoune made reference to “natural” frontiers accentuated by culture to try to elide ethnic differences between the Jola and other ethnic groups. He kept these frontiers rather fuzzy to glue together ethnic “fragments of the nation.”<sup>76</sup> But he also referred to the structural developmental frontiers described by M’Baye in 1960. It was just such a “frontier” of “internal colonization” that Diamacoune later referred to when attempting to justify the separatism of the contemporary MFDC.<sup>77</sup>

Diamacoune, in a seemingly counterintuitive move, thus characterized the Casamance as a transient space of mobility at the same time he essentialized it as sacred, spiritual, and naturally separate from Senegal. While the paucity of maps clearly defining the territorial ambitions of the separatist movement contributed to an ambiguity facilitating the discursive mapping of the Casamance, Diamacoune also insisted on the multi-cultural character of the Casamance without displacing the Jola from their position of primacy as the majority ethnic group of the Lower Casamance. Diamacoune referred to the Casamance as “an intermediate zone between the Sahelian and the Guinean zone . . . a great crossroads where different migratory waves meet, mingle and mix . . . a hospitable land.”<sup>78</sup> Thus, the MFDC constructed the Casamance as distinct but also as a hybrid borderland. This rendering made the Sacred Forest an important symbol for achieving the right national blend.

This symbol, this icon, became a very flexible means of linking local realities to the religious identity of the larger Casamançais nation.<sup>79</sup> As

defined by a Catholic priest, religion may have been the most counterintuitive component of Casamançais nationalism. When Diamacoune asserted a unique Casamançais identity, he referred not to Catholicism but rather to the “sacred forest shrines through which the Senegalese did not pass.”<sup>80</sup> While the Catholic Church may have contributed to the construction of a separate Casamançais identity, Diamacoune built the Casamançais nation on local, traditional religion.<sup>81</sup> Why would a Catholic priest make such a seemingly contradictory choice?

Scholars of nationalism in Africa seem to concur that religion has played a prominent role in national imaginings.<sup>82</sup> Like ethnicity, religion both enabled and limited nationalism. It enabled the Islamo-Wolof Senegalese to think of themselves as Senegalese Muslims while also excluding the Christian and *awasena* Jola Casamançais.<sup>83</sup> This is the irony of the Catholic “father of the nation,” Léopold Senghor. Few Africanists have contested the definition of “the colonial elites” like Senghor in part as missionary-educated. Christianity, especially Protestantism, bore the potential for the kind of secularism that Benedict Anderson posited as a prerequisite of nationalism.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the fusion of Christianity with education produced an elite that could be influenced by “print-capitalism” in a vernacular language the way that Anderson explained.<sup>85</sup> But the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century masses could not imagine the nation through print-capitalism, for most of them were illiterate. Thus, they had to imagine the nation via other means, often in terms not devoid of religion but full of it.<sup>86</sup>

For the African masses, as well as the nationalist elites aspiring to lead them, separating the nation from their cosmologies was nonsense.<sup>87</sup> Some rejected Christianity entirely and turned to local, traditional beliefs to define an “authentic” version of an African nation. Some co-opted Christian ideology and turned it around, using it against colonial oppression.<sup>88</sup> But most followed a combined path, advocating some degree of syncretism. Many Jola adherents of Islam did the same thing.<sup>89</sup> Religious syncretism was not an indicator of old vestiges of traditional religion, the refusal of Africans to fully convert to Christianity or Islam. Rather, it demonstrated the continued relevance—even if contested—of the local, traditional religious worldview, with its links to ancestors and local pasts.<sup>90</sup>

In the Casamance, there were at least three advantages to defining the religious identity of the nation by such syncretism, anchored to the Sacred Forest. First, it provided a more flexible means of connecting the local to the national—of connecting nationalist imagination to local worldviews. Second, it avoided dividing the people of the Casamance between Islam and Christianity. Finally, it helped facilitate the localized “Africanization” of the

Catholic faith, identified by Senghor and other postcolonial leaders as an essential step in breaking free from the chains of imperial history. In short, the Sacred Forest was an effective, flexible tool for separatists to define the Casamance in religious terms in a way that countered the Islamo-Wolof model of Senegalese nationhood while avoiding divisions between Muslim and Christian Casamançais.

The first advantage to the religious identity of The Forest—as demonstrated by Peter Mark, Robert Baum, and Ferdinand de Jong—is that it provided a more flexible identity to link local, particular worldviews to the wider nation. Because of this greater flexibility in matching local conditions, Jola traditional religion proved more useful than the universalizing religions of Christianity and Islam for nationalists hoping to counter hegemonic national models based on either of these faiths. Of course, some of the localized differences in traditional religions led to conflict in other parts of the continent but also could foster a “live-and-let-live” mentality that resembled the qualities Anderson claimed for Western secularism. In explaining the need for Kenyan nationalists to go beyond the “bundling” of ethnicities, Lonsdale notes, “Tribesmen worshipped only local gods, venerated only their own ancestors.”<sup>91</sup> But local religions also provided a powerful means of countering a denigrating, hegemonic discourse often tied to missionary zeal and some version of a “civilizing mission.” More importantly for Casamançais nationalists, the Sacred Forest allowed local believers to worship local gods while tying those gods to the larger nation. Traditional religion was not “swept away” by Islam and Christianity; instead, it was utilized—especially by the MFDC—to unite the Casamançais nation and to forge a Casamançais response to the Islamo-Wolofization of Sénégalité.<sup>92</sup> Therefore, instead of asserting an identity that would divide its partisans, the MFDC referred to what they had in common: the Sacred Forest.<sup>93</sup>

The second advantage to the religious identity of The Forest is that localized religion was the one religious identity that would not divide MFDC partisans. It would not have been a stretch to imagine a Catholic priest in a 94 percent Muslim country asserting a cultural distinctness from Senegal by assigning Catholicism as the key religious component of Casamançais nationalism—especially to counter the power of the Islamo-Wolof model. However, at the time of the 1993 ceasefire, 60 percent of the Jola were Muslim.<sup>94</sup> Many of the MFDC’s most important leaders were also Muslim: “Nk-rumah” Sané, Sidy Badji, Salif Sadio, Ismaila Magne Diémé, and Vieux Faye Sambou, for example.<sup>95</sup> Thus, even if there were a “weakness of Islam” in the Casamance, as Foucher argues, Islam was strong enough and relevant enough to stunt the unrealized “dream of a Catholic Casamance.”<sup>96</sup> While

the Catholic Church may have seen more success among the Jola than in the rest of Senegal, Islam was still the majority religion in the Lower Casamance. Asserting a Catholic identity for the Casamançais nation would have exacerbated Casamançais divisions and excluded more than half of the population from the movement.<sup>97</sup>

At the same time, Diamacoune's central role as the de facto political leader of the MFDC until his death indicates that the Catholic Church played no small part in defining the borders of the Casamance "from the Atlantic to the Falémé."<sup>98</sup> If French colonial officials intended to make France a "Muslim power,"<sup>99</sup> many French Catholics and secularists did not concur. While French missionaries acknowledged Islam's strength in all other areas of Senegal, they considered Jola-land (the Lower Casamance) and Serer-land (the Petite Côte near Joäl) largely animist and therefore available for evangelization.<sup>100</sup> Many Jola thus converted to Christianity for protection from colonial power.<sup>101</sup> Some particularly welcomed Christianity where missionaries allowed for some accommodation with local religion.<sup>102</sup> Of course, what "some accommodation" meant varied with location, but some form of traditional religion, often practiced in or near a "sacred forest," generally formed part of the equation. The MFDC lumped these sacred forests together to form a monolithic version of *the* Sacred Forest—a wooded place to which all Casamançais could relate while distinguishing Casamançais culture from Senegalese culture. The Sacred Forest became a symbol of Casamançais unity.

Thus, when the separatists met in the Sacred Forest of Diabir in 1982 to take solemn oaths to win independence for the Casamance, they swore on the shrines of the Sacred Forest, not on the Bible or the Koran. As one MFDC partisan explained: "I'm a Christian, and my friends are Muslims, but we all decided to set the Bible and the Koran aside and make our pact with the spirits. . . . We have all belonged at a certain moment to the traditional religion: whether one believes or not in these pacts, one thing is real, we have one culture and some practices that have nothing to do with the religions that we practice and that come to us from foreign places."<sup>103</sup> What Robert Baum has called "the *awasena* path" of Jola religions was immensely more powerful in this case than the "world religions" of Christianity and Islam.<sup>104</sup>

Yet Father Diamacoune, because of his commitment to the Catholic faith, never went through the Sacred Forest initiation himself.<sup>105</sup> It is therefore ironic that he posited The Forest as the sacred place that defines Casamançais national identity, virtually cutting himself off from that identity. Hence, he relied on his younger brother Bertrand for knowledge about what young Jola men went through in the Sacred Forest and how it shaped them—at least what Father Diamacoune could know as an uninitiated

man—for a cultural particularism separate from Senegal.<sup>106</sup> Father Diamacoune was not the only Jola leader to avoid the Sacred Forest for much of his life. Robert Sagna, the Socialist Party mayor of Ziguinchor from 1984 to 2009, was also known for not having passed through the Sacred Forest initiation until he was in his fifties and after he was the minister of agriculture in the administration of President Abdou Diouf.<sup>107</sup>

Finally, the third advantage is that by referring to the Sacred Forest, Diamacoune and other Casamançais Catholics further “Africanized” and localized their faith in combination with a universalizing religion like Christianity or Islam. Diamacoune’s emphasis on a “traditional” religious identity for the Casamance echoed the words of Senghor and other early postcolonial intellectuals who were eager to disentangle African religions from discussions of “modernity” and “progress.” In the early 1960s, Senghor wrote that Islamic external jihad (as opposed to an internal struggle for purity and piety) did violence to Africa’s material values while Christianity did violence to its moral values through a discourse that painted the African as animist, traditional, backward, and violent.<sup>108</sup>

Catholic clergy in Senegal were slowly coming around to the idea that some sort of “Africanization” would be necessary for the future of their faith on the continent, just a few years before the Second Vatican Council.<sup>109</sup> A writer known as “the Clerk,” Mary Lonbe, claimed that the church should not be blamed for the materialism of the new postcolonial African elite. Instead, she blamed “the colonizers” for bringing an “atheistic” anticlericalism to Africa:

At the same time that they brought us rolls of cloth, tons of cement, thousands of sheets, and thousands of kilometers of iron concrete, they were also conveying a certain materialist philosophy, of which we other Africans have no need. At the same time they were constructing roads, fixing the railroads, and throwing bridges together, they were digging into our spirits and into our souls a canal to make flow the venom of anticlericalism. This anticlericalism was the supposedly superior product of a race and its intellectuals, who since the days of the authors of the encyclopedias until the Marxists of our day, have perpetrated the act of passing themselves off as scientists while no more scientific than you and me.<sup>110</sup>

Lonbe contested the vaunted “rationality” of Western thinking by tying its materialism to atheism while matching Africanness with Christian “believers.” Though Western colonial histories denigrated African religions as “non-modern” while lauding the “people of the book” as “modern” and “attuned

to the present age,” Senghor elucidated his famous dictum “*Assimiler, ne pas être assimilé!*”<sup>111</sup> when he asserted, “It is our task, once we have chosen them, to adapt these religions to our historical and sociological conditions; it is our task to Negrofy them.”<sup>112</sup>

Catholic officials thus sought to inculturate the new faith with local traditions. This seemed like the logical next step after the development of an African clergy in the late colonial period. The process of Africanization was physically embodied by these new African priests. Missionaries had opened a pre-seminary in Ziguinchor in 1944 and shortly thereafter nominated the first African bishop in Senegambia.<sup>113</sup> These personnel changes went along with a more tolerant approach to the mixing of Catholicism with African ideologies and traditions.<sup>114</sup> Thus, it was not exactly a “leap of faith” for Father Diamacoune to tie Catholicism to the Sacred Forest in his construction of Casamançais nationalism.

If the Sacred Forest lent a degree of African authenticity to the “colonial faith,” its link to local cosmologies was more important than some innate, essentialized “Africanness.” Partha Chatterjee argues that the imperative for the colonized to become “modern” only according to an Andersonian “modular model” left nothing for the colonized themselves to “imagine.”<sup>115</sup> To Casamançais separatists viewing the Senegalese as colonizers, the Islamo-Wolof model of Senegal left Casamançais without the possibility of imagining themselves in the nation. It left them to define the nation in response to a “modernity” already defined by the Senegalese state. As Diouf indicates, finding an alternative to Senghor’s *Sénégalité* meant finding not an alternative to modernity but an alternative modernity. That alternative modernity, ironically, became firmly rooted in the Sacred Forest. Thus, separatists “modernized” religion in the Casamance by making it more “traditional.”

#### THE MANY MEANINGS OF THE FOREST

Though sacred forests are occasionally portrayed as places for the practice of “traditional religion,” recent scholarship has shown the Sacred Forest to be a modern deployment of power serving the interests of those invoking it—whether they subscribed to its spiritual beliefs or not.<sup>116</sup> Since the conflict began in 1982, Mark, Baum, and de Jong have done the most extensive work in English on religions in the Casamance, focused mostly on the Jola.<sup>117</sup> What emerges from this scholarship is not *the* Sacred Forest as a particular geographical space that can be delineated and controlled as state, private, or communal property but a sacred “place” tied to a religious shrine or shrines, often but not always in the forest. These shrines took various forms. Many were as simple as a large stick planted upright in the ground near a large

tree or building. Others were placed inside the hollowed-out trunk of a large silkcotton tree, found all over the Lower Casamance.<sup>118</sup> Others, however, were “far more elaborate, and [occupied] their own small building.” These were often covered by “a small thatched roof.”<sup>119</sup> Different shrines were dedicated to different gods or spirits, but they all pointed ultimately to Emitai, the Supreme Being.<sup>120</sup> One shrine may have been used by a family, a ward, or a village. The forms and meanings of these shrines were as diverse as the contexts in which they were used. Thus, they became malleable symbols for Casamançais identity.

Like Mark, Baum demonstrates the mobile, flexible nature of these pre-colonial shrines. He notes that the earliest known inhabitants of the area he studies—the Koonjaen, in the vicinity of Esulalu, several miles west of Ziguinchor (i.e., “Casa”)—established a shrine in a “sacred grove . . . where men would gather to pray for rain, peace, and the general well-being of the community.” As the community spread, they “carried the . . . shrine with them . . . where they established new sacred forests.” When the Jola migrated into the Lower Casamance during the seventeenth century, they brought some of the palm wine, sacrificial blood, and soil constituting the shrines “to attract the power of the shrine’s spirit and the collective power of the shrine’s prior congregations.”<sup>121</sup> In short, these shrines were as mobile and diverse as the Jola themselves, who have never existed as a fixed, unified ethno-linguistic group.<sup>122</sup>

Some sacred forests were used exclusively by men and others exclusively by women.<sup>123</sup> What made these forests so important in cultural terms was the practice of conducting circumcision initiation rituals in them. Most Jola refer to these ceremonies as *bukut*, a circumcision tradition thought to have been influenced by Mandinka custom and practice, which has largely replaced the tradition of *kahat*, with the exception of a few communities in Casa.<sup>124</sup> In either case, Jola believe that this ceremony makes boys into men—both individually and generationally.<sup>125</sup> It “represents the promotion of an entire generation of men to adult status.” It also granted to older men the power to regulate marriage and socially sanctioned sexual relationships, as a Jola man was not really “a man” until he had been circumcised in the Sacred Forest. And he could not marry until passing through *bukut*. Thus, by postponing the next *bukut*, “the elders in a community could temporarily extend their monopoly over marriageable women.”<sup>126</sup> The *bukut* ceremony normally lasts a matter of weeks and occurs only once in a generation (i.e., once every twenty or twenty-five years). The entire community takes part in the ceremony.

Besides circumcision, elders conduct a type of social training in the forest based on the traditions of their ancestors. Louis-Vincent Thomas

in 1965 predicted that a ceremony he had attended in the village of Nioumoun, in the area of Bliss-Karones (northwestern Casamance), might be the last *bukut* celebrated there because by 1990, when the next *bukut* would likely occur, all of the villagers would profess either Islam or Christianity.<sup>127</sup> That was clearly not the case in 1990, when the separatist conflict took a turn for the worst. Thomas could not have foreseen the effects of the MFDC reducing Casamançais religious identity to “the Sacred Forest,” even if one also practiced Christianity or Islam. But the conflict only reinforced the importance of traditional religion in the Casamance. It certainly did not diminish it.

Not only have the forms of Casamançais sacred forest shrines changed over the years, but the symbols and practices associated with them have changed as well. Mark argues that because *bukut* “figures prominently in Jola narratives,” one can trace the “major ritual changes that the ceremony has undergone during the past 150 years.” In addition to these oral sources, Mark traces these changes through material sources such as ceremonial horned masks worn by the leaders of the *bukut*. Similarities among Jola and Mandinka horned masks indicate cultural interaction of these communities in the past. Mark also asserts that the Jola “now rely heavily” on *bukut* “to establish their identity as Jola in a modern multicultural state.”<sup>128</sup> Thus, the similarities between *bukut* and the Mandinka ceremony of *kankaran* reveal the possibility of forming a national identity through different yet similar religious beliefs and practices.<sup>129</sup> This reduction of diverse identities into one Casamançais identity demonstrates the flexibility of sacred forest symbols and practices. That flexibility explains why the Sacred Forest became such a valuable symbol of Casamançais nationalism—whether Christian or Muslim or animist, Jola or Mandinka, rich or poor, and man or woman.

Because of the importance of the sacred forest to men, women in many Jola communities developed their own sacred forests. Many *ukin* [pl. for “shrine,” s. *boekin*] were dedicated to female fertility and rain, reflecting “the central importance of both matters in an agricultural society where drought was a constant concern and where disease caused a very high infant mortality.”<sup>130</sup> Jola women established “female sacred forests” initially to pray for the safe return of their sons, recruited by the colonial state to fight for France in the Second World War.<sup>131</sup> This timing coincides with Baum’s claim that “women prophets” with spiritual authority over communities of women and men emerged in the wake of the colonial conquest. Baum points to a marked change, however, in terms of women’s religious leadership in the public sphere in Jola communities.<sup>132</sup> Such leadership surely helped support their claims to participation in *the nation*. But regardless of the opportunities for

religious leadership, that they practiced their religion in sacred forests reinforced the mapping of “the Casamance” in “the Sacred Forest.” It made the Sacred Forest a place to which men and women could relate to distinguish the Casamance from the rest of Senegal.

Clearly, the meanings of The Forest, as are those of the nation, were gendered. Men’s control of the Sacred Forest until the early twentieth century, weakened by their failure to stop the colonial conquest, literally placed women on the margins of The Forest—where they stand today with the rest of the uninitiated in attendance as young male initiates enter and exit the Sacred Forest for *bukut*.<sup>133</sup> Only women prophets—exceptions for Jola women rather than the rule—have played leadership roles in Jola communities. The majority are left on the margins “until the situation is hopeless.”<sup>134</sup> At that point—one of hopelessness—women have intervened to correct the men. But at that point, it has often been too late. At the same time, Casamançais women have largely been the best at bringing about peace. Their spiritual capital—the basis of their influence with their sons and brothers—provided their political capital. Casamançais men of the future would do well to take advantage of that capital before the situation is hopeless—for the good of the community, for the good of the nation . . . Casamançais as well as Senegalese.



The relationship between the *forêt classée* and the *forêt sacrée* in the Casamance reveals several important things about the ways that nationalists use cultural symbols to discursively map the nation to advance their interests. Through their discourse of grievance, separatist elites from the MFDC like Diamacoune and Sané counter-mapped the Casamance against an Islamo-Wolof model of the Senegalese nation that encompassed the Casamance at the same time that it rendered it peripheral. The separatists referred Casamançais to the Sacred Forest because of its unique power to compel their identification with an incredibly local, flexible, and “Casamançais” place. But that localness and flexibility also presented challenges to the nationalist project of the separatists.

Hence, this transformation reveals the ways ordinary people targeted by the nationalist message counter-mapped in their own ways, not just against Senegal but against the MFDC as well. These ordinary Casamançais displayed another level of counter-mapping—against “those politicians” from both the MFDC and the Senegalese state. Certainly, the separatist counter-mapping absolutely made sense for plenty of ordinary people, who never felt more Casamançais than when in or near a forest. But as we have

seen with the other spatial symbols discussed in this book, many other Casamançais did not consider *their* sacred forest a symbol of rebellion. Even if the separatist discourse of grievance resonated with them in other Casamançais places, like The River or The Rice Field, many refused to turn over a place like the sacred forest—so sacred, so vital to their worldview—to politicians who only “talked politics” that did not seem to matter to the local, everyday lives of ordinary Casamançais.

## 4 ~ The School

*“Añiil abeteni abajut butila.”* (Pointe Saint Georges Jola)

*“L’enfant rejeté, on ne peut lui en vouloir.”* (French)

“The rejected child, you can’t blame him/her for it.”

—Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance*

THE DAY Idrissa Sagna died began as a typical Friday in the Casamance. January 11, 1980, brought plenty of sunshine for a day of preparations for the quickly approaching rice harvest. Most Muslims donned their best *boubous* to attend worship at their local mosques.<sup>1</sup> But the approaching rice harvest and religious services did not prevent the students of Lycée Djignabo in Ziguinchor from going to school. Rather, the students kept themselves from class.

The students had been on strike for weeks to protest strict new regulations imposed by Mouhamadou “London” Sow, a former English teacher (thus the nickname “London”) and a *nordiste*, or “northerner,” who was the principal of Djignabo.<sup>2</sup> Sow decreed a stricter dress code for the students and faculty amid a shortage of educational resources. Students considered the new dress code as the last drop in a bucket that began to overflow with

rage and violence. The shortage of resources resulted in large part from the financial crisis of the Senegalese state due to structural adjustment in the late 1970s.<sup>3</sup> The combination of tighter restrictions with fewer resources drove the students to strike. Joined by a faction of younger faculty members sympathetic to their leftist politics, the students called for Sow's departure outside the walled compound of the school. Local spectators joined the demonstration in front of the school's black iron gate (figure 4.1).

On that Friday, tensions between the students (and their sympathizers) and the Senegalese security forces arrayed outside the gate heated with the rising sun. As the two sides antagonized one another later in the morning, the tensions reached a feverish pitch. Suddenly, gunshots rang out. The crowd backed away, leaving Sagna lying on the ground, dying in a pool of blood. Two other students were also wounded. Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor stood among the crowd.<sup>4</sup>

Few of the students at the strike that day were likely thinking of separatism as they confronted school authorities and Senegalese security forces.<sup>5</sup> That did not stop Father Diamacoune from seizing the moment to add Sagna's death to a separatist *discourse of grievance* against the Senegalese state.<sup>6</sup> This discourse suggested that the iconic Senegalese merchant trader would trick, cheat, or betray the iconic hard-working Casamançais peasant at every opportunity. And it meant that elites from northern Senegal had betrayed elites from the Casamance.<sup>7</sup> To the separatists, the discourse was not imagined; it was real. It was historical. And it matched the lived reality of many Casamançais in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These Casamançais felt that the *nordistes* denigrated their culture while using Senegal's 1964 eminent domain law to take away their lands. Separatists like Diamacoune and Mamadou "Nkrumah" Sané capitalized on this discontent to make their case for Casamançais separatism.

Fourteen years after the infamous student strike at Djignabo, Diamacoune claimed that Sagna's death was "the real debut of 'the events of the Casamance.'"<sup>8</sup> He interpreted the events of that day with a rather one-sided narrative:

11 January 1980—the student Idrissa Sagna is gunned down in cold blood by an officer of Senegalese origins, not a Jola of the Casamance, but one from the repressive forces of the Senegalese state. This young student was an unarmed innocent bystander, peacefully going his way, without committing the least infraction. . . . Everybody was for the students except, obviously, the handful of people we know. The student Idrissa Sagna, a sixth grader, was

deliberately, coldly, cynically gunned down . . . by the forces of invasion, occupation, and repression of President Abdou Diouf, pretender as a champion of human rights. Yes, a poor innocent one. Abdou Diouf was still the prime minister. A poor innocent one coldly gunned down while doing nothing wrong, not demonstrating, not stealing, and not destroying anything. Yes, an innocent one. To try to reduce the tension, the crime committed by an officer of Senegalese origins was attributed to a poor Jola boy. But everybody knows that the bullet that killed Idrissa Sagna was not even from the gun carried by the scapegoat, who was Casamançais and Jola.<sup>9</sup>

In his account of the killing of Idrissa Sagna, Diamacoune reduced all of the students in the Casamance to the students at Lycée Djignabo. He then reduced the students at Djignabo to Sagna to make Sagna the martyr of a separatist movement about which the young man likely cared very little. Diamacoune claimed that Sagna's death marked the beginning of the "events of the Casamance." But the students were joining in a larger movement of student protests all over Senegal that had begun the previous month. They may have genuinely detested Sow's new dress code, but they also knew they were part of a larger nationwide strike. Likely, they were not thinking of independence for the *Casamançais* nation.<sup>10</sup> If anything, they were thinking of the *Senegalese* nation, as they joined students around the country in striking for better treatment in their schools.

To link the "original MFDC" of the 1950s to the "modern MFDC" of the 1980s, Diamacoune tied Sagna's death in 1980 to that of the anticolonial nationalist Victor Diatta in 1948. Diamacoune considered Diatta as one of the founders of the "original MFDC," an earlier version of the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) that existed from 1949 to 1954 to represent Casamançais interests against those of the northern, metropolitan Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), or in other words, the French Socialist Party. Diamacoune claimed that Diatta, the nephew of Benjamin Diatta (a well-known intermediary with the French from Oussouye), a schoolteacher and a military veteran of the French colonial army, attended an initial meeting in Sédhiou about organizing such a regional party in 1947, although no evidence exists for Victor Diatta's presence at the meeting.<sup>11</sup> Diamacoune posited Diatta's death as the first of a handful of mysterious deaths for the original leaders of the movement leading to the foundation of the original MFDC. These deaths later became foundational to Diamacoune's discourse of Senegalese betrayal of the Casamance. Linking the deaths of the nationalist generation of the original MFDC to

more-contemporary “martyrs” like Sagna was key to the discourse of grievance upon which Casamançais separatism rested. Diamacoune explained, “History repeats itself. On the 20th of November, 1948, the bullet that killed Victor Sihumehemba Diatta in Dakar was not from the gun carried in the pocket of this accomplished man of letters from French West Africa, alleged to be a suicide. Another Casamançais. It was too much.”<sup>12</sup> Through this discourse of betrayal, Diamacoune tied the killing of Sagna in 1980 to the alleged suicide of Diatta in 1948.<sup>13</sup>

It is no coincidence that Diamacoune portrayed these two martyrs as dedicated students, as “men of letters.” (In the sixth grade, Idrissa Sagna was little more than a boy.) Indeed, the educated men who in the early 1980s took up the mantle of the historic MFDC to claim independence for the Casamance also took up many of the traditions of *évolués* like Diatta.<sup>14</sup> The French intended to build the colonial state and, eventually, African nations on the human capital of these “evolved” men—men with enough education to help run colonial businesses and bureaucratic institutions. But in addition to learning French and arithmetic, these young men, and by the time of Sagna, a few young women, learned the history of nations. How was “the nation” presented to students in Casamançais classrooms? Was it possible to imagine the nation without formal education? If so, then how did ordinary Casamançais think of the nation? How did they think about separatism?

Though by doing so I risk reifying Father Diamacoune’s “articulated” or “leapfrogged” history to link the deaths of Diatta (in 1948) and Sagna (in 1980), I contend that the violent nature of their deaths indicates the high stakes of national imagining in the colonial and postcolonial school.<sup>15</sup> Here, nationalist ideas took root in the minds of the colonial elites, and many of these elites—*évolué* schoolteachers—transmitted these ideas to a new generation of postcolonial nationalists like those in the modern MFDC.<sup>16</sup> In other words, teachers like Diatta taught “national” histories to students like Sagna. I am not claiming that Diatta taught Sagna; Diatta died before Sagna was born. But I am claiming that these men represented “men of letters” in the setting of the school.

Therefore, I show in this chapter that the school constituted a breeding ground for nationalism in the minds of its students. The School, as a situated space-place for social and cultural formation, produced an educated group of men—the *schooled*—ready to imagine and perform the separatist nation.<sup>17</sup> The common experience of the nationalist and separatist elites in this chapter was The School. Formal education made them elite. It gave them the knowledge, confidence, and authority to believe they could define national identity for themselves and others. Thus, formal education catalyzed

the violent conflict between elites in the 1950s and in the 1980s. While ordinary Casamançais were not quick to publicly contest these claims, they defined their cultures and interests at the local level, which did not always support separatist objectives.

To make this argument, I build on the work of scholars who have examined the importance of education to the formation of a nationalist elite in African countries. Numerous historians have noted the importance of the colonial school to the elite process of imagining nations.<sup>18</sup> Céline Labrune-Badiane notes that the teaching of French in colonial schools prepared colonial elites to serve as clerks and bureaucrats in the colonial state and colonial businesses while also severing ties to ethnic languages and building a new nation around the colonial language and culture.<sup>19</sup> Though French missionaries at colonial schools in northern Senegal taught and spoke in local languages like Wolof, those in the Casamance, with its greater diversity of languages and cultures, made French the language of instruction.<sup>20</sup> Thus, French became the common language of what Vincent Foucher called the educated Casamançais “litrati.”<sup>21</sup> As Pierre Englebert notes, the Casamance conflict was less a conflict between an elite north and a subaltern south than a conflict between two groups of elites vying for control of the postcolonial state.<sup>22</sup> Foucher also points to the pivotal role of education in the formation of these nationalist elites. He argues that, contrary to claims of Casamançais separation and difference with Senegal, education brought these elites into close contact with the Senegalese state and ultimately left them disappointed with their position in the postcolonial dispensation.<sup>23</sup> To them, it seemed that constructing the Senegalese nation on an Islamo-Wolof model, as posited by Mamadou Diouf (among others), had left them on the outside looking in.<sup>24</sup> This disappointment implies that the school constituted not only a space for imagining the nation to support the state but also a place for contesting that imagination. I bring a focus on space and place to the identities of these elites to see what we can learn about the school as a place of national imagining.

This focus drives me to make two arguments in this chapter. First, the fact that the primary founders of the original MFDC—Emile Badiane, a Jola from Bignona, and Ibrahim (a.k.a. Ibou) Diallo, a Fula from Sédhiou—taught school for a living should tell us something about the process of national imagination in the classroom. Thus, I join scholars like Labrune-Badiane, Foucher, Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, Elizabeth Foster, and Lacy Ferrell in noting the authority emerging from the space of the colonial school to form the minds of pupils in the interest of the state.<sup>25</sup> Schoolteachers possess power and authority to form national citizens for the benefit of the state. In

a way, teachers can be thought of as agents of the nation-state. They exert this power in space intended to impose order and, in some ways, hierarchy on the young minds and bodies of future citizens of the nation-state.<sup>26</sup> These men of the original MFDC sought to educate and train future citizens of Senegal who were also citizens from the Casamance able to look after regional interests the way the men of the original MFDC did. In many ways, these men sought to create “carbon copies” of themselves while protecting and advancing the interests of the Casamance.

But as Foucher, Awenengo Dalberto, Jean-Claude Marut, and many other scholars of the Casamance conflict have noted, these original MFDC leaders did not necessarily intend to separate politically from Senegal.<sup>27</sup> Whereas Foucher focuses on the role of the Jola literati, which included Badiane and Diatta, I consider the multiethnic nature of this original version of the MFDC, represented especially by Diallo, of Fula origins. As Mamadou Diouf has noted, this multiethnic history was important to Father Diamacoune’s construction of a multiethnic separatist movement to elide what often appeared to be a mostly Jola case of ethnic nationalism.<sup>28</sup> I argue that Lycée Djignabo became a particularly iconic place for the separatist movement not only because of the student strike and the violence that made Idrissa Sagna a martyr but also because it was a space for imagining the nation on multiethnic terms.

Second, I engage the arguments of Étienne Smith, Derek Peterson, and Giacomo Macola regarding “homespun historians” to argue that the colonial and postcolonial teaching of Senegalese history left a gap for the contemporary MFDC to exploit.<sup>29</sup> Modern MFDC leaders like Father Diamacoune and Mamadou Sané formulated their discourse of grievance by exploiting this gap in Casamançais history. The discourse of Senegalese betrayal of the Casamance took root in its postwar political history. The narrative of this history—with subjects who were nationalist elites formed in colonial state and missionary schools—shows that colonial and postcolonial history education was meant to serve state interests. While the male, mostly missionary-educated identity of colonial elites initially excluded non-elite social groups from participating in the imagination of the nation, ordinary Casamançais refused to be shut out. Therefore, this chapter shows that, over time, the school became a space for not only imagining the nation but also contesting and performing it—and not only by the male elites to whom the colonial state was entrusted at independence.

To make these arguments, I first examine the development of formal education in the Casamance along with the educational backgrounds of the most important nationalist leaders in the late colonial and postcolonial

periods to show how their school experience informed their ideas of the nation. Second, I analyze the construction of Senegalese national history on the Islamo-Wolof model taught in the colonial and postcolonial schools of Senegal.

Next I analyze the “homespun history” constructed by Father Diamacoune and other separatists to exploit a gap in Senegalese national history. This gap often left Casamançais out of the story. The separatists were eager to fill it, explaining why they decided to revive the name of the historic MFDC, laying claim to a cultural heritage displayed in the history of the original MFDC. In these middle sections, I leave the physical space of *the school* for other political spaces where *the schooled* defined or contested the nation. But The School is always in the background. It is where nationalism took root and sprouted in the minds of colonial and postcolonial elites battling over the cultural definition of the nation. It remained the source of their social capital to engage in nationalism in the ways they did. Thus, the focus is on how schooling fostered emotional attachment to particular territory—a sort of “territorialization” by schooling.<sup>30</sup> Even if only in the background, The School is always present in the narratives that follow.

After that discussion, I consider why one particular school, Lycée Djignabo in Ziguinchor, became the school more than any other where the Casamançais nation was imagined and contested. Taken together, these sections present some of the most important elements of the discourse of Senegalese betrayal of the Casamance. The MFDC tried to fill the gap in Senegalese history with this discourse.

At the end of the chapter, I note the power taken from formal education by nationalist and separatist elites to think that they possessed the moral claim to build a nation. The nation consisted, however, largely of ordinary Casamançais who often disqualified themselves from “talking about politics” with strangers but were quite willing to define their interests on their own local terms, whether those terms agreed with those of “the politicians” or not. Ultimately, this chapter reveals that imagining the nation based on a model taken from the school classroom could prove to be a bloody enterprise.

#### THE COLONIAL SCHOOL IN THE CASAMANCE

In the postwar period, apart from Dakar, the Casamance became the most educated region in Senegal.<sup>31</sup> Especially if one separates the region of Kolda from that of Ziguinchor (the two administrative regions constituting the Casamance), the Lower Casamance has been one of the most literate regions in the country. For example, Foucher has found it odd that the Senegalese

region most known for resisting hierarchy and state authority would become one of the best-educated regions of the country. How is it that “this society, supposedly so entrenched in its refusal of hierarchies, power and the state, came to so easily accept modern education, an institution so closely related to the state, a system so productive of inequalities, so elitist in its principles?” This participation in state hierarchy through schooling “seems to contradict culturalist understandings of Casamance: the egalitarian and anti-hierarchical mentality of the Diola [Jola] seems at odds with their enthusiasm for modern education.”<sup>32</sup> The answer to this question rests with the desire of the nationalist generation to profit from the opportunities offered by French colonialism. After 1945 especially, access to formal education provided access to the state, which to many seemed like the best, if not the only, business around.

To be sure, colonialism played the role of tutor from an early point in French colonial history in the region. Colonial officials believed that “the material civilization [of colonialism] . . . by itself plays a pedagogical role.”<sup>33</sup> French colonial administrators sought to demonstrate to Casamançais (and the colonized across French colonial Africa) by their clean, proper, spacious, and well-constructed material culture that the French were the masters and teachers of the Africans. Missionaries often built schools on or near church grounds, where they could be easily staffed and managed by clerical personnel. These buildings typically appeared as flat, rather featureless stucco structures with open, grilled windows to allow air to circulate, alleviating some of the effects of the heat and humidity in the Casamance. There may have been a chalkboard at the front of the room but little else in terms of desks, furniture, or notebooks. Smaller schools started in rural villages would have appeared even more rudimentary.<sup>34</sup> In general, the French did not invest in maintaining the construction of these schools. In many cases, the schools quickly fell into disrepair.<sup>35</sup>

Before the French clinched their rule along the Casamance River by their 1886 agreement with Portugal, there was already a population of elite, mixed-race “Portuguese” who had converted to Christianity and learned how to read and write to serve as the middlemen of transatlantic trade on the Upper Guinea Coast.<sup>36</sup> But these young men (and they were all men) had to go to Saint-Louis or to Lisbon to obtain instruction.<sup>37</sup> When the Portuguese transferred Ziguinchor to the French in 1886, these Creole elites faced a choice: they could move to Portuguese Guinea, or they could stay in Ziguinchor and adjust to French language and culture. Most chose the latter to try to maintain their position in the changing colonial political economy.<sup>38</sup>

Schooling in the Casamance spread slowly and tentatively at first, with the goal of creating consumers for French products under the guise of the “civilizing mission.” Along with the teaching of French language, history, and culture, the formation of a new elite would also benefit French commerce. As the French considered establishing a trading post along the Casamance in the early nineteenth century, Governor Jean Jubelin in Saint-Louis wrote to the Ministry of the Navy in 1829, “Bringing the indigenous inhabitants to the knowledge and study of French and associating them to our language and culture, an indispensable notion, will inspire among them a taste for our goods and our industries, finally creating each year among them a nursery of young proper subjects to become the elite of their fellow citizens, enlightening in turn and imperceptibly propagating the first elements of European civilization among the people of the interior. Those should be the fruits of the new establishment.”<sup>39</sup> Creating a new class of African elites who could lead fellow Africans to buy European goods implied not only providing those elites with education but providing it for their peasant cousins as well, leading to the eventual formation of the “Jola literati,” the class of well-educated men who would lead the nationalist generation into political independence from French colonialism.<sup>40</sup>

The French built the first school in the Casamance at “the military fort of Sédhiou” in 1860. Labrune-Badiane asserts that this choice of location demonstrates that “the creation of a school was a continuation of the military conquest and the essential role assigned to schools as part of a strategy of political and cultural domination.”<sup>41</sup> As colonial competition in West Africa intensified and the French became keener to establish a more permanent presence in the Casamance, the school gradually became an important tool of colonial infiltration and domination. By 1870, this first attempt at colonial schooling was abandoned because of a shortage of qualified teachers willing to serve in the Casamance—a problematic attitude that would cripple education in the Casamance for generations. A similar attempt at establishing a school in Sédhiou by Protestant missionaries in 1865 was also abandoned after only a few years. The Catholic missionaries of the Holy Ghost Fathers, however, saw more success at establishing a lasting presence, starting schools in Sédhiou (1876), Carabane (1880), and Ziguinchor (1888). The sisters of the Congregation of the Holy Heart of Mary established schools for girls in the Casamance after 1877. In the 1890s and early 1900s, the colonial administration added secular state schools in Sédhiou, Carabane, and Ziguinchor to these religious offerings.<sup>42</sup>

In Francophone Africa, the Church and the state hardly worked together. As Toyin Falola explains, “If the missionaries were interested in

evangelization, the French government was interested in secular French culture.<sup>43</sup> Catholic education in French West Africa came to an abrupt halt in 1905, with the passage of a French law dictating the strict separation of church and state. The law was particularly stringent against any role for the Catholic Church in education. As Foucher explains, “This law had a disastrous effect on education in Casamance, where much depended on the educational activism of the Church, as observed by many colonial civil servants, who asked for a delay before implementing the law in the colonies.”<sup>44</sup>

Thus, the colonial state turned to building public schools to try to replace the efforts of the missionaries. To the public schools already established in Sédhiou, Carabane, and Ziguinchor, the state added new schools in the colonial administrative centers of Bignona (1907) and Kolda (1909). In 1909, a new girls’ school was opened in Ziguinchor.<sup>45</sup> In 1913, schools were opened in Diouloulou, Oussouye, and Velingara. The colonial administration was trying to pick up where the Catholic Church had left off, though the Holy Ghost Fathers could remain with a minimal presence. Almost all these schools were closed the following year, however, as the French mobilized to fight the First World War. The colonial administration would gradually reopen the schools after the war.<sup>46</sup> The missionary schools also slowly began to return in the 1920s.<sup>47</sup> But keeping students in school was a challenge. Poor attendance was common. Many students dropped out altogether. Casamançais families had yet to see tangible benefits of sending their children to school.<sup>48</sup>

These calculations began to change in the 1930s. French colonial officials returned to building schools to consolidate the “civilizing mission” of French colonialism. They sought to expand beyond the burgeoning colonial towns to open schools in the villages of the countryside. The colonial administration of French West Africa instituted a Popular Rural Schooling program (in the *écoles rurales populaires*) to promote the “ruralization of education.” These schools focused on practical vocational education for rural communities.<sup>49</sup> Gradually, more and more Casamançais began to see some benefit from education. Village leaders began to build schools themselves and to request the services of teachers from colonial authorities.<sup>50</sup> Doudou Sarr, a teacher who enrolled at the school in Bignona in 1928, explained: “Our parents have understood that it is in their interest to put their children in school. . . . My father seeing what is going on around him . . . he has seen the neighbours’ parents access better social situations. With the penetration of Islam, we may have wanted to slow down this movement towards literacy by pushing parents to send their children to Quranic school, but when they saw the others’ son coming back, when he sends money to his family and you receive absolutely

nothing, why not do like the others?”<sup>51</sup> Given the requirements of the agricultural political economy in the Casamance (tending rice and peanut fields, fetching water and firewood, etc.), more and more families faced a decision about the most profitable use of their children’s time.<sup>52</sup>

Again, however, finding teachers who would agree to serve in the Casamance proved to be difficult. Before 1945, the Casamance was thought of as a “backwater” of education, where few French or Senegalese teachers wanted to serve. Most of the colonial and postcolonial *instituteurs* (i.e., teachers) came from the Four Communes and looked at a tour in the Casamance as an undesirable post. Many viewed the population as ignorant and unadvanced compared to themselves.<sup>53</sup> At Balingore, the canton chief (*chef de canton*), Alpha Bodian, accused the school director from northern Senegal of “manifesting a gross negligence with regard to the Jola children” and then concluded, “Mister Diop is in effect a native of the Senegal River valley [area east of Saint-Louis in northern Senegal] and does not like us.”<sup>54</sup>

If the charge is true, Mr. Diop may have felt out of sorts. One colonial official reported that teachers from northern Senegal felt out of place, too far from their homes: “The majority of secondary schoolteachers, originally from northern Senegal, demonstrate their strong repugnance at serving in Lower Casamance, complaining of the difficulty of procuring food and of the humidity of the climate.” The official concluded, “I think their principal complaint is finding themselves in the midst of a polytheist and Catholic population very different from them, making them feel estranged from their own country.”<sup>55</sup> Evidently, neither those from northern Senegal nor those from the Casamance thought of themselves at the time as coming from the same “country.” This perception would prove to be a challenge for Léopold Senghor and other Senegalese nation-builders.

Negative perceptions of the “other” went both ways. The district officer (*commandant de cercle*) of Ziguinchor in 1932 reported that teachers from northern Senegal “are not morally supported by the authority of the indigenous chiefs and are considered as intruders among the people to whom they have been called to live and serve. So that is one of the principal causes, if not the only cause, of the reported failures and lack of success. An entirely local recruitment effort, from among the indigenous elite, would help us avoid sending the wrong signal.”<sup>56</sup> But as Labrune-Badiane shows, the tense relations between teachers from the North, especially those from the Four Communes, and the populations of the South “must be seen as an individual affair: not all teachers from northern Senegal acted arrogantly toward the population of the South.” Moreover, contrary to the opinion of the commandant de cercle in Ziguinchor, it became clear that some teachers originally from the Casamance

“also demonstrated condemnable behavior toward their students.”<sup>57</sup> Thus, recruiting teachers from the Casamance would be no panacea.

In the 1940s and '50s, “in the context of the overhaul of the French colonial empire,” school construction in the Casamance began to soar, as the French invited colonial elites to join them in rebuilding the French Empire as *la plus Grande France*, or “Greater France.”<sup>58</sup> Educational infrastructure mushroomed. In fifteen years, the number of public primary schools in the Casamance tripled, increasing from thirty-seven in 1944–45, to forty-nine in 1950, to ninety in 1959, a year before Senegalese independence. About thirty Catholic schools were opened between 1947 and 1953, including enrollment for girls.<sup>59</sup>

These educated elites would play important roles in leading more-autonomous polities in the new Territorial Assembly in the late 1950s and in reproducing the educational system that spawned them, as many, like Emile Badiane and the other founders of the early MFDC, became teachers.<sup>60</sup> But this growing class of technocrats also played and/or followed soccer, published newspapers, wore Western clothes, went to the theater, and ballroom danced as cultural evidence of their *évolué* status.<sup>61</sup>

With their new status, *évolués* like Emile Badiane were able to provide some amount of patronage for their communities. They appear to have felt obliged to make the community’s investment in their education pay off. As Labrune-Badiane notes, “The Bignona subdivision [Emile Badiane’s native region] was always ahead from [*sic*] the other subdivisions in Casamance, even in AOF [i.e., French West Africa].”<sup>62</sup> Badiane must have faced pressure to produce material and financial resources for his community.

Additionally, local communities also drove the demand for schools. One newspaper account of the inauguration of a new school in the Fogny region of the Casamance in 1954 provides an illustration of how ordinary Casamançais drove the process and provided for themselves, together with colonial officials and local elites:

On 23 October 1954, Mr. Sere de Rivieres, assistant to the district officer [commandant de cercle], and Mr. Vacquié, assistant chief administrator of the area managed by the territorial counsellors Emile Badiane and Ibou Diallo, accompanied several canton chiefs at the inauguration of a new school building in the village of Bona [on the Soungrougrou, northwest of Sédhiou and east of Sindian]. In the paved village, a large crowd marked this event with popular rejoicing, as people from the surrounding areas celebrated for two nights and a day, indicating their joy by the thundering pounds of tam-

tams and wrestling matches. A result of the district tax [*œuvre de la taxe de cercle*], the new school owes much to the perseverance and the tenacious efforts of the population and to the gracious work of those who built it in spite of the difficulties of transportation and supply. Aware of the compensation they had earned, the inhabitants asked that they be rewarded with an experienced teacher.

The article goes on to explain that the school building consisted of two classrooms, measuring twenty by twelve meters, constructed with strong materials and “in good taste.” Thus, the new school would constitute an important link in the social fabric of this part of the Casamance.<sup>63</sup> As Labrune-Badiane argues, “Schooling generates a new relationship with space and thus new territorial identities. Through the teaching of history and geography, pupils learned to situate themselves within the space and history of their land, Casamance, Senegal, AOF and the French colonial empire.”<sup>64</sup>

On the eve of independence, however, not every Casamançais student imagined their political community along these lines. Some did. But many blurred these boundaries, others ignored them, and still others sought to destroy them altogether.

#### THE POSTCOLONIAL SCHOOL IN THE CASAMANCE

Students continued to imagine the nation in postcolonial schools. But the nation had changed, especially in colonialism’s final decade, gradually reduced from the “imperial nation-state” of Greater France, to a French-speaking federation of West African states, to the short-lived Mali Federation, and finally to Senegal.<sup>65</sup> This final version of the nation would be taught in primary and secondary schools across Senegal, such as Lycée Djignabo in Ziguinchor.

The postcolonial school was built on the same model as the colonial school. In many cases, it was the same building. Larger urban schools like Lycée Djignabo consisted of several buildings spread about a fenced compound, with separate classrooms for different grades.<sup>66</sup> At a state school like Djignabo, this compound also included separate buildings for staff offices, a library, archives of the school, and administration. Students dressed in school uniforms and entered the school compound through a large metal gate on one of Ziguinchor’s busier residential thoroughfares, bordered by upper-middle-class homes, businesses, church and NGO offices, and cafés.<sup>67</sup>

In 1995, at the point of some of the heaviest fighting in the Casamance conflict, the Ziguinchor region’s literacy rate was 49.74 percent, following Dakar’s at 60.39 percent. The Kolda region’s literacy rate, however, ranked



FIGURE 4.1. The front gate of Lycée Djignabo, where Idrissa Sagna was shot and killed on January 11, 1980, during the student strike. Photograph by author, March 2014.

near the bottom at 22.14 percent. The lower literacy rate for the Upper Casamance may have contributed to Jola leadership of the MFDC, as the Jola were the majority ethnic group in the region of Ziguinchor.<sup>68</sup> Religion also seems to have played a factor here, as Catholic missionaries more heavily evangelized the Jola than the Mandinka, who had been Islamized well before the French arrival.<sup>69</sup> Thus, Mandinka parents were more likely to send their children to a Koranic school than a Western one, if they considered schooling their children at all. Ziguinchor's relatively high literacy rate resulted from its high schooling rate (table 4.1).

TABLE 4.1. SENEGALESE SCHOOLING RATE BY REGION SINCE 1964

Region	Rate of education		Number of classes	
	1964–65	1976	1964–65	1976
Dakar	53%	71%	1,317	2,170
<b>Casamance</b>	<b>31%</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>759</b>	<b>1,001</b>
Diourbel/Louga	14%	14%	376	486
Senegal River valley	35%	33%	578	585
Eastern Senegal	20%	22%	216	247
Sine-Saloum	24%	23%	789	2,508
Thies	30%	29%	609	923

Source: Makhtar Diouf, *Sénégal: Les ethnies et la nation* (Geneva: UNRISD; Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1994), 142–43. The percentages found in the original source have been rounded here.

This trend did not appear to fade in the 1980s, either. In 1987–88, of the 2,420 primary schools in Senegal, 309 of them—or 13 percent—could be found in the Casamance, which accounted for less than 6 percent of the population.<sup>70</sup> Hence, while the MFDC’s discourse of betrayal claimed that the Casamance had been denied the social goods of the Senegalese state, when it came to education, this discourse was a myth.

During the postcolonial period, the church or the state continued to furnish Western education to Senegalese citizens.<sup>71</sup> Although the Casamance received a disproportionate amount in school investment per capita, the figures above show that no region’s rate of education grew as precipitously between 1964–65 and 1976 as Dakar. Whereas the other regions’ rates remained essentially stagnant or declined, Dakar’s grew by nearly 20 percent. As Foucher claims, this period marked a turning point where “the social compact between the Diola [Jola] and the state was suddenly broken.” The break appeared visually as “the Senegalese state closed the boarding schools upon which so many rural Diola students depended, and drastically reduced the intake in the civil service.” Therefore, Foucher concludes, “school has . . . been central in the development of Casamançais nationalism because it was the site around which both its material and its ideological structures could develop.”<sup>72</sup> This break left rural students at a disadvantage and simultaneously empowered urban students to define the nation for others. Access to formal education became a marker of power in the Casamance.

#### NATIONAL HISTORIES IN THE COLONIAL/POSTCOLONIAL SCHOOL

Part of the new colonial elite’s power resulted from being able to write new national histories for new African nations. The School in colonial and postcolonial Senegal produced “the schooled.” As noted earlier, the French referred to these men as the “*évolués*.” Foucher refers to them as the “*litrati*.” Regardless of what we call them, every nationalist discussed in this book received his education from a church or state school, a trend that fit the profile of nationalist leaders across the continent.<sup>73</sup> In school, Africans learned the history of Europeans. In Francophone Africa, this history focused on the development of the French nation through its language, history, and cultural achievements.<sup>74</sup> After graduation, these students worked in enterprises run or regulated by “the French imperial nation-state.”<sup>75</sup> For many members of this new colonial elite, the nation fit nicely into the contours of the state.

The primary problem to these men was that Europeans—instead of them—were steering the “ship of state.” Basil Davidson nicely sums up the worldview of this nationalist generation in explaining “the Black Man’s Burden” as these nations emerged from colonial rule in the postwar period: “The

activists of the 1950s plunged into their chosen road of nationalism, seeing this as the only available guarantee of a route open to progress. They accepted the aim of building nation-states on the British model (or, later, on the French) because, as it seemed to them and as they were strongly advised, there could exist no other useful objective.” Ghanaian independence leader Kwame Nkrumah’s advice that “they should seek the political kingdom, and all would then be added to them, expressed a central maxim of which the truth appeared self-evident: once sovereignty was seized by Africans no matter under what conditions, the road to freedom and development would be theirs to follow.” As Davidson notes, “That this acceptance of the postcolonial nation-state meant acceptance of the legacy of the colonial partition, and of the moral and political practices of colonial rule in its institutional dimensions, was a handicap which the more perceptive of the activists well perceived.”<sup>76</sup> In Senegal, accepting “the legacy of the colonial partition” meant accepting the division of Senegal into a northern half and a southern half, divided by the Anglophone colony of The Gambia. Accepting “the moral and political practices of colonial rule in its institutional dimensions” meant accepting a system of political parties that grew more out of French history than Senegalese history. To some extent, the national history of Senegal remained to be written.

For many Francophone West African leaders, the history of their nations began in a school called William Ponty—named after a former governor-general of French West Africa. The French established the school in 1913 on Gorée Island.<sup>77</sup> In 1937, they transferred it to Sebikotane, east of Dakar.<sup>78</sup> This school provided the educational foundation for teachers, doctors, and administrators in French West Africa. Some of its most famous graduates included national leaders like Felix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire), Modibo Keita (Mali), Mamadou Dia (Senegal), Hubert Maga (Benin), and Hamani Diori (Niger).<sup>79</sup> The school became so important to nationalists in French West Africa that Benedict Anderson specifically mentions it in *Imagined Communities*: “In its heyday, the Ecole [*sic*] Normale William Ponty in Dakar, though only a secondary school, was still the apex of the colonial educational pyramid in French West Africa. To William Ponty came intelligent students from what we know today as Guinea, Mali, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and so on. We should not be surprised therefore if the pilgrimages of these boys, terminating in Dakar, were initially read in French [West] African terms, of which the paradoxical concept *négritude*—essence of African-ness expressible only in French, language of the William Ponty classrooms—is an unforgettable symbol.” This was a contingent history, however. As Anderson explains: “The apicality of William Ponty was accidental and evanescent. As

more secondary schools were constructed in French West Africa, it was no longer necessary for bright boys to make so distant a pilgrimage. And in any case the educational centrality of William Ponty was never matched by a comparable administrative centrality of Dakar. The interchangeability of French West African boys on the benches of William Ponty was not paralleled by their later bureaucratic substitutability in the French West African colonial administration.” Rather than take up duties in the colonial administration, as intended, these newly formed bureaucrats became nationalists who went home to lead anticolonial movements for independence. “Hence, the school’s Old Boys went home to become, eventually, Guinean or Malian nationalist leaders, while retaining a ‘West African’ camaraderie and solidary intimacy lost to succeeding generations.”<sup>80</sup> These students learned their French-centered history well and then went home to begin writing their own national histories.

The École William Ponty may have provided a common print language, ideology, worldview, history, and experience from which these young African boys could eventually do their own national “imagining,” but it also provided various “fields” of competition. While this competition may have provided links for national formation and cohesion, it also catalyzed jealousies, animosities, and divisions among young men who knew each other, making the rivalries over West African nation building quite personal. They would result in the failure of Senghor’s hoped-for Francophone West African federation.<sup>81</sup>

At schools like William Ponty across French West Africa, students primarily learned the history of European nations, but they also learned some history of the Africans upon whom the colonizers were establishing African nations. In Senegal—allegedly founded on an “Islam-Wolof model”—that meant learning about the heroic resistance of anticolonial leaders like Lat Dior, Umar Tall, and Amadou Bamba—all from northern Senegal.<sup>82</sup> To many Casamançais, this history was not their history; it was Senegalese, meant for those north of The Gambia.<sup>83</sup> This historical construction was essential to colonial and postcolonial hegemony over the Casamance, starting with “historical actors” like Léopold Sédar Senghor acting as “historical narrators” to formulate an empirical narrative to be taught in colonial schools.<sup>84</sup>

One of the most brilliant students in French West Africa, Senghor would become the first president of independent Senegal. He attended primary boarding school at Ngasobil, a seminary run by the Holy Ghost Fathers about three and a half miles (six kilometers) north of his hometown, Joël.<sup>85</sup> Senghor might have ended up as a priest like Diamacoune if not for a run-in with the Father Superior at a seminary in Dakar. (Senghor transferred to the Libermann Seminary in 1922.) He apparently protested too forcefully after

the Holy Father insulted his parents as “savages” and “primitives.”<sup>86</sup> Senghor later indicated that this insult proved to be the tipping point for him, after enduring a discourse for years on his need for “salvation” and “civilization” that could only come from White people. European history became a burden to Senghor. He wrote, “The ‘civilizing mission,’ the ‘white man’s burden,’ everyone had spoken to us about them since our childhood: teachers and professors, missionaries and colonial officials.”<sup>87</sup> A few days later, the director of the seminary told Senghor that he “did not have the priestly vocation.”<sup>88</sup>

Senghor continued his experience with French hypocrisy and inequality in Paris, where he spent the interwar years pursuing higher education. While there, he also partnered with Caribbean intellectuals Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas to produce the ideology of *négritude*. Senghor defined *négritude* as “Negro-African cultural values,” and it became foundational to many nationalist movements among the African Diaspora, especially those in French West Africa.<sup>89</sup> With this ideological foundation, Senghor returned to Senegal, where he entered politics. He decided to run against his political mentor, Lamine Guèye, for a seat in the new Territorial Assembly. But he needed an ally in the Casamance. He found one in Emile Badiane.

Born in Tindième in 1915 to one of the earliest Jola converts to Catholicism, Emile Badiane impressed his primary school teachers so much that they sent him to attend the prestigious École Normale William Ponty. Badiane stood out as a star student, graduating as valedictorian of his class in 1935.<sup>90</sup> A classmate of Badiane’s at William Ponty, Amadou Clédor Sall, recalled, “Emile asserted himself by way of his grand intelligence and prodigious capacity for imagination. His success was remarkable in many domains, such as French, mathematics, natural sciences, and drawing.”<sup>91</sup> If Badiane excelled at history, it was not noted.

Besides, as with Senghor’s experience, studying history in a colonial school implied the memorization of dates, names, and narratives about the French nation and other aspects of Western civilization. It covered little African history, and it certainly did not call for students to interpret historical sources, methodologies, and narratives on their own. That was too dangerous to the colonial dispensation. Nevertheless, Badiane, like Senghor, maintained a fascination with “culture.”<sup>92</sup> After graduation, Badiane taught school in the region of Podor.<sup>93</sup> But he was eventually transferred to his native Casamance, where he spent the rest of his teaching career in the communities of Baila, Balingore, Besire, Nyassia, and Sédhiou.<sup>94</sup> It was in Sédhiou in 1947 that Badiane and more than 120 “literate notables” met to discuss the formation of a new party to represent Casamançais interests.<sup>95</sup> One of the men allegedly at the meeting was Mathieu Diamacoune, the father of Augustin

Diamacoune Senghor, who would write his own history of the Casamance and the early MFDC in the 1990s.<sup>96</sup>

It was no accident of history that all these men, and others attempting to define the nation in Senegal in the postwar period, were men of letters—men with primary, secondary, and in many cases, university education; The School had produced “the schooled.” Senghor specifically targeted education as a primary means of building national unity. On the front page of the first edition of the party newspaper he created in 1948, immediately adjacent to the article “Why This New Journal?” Senghor published an article titled “The Condition of Our Evolution: Teaching Reform.” He claimed that “evolution” and “reform” involved two aspects of education. The first was “cultural.” This aspect “concerned the ability of each individual to develop his or her personhood, to maximize the individual’s virtues, in intellectual and artistic terms as much as moral and physical.” The second aspect was “social” but not “political,” according to Senghor. This aspect was “a question of preparing each person in society to take the place designated according to the person’s natural abilities.”<sup>97</sup>

That such a statement could be considered merely “social” and not “political” seems shocking. But at the time, Senghor was still a member of the SFIO (the French Socialist Party); perhaps he did not yet want to estrange himself from the party.<sup>98</sup> He may have wanted to be careful not to alarm French colonial authorities too much as well, for after explaining these two aspects, he proposed transferring not the “political control” of education—which could remain under the French as far as Senghor was concerned—but the “cultural control” of Senegalese education from the Ministry of the Colonies to a “Ministry of National Education.”<sup>99</sup>

This article decodes what Senghor and the nationalist generation thought of as the purpose of education. Especially for a socialist newspaper, the article exhibits less a focus on developing technical skills for the proletarian revolution than concern with defining the cultural aspects of the nation. Perhaps for Senghor and other nationalists, citizens would develop technical skills in accordance with their proper “place,” as dictated by their “natural” abilities. One notices some rather Darwinian, diffusionist principles here, likely the result of Senghor’s colonial education.<sup>100</sup> This education, coupled with his strong intellectual capacity, prepared him to lead his nation into independence.

To have the opportunity to do that, though, Senghor, who left the SFIO in 1948 to form the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), needed the Casamance in his electoral contest against the SFIO’s Lamine Guèye. And it appears that, for the most part, and certainly from about 1950 to 1980,

Casamançais were glad to have him on their side. For many Casamançais, Senghor seemed preferable to Guèye, a putatively distant member of the Four Communes. For them, Guèye's relationship to the urban centers of northern Senegal made him almost as foreign as French colonial officials. Rural Casamançais also rejected the political leadership of Assane Seck, leader of the Mouvement Autonome de Casamance (MAC) and close ally of Guèye in the elections for the French Union Territorial Assembly in the late 1950s. Both these men were considered too closely tied to unionists and urban elites, out of touch with the concerns of ordinary agricultural people in the Casamance, even though Seck had grown up in a Lebu (an ethnic group from the area near Dakar) family in the Casamance. For some Casamançais, Seck's Lebu heritage made him suspect. Regardless, like Emile Badiane of the original MFDC, Seck later forged a close political alliance with Senghor. But in the mid to late 1950s, Senghor and Badiane presented themselves as the MFDC-BDS champions of rural Casamançais against the urban SFIO-MAC representatives Guèye and Seck.<sup>101</sup>

For all of these political leaders, their background as men of letters gave them the tools to argue about the political future of an independent Senegal. The School had provided them with a vocabulary for a nationalist political discourse and an important cultural link to power. As can be seen in figure 4.2, The School was a very gendered place, decidedly masculine at this point in time. These aspects of identity influenced the kinds of histories taught and studied at The School.

#### "HOMESPUN HISTORIANS" AND THE GAP IN CASAMANÇAIS HISTORY

Colonial schools may have taught national histories along state contours, but their choice to mostly ignore African histories left a gap for nationalists to fill with cultural content of their choosing. The early nationalists filled the gap in ways that benefited them. As the Casamance conflict began to expand in 1990, Yaya Jaata explained

another source of frustration: when you go through the history books used in our schools, nowhere will you find a description of the heroic struggle of the people of Casamance. No mention is made of Djignabo, Alioune Sané, Fodé [Foday] Kaba, and, more recently, Aliin Siitoe Jaata [Aline Sitoé Diatta]. How can you expect the youth of Casamance, who must draw their spiritual nourishment from history, to understand such prejudice? . . . The state media give pride of place to foreign culture, to the detriment of national culture. Those cultures perhaps considered to represent a 'minority'




FIGURE 4.2. Assane Seck (circle), founder of the *Mouvement Autonome Casamançais* (MAC), the SFIO-allied Casamançais opposition to the early MFDC in the 1950s, among his class at the *École William Ponty*. This image is representative of the kinds of missionary and colonial schools that most leaders of the nationalist generation attended. Source: Library, *Université d'Assane Seck* at Ziguinchor (UASZ).

in the south are totally ignored. What has been done since independence so that the peoples living in Senegal may get to know each other? What has been done to help eliminate these prejudices held for a long time by those who were charged with educating and administering the people?<sup>102</sup>

Separatists like Father Diamacoune and Mamadou Sané were eager to exploit the remaining gap. In doing so, Diamacoune acted as a “homespun historian,” especially through his 1995 opus, *Pays du refus*, but also through the many letters, speeches, and statements he made in interviews and press releases through the years, often as the secretary-general of the MFDC.<sup>103</sup>

Derek Peterson and Giacomo Macola have given us the term *homespun historian* in *Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa*. They note that professional historians were not alone in their research on the African past and that “even at the birth of the academic discipline of African history, university-based scholars took their place alongside African researchers who were trolling through history. Working from

outside the university, these homegrown historians very often saw the past from a partisan vantage point.” This partisan vantage point was quite diverse: “Some were moral reformers, searching for instructive traditions with which to chasten young men and women. Others were kingmakers, mining their people’s history for evidence with which to legitimate political authority. Still others were radicals plumbing the depths of the past to explain the racial and social inequalities they confronted.” Regardless of their subjective viewpoints, by and large these “homespun historians” focused their histories on practical questions of living with the postcolonial legacy: “These men (and they were virtually always men) pursued their historical research at the interstices of busy lives, as they also composed sermons, pursued litigation, translated the Bible, or wrote petitions. Their investigations into the past enabled their contemporary political and moral work.”<sup>104</sup> This description nearly perfectly fits the historical and political work of Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, whom Vincent Foucher and Mohamed Manga refer to as a “lumpen” intellectual—a semi-elite with a mediocre intellectual profile.<sup>105</sup>

As Peterson and Macola note in the case of Bethwell Ogot’s important contribution to Luo history in Kenya, “Luo people were not waiting for Ogot or other professional scholars to compose their history.”<sup>106</sup> The same could be said of the Jola of the Lower Casamance. While their Mandinka neighbors had important genealogies and political histories received through oral traditions preserved by professional griots, the Jola and other societies in the Casamance characterized by shared horizontal power structures passed on their oral histories around the village palaver or the family compound. Seldom mentioned in these histories were the anticolonial heroes of northern Senegal. Instead, these histories made claims to autochthony and narrated histories of migration and conquest by various groups along the Upper Guinea Coast.<sup>107</sup> They did not need Diamacoune or any other literate historian to illuminate their past for them.

By writing down these oral histories, however, Diamacoune weaponized or instrumentalized them for the separatist movement. He acted as both “historical actor” and “historical narrator,” to borrow Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s terms, in “what happened” and in “what is said to have happened” in the history of Casamançais “defiance.”<sup>108</sup> He “wrote back” against what he viewed as an increasingly hegemonic history of Senegal based on the Islamo-Wolof model of Senegalese national identity.<sup>109</sup> In doing so, he built upon popular Casamançais sentiment that Senegalese national history ignored the Casamance.

Diamacoune and Sané sought to write Casamançais history in a way that justified their claim to the name of the “original MFDC” of 1949 to 1954.



FIGURE 4.3. Assane Seck (left) and Emile Badiane (right), date unknown. Source: Library, UASZ.

They began to “write back” against the colonizing narrative of French and Senegalese histories. Diamacoune wrote, “How to write the history of the Casamance? It has to be lived first. And above all, never forget that in the current Department of Bignona, like everywhere else in the Casamance, it is the colonial administration—once French, today Senegalese—that most often played the religious and ethnic cards, in order to divide and conquer the population.”<sup>110</sup> In January 1955, Bignona had been the site of a violent confrontation between the supporters of Léopold Senghor (supported by former members of the disbanded “original MFDC”) and Lamine Guèye.<sup>111</sup> Diamacoune sought to link the violent events at Lycée Djignabo in 1980 to those of 1955. The death of Emile Badiane was an important step in that process.

#### RUMOR IN AFRICAN HISTORY

Emile Badiane was a political star of the Casamance who died, like Victor Diatta, before his time. It is hard to say how much more he might have accomplished, because, like Diatta, Badiane died under mysterious circumstances. These circumstances became fodder for Father Diamacoune and the separatists. The circumstances came to constitute one more element in the discourse of Senegalese betrayal of the Casamance. To be clear, Diamacoune had next to nothing as evidence for some of the most powerful claims of this discourse. But perhaps that was why the claims became so

powerful. They could only exist in the imagination, in the shadows of *what might have happened* in Senegalese history. As Luise White has shown, there is immense power in rumor and innuendo.<sup>112</sup> Diamacoune dealt expertly in both. This section examines three mysterious events—mysterious because there is little evidence that any of them occurred: first, that the Senegalese state secretly assassinated Badiane, one of Senghor’s closest political allies; second, that it then destroyed a secret agreement between Senghor and Badiane promising the delayed independence of the Casamance; and third, that the state furthermore destroyed a large archive of documents on Casamançais history.

From the time Badiane joined the BDS in 1954 until he died in 1972, there seemed to be few political partnerships—indeed, friendships—stronger than his with Senghor. After Senghor won the territorial election against Guèye and later became the first president of an independent Senegal, he appointed Badiane to three ministerial posts, including the Ministry of Information (1959–60, under the short-lived Mali Federation), the Ministry of Education (1960–70), and the Ministry of Cooperation (1970–72).<sup>113</sup> Despite this ministerial reshuffling typical of African one-party states at the time, Badiane was a “companion to Senghor from the earliest moments of the struggle [who] never quit him until his death.”<sup>114</sup>

Yet Badiane was no yes-man, performing like a robot at the will of his master, Senghor. Indeed, Badiane expressed the opinion that political debate was healthy, important for a modern democratic state. In a 1965 speech to the Senegalese National Assembly, Badiane noted that he had enjoyed the opportunity, while traveling the country as minister of education, to meet numerous representatives to the assembly. Then he claimed: “Thanks to these meetings, for the majority of us, we are no longer strangers to one another. Often, if we do not agree with one another in relation to certain questions, we do not hang on to these disagreements but remind one another of the honest preoccupations that animate us. And that’s the essential thing: to work together, each in his sphere, for the same cause, with faith and courage. I hope that my service in this region sees our collaboration reinforced and maintained, to the profit of the major interests of the Casamance.”<sup>115</sup>

Badiane’s words here demonstrate how he and other elites were imagining the nation, if we accept Benedict Anderson’s assertion that nationalism enables people who do not know each other personally to imagine themselves as part of a community defined by a common culture.<sup>116</sup> As demonstrated by this excerpt, there is no document written by Badiane and no press account indicating that he thought of the Casamance in any way separate from Senegal after 1960. While he and other Casamançais leaders

certainly referred to “the Casamance” as a political entity, they did so only in reference to their region of Senegal. But that does not stop contemporary Casamançais from claiming that they “had a nation before Senegal did,” and in some ways this notion may be true.<sup>117</sup> Regardless, it did not inherently divorce the Casamance from Senegal.

That Senghor’s conception of a French-speaking West African federation of states crumbled to, first, the short-lived Mali Federation and then to Senegal showed why he was keen to guard the territory considered part of “Senegal” under the colonial state.<sup>118</sup> While Senghor certainly cared about African culture vis-à-vis *négritude*, he seemed less concerned with the cultural content of “Senegal” and more concerned with the state, as the state would not only make Senegalese “modern” but also facilitate the Senegalese contribution to the “civilization of the universal.”<sup>119</sup> At the dawn of independence, Senghor argued, “We have said that the state is the expression of the Nation; it is primarily a means of realizing the Nation. Political history teaches that the lack of organization of the State is a weakness that fatally engenders the disintegration of the Nation.”<sup>120</sup> Clearly, Senghor knew that to have a state after 1945, one needed a nation, often achieved in Africa through the “bundling” of ethnic groups or regions.<sup>121</sup> He had already lost the dream of a postcolonial French West African federation to nationalist rivalries with men like Houphouët-Boigny and Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré.<sup>122</sup> He was not about to lose what remained of Senegal. By 1960, regardless of whether Casamançais nationalism was more developed than Senegalese nationalism, Senghor needed the Casamance; therefore, he needed the original MFDC. To get it, he needed Badiane. Whether through a secret agreement or not, he got him.

So why did the modern MFDC assume the name of this late-colonial regional party? In part, because there seemed to be something suspicious about Badiane’s death, coming one year after the 1971 death of MFDC co-founder Ibou Diallo. Badiane died on December 22, 1972, a few months after returning from a trip to Zaire as the minister of cooperation.<sup>123</sup> But no cause of death appears in the reporting following Badiane’s death. Instead, one reads that he simply “passed away” in the early morning hours at the Principal Hospital of Dakar. Other reports note only that “he died.” One press account refers to his death as “the brutal disappearance during the night of Thursday to Friday of our minister of Cooperation.”<sup>124</sup> Brutal for whom: Badiane or the people of Senegal? The reporting is not clear. The modern MFDC seized upon this ambiguity surrounding the cause and the means of Badiane’s death to argue that Badiane was killed by Senegalese intelligence agents. The exact method of assassinating Badiane is unclear, but the fact

that no cause of death was given enabled these rumors. Manga has claimed that the autopsy report listed the cause of death as complications from diabetes.<sup>125</sup> But this claim has not completely laid the rumors to rest.

In any case, the Senegalese state commemorated Badiane's death on an annual basis, placing a bust of him in Bignona. Later, a large statue of Badiane was constructed in the middle of Bignona's large traffic circle on the north side of town, leading to Tindième, Badiane's home village. Roads, streets, and bridges in Ziguinchor and other Casamançais towns were also named after Badiane. But rather than give the state credit for these efforts to honor the memory of this Casamançais political hero, separatists considered them paltry efforts to distract attention from what they claimed was the state's assassination of Badiane.

Moreover, the separatists claim that Senghor ordered Badiane assassinated so that he would not have to honor a "secret agreement" he made with Badiane in 1954 to entice Badiane to join the BDS. The agreement between Senghor and Badiane allegedly stipulated that the Casamance would get its independence after twenty years of union with Senegal if the MFDC would throw its support to the BDS to carry Senegal into independence. Why such an agreement would need to remain secret is not clear. But that is the story that the modern MFDC told. Diamacoune and Sané claimed that the Senegalese made the agreement disappear, quipping, "We fell asleep as Casamançais and woke up to find ourselves Senegalese."<sup>126</sup> To these separatists, they had been cheated by the iconic conniving Senegalese *commerçant* (merchant) once again.

As if murdering Badiane and ripping up the alleged "secret agreement" were not enough, separatists also claimed that the Senegalese state "silenced the past" by destroying archives related to Casamançais history.<sup>127</sup> Diamacoune's biographer, René Capain Bassène, asked Diamacoune directly if he had any evidence for this claim. He had none. Instead, he parried:

The history of the Casamance has been hidden from you. You have not learned the real history of the Casamance. I only wish for proof that at the beginning of Senegalese independence, the Senegalese administration requested . . . from certain prefectures of the Casamance to send them some documents, some of the archives of the Casamance. One of [these bureaucrats] told me: "I don't know, I'm not sure what will happen with our Senegalese brothers. Each day, send us this document, send us that document. The documents leave but never come back. And these are not just any documents! These are the treaties of peace, friendship, and protectorate that

our grandparents signed with the colonizers, above all those of the French.” So, after the war of liberation, these documents were placed under embargo. One could not consult them. After the war of liberation for Portuguese Guinea (contemporary Guinea-Bissau) [1963–74], when they sent some Senegalese army officers here to act as prefects, they were ordered to burn all the archives of the Casamance. They burned them at Oussouye, which had inherited some archives from Carabane, the first point of French penetration in the Casamance. They burned them in Ziguinchor, in Sédhiou, in Kolda, and in Velingara. When the people of Kolda protested, they attributed these cases to the agitations of the opposition, of those who were not of Senghor’s party [i.e., the BDS]. However, that’s not true: it was the administration that ordered the archives to be burned!<sup>128</sup>

Thus, into the mysterious silence surrounding the deaths of Victor Diatta, Ibou Diallo, and Emile Badiane, into the silence of Casamançais history—which was not taught to students in Senegalese schools but passed on to Casamançais children in their homes and villages—Diamacoune threw these historical claims. While there was little evidence to support his claims, there was also little evidence to refute them. Hence, Diamacoune seized the opportunity to fill this lacuna in Casamançais history with a narrative benefiting the MFDC. He told his biographer, “Senegal first of all must restore to the Casamance its history. You have seen that there is no history of the Casamance. They have done everything in their power to render us a people without history.”<sup>129</sup> Once this discourse of grievance was established by 1980, it took the death of a young Casamançais sixth-grade boy, a life full of promise snuffed out by Senegalese “betrayal,” to fan the flames of conflict.

A SYMPATHETIC PROFESSIONAL HISTORIAN:  
MAKING LYCÉE DJIGNABO CASAMANÇAIS

No school became more symbolic of Casamançais particularism than Lycée Djignabo. It served as a nexus for various spatial vectors in this book—from the student strike where Idrissa Sagna was killed at The School to the city politics over land tenure in The Rice Field that helped catalyze the student strike and to the students supporting Casa-Sports in The Stadium. I argue that Djignabo became a nexus for these vectors because it was a space for imagining and contesting the nation. Because Diamacoune insisted that “the events of the Casamance” began with Sagna’s death, it may be tempting to believe that the history of the Casamance conflict began at Lycée Djignabo in 1980. But Djignabo entered the national consciousness before 1980.

Even before the student strike, a French principal of the school, Christian Roche, wrote a history of the colonial conquest in the Casamance for his doctoral dissertation at the University of Paris. Published in 1975, the research for “*Conquête et résistance des peuples de Casamance, 1850–1920*” depended somewhat on Roche’s position as principal of Djignabo.<sup>130</sup> By 1985, Roche had converted his dissertation into a book entitled *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920*.<sup>131</sup> Whereas previous French scholarship had focused on ethnography, Roche’s book provided a “national history” of sorts where there had been none.<sup>132</sup> Suddenly, the Casamance had a history written by a professional historian highlighting Casamançais “resistance” to colonialism. Separatists were quick to claim this heritage of Casamançais sovereignty and resistance to foreign domination of all kinds, claiming that it also stretched to resistance of “the Senegalese.” They essentialized the Casamançais as naturally rebellious. Separatists became aware of Roche’s work in the 1970s, after his dissertation was published in 1975 and reached Dakar in 1976. The book’s appearance in 1985 came after separatist sentiments began to harden among the Casamançais population following the 1982 separatist march and the 1983 encounter that killed four Senegalese gendarmes. Many more important factors intensified the conflict in 1990, but several Casamançais and outside observers believe that the publication of Roche’s book constituted an important ingredient for the “recipe” of Casamançais nationalism and separatism.<sup>133</sup> Jean-Claude Marut asserts that the book “provided the body of dates and events that would constitute this discourse.”<sup>134</sup> Indeed, Roche—like Diamacoune—blurred the lines between historical actors and historical narrators, inhabiting both roles at various times.<sup>135</sup> How did Roche’s position as the principal of Lycée Djignabo affect this history?

Lycée Djignabo was named for an anticolonial Jola warrior named Djignabo Bassène, whose practically suicidal resistance to French military force in the village of Séléki made his story the stuff of Casamançais legend. Séléki earned a reputation for especially “ferocious resistance” to French colonial conquest, requiring aerial bombardment before the people finally submitted to colonial force. Roche wrote that Djignabo was born circa 1875–80. But little is known of his life, except that Djignabo had been known as a “particularly dreaded and famous fetish priest, as well as a great warrior.”<sup>136</sup> The mysticism of Djignabo was believed to be so powerful that bullets bounced off his skin when the Europeans shot at him. This mysticism failed to protect Djignabo the night of May 17, 1906, when French soldiers shot and killed him.<sup>137</sup> In any case, Lycée Djignabo has maintained institutional links to the village of Séléki and to the descendants of Djignabo, the school’s namesake, as demonstrated by a display inside the principal’s office (as of 2014).

Roche's positionality as a professional historian seemed important to the separatists, even though his oral sources were similar to those passed on in homes and villages across the Casamance for years and used by Diamacoune in his "homespun history." Roche asserted that none of Djignabo's story would be known if it were left to the colonial and national archives. Rather, he discovered Djignabo's story from oral testimonies provided by Pierre Lambin, the French colonial administrator in 1906, and Tété Diadiou, the Jola interpreter for several French administrators of the Casamance, especially during the early colonial period.<sup>138</sup> In any case, Roche dug up the history of Djignabo just in time for a separatist movement hungry for historical examples of timeless Casamançais resistance to foreign domination. Along with this discourse of resistance, Father Diamacoune asserted "Casamance for the Casamançais . . . all foreigners get out!"<sup>139</sup> posing a stark contrast to the tradition of Casamançais hospitality in a gentle, peaceful borderland known as a cultural crossroads for centuries during the precolonial era.<sup>140</sup> Roche's history portrayed the Casamance not as a borderland for the mixing and mingling of goods and cultures but as a country of defiance, or a *Pays du refus*, the title of Diamacoune's 170-page opus during the 1993 ceasefire.

Lycée Djignabo brought together young men (and eventually women) from all over the Casamance who thought of themselves in local, ethnic terms and compelled them to think more in national terms—as Casamançais and, for some, as Senegalese. Young Jola, Mandinka, and Balanta enrolled there and became Casamançais. At Djignabo, named for a symbol of Casamançais resistance, they learned a national history and had their concepts of space and time realigned to fit those of the nation. The School imposed its order and discipline. Their schedules were dictated not by an agricultural calendar—by the weather and the environment—but by the ring of the bell, compelling them to move to the next class to become good citizens of "Senegal."<sup>141</sup> But by the time of the student strike of 1980, this order had begun to break down. Liberal students and faculty began to contest this order. And then one day, Senegalese forces killed Idrissa Sagna.

#### THOSE "BETTER PLACED" TO DEFINE THE NATION?

Among the nationalist and separatist generation in the Casamance, Bertrand Diamacoune was unique because he did not go to school. In regard to Father Diamacoune, it is debatable how much he was "elite," even with his doctorate, but there is no debate about his little brother: Bertrand was not elite. Instead, he relied on his father's teaching in the village and on his brother's historical interpretations outside of it.<sup>142</sup> Bertrand was able to tag along with his older brother and educate him on "traditional things" because

Father Diamacoune never went through the sacred forest initiation central to the identities of Jola men.<sup>143</sup> But Bertrand was also unique because he did not disqualify himself from participating in politics, as many disinherited social classes, especially those without formal education, often did. Father Diamacoune claimed to raise his voice for “those without a voice.”<sup>144</sup> But he often seemed to be engaging in a conversation with other educated elites in some sort of echo chamber where they could only hear each other’s voices.

Many of my village informants—especially women—automatically disqualified themselves from talking to me about Casamançais history and politics. When I asked them for interviews, they often responded with a statement like “I don’t know about politics . . . you should talk to [insert name of the most prominent man who had attained the highest degree of education in the village]. He knows about those things.”<sup>145</sup> Thus, I was struck by the power that formal education had granted to men especially—but increasingly to women as well—to engage in politics. I wondered whether the subaltern would speak. But in less formal situations among villagers, I did hear them speak. They spoke about their families, their communities, the quality of the last rice harvest, which prized child did well in school or married another prized child of the village. Though I seldom heard them speak about separatism—unless I asked—I did hear them speak about politics. So it seems that the subaltern can and does speak but perhaps not on the same stage as nationalist elites.<sup>146</sup>

Villagers lacking formal education in the Casamance may disqualify themselves from speaking to strangers about history and politics. But that does not mean that they ignore history and politics in the intimacy of their own homes. Yet the fact that they will not—perhaps cannot—engage with political debates beyond the local indicates why nationalism has been perceived as a contest between elites defined by their educational experiences. Many non-Western societies have traditionally considered the family—not a school run by strangers—as the proper civil institution for educating children. In this regard, Partha Chatterjee claims to read “against the grain” Hegel’s writing on “ethical life”: “I will also recall here that Hegel makes the family the site for that other great process by which ‘individual’ subjectivities could be negotiated in society, namely, the education of children, which site too he would not be able to defend against the relentless sway of the modern disciplinary regime of power constantly striving to produce the ‘normalized’ individual.” Chatterjee claims that this production of the normalized, rational, individual actor is a communal activity: “Against the grain of liberal sociology, I prefer to read Hegel as saying that education properly belongs to the field of the ethical life of the community, and not to the compulsory discipline of the school, the prison, the hospital, and the psychiatrist’s clinic.”<sup>147</sup> Chatterjee

thus establishes a dichotomy between the West's modern school and its narrative of "bourgeois individualism" in a "bourgeois nuclear family" for capitalist production and the non-West's family education, with its communal values and its focus on communal agricultural production. One sees the tension between these two educational models in the Casamance.

This tension extends to religious life as well. The role of schools in seeding a common ground of similar identities can hardly be overstated. In the Casamance, it not only provided the common "vernacular" language for imagining the nation but also provided a common cosmology.<sup>148</sup> This cosmology was not shaped by religion per se, though Islam, Catholicism, and "sacred forests" clearly played important roles.

Rather, it was a cosmology shaped by modern secularism, for even in missionary schools, Christian priests and nuns taught students the histories of nations. Despite the French state's often contentious relationship with the Church, these histories rendered ultimate sovereignty not to the God of the Bible or the Quran but to the secular nation. The principal actor in these histories was the nation-state, not the Church.<sup>149</sup> As demonstrated by Nkrumah's admonition to "seek first the political kingdom," all roads led to the nation-state as the ultimate destination of modernity.<sup>150</sup> The histories taught in Senegalese schools may have been "big man" histories, but they were big men with something in common: a role in defining "the nation." In this light, it does not seem quite so odd that a Catholic priest—who never actually set foot in a Casamançais sacred forest—spoke and wrote as the mouthpiece for a separatist movement demanding ultimate loyalty not to the Christian god but to the nation defined by multiple shrines in sacred forests all over the Casamance. Thus, scholars have remembered Diamacoune for urging separatists to pursue the nation-state more than God.

The enrollment books at Lycée Djignabo demonstrate a demographic shift in who has been equipped to imagine or contest the nation on these terms. Whereas the nationalist generation was typically male and missionary-educated, the new generation of politically conscious Senegalese includes almost as many women as men. This fact could be seen not only in the log-books at Djignabo but also in the streets of Dakar during the *Y en a marre* demonstrations of 2012, preventing Abdoulaye Wade from changing the Senegalese constitution to run for a third presidential term.<sup>151</sup> The gender of those imagining and performing the nation in the public sphere has changed. The requirement for formal education, however, has not. At this point in Senegalese history, imagining the nation still begins in a classroom.



The modern school is a very political space, but so is the “traditional” school—the home or the village palaver—for those in the village lacking formal education. Nations are not imagined in these informal educational settings in the village, however. In the Casamance, The School proved to be a necessary space-place for imagining and contesting the nation. The narratives of violence between late-colonial educated elites in the Casamance and the postcolonial educated elites at Lycée Djignabo demonstrate the high stakes over this space-place. Yet even though the modern MFDC articulated history to tie the student strike of 1980 to the late-colonial political divisions immanent in the Casamance in 1954 and 1955, one would be mistaken to think that nothing had changed in The School. Whereas the colonial school produced a struggle for the right to imagine the nation among male, missionary-educated elites, the postcolonial school has gradually become more democratic, as girls and young women have become educated in larger and larger numbers. Because “monocausal explanations are *ipso facto* wrong,” one should not directly connect the relatively higher level of education in the Casamance since independence to the genesis of the separatist movement.<sup>152</sup> Yet I would be remiss to leave it unaccounted for as one of the factors that help us to understand the development of political consciousness—or national consciousness—in the Casamance.

This chapter concludes with the narrative of Casamançais in the villages because even though they may represent the “subaltern” or “disinherited,” Casamançais separatism ultimately rested on them. This is not to belittle the sacrifices made by villagers who believed in the cause of Casamançais nationalism. But to the degree that separatism stalled in the Casamance, it stalled because it failed to fire the imaginations of these villagers. Most of the chapter deals with the divisions, disagreements, and fights among educated colonial and postcolonial elites. Yet it was ordinary Casamançais out in the villages who refused to “imagine their communities” beyond the local—who considered matters like nationalism and separatism “just politics” that had little bearing on their lives. Or they considered the education of their children to be a family matter, not a state matter. Whether these were “uncaptured peasants” or ordinary people simply living their lives while perfecting “the art of not being governed,” they demonstrated that educated elites could argue all they wanted in their urban political echo chamber.<sup>153</sup> This echo chamber was shaped by The School, but separatism would not work without the agreement of the people, often educated by “traditional” means in the family compound or by “homespun historians” in the village.

## 5 ~ The Stadium

*“Ajakum ákollei an tártuumut.”* (Júaat Jola)

*“N’aie pas peur de l’adversaire avant que vous ayez lutté.”* (French)

“Don’t be afraid of your opponent before you even wrestle the match.”

—Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance*

IT WAS the kick that made star striker Jules-François Bocandé a symbol of rebellion. But he did not kick a soccer ball; instead, he kicked the referee . . . in the groin. For the second year in a row, Bocandé’s team, Casa-Sports, had advanced to the final match of the Senegalese Premier League championship (La Coupe du Sénégal) on Sunday, August 10, 1980.

Casa-Sports faced rival Jeanne d’Arc in Dakar’s Demba Diop Stadium for the second time for the twentieth edition of the Senegalese Cup. The first 120-minute match played one week earlier had ended in a 1–1 tie.<sup>1</sup> Jeanne d’Arc, a club that had already won the Senegalese Cup three times, was vying to further cement the hold of teams from the Dakar area on the cup.<sup>2</sup> In the second half of the game, referee Bakary Sarr—also from Dakar—whistled a penalty against Casa-Sports inside the penalty box, giving Jeanne d’Arc a free kick in front of the Casa-Sports goal. Nearly everyone else in the stadium



FIGURE 5.1. “Mr. Bakary Sarr among the players: a costly error.” Players plead with Sarr after he called the decisive foul in the box, granting a penalty kick to Jeanne d’Arc. Source: *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 11, 1980, 10.

could see that the foul occurred outside the box.<sup>3</sup> In any case, Baba Touré, the Jeanne d’Arc kicker, missed the penalty kick. Casa-Sports seemed to have escaped injustice. But Sarr stopped play again, claiming that Touré had rushed the penalty shot before Sarr blew his whistle to restart play, indicating that all the players were set. Thus, the players lined up again, and Touré received a second chance (figure 5.1).

This time, the ball sailed into the back of the net. About 40 minutes later, time expired. Jeanne d’Arc, 1; Casa-Sports, 0. Before Sarr could exit the field, Bocandé kicked him in the groin. Players and coaches restrained Sarr and Bocandé, but fans and policemen rushed onto the field to fight (figure 5.2).



FIGURE 5.2. Fans and police rush onto the field after the 1980 *Coupe du Sénégal*. Source: *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 11, 1980, 10.

Casa-Sports fans threw rocks at the police. Policemen drew their billy clubs and began to beat and arrest fans. Riots erupted in other parts of the field, in the stands, and outside the stadium. Fans attacked the police and each other with—in addition to the rocks—clubs, knives, and machetes. Eighty-nine people were injured, some severely, including some of the policemen.<sup>4</sup> The match was labeled “the final of shame,” in which “football was betrayed.”<sup>5</sup>

A few days later, the Senegalese Soccer Federation (Fédération Sénégalaise de Football, or FSF) suspended all league play and sanctioned Bocandé “for life.”<sup>6</sup> It ruled that Bocandé was never to play soccer on Senegalese soil again. Another Casa-Sports player who struck Sarr received a five-year ban. A federation official explained that the second player “was treated lightly because he had expressed regret.”<sup>7</sup> Apparently, Bocandé, portrayed by the Senegalese press as a principal instigator of the violence, did not show the same remorse.<sup>8</sup>

Separatists quickly seized the occasion to tie the fortunes of Bocandé and Casa-Sports to the entire Casamance region. Bertrand Diamacoune claimed that the Senegalese Soccer Federation’s sanction against Bocandé constituted “a sanction against the entire Casamance.”<sup>9</sup> A few weeks after the fateful match, Bertrand’s older brother, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, gave a defiant speech at a conference honoring Aline Sitoé Diatta at the Dakar Chamber of Commerce.<sup>10</sup>

At the Chamber of Commerce on August 23, 1980, Father Diamacoune capitalized on the tension following the violence of the Senegalese Cup final to summarize the three hundred years of Casamançais history preceding Diatta’s disappearance, asserting Senegalese betrayal of the Casamance at every opportunity.<sup>11</sup> Diamacoune linked the fact that Diatta’s body was

never returned to her family to a Senegalese and French conspiracy to deny the family closure and to ignore the heroic history of Casamançais resistance to foreign domination. Though Diamacoune stopped short of directly calling for Casamançais independence, he hinted, “I am exposing historical facts. . . . [It] is the hour of the Casamance. . . . The Casamance will always constitute, whether one likes it or not . . . ‘an exception and an anachronism.’ If these are synonyms for national independence, I am absolutely in agreement.”<sup>12</sup> Diamacoune suggested that the cultural differences manifested in Casamançais and Senegalese histories demonstrated that the Casamance had never been and could never be a part of Senegal.

The appearance of this separatist discourse soon after the controversy and violence of the Senegalese Cup final match was no coincidence. Rather, it emerged from a longer history, illustrating the complex nexus of sports and politics and, in this particular case, of sports and nationalism. While others have noted this nexus in the context of African sports (especially soccer), I show *how* the sports stadium over time became a place for “imagining” the Casamance.<sup>13</sup> As such, this chapter contributes to the growing literature on ways of imagining the nation other than Benedict Anderson’s “print-capitalism”—especially in areas of the formerly colonized world with low literacy rates.<sup>14</sup> These alternative means of imagining the nation suggest the engagement of ordinary social groups in corroborating, contesting, or ignoring elite construction of the ties between sports and separatism. While demonstrating change in the sports stadium *over time* through links between soccer, wrestling, and the separatist movement, I also show how various Casamançais in the stadium imagined the nation in different ways *at the same time*. Thus, I trace the contours of space and place to argue that while the separatist movement attempted to construct a monolithic version of The Stadium as a place for the symbolic performance of the Casamançais nation, some Casamançais refused to follow the separatists’ lead, instead imagining the Casamance not as a separate nation but as the southern region of Senegal.<sup>15</sup>

To trace these contours, I examine the ties between the early supporters of Casa-Sports and the early supporters of separatism in the late 1970s. Early separatist meetings held on white plastic chairs in the middle of the soccer pitch demonstrated the connection between soccer and the performance of the nation in The Stadium by separatists. This narrative demonstrates the ways the soccer stadium became a place for imagining and performing the Casamançais nation as separate from Senegal.<sup>16</sup> But as I alternate between the soccer stadium and the wrestling stadium, I show how Casamançais also participated in and performed the Senegalese nation while maintaining a separate Casamançais identity. As an “odd case”

suggests, some Casamançais refused to support Casa-Sports in every game, and some Casa-Sports supporters refused to link their soccer club to separatism, just as Casamançais wrestlers refused to link their victories in the wrestling stadium to separatism. By the end of the chapter, I show why Bocandé's kick at the conclusion of the 1980 Senegalese Cup reverberated beyond the stadium, beyond Casa-Sports, and beyond sports to shake the Senegalese nation to its core.

#### THE COLONIAL STADIUM

On one hand, French colonizers brought the stadium as a built environment for the performance of social relations to the Casamance in the first half of the twentieth century, along with colonial sports like soccer and boxing. European sports often required, to some extent, not only the imperative for entertainment and the leisure time to go with it but also some sort of built facility in which or on which to play. Missionaries and colonial officials viewed sports as a way of cultivating Western values and practices through physical exercise, teamwork, and discipline. This social training was to take place in space controlled by colonial elites or their surrogates—typically educated men with ties to missionary organizations or the colonial state.<sup>17</sup> Ultimately, colonial armed forces, gendarmes, or police ensured control of this social space by the force of arms.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, precolonial Africans had been playing and performing sports such as wrestling, martial arts, canoe racing, and competitive dancing well before the arrival of Europeans.<sup>19</sup> These sports were valued in agricultural societies with the requirement for self-defense. In the Casamance, for example, youths wrestled—boys against boys, and girls against girls—in matches, often for the pride of the whole village or a collection of villages.<sup>20</sup> Precolonial sports required their own constructed spaces, but these spaces were not focused on containing and controlling a crowd as much as the stadiums constructed by Europeans.<sup>21</sup> Like Europeans, Africans played sports for fitness, status, wealth, the performance of identity, and power in one form or another.<sup>22</sup> Africans often linked athletic performances to community festivals based on the agricultural calendar, with “rituals of spectatorship” facilitated by griot storytelling and other verbal performances honoring the athletes’ physical prowess.<sup>23</sup> Thus, Africans defined and performed social relations through athletics well before the arrival of Europeans. They were therefore poised to participate in colonial sports, though Africans quickly made these sports their own.<sup>24</sup>

Shortly after demarcating the colonial borders that created the Casamance, fighting the First World War, and defeating the anticolonial resistance

that lasted longer in the Casamance than in any other part of Senegal, French colonial officials posited the building of bodies and the building of infrastructure as prime components of the “civilizing mission.”<sup>25</sup> Former colonial official Jules Malbranque asserted that building a municipal stadium in Ziguinchor was “one of the most interesting and important social projects” in the Casamance “for the training of the body and for the perfecting of the morals and nature of man.” Performing athletic exercise in stadiums would “spare the youth from laziness and life on the street.” It would also facilitate, according to Malbranque, the improvement of “the races of color to the development of all humanity.”<sup>26</sup> By asserting the need to build urban stadiums in what was otherwise a colonial economic report, Malbranque suggested the benefit (to France) of these disciplined bodies participating in the colonial economy as producers and consumers. He thus tied the pursuit of colonial economic interests to the rhetoric of the “civilizing mission” through sport.

Whether intentionally or not, he also implied that this “civilizing” should be carried out in enclosed spaces like stadiums, secure spaces easily controlled by colonial police and military forces. Colonial officials seemed to fear well-trained African bodies less than well-educated African minds.<sup>27</sup> But just in case, the police or gendarmes were not far away. After all, as Laura Fair argues in the case of colonial Zanzibar, “the governing of sports was no game.”<sup>28</sup> In other words, colonial officials treated the administration of colonial sports clubs, leagues, and stadiums as seriously as any other part of the colony. Malbranque’s call for the construction of stadiums for the improvement of youthful vigor in the Casamance demonstrated this seriousness.<sup>29</sup> Clearly, colonial officials wanted to keep urban African youths busy, and they were willing to pay to do it. Thus, stadiums quickly became physical manifestations of the colonial presence in port cities along the West African coast.

By the late colonial period, they also became sites for the manifestation of national identity. Peter Alegi explains that “while European colonizers intended for sport to prop up their self-proclaimed ‘civilizing mission’ in Africa, they unwittingly created new opportunities for various forms of African resistance, not only against colonialism but also against social inequalities within African communities.”<sup>30</sup> While colonizers intended for sports and other cultural projects of the “civilizing mission” to build African nations that benefited colonial interests, Africans took these cultural forms in their own directions. Senegalese wrestlers modified their style of wrestling to incorporate the styles of not only other Senegalese ethnic groups but also aspects of boxing, a sport brought to Africa by European powers. African soccer clubs, which “occasionally expressed opposition to *colonial* power

and authority,” eventually expressed opposition to *postcolonial* power and authority, as became the case with Casa-Sports.<sup>31</sup> By the postcolonial era, therefore, stadiums had been transformed into carefully staged spaces for performing “the nation,” although not always in ways intended by colonial and postcolonial elites.

#### “TRADITIONAL” WRESTLING IN THE COLONIAL STADIUM

Another of these contested sporting spaces where a unique Casamançais identity could often be found was the wrestling stadium. As Donal B. Cruise O’Brien notes, “In attempting to assess the precise degree and quality of communal allegiances and antagonisms at a popular level . . . one is I think well advised to look outside political life, and indeed away from the traditional ethnographic domains of social anthropology. . . . Popular attitudes to sport, and in particular to the most popular sport in Senegal—wrestling—may provide a more relevant measure.” O’Brien explains, “Here (very literally) is an arena, not only within which various communal champions display their differential physical prowess, but also . . . around which variously communal crowds display allegiances of course to their preferred champions but also by extension to the tribe or region which the champion is held to represent.”<sup>32</sup>

These allegiances, in some cases, made The Stadium a place for asserting a Casamançais identity. For many Casamançais, however, and for many of their fellows from northern Senegal, there was no transformation in the stadium: they remained a component of the Senegalese nation.<sup>33</sup> Those who felt and asserted “difference” in The Stadium, nevertheless, made Senegalese wrestling—*la lutte*, which literally means “the struggle” in French—a terrain of struggle for Senegalese nationalists and Casamançais separatists, among a host of ethnic entrepreneurs.

If Senegal had an indigenous “national” sport, it was wrestling, not soccer. Soccer only arrived with colonialism. But people in what is now Senegal, as in other cultures around the world, had been wrestling for centuries to note stages of the agricultural cycle and gendered rites of passage. They often held matches to mark the end of harvest (rice harvest in the Lower Casamance, groundnut harvest in the Middle and Upper Casamance) and male and female circumcision and initiation.<sup>34</sup> Occasionally, fishers and farmers with fish and crops to spare would wager them on the outcome of a friendly village match.<sup>35</sup>

The contemporary form of “traditional” wrestling, *laamb*, seen in wrestling arenas around Dakar, began as a form of freestyle wrestling (*la lutte libre* in French sources) known as *mbapat* among the Lebu ethnic group.<sup>36</sup> It typically involved “taking down” one’s opponent (*terrasser* in French), so that

the opponent's head, back, or both hands and knees touched the ground.<sup>37</sup> Because the Lebu were the indigenous people where the French established Dakar on the Cap-Vert Peninsula, colonial sports organizers adopted Lebu rules and traditions to establish and regulate the sport in the increasingly diverse (in ethnic terms) and urban area around Dakar.<sup>38</sup>

As the sport migrated from the village to the city, it began to change. But these changes took time. During the colonial period, each ethnic group, while modifying its rules to match those of other ethnic groups, often established its own wrestling arena. As they had with soccer, the Jola adopted (after independence) Robert Delmas Stadium in Dakar as their "home field." They later renamed it after Emile Badiane, the nationalist hero of the original Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC).<sup>39</sup> With greater media exposure and commercialization of the sport after independence, however, other ethnic groups in the Dakar area modified their wrestling styles to match the *laamb* of the Lebu, Wolof, and Serer of the Cap-Vert Peninsula.

The most important rule change came with the introduction of *la frappe* (the punch) after 1945. Punching became intertwined with the sport from its exposure to colonial boxing.<sup>40</sup> Eventually, fight promoters had to determine whether matches would be conducted *avec frappe* (with punching) or *sans frappe* (without punching). After the Second World War, the sport became increasingly commercialized. Thus, wrestlers and promoters gave the crowds (and advertisers) what they wanted: in general, they wanted more punching.

#### "GROWN-UPS ON WHITE PLASTIC CHAIRS": SEPARATISTS IN THE STADIUM

In contrast, Senegalese soccer officials were trying to keep punching *out* of the soccer stadium. Soccer and separatism grew together with the increasing prominence of Casa-Sports in the Senegalese Premier League in the late 1970s. Many of the early separatists and early supporters of Casa-Sports were the same people. Thus, perhaps it should come as no surprise that when the fledgling separatist movement needed a somewhat secure but public space in which to meet, a few of the separatists first thought of Néma Stadium, where Casa-Sports played its home matches in Ziguinchor, the regional capital. Created in 1969 to represent the Casamance in the Senegalese Premier League, Casa-Sports resulted from the combination of ancestors Foyer-Casamance, Galéa FC, and another Casamançais club.<sup>41</sup> By the late 1970s, separatists began holding meetings in Néma Stadium because it was a public space large enough to hold all the participants while avoiding detection (so they thought) by Senegalese security services.<sup>42</sup> One MFDC member recalled: "It all started under the etiquette of the Casamance Sporting

Club, now known as Casa-Sports, the only popular club around which the Casamançais came together. The first meeting took place at Néma Stadium (now Jules-François Bocandé Stadium in Ziguinchor). It brought together all the ethnicities of the people: Manding [Mandinka], Mancagne, Manjack [Manjaco], Peul [Fula], Balante [Balanta], Bainouk [Bainouk], Sarakolé, and Diola [Jola]. . . . At the end of this meeting, an office was established.”<sup>43</sup> Thus, the multiethnic Casamance could be found in Casa-Sports.

These meetings brought politics to The Stadium, in white plastic chairs. Louise Badiane grew up in Ziguinchor.<sup>44</sup> She remembers as a young girl seeing “grown-ups sitting on white plastic chairs at the stadium out by the airport, talking about something important.”<sup>45</sup> She later discovered that those “grown-ups” at Néma Stadium were discussing separatism; they were discussing sedition. But for Badiane, that realization came later. At the time, she knew those adults were probably talking about more than soccer, even though most of them were known supporters of Casa-Sports. That image of “grown-ups . . . on white plastic chairs” discussing something of significance speaks volumes about the MFDC’s instrumentalization of Casa-Sports and its stadium for separatist purposes. Whether the club’s players and officials agreed with this instrumentalization or not, it linked Casa-Sports, at the time, to politics in a way that many cheered and others ignored. It made any stadium in which Casa-Sports played during the late 1970s and early 1980s into a contested space for the imagination and performance of Casamançais and Senegalese identities.

The separatists’ “secret” stadium meetings could not remain secret indefinitely, of course. Because colonial and postcolonial officials had depended on the sports stadium to impart values of citizenship and sportsmanship and to impose a degree of social control, little could be performed in a stadium in secret. The stadium was designed, after all, to feature the action taking place at center pitch. Thus, once Senegalese intelligence agents began infiltrating their meetings, separatists moved their gatherings to Diabir, a village on the southern edge of Ziguinchor. After a meeting near Diabir in December 1982, the separatists began their fateful march into Ziguinchor to take down the Senegalese flags flying in front of government buildings, leading to the first mass violence of the Casamance conflict when Senegalese troops responded to this assault on Senegalese sovereignty.<sup>46</sup>

Before the violence began and before being chased out of the stadium, however, separatists and their sympathizers in the late 1970s set up white plastic chairs in a circle on the soccer pitch. They aired their grievances against the Senegalese state. Many protested the recent implementation of the eminent domain law passed in 1964.<sup>47</sup> They accused “northerners” of

exploiting obscure Senegalese land tenure laws to steal land belonging for generations to Casamançais.<sup>48</sup> When northerners were not directly involved in such disputes, the separatists blamed the Senegalese government for siding with the other party.<sup>49</sup> In general, they demonized Senegal and equated Senegalese with colonizing Frenchmen—bent on exploiting Casamançais bodies, labor, and resources.<sup>50</sup>

Ansoumana Abba Bodian, for example, a high school English teacher, represented forty-six families of the Ziguinchor neighborhood of Kadior who were “expelled” from land seized by Socitour, a French company building a resort hotel on the property. Bodian first took his complaint to Socitour officials. After receiving little response, he wrote to the Senegalese government—starting with the gendarmerie and police and eventually addressing letters to the minister of education and two Senegalese presidents, Léopold Senghor and Abdou Diouf.<sup>51</sup> None of these authorities responded to Bodian’s letters, and none provided satisfaction, according to Bodian, to the forty-six Kadior families. Thus, Bodian and other separatists considered the French and the Senegalese equal colonial partners in exploiting the Casamance for its natural resources with no consideration for local property rights.<sup>52</sup> Regardless of whether Senegalese commercial traders were better prepared than Casamançais rice peasants for jobs in the booming tourist economy, it appeared to Bodian and many other Casamançais that outsiders, “strangers to the Casamance,” were profiting from the beautiful white beaches, the lush green landscape, and the rich cultural heritage of the Casamance while ignoring or excluding its people. The Stadium meetings provided Bodian and others the opportunity to air these grievances, constructing a justification for separatism.

By 1980, separatists had begun to use The Stadium for potentially subversive purposes. Those attending the stadium meetings sensed they were headed for an eventual showdown with the Senegalese state. Some encouraged the confrontation; others appealed for peace. According to one eyewitness, Father Diamacoune made an appearance at one of these meetings to appeal for peace. Abdou Elinkine Diatta was a high school student in Ziguinchor who attended one of these early stadium meetings, where he heard a speech by Father Diamacoune. He later explained:

I went with certain student leaders who had been called together to a meeting by a priest named Diamacoune . . . and the priest met with us at the municipal stadium Pedro Gomis in Ziguinchor. Once we were seated, he commenced giving a speech about peace, asking us to renounce violence and to

return to our studies. It was the first time that I had the occasion to see Father Diamacoune. I didn't even know him, and I had never heard anyone speak of him. In 1981, there were some people who started to meet and speak of independence for the Casamance. One day, one of my friends told me that there was going to be a meeting during the night at the municipal stadium of Néma. I went, and there it was decided, for reasons of security and discretion, to hold the next meeting in the neighborhood of Diabir, in Ziguinchor. . . . And it was at that meeting [in Diabir] that the decision was made to organize a march to demand independence for the Casamance from Senegal.<sup>53</sup>

As events unfolded, Casamançais nationalists began to fuse together the athletic and political performances in The Stadium to make a broader appeal to the Casamançais masses, most of whom were more likely to listen to a Casa-Sports game on the radio than to read a separatist tract or listen to a political speech at a separatist rally. The Stadium provided a public yet somewhat secluded space for the separatists to express their frustration with the Senegalese state, define their goals, and debate proposals.

Separatists from the large Casamançais expatriate community in Dakar also used meetings of the local committee of Casa-Sports supporters to hold discussions of separatist objectives.<sup>54</sup> They met in Dakar's Robert Delmas Stadium.<sup>55</sup> As at the meetings in Ziguinchor, some of the Casa-Sports supporters called for blood while others called for dialogue. One informant told Vincent Foucher: "The Casa, it really was a cover. There, they woke the people up, they woke the history of Casamance up. Even in [postcolonial] schools, the history of Casamance would not be taught. But [in the colonial era] there were songs dedicated to Casamance that were sung at school, but these songs were forbidden [by the postcolonial state]. The Senegalese were coming here, to do just whatever they pleased, with the mayor here, a northerner. That was what they talked about, in the meetings."<sup>56</sup>

These supporters, however, also had to be mindful of where they were—in the capital of "Senegal."<sup>57</sup> Senegalese security services began targeting the meetings for intelligence on separatist plans and activities, recruiting a few Casa-Sports members to provide information for the government. Rumors began to circulate, and fear and suspicion increasingly gripped the meetings.<sup>58</sup> But these meetings did not automatically transform the stadium from a space of social training, control, and surveillance into a space of subversion. Even within Casa-Sports, there were those who preferred to keep politics out of soccer. Some Casa-Sports supporters felt uncomfortable

mixing soccer and separatism, believing that such a mix could become a dangerous concoction.<sup>59</sup> But they waged a losing battle to keep the two separate.

#### GAME TIME FOR THE NATION

The growing ties between the fans of Casa-Sports and the separatist movement became clearer at Casa-Sports matches. During these matches, of course, the white plastic chairs disappeared from the field, but the conflation of soccer and separatism in The Stadium remained—transferred into the stands. Casa-Sports fans began to attend soccer matches armed with clubs and machetes.<sup>60</sup> Similar to what British sports fans would see from soccer “hooligans” in the following decade, Casa-Sports soccer matches became known for action in the stands as much as action on the field. To Casa-Sports fans, the games became occasions for demonstrating more than pride in one’s soccer club; they were occasions for demonstrating pride in one’s regional identity as well as Casamançais dissatisfaction with the postcolonial dispensation.<sup>61</sup> Casamançais distinguished themselves at the games from the Muslim teetotalers of northern Senegal by dressing in palm wine-tapping costumes.<sup>62</sup> They heralded Casa-Sports and its players in song, referring in Jola, for example, to “Bocandé, the Panther.”<sup>63</sup> Separatists went to the games to distribute copies of the separatist magazine, *Kelumak*.<sup>64</sup> The Casa-Sports section of the stadium became known as *la tribune Katanga*, in reference to the separatist region of the Congo in the 1960s.<sup>65</sup> Some of the more militant Casa-Sports fans began to refer to their club as not only their regional but their “national” team as well.<sup>66</sup> They claimed that the tension at Casa-Sports matches demonstrated the Casamance was not really a part of Senegal.

The tension began to peak when Casa-Sports won the Senegalese Cup for the first time in 1979. Until then, northern teams had dominated the championship. But in August 1979, Casa-Sports fans flocked to Dakar’s Demba Diop Stadium from all over “the Casamance,” from Cap Skirring to Kolda and Kédougou to Matam.<sup>67</sup> They walked and rode buses. They took *car rapides*, bush taxis, pirogues, and motorbikes.<sup>68</sup> Casa-Sports organized large convoys of buses transporting supporters from Ziguinchor and other Senegalese cities to Dakar. Casa-Sports’ Dakar organizing committee helped arrange transportation and lodging in Dakar.<sup>69</sup> President Senghor, the “father of the nation,” attended the match, likely expecting a fairly easy victory by the northern Senegalese club, Jaraaf.<sup>70</sup> After all, teams from Dakar or Saint-Louis had won the Senegalese Cup every year since its inception in 1961. But 1979 would be different. That year, Casa-Sports beat Jaraaf by a score of 2–0.

For the first time, a Casamançais club—or to many Senegalese, *the* Casamançais club—won the Senegalese Cup. When presenting the trophy cup to Demba Ndiaye, the Wolof captain of Casa-Sports, President Senghor allegedly remarked, “I really like this Casa-Sports team. What I like the most about it is that there are not only Jola on the team but Wolof, Peul [Pular or Fulani], Toucouleur, and Serer. That is Senegal . . . long live Senegal!”<sup>71</sup> Radio and television journalist Laye Diaw explains, “That’s why the Casamance is the most Senegalese region of Senegal: it best represents Senegalese diversity. After all, the Casa-Sports player who scored the two goals against Jaraaf in 1979 was Tanor Ndiaye, a Wolof.”<sup>72</sup> Ndiaye’s contribution to the-Casamance-as-Senegalese, however, seemed all but forgotten after the Senegalese Cup final the following year. According to the MFDC, Senegalese government officials wanted to ensure that such a victory for the Casamance never occurred again.<sup>73</sup>

For many Casamançais, even if they did not consider themselves separatists, the 1980 Senegalese Cup constituted the *ras-le-bol* moment.<sup>74</sup> The controversial penalty against Casa-Sports late in the game represented another case of Senegal cheating the Casamance out of something good, something that belonged to the Casamance. Mohamed Manga wrote of the feelings of resentment after the game:

The football space becomes . . . the refuge of the frustrated, the place for demonstrating personalities in crisis, the field of expression and the vivification of community feeling. This is why what seemed like the unfair elimination of the flagship team of the Casamance, the sanction of some of its players, and the tear gas canisters dropped on the ranks of Casa-Sports supporters during the final of the 1980 Senegalese Cup in Dakar . . . were seen as maneuvers to stifle the dynamics of regional sport. The register of the hostility of “the power of the North and the Northerners” was thus enriched for those subjects who doubted the possibility of a harmonious life within the national framework.<sup>75</sup>

Many did not need to be convinced by separatists that the result of the match was another case of Senegalese trickery at the expense of hard-working Casamançais. Some questioned what President Senghor meant when he allegedly stated after the game, “I prefer regionalism to tribalism.”<sup>76</sup> Many Casamançais found this reference to “tribalism” jolting.<sup>77</sup> Of course, the Jola were the majority among the separatists, but other ethnic groups—Mandinka, Manjak, Mancagne, and Bainouk, for example—were involved, too. Had the president attempted to discredit separatist claims to

land lost and jobs not awarded by slyly accusing the separatists of tribalism? Even Senghor, a “cousin” Serer, seemed to be attempting to dupe them.<sup>78</sup> To the separatists, fueled by Father Diamaconé’s separatist rhetoric after the 1980 Chamber of Commerce speech, it was time to respond to Senegalese treachery in The Stadium and other Casamançais places.

Thus, after meeting near Diabir—just south of Ziguinchor—on Christmas night, 1982, the separatists marched into Ziguinchor the next morning to remove the Senegalese flag flying in front of the governor’s office and hoist a white flag. They repeated this act at other government buildings around town, including the gendarme headquarters. The gendarmes and police finally mustered a response, beating marchers with billy clubs and occasionally firing their weapons above the marchers’ heads. No separatists were killed that first violent day, but dozens were wounded, bruised, and bloodied. Mass arrests and torture followed.<sup>79</sup> When gendarmes in 1983 tried to break up a similar meeting in Diabir near the one-year anniversary of the separatist march, separatists attacked—killing four and wounding four of the gendarmes, then mutilating the corpses of the dead. A “major soccer match” in Ziguinchor between Casa-Sports and another Senegalese team was canceled as a “precautionary measure,” though Casa-Sports later played a team from the Senegalese Armed Forces in Dakar “without incident.”<sup>80</sup> Soccer could go on, but many of the separatists exited the stadium for the forest, where they took up arms and kicked off the Casamance conflict. What started several years before as only a discussion between “grown-ups on white plastic chairs” was suddenly manifest in bullets, billy clubs, and blood.

#### THE POSTCOLONIAL WRESTLING STADIUM

As I make clear throughout this book, the violence did not come from nowhere. Rather, it emerged from particular social spaces where the nation had been “mapped” in particular ways. At stadiums like Robert Delmas (later named after Emile Badiane), while soccer players played “games” (*les jeux*), wrestlers did “combat.” This distinction was perhaps fitting because, as with soccer, participants contested various forms of identity in the wrestling arena.<sup>81</sup> But none of these identities had anything to do with nationalism until the MFDC began its cultural mapping in social spaces like The Stadium. As a national symbol, however, the identity of The Stadium was also up for contestation, especially after 1969, when President Senghor created the Ministry of Youth and Sports for the effective and just management of laamb, soccer, and other sports.<sup>82</sup>

In other words, Casamançais separatists coded aspects of *la lutte* as “Senegalese” and others as “Casamançais.” The fact that *mbapat* came from

a common Wolof and Serer word<sup>83</sup> and that it grew into laamb with colonial collusion along with fame and fortune in the Wolof and Serer heartlands likely made it somewhat corrupt to the separatists.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, it seemed like one more cultural aspect of the “Islam-Wolofization” of Senegal for separatists to contest.<sup>85</sup> Not every Casamançais, however, and certainly not every Senegalese, agreed with these definitions of the national pastime. These “ordinary Casamançais”—those other than the educated male elites known as the “notables” and the “Jola literati”—counter-mapped the stadium as a place of both Casamançais and Senegalese belonging.<sup>86</sup> Their counter-mapping prevented the MFDC from converting the wrestling stadium into a place of subversion, as it had with the soccer club, Casa-Sports.

A few separatists, however, tried. They argued that the Casamançais version of freestyle wrestling was “purer” than the Senegalese laamb. Nothing demonstrated this assertion better than the *frappe*, or punch, that had become associated with Senegalese wrestling. Although allowing the punch had to be agreed upon before the match on a case-by-case basis by both wrestlers, separatists claimed that this punching represented Senegalese “cheating” and “trickery.”<sup>87</sup> They also suggested that the exorbitant sums of money circulating around Senegalese laamb matches made them corrupt. These claims added up to another contribution to the discourse of grievance against Senegal: Senegalese wrestlers punched because they were cheaters hungry for profit at the expense of “pure,” hard-working Casamançais.

But this claim ignored the role of various Casamançais in building the Senegalese nation. After all, one of the greatest Senegalese laamb wrestlers of all time was a Casamançais named Mamadou Lamine Sakho, who went by the stage name of “Double Less” in the 1970s. Double Less became something of a Casamançais icon in the wrestling arenas around Dakar. Beyond Senegal, Double Less represented Senegal in Greco-Roman wrestling at three different Olympic Games, in 1976, 1980, and 1984.<sup>88</sup> At the 1980 Moscow Olympics, he finished only one match away from wrestling for the bronze medal.<sup>89</sup> He proudly and capably represented the nation of Senegal on the international stage at the Olympic Games. Thus, he became a national hero of not only the Casamance but all of Senegal.

Clearly, Double Less could represent different regional and national identities at different times and in different contexts. In spring 1975, he wrestled Dakar’s Wolof champion, Mbaye Gueye, at Demba Diop Stadium in one of the most famous Senegalese wrestling matches of all time.<sup>90</sup> The match led to “some supplementary scuffles in the stadium.” After organizers labeled the match as an example of “Casamance versus Senegal,” President Senghor tried to soothe tensions by “the scarcely convincing public

declaration that ‘there is no place for regionalism in sport.’” O’Brien claims that “qualified observers . . . remarked that fighting in the stadium was provoked by those who had bet substantial sums on the (Wolof) loser.”<sup>91</sup> In any case, the match added to the simmering tensions between Casamançais and other Senegalese—especially Dakarais—in the late 1970s.

During these years—concurrent with structural adjustment, increasing desertification, economic crisis, and a budding separatist discourse—more laamb challengers began to come from outside Dakar. In addition to Double Less, these challengers included northern Senegalese like Robert Diouf (from the Petite Côte), Ibou Senghor and Moussa Diamé (from the Peanut Basin, i.e., the vicinity of Touba and Diourbel), and Ousmane Ngom (from Waalo). The new challengers arrived in part because the prizes available from wrestling continued to climb. It was “with this generation of very gifted and charismatic wrestlers” that wrestlers’ fees reached and then exceeded the mark of one million francs CFA.<sup>92</sup> Thus, in addition to being a decade of want and crisis, the 1970s—for Senegalese wrestling—became known as “the Era of Fat Prizes.”<sup>93</sup> And it was during this era that Double Less became known as the “Seigneur des Arènes” (Lord of the Arena). This Casamançais participation in the Senegalese wrestling stadium therefore seemed to benefit at least a few Casamançais. As Foucher has argued in relation to other cultural aspects of the Casamance, consequently, the problem for the separatists was not that Senegal kept them at a distance.<sup>94</sup> Rather, the separatists maintained such strong ties to Senegal that they believed they had a viable claim to a postcolonial dispensation—especially in economic terms—that never materialized.

The success of Double Less in the laamb stadium demonstrated the possibilities of Casamançais performance and participation in the Senegalese nation. It suggested that Casamançais could “wrestle” with the Senegalese all they wanted. But in the end, they could not leave The Stadium of Senegal. They could not leave the Senegalese nation-state. This essentially became the position of the Senegalese government in negotiations with the MFDC throughout the Casamance conflict: Casamançais could assert their unique identity, cultural hegemony, and some sort of political autonomy in the Casamance all they wanted, as long as they did not secede from Senegal. Under this regime, wrestling, like soccer, became a way of expressing and, in some cases, dissipating separatist tensions. As Ousseynou Faye explains, it was “by this *place* of conversion and distribution” of “the discharge of physical violence” that Senegalese society “de-dramatized the violence and secured it within acceptable limits.”<sup>95</sup>

I would go a step further and argue that not only did wrestling remove some of the drama from the “real” or uncontrolled political violence, it also

helped forge a Senegalese nation. It brought communities together to cheer their wrestlers, as demonstrated by the regional wrestling matches held along with dances, singing, and celebrations to commemorate the annual anniversaries of Senegalese independence—the Fêtes de l'Indépendance—begun in 1961.<sup>96</sup> Some Casamançais accepted or even participated in this social regulation, preferring the violence of The Stadium to the violence of the battlefield. The separatists, however, rejected it and endeavored to tie their grievances to the wrestling arena.

#### SPACE AND PLACE IN THE STADIUM

This history demonstrates that the stadium was a political space. As such, spatial theory can help show how and why it became so political—even before separatists began setting up those white plastic chairs on the soccer pitch and Double Less became Lord of the Arena. The co-constitutive histories of Casa-Sports, Double Less, and Casamançais separatism seem to validate Henri Lefebvre's observation that "there is a politics of space because space is political."<sup>97</sup> As a space for performing social relations and imagining the nation, the Senegalese soccer and wrestling stadiums took on elements of space and place. As explained in the introduction to this book, I define *space* as a physical domain of three dimensions for human action. But Lefebvre warns against assigning neutrality and objectivity to space. He insists, "Space is not a *scientific object* removed from ideology or politics; it has always been political and strategic."<sup>98</sup> Furthermore, it has always been "historical" because it has "already been occupied and planned, already the focus of past strategies, of which we cannot always find traces." Thus, Lefebvre argues, space is "a product literally populated with ideologies," just as various Casamançais "populated" the stadium with "ideologies" of their own.<sup>99</sup> These ideologies occasionally matched those of the MFDC; at other times, they did not. Hence, one might add a fourth dimension to space: that of ideology, or of the imagination, to borrow Anderson's language.

But whenever this fourth dimension was in play, the "space" of the stadium began to look and feel more like "place." If we define *place* as "space to which meaning has been ascribed and endowed with value," then space and place are co-constitutive and always in tension.<sup>100</sup> Nationalists depend on this tension to construct "the nation" against some kind of "other." The MFDC attempted to construct the Casamance in The Stadium against Senegal. Much to its chagrin, however, space is not always transformed into place in a linear, irreversible process over time. In fact, space and place can coexist in different ways for different people.

Hence, I build on Doreen Massey's conception of "envelopes of space-time" to propose diachronic *space-place*, acting as a dialectical, bidirectional continuum between space and place over time for the imagination and performance of the nation. I concur with Massey that space is inherently multiple—that space and "multiplicity" are "co-constitutive." Massey asserts, "Without space, no multiplicity; without multiplicity, no space." Because of this relationship, Massey contends that space is "always in the process of being made. It is never finished; never closed."<sup>101</sup> This open-endedness makes space political,<sup>102</sup> allowing for a range of connections between "the imagination of the spatial" and "the imagination of the political."<sup>103</sup> While Lefebvre finds that space is always historical, Massey finds it is always futuristic. Clearly, it is both. But thinking of space as one thing and place as another along this continuum is too simplistic, especially if we focus, as historians do, on change over time.

Thus, I hyphenate *space-place* to suggest the possibility of the *simultaneous* operation of identity on this continuum. Negotiators in the Casamance peace process depended on this simultaneous multiplicity—whether they knew it or not—to make their case that several cultural identities could coexist in Senegal.<sup>104</sup> While the MFDC insisted on a particular definition of certain spaces like The Stadium as "places" representative of the nation, various Casamançais imagined the nation in those spaces on their own terms. Multiple imaginings of the stadium in Senegal ensured that the MFDC never successfully reduced this space to a monolithic Casamançais place—The Stadium.

#### THE ODD CASE AND THE STADIUM: A SPACE-PLACE OF DIVERSE IMAGININGS

Because of the links between The Stadium and Casamançais nationalism, I expand Susann Baller's window of analysis for the performance of social relations through soccer from the neighborhood to the nation. Baller argues that Senegalese neighborhood *navétanes* (youth soccer) teams played on soccer pitches around Dakar that became spaces for performing local identities, as urban youths felt increasingly estranged from the state. She claims their navétanes league play constituted "performative acts" serving "the formation of and identification with the neighbourhood as a social space."<sup>105</sup> In the Casamance, many of these youths also felt increasingly estranged from the nation, as state weaknesses became symbolic of the cracks in the cultural identity of what Senghor referred to as "Sénégalité"—a Senegalese cultural identity religiously Muslim and ethnically Wolof.<sup>106</sup> Baller claims that the navétanes, in a context of "rapid urbanization" and "(often forced) removals," granted marginalized urban youths "an opportunity to

have an impact on urban space and imbue it with meaning.”<sup>107</sup> A similar process played out in a different fashion in the Casamance, where urban youths tied the activities of their soccer club to the natural surroundings in the lush green countryside of La Verte Casamance (the green Casamance). While most Casamançais tied the green jerseys of Casa-Sports to the green countryside of the Casamance, a few did not. These few performed the nation in other ways, in other spaces, with other symbols—effectively contesting or ignoring MFDC nationalist discourse. An odd case drew my attention to this diversity in the stadium.

This odd case—an oral history from a man in a village near Ziguinchor—was intriguing because it was dramatically different from the others in terms of the politics of The Stadium. During my three years of work and research in Senegal, most informants told me there had been strong links between Casa-Sports supporters and the separatists of the early 1980s. But this informant refuted this claim and denied there was any connection between soccer and politics. He was an official with Casa-Sports’ Dakar organizing committee when the controversial Senegalese Cup final was played in 1980. He was also Jola, born and raised in the Lower Casamance. Of the infamous 1980 final match, he recalled, “The foul clearly took place outside of the penalty box, but the referee [Bakary Sarr] is a human being, just like the rest of us. He made a mistake; that’s all. He was not trying to incite violence. I wish the match had not ended that way, but it’s just a game, and there has to be a winner and a loser.”<sup>108</sup> The informant’s assertion that there was no link between soccer and separatism seemed to falter because he also claimed that Senegalese intelligence services targeted Casa-Sports meetings in Dakar for intelligence collection. How could there be no link between politics and soccer if the Senegalese intelligence services were targeting Casa-Sports meetings? Does that targeting not show that one (soccer, i.e., Casa-Sports) was influenced by the other (politics, i.e., the Senegalese gendarmerie)?

Nevertheless, as I posed these questions to other informants, I began to hear similar assertions for the first time. Suddenly, the consensus I thought I saw on the links between soccer and separatism were not so clear. For one reason or another, some Casamançais were not as devoted to or as interested in Casa-Sports. Or if they were Casa-Sports fans, they had no interest in separatism; they had no interest in seeing themselves with a national identity other than Senegalese. My “odd case” showed that where some saw a connection between sports and politics, others saw only sports in the stadium and politics outside it. Another informant believed that soccer was an Anglophone sport for which Francophone Casamançais cared very little.

This informant suggested that soccer's foreign, colonial origins made it suspect. A real Casamançais, he said, loved wrestling.<sup>109</sup> Indeed, numerous informants confirmed the idea that wrestling was more "Casamançais" than soccer. Others tied the entire matter of separatism to the region of Casa, the area west of Ziguinchor centered on the town of Oussouye.<sup>110</sup> While they supported Casa-Sports because they were Casamançais, they did not feel that this support made them separatists. They claimed to have been "Senegalese from the region of the Casamance." To them, their support for Casa-Sports said nothing about their national affiliation. As evidence, they suggested looking at their Senegalese national identification cards.<sup>111</sup> Separatists could try to essentialize The Stadium into a monolithic national icon all they wanted, but Casamançais had their own minds on the matter.

Consequently, the "odd case" on diverse national imaginations in the stadium began to appear not so odd after all. Even Father Diamacoune, the secretary-general of the MFDC for much of its existence, shared the view that supporting separatism did not equate to supporting Casa-Sports. Diamacoune's refusal to make this link was especially noteworthy because he readily claimed difference with Senegal at every other opportunity. It also showed the simultaneous multiplicity of identities that could transform the space-place of *The Stadium* into a *stadium* like any other. Diamacoune claimed to support—ironically—Jeanne d'Arc, Casa-Sports' opponent in the controversial 1980 Senegalese Cup. He told his biographer in 2005, "I wrestled in the village when I was younger, and I played soccer until the 1970s. . . . My favorite Senegalese soccer team is not Casa-Sports of Ziguinchor, though I support them very well, but rather Jeanne d'Arc of Dakar, because they bear the name of my personal role model."<sup>112</sup> At first glance, it may seem that Diamacoune's identity as a priest overrode his identity as a nationalist. But the story of Joan of Arc's resistance to the English invasion of France in the fifteenth century also served as a strong role model for MFDC resistance against Senegalese rule in the Casamance.<sup>113</sup> Knowing this history, however, would likely require formal education—something the nationalist elites like Diamacoune received but many Casamançais, especially those in rural areas, did not.

#### AMBIGUOUS HERO OF AN AMBIGUOUS NATION

As much as Diamacoune, Jules-François Bocandé, the rebellious soccer hero turned "emblem of the Casamance," exemplified the often ambiguous relationship between soccer and separatism.<sup>114</sup> This ambiguity was apparent at Bocandé's "state funeral" in 2012.<sup>115</sup> Bocandé died at the age of fifty-four on May 7, 2012, in Metz, France, from complications following surgery

for a stroke. Eight days later, with Macky Sall, the president of Senegal, in attendance along with Bocandé's family and former and current players, coaches, and fans, Laye Diaw, with his famous baritone voice, attempted to explain the various identities competing for Bocandé's loyalty throughout his life. For years, Diaw had brought play-by-play coverage of Senegalese sports to listeners on Radiotélévision Sénégal. He spoke from the podium in Demba Diop in a black suit, his eyes covered by dark sunglasses. He recited the chronology of Bocandé's contributions to the Senegalese national team during the 1980s and 1990s. Diaw's voice boomed near the end of a crescendo concluding the lineup of the Senegalese side for the 1985 Africa Cup of Nations tournament (known as "CAF" for being the premier competition of the Confederation of African Football [Confédération Africaine de Football]). After listing the names of players from northern Senegal like Cheikh Seck, Pape Fall, Amadou Diop, and Cheikh Tidiane Fall, Diaw's voice boomed, "And at middle striker, JULES FRANÇOIS BER-TRAND BO-CAN-DÉ!" Diaw slowly and loudly drew out the syllables of Bocandé's name. The crowd roared. Former players and coaches—as well as politicians eager to associate themselves with the Bocandé legacy—followed Diaw onto the podium.<sup>116</sup> All hailed Bocandé as a hero of the Senegalese nation while noting his Casamançais roots.

Bocandé reflected the hybrid nature of identity formation in Senegal and particularly in the Casamance.<sup>117</sup> Bocandé's cultural identity—and therefore the cultural legacy defined in part by his achievements—was complicated. Bocandé began his career as an icon of the Casamançais nation after kicking the referee at the end of the controversial 1980 match. He finished as an icon of the Senegalese nation, with a Senegalese flag draped over his coffin. Along the way, he scored goals—lots of them—winning games and championships not just for Casa-Sports but, after his FSF suspension, for FC Seraing (Belgium), FC Metz, Paris Saint-Germain, Nice, and Lens (all in France). After scoring twenty-five goals for Metz during the 1985–86 campaign, he was named the French Premier League's "Striker of the Year."<sup>118</sup> The FSF rescinded the lifetime ban that year so that Bocandé could captain the Senegalese national team during its CAF appearances in the second half of the decade.

Though many pointed to the conclusion of the 1980 soccer match as the catalyst that transformed the *ras-le-bol* sentiment of many Casamançais into separatist violence, Bocandé spent the rest of his life trying to escape the legacy of that controversial match. Bocandé was a proud man. He was proudly Senegalese, Casamançais, and Jola—all at the same time. It is tempting to say he found a new Senegalese identity when he came back to

captain the 1985 Senegalese CAF squad. But in fact, Bocandé never stopped being Senegalese. When the FSF rescinded the ban and asked Bocandé to captain the national team, Bocandé, while playing for Metz, purposely and grievously fouled an opposing player for a red card so that he would be available to his national team during the CAF tournament.<sup>119</sup>

Bocandé was known for being equally comfortable sipping palm wine with rebels in the forest or marching for peace in the streets of Ziguinchor.<sup>120</sup> He was well respected by the rebels. They considered him one of their own. But so did the Senegalese soccer community. Bocandé returned to the Senegalese national team for the 2002 World Cup, when Senegal famously beat the former colonial power and reigning World Cup champion, France. World Cup players like El-Hadj Diouf credited Bocandé with mentoring them and guiding them to Senegal's best World Cup performance ever, advancing to the quarter finals of the knockout stage.

After his state funeral in Dakar, Bocandé was fittingly laid to rest in the middle of a mixed Muslim-Christian cemetery in his hometown of Ziguinchor. The man who dug his grave, Mamadou Camara, claimed to have once played for Foyer-Casamance, an ancestor of Casa-Sports. Because vandals had stolen a metallic-gold soccer cleat from the top of Bocandé's tomb, Camara daily stood guard next to the tomb to secure the legacy of this "emblem of the Casamance" who was also a Senegalese soccer hero.<sup>121</sup> The Casamançais soccer rebel of 1980 ended his journey on earth as not only an "emblem of the Casamance" but an "emblem of Senegal," too.

#### STRUGGLING FOR THE NATION:

#### SOCIAL PERFORMANCE IN THE WRESTLING STADIUM

More recently, a single Senegalese laamb match generated hundreds of thousands of dollars for wrestlers, promoters, advertisers, shamans, clerics, musicians, and of course, politicians. In 2012, the "king of the arena" was Omar Sakho, known as "Balla Gaye 2." He is the son of Mamadou Sakho (i.e., Double Less). The Senegalese media have often referred to his Casamançais origins to demonstrate his participation, like his father's, in the Senegalese national pastime. This participation has been a source of pride not only for Balla Gaye 2 but also for many Casamançais eager to put the violence of the Casamance conflict behind them and to move ahead into a more peaceful future. From his marquee "combat" on April 22, 2012, against Yahya Diop, who went by the stage name of "Yékini" (figure 5.3), Gaye, like Yékini, expected to take home around \$300,000, in addition to the \$100,000 prize expected from top-tier matches.<sup>122</sup> Wrestling prize money had come a long way since Mbehr Ndiaye, the champion of Rufisque in 1937, won the relatively large sum of



FIGURE 5.3. Match *avec frappe* between Balla Gaye 2 and Yékini, April 22, 2012. Photograph by Joe Penney.

200 francs.<sup>123</sup> With half the Senegalese population living below the poverty line, it was understandable why many young Senegalese men dreamt of becoming wrestling stars. Other recent Senegalese wrestling champions were called “Mohamed Aly,” “Tyson,” and “Bombardier.”<sup>124</sup>

Many Senegalese believed that Balla Gaye’s strength came from his mystical power as much as his physical prowess. For hours before the wrestlers actually matched up head-to-head in the arena, they armed themselves with mystical power from songs, dances, gris-gris pouches (containing shredded verses from the Koran provided by their marabouts) tied around their limbs, and various liquids poured out over their bodies for protection from evil spirits and around the sandy wrestling ring as libations to the spirits. “The *gris-gris* and baths are just for protection against negative tongues and eyes,” said Mbaye Gueye Dieng, one of the Sufi marabouts attending the match.<sup>125</sup> Senegalese wrestlers believed that mystical powers from marabouts in the Casamance, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau had proven to be the most powerful in the ring. Thus, as a Casamançais, Balla Gaye, it was believed, enjoyed exceptional access to these powers.<sup>126</sup> This belief was based on a common Senegalese trope

about the Casamance as pagan, animist, uncivilized, and somehow more “African” than northern Senegal.

Out in the villages and small towns of the Casamance and away from the large commercialized wrestling arenas of Dakar, the wrestling stadium became an important space for the performance of social relations in the Casamance, as in the rest of Senegal. To be clear, there have been very few stadiums as built environments for wrestling in the villages. Rather, village wrestling matches occur on a dirt field or in a clearing. But I still refer to these spaces as “stadiums” where social relations play out among members of the community in ways that help form a “Casamançais” identity—that help produce “place” for those living there. Different actors have inhabited these wrestling stadiums for different purposes. The wrestlers—mostly young men—entered the stadium to prove their manhood, seeking fame and fortune. The older men entered the stadium to organize, sanction, and regulate the matches. Women entered the stadium to sing and cheer for their wrestlers, lauding the men’s strong, lithe bodies and championship prowess. Though young girls have wrestled in the Casamance, few have continued wrestling into adulthood, as the demands of life as wives and mothers began to limit their opportunities for practice and competition. But during village matches, if not wrestling themselves, the women’s singing and dancing make them the most prominent spectators in the crowd.<sup>127</sup>

Thus, gender and age have constituted the most conspicuous categories of social performance in the wrestling stadium. At the village level in



FIGURE 5.4. Girls wrestling in Diembereng during the Festival of the Rice Fields, 2014. Photograph by author.

the Casamance, every younger man was expected to participate in the wrestling. He would bring dishonor to his family and village if he chose not to wrestle. His manhood would also be questioned.<sup>128</sup> The older men asserted their social power and control while organizing the matches and regulating the amount of acceptable violence. If tempers flared in the heat of competition, the older men quickly stepped in to limit or redirect the anger. The women cheered and sang, urging on their sons, brothers, and other favorite wrestlers to victory while literally singing their praises.<sup>129</sup>

Though these contemporary social performances can be traced far back into the distant past, as demonstrated by Robert Baum, they also changed with colonialism and urbanization.<sup>130</sup> After 1945, political and economic entrepreneurs invested in Senegalese wrestling. Their investment benefited the nation-state. The combination of political, religious, ethnic, and gender identity performances in the wrestling stadium made it a particularly dynamic space-place for the performance of the nation.<sup>131</sup> Indeed, Faye credits laamb with an important contribution to the construction of the Senegalese nation-state: “Erected as a ‘place of memory’ for the nation-state under construction, this space sheltered its operation of seduction of consumers and of ‘citizens’ that animates the different spectators of laamb. The circulation of money, of the discourses and practices between these elites and the wrestlers, emerged on the construction of a familiar society in which people know one another. The evidence of its utility was solely based on its defining satisfaction of the need to broaden the social reach of the dominant order.”<sup>132</sup> In other words, as the political economy of wrestling in Senegal helped make the state, it also helped make the nation, as it gave many different Senegalese from many different walks of life a reason to show up to the stadium to enjoy the spectacle of la lutte—which can also mean “struggle”—together. In a way, as the wrestlers and the spectators struggled together, they made the nation.



This ambiguous national identity can still be seen at Senegalese international soccer matches. Senegalese spectators at home matches in Léopold Sédar Senghor National Stadium outside of Dakar wear various assortments of the national team’s colors: red, green, and yellow. But since the 1970s, there has been a large section of solid green at each game, indicating the presence of the fans of Casa-Sports.<sup>133</sup> These fans demonstrate more than allegiance to their club by wearing their green Casa-Sports jerseys to a Senegalese international soccer match; they express their allegiance to their “other” national identity: La Verte Casamance. Yet by their overt presence in the national

stadium of Senegal, they also demonstrate their allegiance to Senegal. They participate in and perform the Senegalese nation at the same time they proclaim their pride in their Casamançais identity, effectively contesting or ignoring MFDC assertions that Casamançais cultural identity has always been so different from Senegalese identity that the Casamance could not possibly remain politically with Senegal. Like Bocandé, Casa-Sports seems to have undergone a transformation, at least in terms of its public image, but also in terms of its image with the Senegalese government. It went from being targeted by Senegalese intelligence and security services for harboring rebel activity in the early 1980s to taking its place in the national stadium of Senegal in the present.<sup>134</sup> The simultaneous panoply of identities in the space-place of the stadium demonstrates that Casamançais have imagined the nation in their own ways, often refusing to perform the nation in the same way as the separatists.

The twin histories of sports and separatism in the Casamance confirm Lefebvre's claim that space and place are historically produced, because the stadium was "occupied and planned, already the focus of past strategies," whether we can find their "traces" or not.<sup>135</sup> At the same time, despite colonial and postcolonial intentions to control bodies and minds in the stadium, contemporary Casamançais have refused to be shackled to a particular interpretation of the nation in the stadium. In fact, while some Casamançais corroborated separatist interpretations of this history, others contested or ignored it, leaving open the possibility of multiple imaginings in the stadium.

If the sports stadium in the Casamance was, in fact, a space-place for multiple, simultaneous national imaginings, then that means the stadium also produced multiple trajectories of change over time because at the end of the game or the match, people went home. They lived their lives. And regardless of what the MFDC or the Senegalese state told them to think about "the nation," they had to figure out how to live with their neighbors and raise their families. Some found that the separatist movement helped them live together with dignity. Others found the opposite. As much as the Senegalese sports stadium became a space of division in the past, it has shown the potential to be a place of unity in the present and into the future.

# Conclusion

“*Tebakan Buyiii (Kátungai ni Jíteemeru).*” (Júaat Jola)

“*Ceux qu'on ne peut pas nommer de Buyiii (Kátunga et Jíteemeru).*” (French)

“Those whom one cannot name from Buyiii (Kátunga and Jíteemeru).”

—Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance*

I do not know how long it would be profitable to meditate on the encounter . . . but I do know that however long I did so I would not get anywhere near to the bottom of it. Nor have I ever gotten anywhere near to the bottom of anything I have ever written about. . . . Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the more deeply it goes the less complete it is.

—Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*

ON MAY 1, 2014, Salif Sadio declared a unilateral ceasefire on the part of his faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC). Thus ended months of secret peace negotiations between Sadio and the Senegalese president, Macky Sall. The negotiations took place under the auspices of the Italian Sant’Egidio community of the Catholic Church in Rome. Despite broken ceasefire agreements in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, and 2004, the people of Senegal—including many Casamançais—dared to hope that this time would be different.

There was hope for two reasons. First, ordinary Casamançais, those who would constitute a separate Casamançais nation, had grown weary of

the conflict. On several occasions during my research in the Casamance, I heard Casamançais declare, “*On est fatigué*” (We are tired of this).<sup>1</sup> One MFDC combatant said, “I think that it’s time for us to unite and accept to negotiate with Senegal, because since 1983, there has been neither victor, nor vanquished.”<sup>2</sup> For many of these Casamançais, even though they were also tired of perceived slights and denigration from the *nordistes*, they were more tired of the problems created by the war: the death and maiming of loved ones, land alienation, poverty, land mines, conflict-related banditry, government surveillance, and lost economic opportunities. They no longer cared, if they ever did, whether their ID cards said they were Senegalese or Casamançais. They just wanted to be left alone. And most of the people with whom I spoke said they were content to think of themselves—and to be considered by others—as Senegalese citizens from the Casamance. They were content to be Casamançais and Senegalese at the same time.

Second, these accommodations to being Senegalese have appeared increasingly prevalent as the older generation of separatists die. Some of these leaders became the victims of fratricidal MFDC violence, such as Léopold Sagna, leader of Atika’s Southern Front, who was captured and executed by Sadio in 2001.<sup>3</sup> Sidy Badji, founder of Atika and commander of the Northern Front after Sagna split from his forces, died in 2003. Father Diamacoune died in 2007. His younger brother, Bertrand, died in 2014. Of the first generation of separatists, Mamadou Sané and Sadio have worked to keep the separatist movement alive, occasionally competing to take up the mantle of Father Diamacoune as the MFDC’s spokesman. But even Sadio, portrayed in the mid-2000s after killing Sagna as the hardest of the hard-liners, has recently appeared ready for peace. In any case, those working for peace in the Casamance knew that waiting for the leaders of the MFDC to die off, while perhaps not the most effective short-term strategy, was becoming increasingly realistic in the long term.

Thus, one hopes that Senegalese will increasingly think of the social spaces and places analyzed in this project as spaces and places of peace, not as those of division, as they were in the past. One hopes that more ordinary Casamançais will continue to counter-map the Casamance against all forms of mapping that instigate violence. One hopes the seemingly interminable situation of “no peace, no war” will be transformed into a situation where Casamançais children have no experience of war . . . ever.

#### SPACE, PLACE, NATIONALISM, AND HISTORY

This book has demonstrated that spaces, places, and nationalisms are diverse and that they change over time. Long before the arrival of formal colonialism in the late nineteenth century, long-distance traders, slave raiders,

missionaries, and warriors fashioned the Casamance into a dynamic environment for the transatlantic exchange of persons, commodities, and cultures. But as Europeans began to map rivers like the Casamance, the Gambia, and the Cacheu, they attempted to fix bodies and resources in space for colonial extraction. Colonial interests fashioned the borders of the Casamance; indeed, they brought “the Casamance” into being. But the people like Foday Sylla and Aline Sitoé Diatta who found themselves living in this new polity did not easily acquiesce to colonial mapping. Rather, they counter-mapped their own interests at the local level along the river and in the rice field, the forest, the school, and the stadium. When separatists tried to tell these Casamançais they were no longer part of Senegal, some agreed. But some of them counter-mapped against the separatists as well, refusing to be corralled into a Casamançais nation as much as they refused to be corralled into Senegal.

This multidirectional array of identity vectors did not emerge from the primordial mists of some version of “Merrie Africa.” Rather, it emerged from the changes that took place over time in the Casamance. Despite the Casamançais reputation for fierce resistance to outside domination, Casamançais resistance has ebbed and flowed over the centuries. It ebbed and flowed with the captives sent across the Atlantic throughout the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. It ebbed and flowed with varying degrees of success resisting the colonial conquest in the late nineteenth century. And it ebbed and flowed with the folding together and tearing apart of the post-colonial Senegalese social fabric. The contested changes that took place on The River, in The Rice Field, in The School, in The Forest, and in The Stadium gave birth to a separatist movement riven by the contested meanings of identity in each of these space-places.

If the five social space-places analyzed in this project became spaces of contestation over the identity of the Casamance, what can we learn from looking at the history of nationalism through a spatial lens? First, while every human conflict stems, in part, from competing versions of history (i.e., Who did what to whom, and why?), we learn that history appeared as a battlefield in a particular fashion for Casamançais national identity. Father Diamacoune fashioned himself as a historian. He based his discourse of grievance against Senegal on a particular interpretation of Senegambian history. He labeled French and Senegalese histories of the region as “colonial” and insisted on alternative histories that benefited his version of the “authentic Casamançais,” an iconic rice peasant. But Diamacoune and other separatist elites were not peasants—far from it. They were self-appointed spokesmen of the peasants. Thus, these urban elites did not have the cultural cachet to convince the

rural peasants to let the elites represent them. The elites could write what histories they wanted in MFDC literature. The histories that mattered to the peasants were those told from their village elders' memories around steaming pots of rice and fish. Sometimes these histories matched those of the elites; sometimes they did not.

Moreover, the Senegalese state did not cede the field of Casamançais history to the separatists. Rather, it wrote Casamançais history as Senegalese, as when it fashioned Casamançais anticolonial heroes like Aline Sitoé Diatta as heroes of Senegal, not just the Casamance. Or when it built and named public infrastructure after Casamançais heroes, like the Dakar-Ziguinchor ferry named after Diatta. Or the stadium named after Jules-François Bocandé. Or the streets in Ziguinchor and Bignona named after Emile Badiane. The state demonstrated its power to influence not only bodies and resources in space but the collective memory of those bodies and resources as well—to transform space into place in new ways.

The second thing we learn about nationalism from looking through a spatial lens is that space itself can serve as a means of national imagination. As discussed in the introduction, space and place can work as some of the “cultural artefacts” that Anderson posited as requirements for imagining the nation: “My point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. To understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.”<sup>4</sup> In this book, I have demonstrated how the historical meanings of *The River*, *The Rice Field*, *The School*, *The Forest*, and *The Stadium* came into being for the MFDC, changed over time, and commanded “profound emotional legitimacy.” I have pieced together this array of spatial symbols as a “discourse of grievance” against the Senegalese state, “discursively mapping”—or rather counter-mapping—the Casamance against Senegal. But I have attempted to take this argument further.

Cultural geographers will not be surprised to find that social space holds “profound emotional legitimacy” for particular types of identity. But they may be surprised that ordinary people have taken these identities in different directions, often counter-mapping against the forces of nationalism, religion, ethnicity, and elite influence. They may find it useful, as I have, to think of different levels and directions of counter-mapping, such as the counter-mapping of ordinary Casamançais . . . against the counter-mapping of the MFDC’s separatist elites . . . against the mapping of the Senegalese

state. For those looking for avenues to explore for achieving peace, the diversity of mappings and counter-mappings between the various actors in the Casamance conflict may hold untapped potential. Those searching for peace may discover that diverse mappings related to diverse identities produce diverse possibilities for peace.

#### WHAT STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE?

Apart from the questions about war and peace, what still needs to be done? What are the limitations of this project or of its approach? Research possibilities are nearly endless, but I see a few potential trails of research worth mentioning. One trailhead may be found near other social spaces where Casamançais nationalism formed. In other words, in addition to the five spaces analyzed in this project, what were the other sites of separatist imagining?

One potential site rests with the monuments and public spaces created and maintained around Senegal, particularly in the Casamance. How do history and memory operate in these public spaces? How do the approaches of state and nonstate actors to commemoration of “the nation” in these spaces differ, and why? Carola Lentz and her team of researchers have established a solid foundation for investigation of these questions with their analysis of the fifty-year Jubilee celebrations across Africa.<sup>5</sup> Lentz argues that “tombs of the unknown soldier” (in French, *monuments aux morts*) have provided capacious and flexible symbolism for mapping diverse identities onto the nation. In the Casamance, therefore, what are the meanings and what are the debates surrounding Ziguinchor’s Monument aux Morts, constructed after the Second World War to commemorate Casamançais casualties and veterans of the colonial Tirailleurs Sénégalais (Senegalese riflemen)?<sup>6</sup> Father Diamacoune posited this monument as another site of contestation with the Senegalese state. Thus, monuments to the dead—whether dead colonial riflemen or the martyred heroine Aline Sitoé Diatta—became sites for contesting the meanings of history and the nation.

A second trailhead can be found around the means of imagining the nation. This trail fundamentally builds on Anderson’s assertion that nations have been constructed through print-capitalism. Like numerous other scholars of nationalism, I have argued that this aspect of Anderson’s argument ignores the histories of nations where nonprint means—nonprint cultural artefacts—became more important to national imagining. While Judith Byfield argues that Nigerians imagined the nation through particular styles of dress and Ziad Fahmy argues that Egyptians imagined the nation through various oral/aural media forms in colloquial Egyptian, I argue that

Casamançais imagined the nation through space and place.<sup>7</sup> But what other nonprint means of imagining the nation affected the formation, execution, and results of nationalist movements in Africa? In the rest of the postcolonial world? Why were these nonprint means of imagining the nation so powerful? Discovering these alternative means of imagining the nation has become exceedingly important because the power of nationalism does not seem to be diminishing with modernity. If anything, nationalism appears to be growing stronger as global inequality has increased along with increasing connectivity, thanks to neoliberalism and the Information Revolution.

As more people divide themselves from others by “nation,” they must imagine the nation by these nonprint means, especially in areas of the world with lower literacy rates. Given that the majority of human beings on the planet live more like West Africans than like Western Europeans (especially in terms of health, wealth, and access to formal education), finding these nonprint means of imagining the nation will become increasingly important.

#### A NEW FRAME FOR “LIVING TOGETHER”

Discovering these other means of national imagination may provide new approaches to peace. The time is right to do so, to allow Casamançais to find new ways for *vivre ensemble* (living together).<sup>8</sup> As Jean-Claude Marut argues, “The MFDC has (without doubt) lost the war,” but up to the present, “the Senegalese state has not yet won the peace.”<sup>9</sup> There can be little doubt that the Senegalese state must have the principal role in pursuing real and lasting peace. But other states—The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau especially—must also work to return refugees to the Casamance and to incorporate their respective Jola populations into the nation while also avoiding the temptation to meddle in the Casamance. But while state action is necessary, it is not sufficient.

The people of the Casamance must also want and pursue peace. The largest burdens of the conflict have fallen on their shoulders. They—especially women and children—have suffered the worst atrocities and the most stinging injustices. Despite their occasional mockery for the notion of Senegalese *téranga* (Wolof for “hospitality”), they have had to find a way to live with this conflict. They have provided space, place, and sustenance for the rebels and for Senegalese soldiers, depending on the context. As they have found ways to “live together” near The River, The Rice Field, The School, The Forest, and The Stadium, they have found ways of being that incorporate multiple identities. Perhaps the best way to achieve a true and lasting peace will be to harness their ideas, practices, and cultures to map a Senegalese nation at peace with itself.

# Notes

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Epigraph: Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, quoted in Xavier Diatta, *Fiju di Terra: La crise casamançaise racontée à mes enfants* (Quebec: Inje Ajamaat/Kmanjen, 2017), 116. I thank Erin Hern and especially her student Aminata Mbodj for the translation of *pays du refus*, which I had originally translated as “country of refusal,” to “country of defiance,” which better captures the attitudes of Father Diamacoune and other Casamançais separatists.

## INTRODUCTION

Epigraph: Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance* (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 302. Every chapter in this book begins with a Jola proverb from Diatta. As he explains, “Among the Jola of Fogny, in particular, when a village wants to wrestle against another village, it sends its youth to the public place of the opposing village to sing and announce the challenge. When one hears this song, one knows there will be a wrestling match later in the village. One just has to find out which village will be coming to the challenge. This proverb is cited whenever one is sure to face a challenge. Just as the match not yet announced has not yet arrived, so other challenges in life cannot be faced until they are announced or until one is made aware of them. When one demands if you are near the bottom, you respond by this dictum. You may be in a tough situation, but you foresee an end to your problems.” This proverb reminds me of an American dictum, which I often heard from my late father: “When the going gets tough, the tough get going.” For more on the wrestling stadium as a contested icon of national imagining, see chap. 5. All translations from French and Portuguese in this book are the author’s, unless otherwise noted.

1. The Casamance conflict is a relatively low-intensity conflict in comparison to other postcolonial West African conflicts, such as the Biafran War in Nigeria, 1967–70 (500,000 to 2,000,000 killed); Liberia, 1989–2003 (250,000 to 520,000 killed); Sierra Leone, 1991–2002 (50,000 to 300,000 killed); and Cote d’Ivoire, 2002–7, 2010–11 (6,000 killed). See Alexandre Marc, Neelam Verjee, and Stephen Mogaka, *The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa*, Africa Development Forum (Washington, DC: World Bank and Agence

- Française de Développement, 2015), 8, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22033>.
2. Sané's nickname, "Nkrumah," was taken from the nationalist leader of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah. Augustin Diamacoune Senghor became known by his middle name to avoid confusion with independent Senegal's first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, who was no relation. Senghor died in 2001, and Diamacoune died in 2007.
  3. Account of Sané's meeting with Diamacoune from Mamadou "Nkrumah" Sané, as recounted in René Capain Bassène, *Labbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: Par lui-même et par ceux qui l'ont connu* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013), 106–7.
  4. Jean-Claude Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 84–85; Xavier Diatta, *Fiju di Terra: La crise casamançaise racontée à mes enfants* (Quebec: Inje Ajamaat/Kmanjen, 2017), 44–45. *Nordiste* means "northerner," i.e., someone from northern Senegal, often portrayed by separatists as a foreign "other" to the Casamance.
  5. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 96.
  6. Papa Kulimpi means "the bearded father" in the Jola language. On the concept of "othering," see Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); and Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993).
  7. Sané, as recounted in Bassène, *Labbé*, 106. I thank Pape Chérif "Akandijack" Bertrand Bassène for the first name of Mrs. Sané. Confirmed by Mamadou Sané in email to author, July 25, 2019.
  8. Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, "Le Message de la reine Alinsitoë," Conférence tenue par l'abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor le samedi, 23 août 1980, à la Chambre de Commerce de Dakar, organisée par le Cocarzi (Comité d'organisation pour le Carnaval de la Ville de Ziguinchor), Archives of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce.
  9. Sané, as recounted in Bassène, *Labbé*, 107. See also Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 99. Corroborated in Vincent Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims: Education, Migration and the Birth of Casamançais Nationalism (Senegal)" (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002); and Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, "Les Joola, la Casamance et l'État (1890–2004): L'identification joola au Sénégal" (PhD diss., Université Paris, Denis Diderot—Paris VII 2007).
  10. *Safoull* means "hello" or "good day" to a group in Jola.
  11. For more information on why the choice of palm wine was significant to the separatists, see chap. 3.
  12. Sané later claimed that there has never been two different MFDCs but only one, a party continuously advocating Casamançais independence since the 1940s. Few scholars of the Casamance conflict have supported this assertion. Sané, email to author, July 25, 2019; and as recounted in René Capain Bassène, *Casamance: Récits d'un conflit oublié (1982–2014)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2015), 21–23. For more on the distinction between the "original MFDC" and the "modern MFDC," see chap. 4.
  13. Sané, as recounted in Bassène, *Labbé*, 107.

14. Actually, it was born over the course of two separate meetings. After this initial meeting in April, Diamacoune and Sané met again in July 1982. See Bassène, *Casamance*, 291; Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 99.
15. “Une manifestation insurrectionnelle a été matée en Casamance,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 29, 1982. Though Father Diamacoune later estimated the crowd of marchers at 100,000, with some coming from as far away as the Falémé River, this figure was likely exaggerated. See Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, *Casamance: Pays du refus; Réponse à Monsieur Jacques Charpy* (Ziguinchor: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, 1995), 3; and Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 100.
16. Sané claims he was arrested on the twentieth of December, not the twenty-first. See Nkrumah Sané in Bassène, *Casamance*, 70; and Diamacoune, as recounted in Bassène, *L'abbé*, 50.
17. Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 100–101.
18. One of the instigators of the march at Diabir on December 6, 1983, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 80.
19. Several MFDC testimonies, including Sané, Jean-Marie Tendeng, and Pierre-Marie Diatta, among others, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 58–62.
20. Unnamed rebel testimony, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 82.
21. Former MFDC rebel co-detained with Sané at Dakar's Reubeuss prison, testimony in Bassène, *Casamance*, 89.
22. Several rebel testimonies, including César Atoute Badiate and Malamine Diatta, among others, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 83–93.
23. MFDC testimonies, including Abdou Elinkine Diatta, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 90–92.
24. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, “Senegal: Finding Incentives for Peace in Casamance,” allAfrica.com, June 25, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200806251043.html>.
25. Handicap International, “Etude d'urgence sur l'impact des mines en Casamance,” Government of Canada and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), October 2005–May 2006, 8.
26. Ferdinand de Jong and Geneviève Gasser, “Contested Casamance: Introduction,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 213.
27. MFDC faction leader Salif Sadio declared a universal ceasefire in 2014 after negotiations with Senegalese government leaders under the auspices of Sant'Egidio, a Catholic NGO based at the Vatican. But other MFDC factions refused to join the ceasefire. The most recent violence from the conflict (2022) has affected the political situations in both neighboring states, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.
28. On “neither war nor peace,” see Cécile Sow, “Casamance, ni guerre ni paix,” *JeuneAfrique.com*, November 26, 2009, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/199990/politique/casamance-ni-guerre-ni-paix/>; and “Sénégal: Une situation de ni paix, ni guerre en Casamance,” *New Humanitarian*, December 28, 2007, <https://reliefweb.int/report/senegal/s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-une>

- situation-de-ni-paix-ni-guerre-en-casamance. On “Africa’s longest-running civil conflict,” see IRIN [now the *New Humanitarian*], “Senegal: No End to Region’s Longest-Running War,” *New Humanitarian*, October 16, 2006, <https://reliefweb.int/report/senegal/senegal-no-end-regions-longest-running-war>; Vincent Foucher, “On the Matter (and Materiality) of the Nation: Interpreting Casamance’s Unresolved Separatist Struggle,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (2011): 82–83; and Jean-Claude Marut, “A l’Ouest, quoi de nouveau? Les obstacles à la paix en Casamance,” *Les cahiers d’outre-mer* 64, no. 255 (2011): 363.
29. For more on the Berlin Conference, see Mostafa Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 8–16; and Simon Katzenellenbogen, “It Didn’t Happen at Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in the Setting of Africa’s Colonial Boundaries,” in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*, ed. Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 21–34.
  30. Christian Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920* (Paris: Karthala, 1985), 21–52; Paul Nugent, “Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands: Refuge, Settlement and Islam from c. 1880 to the Present,” *Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 221–43. These African influences support the argument of Juliana Barr that borderlands cannot be thought of as only forming along European imperial frontiers, with indigenous participation only on the margins or in the background. See Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 5–46. For scholarship on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands from which most of the borderlands literature emerged, see Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (1999): 814–41; and Herbert Eugene Bolton, *The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1921). Paul Nugent has led Africanist contributions to the borderlands literature. In addition to the article cited above, see Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Life of the Borderlands since 1914* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002). For a more recent treatment of the Senegambian borderland, see David Newman Glovsky, “Belonging beyond Boundaries: Constructing a Transnational Community in a West African Borderland” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2020). For a different conception of a “borderland,” see Ziad Fahmy, “Jurisdictional Borderlands: Extraterritoriality and Legal Chameleons in Precolonial Alexandria, 1840–1870,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 55, no. 2 (2013): 305–29.
  31. On the Gambian border as an iconic case of Africa’s “artificial” borders, see Robert Tignor et al., *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the World*

- from *the Beginnings of Humankind to the Present*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), 744. On the “curse” of the colonial partition, see Basil Davidson, *The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York: Times Books, 1992). For more on Africa’s “artificial” borders—and why every border is artificial—see Katzenellenbogen, “It Didn’t Happen at Berlin.”
32. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 22.
  33. Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 156–61.
  34. There were exceptions, however. For an example, see Julie MacArthur, “Decolonizing Sovereignty: States of Exception along the Kenya-Somali Frontier,” *American Historical Review* 124, no. 1 (February 2019): 108–9.
  35. Mareike Schomerus et al., “Africa’s Secessionism: A Breakdance of Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, and Disenchantment,” in *Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment*, ed. Lotje de Vries, Pierre Englebert, and Mareike Schomerus (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 4–5.
  36. Address by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (president of the Republic of Ghana), in Organization of African Unity, ed., *Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U.: Speeches Delivered at the Assembly, Cairo, 17–21 July 1964* (Cairo: Information Department, 1964), 74–75.
  37. Senior Senegalese military officer, interview by author, Dakar, February 23, 2007.
  38. On the “geo-body” of the nation, see Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994), esp. chap. 7, 8, 9.
  39. Ibrahima Gaye, “Pour la nation, pour la république,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 29, 1982, Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar.
  40. Philip Aka, “The Senegambia Confederation in Historical Perspective,” in *African Intellectuals and the State of the Continent: Essays in Honor of Professor Sulayman S. Nyang* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), 37–66; Edmun B. Richmond, “Senegambia and the Confederation: History, Expectations, and Disillusions,” *Journal of Third World Studies* 10, no. 2 (1993): 172–94. Other scholars have taken a Francophone approach to the idea of federation in West Africa, in parallel with renewed interest among Africanists in regional approaches to the postcolony. For a few recent examples, see Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); and Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).
  41. This mounting crisis is best explained by Marut in a section of his book titled “Le ras-le-bol casamançais: Une crise du lien,” in Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 79–94. For more on this crisis in the 1970s, see Vincent

- Foucher, "The Mouvement Des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance: The Illusion of Separatism in Senegal?," in de Vries, Englebort, and Schomerus, *Secessionism in African Politics*, 277–78.
42. Jonathan Derrick, "West Africa's Worst Year of Famine," *African Affairs* 83, no. 332 (1984): 281–99.
  43. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 87–91.
  44. Foucher, "Illusion of Separatism," 278–79.
  45. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 36.
  46. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 42–43.
  47. In 2010, I retired from the U.S. military.
  48. Initially accompanying Ambassador Richard Roth (2005, along with the Defense and Army attaché Lieutenant Colonel Scott Womack), then Chargé d'Affaires Robert Jackson (2005–6), and finally, Ambassador Janice Jacobs (2006–7).
  49. For another case where discursive maps were preferred over paper maps for the more flexible histories and identities possible in defining the nation, see Andrew Shryock, *Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Thanks to Mike Reimer for this reference.
  50. A retired senior Senegalese government official, interview by author, Bigonona, Senegal, April 5, 2006.
  51. I have since discovered a large and comprehensive literature on sacred forests and associated shrines in the Casamance and other parts of Africa. See Louis-Vincent Thomas, *Les Diola: Essai d'analyse fonctionnelle sur une population de Basse-Casamance*, Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire 55 (Dakar: Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 1958); Jean Girard, *Genèse du pouvoir charismatique en Basse Casamance (Sénégal)* (Dakar: Institut fondamental d'Afrique noire, 1969); Peter Geschiere and Jos van der Klei, "La relation état-paysans et ses ambivalences: Modes populaires d'action politique chez les Maka (Cameroun) et les Diola (Casamance)," in *L'Etat contemporain en Afrique*, ed. Emmanuel Terray (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), 297–340; Peter Mark, *The Wild Bull and the Sacred Forest: Form, Meaning, and Change in Senegambian Initiation Masks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Robert Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Ferdinand de Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity: Power and Secrecy in Casamance, Senegal* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
  52. Diamacoune, as quoted by Mamadou Diouf, "Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC and the Struggle for Independence in Casamance," trans. Jonathan M. Sears, in *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, ed. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: J. Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 223. See also Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 62.

53. U.S. Department of State, “2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Senegal” (Washington, DC), executive summary, 1. In chap. 3, I explain why this reference to local religion in the Casamance made complete sense to a nationalist like Father Diamacoune.
54. Diamacoune, as quoted by Diatta, *Fiju di Terra*, 113–14. The italics are mine, to emphasize a few of the spaces analyzed in this book.
55. The son of a former *chef de quartier* (neighborhood chief) in Ziguinchor, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 33.
56. MFDC combatant in Kassalol in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 190.
57. I put quotation marks around the word *natural* here to indicate the ways in which even natural spaces are rendered as places through social historical construction. See Keith H. Basso, *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996).
58. Unnamed informant, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 34.
59. On transgression, see Tim Cresswell, *In Place / Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 8–9. On seeing like a state, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
60. Scholars of the Casamance and Casamançais themselves seem to agree on the western border as the Atlantic Ocean, the northern border as the international border with The Gambia, and the southern border as the international borders with Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry. But the eastern border seems to be much fuzzier. Some informants draw the border along the Gambia River east of Kolda, while most separatists draw it along the Falémé River and incorporate cities such as Kédougou and Matam. The people of Matam, however, would likely be surprised to learn that they were a part of the Casamance and not Senegal. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; MFDC members, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014.
61. De Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*, 1.
62. Numerous informants in Ziguinchor, such as a former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, village near Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 27, 2014. See also Paul Diédhiou, *L'identité joola en question: La bataille idéologique du MFDC pour l'indépendance* (Paris: Karthala, 2011), 330; Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 92; and Vincent Foucher, “La guerre des dieux? Religions et séparatisme en Basse Casamance,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2005): 376.
63. I do not claim that only colonialism produced such spatial imaginaries. For some examples of place and meaning in precolonial sacred spaces, see Christopher Ehret on “territorial spirits” in *The Civilizations of Africa: A History to 1800* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002), 50,

- as cited in Kairn A. Klieman, *“The Pygmies Were Our Compass”: Bantu and Batwa in the History of West Central Africa, Early Times to c. 1900 C.E.* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 74. This concept is similar to Sandra E. Greene’s analysis of sacred spaces in precolonial and early colonial Ghana. See Greene, *Sacred Sites and the Colonial Encounter: A History of Meaning and Memory in Ghana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).
64. Christopher J. Gray, *Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa: Southern Gabon, ca. 1850–1940*, Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 2–3.
  65. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014. Bertrand, several years younger than his brother, Augustin, enjoyed telling me that he was the priest’s senior when it came to the sacred forest. For more detail, see chap. 3.
  66. Augustin Sagna (bishop of the Ziguinchor Diocese) to all the priests in the diocese, January 9, 1983, Archives of the Diocese of Ziguinchor. This letter was written following the arrest of Father Diamacoune, on December 23, 1982.
  67. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006).
  68. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
  69. Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1995); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For an Africanist analysis of landscape in South Africa, see Jeremy Foster, *Washed with Sun: Landscape and the Making of White South Africa* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008). For an analysis of landscape and *terroir* in relation to the Casamance, see Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History,” 222–26.
  70. For a few examples of the literature on counter-mapping, see Joel Wainwright and Joe Bryan, “Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize,” *Cultural Geographies* 16, no. 2 (2009): 153–78; and Nancy Peluso, “Whose Woods Are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia,” *Antipode* 27, no. 4 (1995): 383–406. For counter-mapping as ethnocartography, see Julie MacArthur, *Cartography and the Political Imagination: Mapping Community in Colonial Kenya*, New African Histories (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 20.
  71. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*.
  72. Wainwright and Bryan, “Cartography, Territory, Property”; Peluso, “Whose Woods Are These?”
  73. MacArthur, *Cartography and the Political Imagination*; Keren Weitzberg, *We Do Not Have Borders: Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017).

74. Henri Lefebvre, "Réflexions sur la politique de l'espace," in *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*, ed. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 170.
75. Yi-fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 6.
76. Doreen B. Massey, *For Space* (London: SAGE, 2005), 183.
77. On staging the nation, see Raymond B. Craib, *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 2–7; and Carola Lentz, "The 2010 Independence Jubilees: The Politics and Aesthetics of National Commemoration in Africa," *Nations and Nationalism* 19, no. 2 (2013): 217–37.
78. For a few examples of the literature on counter-mapping, see Wainwright and Bryan, "Cartography, Territory, Property," 153–78; and Peluso, "Whose Woods Are These?," 383–406.
79. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, as quoted in Davidson, *Black Man's Burden*, 162.
80. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 4–7.
81. Of the thirty-two states represented at the inaugural session of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in 1963, only five had not been violently overthrown by 1997. John Reader, *Africa: A Biography of the Continent* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1998), 667.
82. On imagining the nation through print-capitalism, see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
83. Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939–1958* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005), 1–2.
84. See Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), chap. 1.
85. Marissa J. Moorman, *In tonations: A Social History of Music and Nation in Luanda, Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 2.
86. As illustrated in, among others, Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*.
87. Judith A. Byfield, *The Great Upheaval: Women and Nation in Postwar Nigeria* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2021), 5–19.
88. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 45.
89. As Marut notes, Father Diamacoune's position became more moderate later in his life. See Marut, 252–64.
90. Lentz, "2010 Independence Jubilees," 231–33.
91. Michael Lambert, "Violence and the War of Words: Ethnicity v. Nationalism in the Casamance," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 68, no. 4 (1998): 585–602; Olga F. Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production: The Jola of Casamance, Senegal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Diouf, "Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History"; Étienne Smith, "La nation 'par le côté': Le récit des cousinages au Sénégal," *Cahiers d'études*

- africaines* 184, no. 4 (2006): 907–65; Hamadou Tidiane Sy, “The Casamance Separatist Conflict: From Identity to the Trap of ‘Identitism,’” in *Identity Matters: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict*, ed. James L. Peacock, Patricia M. Thornton, and Patrick B. Inman (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 157–70; Catherine Boone, “Sons of the Soil Conflict in Africa: Institutional Determinants of Ethnic Conflict over Land,” *World Development* 96 (August 1, 2017): 276–93.
92. Martha Wilfahrt, *Precolonial Legacies in Postcolonial Politics: Representation and Redistribution in Decentralized West Africa*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 12, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108996983>.
  93. On the connotations of tribalism, see chap. 8, “Africans Live in Tribes, Don’t They?,” in Curtis A. Keim, *Mistaking Africa: Curiosities and Inventions of the American Mind* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).
  94. Former police commissar, in Bassène, *Casamance*, 65.
  95. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 3; former senior Senegalese government official, interview by author, Bignona, April 2006. On the distinctions between separatism, secessionism, and irredentism in the Casamance, see Estelle Patricia Raymonde Nicol, “A Separatist Issue in Post-colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)” (PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 1997), 2–4. Like most scholars of the Casamance conflict, I refer to the conflict as a case of separatism throughout this book.
  96. Mamadou Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal: Le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries* (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 2001); Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History.”
  97. William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4–15.
  98. William Reno, email correspondence with author, July 5, 2022.
  99. Private meeting with Senegalese military officers, Dakar, April 14, 2006.
  100. Reno, email, July 5, 2022.
  101. Reno, email, July 5, 2022.
  102. Samuel Fury Childs Daly, *A History of the Republic of Biafra: Law, Crime, and the Nigerian Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 17.
  103. Schomerus et al., “Africa’s Secessionism,” 10–11.
  104. Foucher, “Illusion of Separatism,” 266.
  105. Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, “Hidden Debates over the Status of the Casamance during the Decolonization Process in Senegal: Regionalism, Territorialism, and Federalism at a Crossroads, 1946–62,” *Journal of African History* 61, no. 1 (March 2020): 85. For a focused review of the article, see my review on H-Diplo: Article Review 1060, September 9, 2021, <https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/8187414/h-diplo-article-review-1060-hidden-debates-over-status-casamance>.
  106. Pierre Englebert, *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 156–60. Perhaps the “moderates” engaged in some sort of performance to gain accessions from the Government of

- Senegal. But it is hard to argue that rebel faction leaders like Salif Sadio, at least after 2001, did not truly desire independence for the Casamance. In fact, he was more than willing to torture and kill other rebels who did not support that position faithfully enough. From several MFDC rebel (Atika) testimonies provided to Bassène, in *Casamance*, 187–202.
107. For a few examples of pushing back against this fetishization, see Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 1–8; James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 40–63; and Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History* (New York: Knopf, 1988), 293–319.
  108. To distinguish between Bertrand Diamacoune and his older brother, I normally use the title and name “Father Diamacoune” when referring to Augustin, the priest.
  109. I thank one of my anonymous reviewers with Ohio University Press for this language about a spatial itinerary versus a chronological history.
  110. For more on European mapping of the Casamance, see Nugent, “Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands.”
  111. Thomas, *Les Diola*. See also Louis-Vincent Thomas, “Les Diola d’antan: A propos des Diola ‘traditionnels’ de Basse-Casamance,” in *Comprendre la Casamance: Chronique d’une intégration contrastée*, ed. François-George Barbier-Wiesser and Edgard Pisani (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 74–77.
  112. See Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*.
  113. Numerous interviews in the Casamance, March and April 2014, e.g., the “Notables” of Sindian, group interview by author, Sindian, April 6, 2014; MFDC Bignona, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014. In addition to Peter Mark’s work on “Mandingization” in *A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance since 1500* (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden GmbH, 1985) and in *Wild Bull*, see Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*, as well as Steven Thomson, “Revisiting ‘Mandingization’ in Coastal Gambia and Casamance (Senegal): Four Approaches to Ethnic Change,” *African Studies Review* 54, no. 2 (September 2011): 95–121.
  114. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 51.
  115. Girard, *Genèse du pouvoir charismatique en Basse Casamance*.
  116. Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014.
  117. Numerous informants in Ziguinchor, such as former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, village near Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 27, 2014.
  118. Anonymous informant, interview by author, Diabir, March 20, 2014; Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014.
  119. Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” esp. chap. 1, “The Development of Multi-local Communities.”
  120. Amnesty International, *Senegal: Climate of Terror in Casamance* (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1998); Bassène, *Casamance*.

Epigraph: Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Joola de Casamance* (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 86. This is a proverb about the power of women. Diatta explains that this proverb makes three allusions. First, water is considered a principle of life, similar to a man's sperm. Second, there is an intrinsic liaison between water and women. Water is the means by which a man's sperm, with the power of life, passes from the virtual to the real. Third, the water (or the semen) can be found everywhere. One can find a man anywhere, just like water. This would be a proverb that a Jola woman might respond with to the threat or repudiation of transgressions by a husband: like water in the Casamance, the wife can find a husband anywhere; she does not have to depend on him.

1. Except for three days in 1984, Vieira had been the president of Guinea-Bissau from 1980 to 1999. Jean-Claude Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 291–95; Elimane Fall, “Salif Sadio, le mystérieux,” *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), April 25, 2006, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/76901/archives-thematique/salif-sadio-le-mysterieux/>.
2. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 291–95.
3. Multiple informants, in René Capain Bassène, *Casamance: Récits d'un conflit oublié (1982–2014)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2015), 210–21.
4. From several diplomatic meetings with senior Senegalese military and/or security officials, 2006.
5. MFDC, “La voix de la Casamance’ . . . une parole diola,” ed. Dominique Darbon, *Politique africaine* 18 (1985): 127. The Portuguese founded Farim on the Cacheu River, in north-central contemporary Guinea-Bissau, and Ziguinchor on the Casamance River, the next major river to the north.
6. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 53. References to les Rivières du Sud are prevalent in the primary and secondary source literature on the Casamance. For a few more examples, see Annie Chéneau-Loquay, “La raison: Géographie ‘des’ Casamance,” in *Comprendre la Casamance: Chronique d'une intégration contrastée*, ed. François-George Barbier-Wiesser and Edgar Pisani (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 47, 54; Walter Rodney, *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545–1800* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), 2; and Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 18, 316n27. Barry claims that while the French, from their post at Saint-Louis, referred to the area as “the Southern Rivers area,” the British, from theirs in Sierra Leone, referred to the same area as the Northern Rivers region or the Upper Guinea Coast.
7. Peter Mark, *“Portuguese” Style and Luso-African Identity: Precolonial Senegambia, Sixteenth–Nineteenth Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 13–32.
8. On the problematic notion of Europeans “discovering” indigenous African, Asian, and American places, Mary Louise Pratt argues, “As a rule the ‘discovery’ of sites like Lake Tanganyika [or the Casamance River in this case] involved making one’s way to the region and asking the local inhabitants

- if they knew of any big lakes, etc. in the area, then hiring them to take you there, whereupon with their guidance and support, you proceeded to discover what they already knew.” Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2008), 198.
9. Louis-Vincent Thomas, *Les Diola: Essai d'analyse fonctionnelle sur une population de Basse-Casamance*, Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire 55 (Dakar: Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 1958), 9; Peter Mark, *A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance since 1500* (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden GmbH, 1985), 12; Robert Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65, 75; Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 53–54.
  10. Thomas, *Les Diola*, 9. On the mixed-race Luso-Africans known as “the Portuguese,” see Mark, “Portuguese” Style. For more on imperial naming practices from an Australian context, see Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History* (New York: Knopf, 1988).
  11. Nouha Cissé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014; Landing Savané, remarks at conference at the Université Assane Seck at Ziguinchor following presentation by Professor Amadou Kadel Kane (Geography Department, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar) called “Perceptions des frontières et recompositions territoriales,” March 19, 2014. For more on the migration and cultural mixing in this Senegambian borderland, see David Newman Glovsky, “Belonging beyond Boundaries: Constructing a Transnational Community in a West African Borderland” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2020).
  12. For a comprehensive treatment of the colonial conquest in the Casamance, see Christian Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920* (Paris: Karthala, 1985).
  13. Government of Senegal, *The Truth about Casamance* (Dakar: Ministry of Communication, the Republic of Senegal, 1997), 8. Also see transcript of speech given by Senegalese president Macky Sall to launch a new initiative for peace and the development of the Casamance. “Casamance: Pôle de développement,” Ziguinchor, March 17, 2014, [https://www.dakaractu.com/Ceremonie-de-lancement-du-projet-pole-de-developpement-de-la-Casamance-PPDC-Allocution-de-Son-Excellence-Monsieur-Macky\\_a62176.html](https://www.dakaractu.com/Ceremonie-de-lancement-du-projet-pole-de-developpement-de-la-Casamance-PPDC-Allocution-de-Son-Excellence-Monsieur-Macky_a62176.html).
  14. For more on African river history and national identities, see Heather J. Hoag, *Developing the Rivers of East and West Africa: An Environmental History* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); Sara B. Pritchard, *Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Robert W. Harms, *River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin in the Era of the Slave and Ivory Trade, 1500–1891* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Robert W. Harms, *Games against Nature: An Eco-cultural History of the Nunu of Equatorial*

- Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); James F. Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce: The Senegal River Valley, 1700–1860* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Sandra E. Greene, *Sacred Sites and the Colonial Encounter: A History of Meaning and Memory in Ghana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), esp. chap. 2, “Of Water and Spirits”; and Jan Vansina, *Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880–1960* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010). For a small sampling of non-African river history, see Tricia Cusack, *Riverscapes and National Identities* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010); Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1995); Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985); and Fernand Braudel, *The Identity of France*, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1988–90).
15. On the hardening of identities in the Senegambia region for colonial “divide-and-rule” strategies, see Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*; Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*; Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*; Mark, “Portuguese” Style, 31–32; Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*; and David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
  16. Rodney, *History of the Upper Guinea Coast*, 3.
  17. I heard this statement in nearly every oral history I collected in the Casamance. To cite a few specifically: Bilaly Keita (director of the Affiniam Dam), Affiniam, October 30, 2014; Casamançais refugee to The Gambia, Banjul, March 14, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Sindian Notables, group interview, Sindian, April 6, 2014.
  18. This precolonial migration and cultural mixing has been well established by other historians. Walter Rodney was one of the first scholars to focus a monograph on “the Upper Guinea Coast,” which he defined as “the relatively small section of the West African Coast between the Gambia and Cape Mount [near the southern boundary of modern Liberia].” Rodney, *History of the Upper Guinea Coast*, vii. For more on this area, including the Senegambian region that overlaps it from the north, see Philip D. Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975); Mark, “Portuguese” Style; Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*; Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*; Walter Hawthorne, *Planting Rice and Harvesting Slaves: Transformations along the Guinea-Bissau Coast, 1400–1900* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003); Toby Green, *The Rise of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in Western Africa, 1300–1589* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Edda L. Fields-Black, *Deep Roots: Rice Farmers in West Africa and the African Diaspora* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); and Emily Lynn Osborn, *Our New Husbands Are Here: Households, Gender, and Politics in a*

- West African State from the Slave Trade to Colonial Rule* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011).
19. On the Casamance as a “civilization of rice,” see Louis-Vincent Thomas, “Les Diola d’antan: A propos des Diola ‘traditionnels’ de Basse-Casamance,” in *Comprendre la Casamance: Chronique d’une intégration contrastée*, ed. François-George Barbier-Wiesser and Edgard Pisani (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 70, 74–77.
  20. For more on the environmental changes, see chap. 2 of this book.
  21. For examples of the mistaken notion of a static Africa with no history—no change over time—see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover Publications, 1956); and Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965).
  22. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*; Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*; Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*. While most scholars assert that the Floop migrated into the Lower Casamance from the kingdom of Gabu, a subsidiary of the Mali Empire in what is today eastern Guinea-Bissau, Baum claims that the Floop were already a coastal people, moving into the Lower Casamance from an area farther south along the Upper Guinea Coast.
  23. William Fox, *A Brief History of the Wesleyan Missions on the Western Coast of Africa* (London: Aylott and Jones; J. Mason, 1851), 236. Fox demonstrated his racism with statements like this: “The Jollars (or Feloops) are nearly the zero of the thermometer of African civilization in this part of the continent. They are a wild and unsociable race of people, of a gloomy disposition, and are supposed never to forgive an injury.”
  24. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 31, 53.
  25. Jacques Charpy, “Casamance et Sénégal au temps de la colonisation française,” in Barbier-Wiesser and Pisani, *Comprendre la Casamance*, 479; Philippe Méguelle, *Chefferie coloniale et égalitarisme diola: Les difficultés de la politique indigène de la France en Basse-Casamance (Sénégal), 1828–1923* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012), 11.
  26. For more information on the impact of the trans-Saharan slave trade, see Ghislaine Lydon, *On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); John O. Hunwick and Eve Troutt Powell, *The African Diaspora in the Mediterranean Lands of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2010); Eve Troutt Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Ibrahima Thioub, “Regard critique sur les lectures africaines de l’esclavage et de la traite atlantique,” in *Les historiens africains et la mondialisation*, ed. Issiaka Mande and Blandine Stefanson (Paris: Karthala, 2005), 271–92; and Robin Law, *The Oyo Empire, c.1600–c.1836: A West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977).
  27. For the rest of the chapter, I adopt Peter Mark’s convention of using quotation marks around “Portuguese” to refer to the mixed-race descendants

- of Portuguese settlers and Senegambian wives. *Portuguese* without quotation marks refers to “white” settlers and merchants from Europe’s Iberian Peninsula.
28. Mark, “*Portuguese*” *Style*, 14.
  29. For more on French cartography in this period, see Christine Marie Petto, *When France Was King of Cartography: The Patronage and Production of Maps in Early Modern France* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007).
  30. For more on this distinction, see John Alexander Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1987).
  31. For his description of the “Feloops” and other ethnic groups in the region, see the first three chapters of Mungo Park, *Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa Performed under the African Association, in the Years 1795, 1796, and 1797; By Mungo Park, with an Appendix, Containing Geographical Illustrations of Africa, by Major Rennell*, 3rd ed. (London: W. Bulmer, 1799).
  32. Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, 133. Much of the Portuguese decline resulted from Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the subsequent displacement of the Crown to Brazil.
  33. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 53, 57.
  34. Mark, 11.
  35. Sénégal et Dépendances IV, dossier 2, Archives Nationales de France, Section Outre-Mer (hereafter ANFOM), as quoted in Mark, 55.
  36. 185 Mi 45, ANFOM, as quoted in Mark, 55.
  37. 185 Mi 45, ANFOM, as quoted in Mark, 55.
  38. Sénégal et Dépendances IV, ANFOM, dossier 25, “Casamance, rapport de la commission d’exploration,” May 1857, as quoted in Mark, 55. The Wolof are Senegal’s largest ethnic group primarily found in the northern part of the country.
  39. Méguelle, *Chefferie coloniale et égalitarisme diola*, part II (139–318).
  40. Frederick Lugard wrote an essay to explain indirect rule in Nigeria. See Lord Lugard, “Indirect Rule in Tropical Africa, 1900,” in *Documents from the African Past*, ed. Robert O. Collins (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2001), 290–97; and Félix Eboué, “Native Policy and Political Institutions in French Equatorial Africa, 1941,” in Collins, *Documents from the African Past*, 327–30.
  41. Bertrand-Bocandé, “Notes sur la Guinée Portugaise ou Sénégalambie Méridionale,” *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* 12, no. 67/68 (1849): 327, as quoted in French in Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 60.
  42. Louis-Vincent Thomas, foreword to Peter Mark, *The Wild Bull and the Sacred Forest: Form, Meaning, and Change in Senegambian Initiation Masks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ix; Western government official from the Casamance, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 27, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014. For

- an account of this cultural unity against Mandinka Muslim slave raiding in the late nineteenth century, see Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*.
43. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 64.
  44. Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 130.
  45. Convention relative à la délimitation des possessions respectives dans l'Afrique occidentale, signée à Paris le 12 mai 1886, 1F 0016, Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar (hereafter ANS). Also see Ian Brownlie, *African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia* (London: C. Hurst, 1979), 351. On the Portuguese establishment of a trading post at Ziguinchor in the mid-seventeenth century, see Pierre Xavier Trincaz, *Colonisation et régionalisme: Ziguinchor en Casamance* (Paris: Editions de l'ORSTOM; Institut français de recherche scientifique pour le développement en coopération, 1984); and René Pélissier, *Naissance de la Guinée: Portugais et Africains en Sénégambie, 1841-1936* (Orgeval, France: Pélissier, 1989).
  46. Vincent Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims: Education, Migration and the Birth of Casamançais Nationalism (Senegal)," PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002, 126–27. For more on the recruiting drive led by Blaise Diagne, the first African elected to the French National Assembly, see Myron J. Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann; London: J. Currey, 1991); Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); G. Wesley Johnson, "The Ascendancy of Blaise Diagne and the Beginning of African Politics in Senegal," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 36, no. 3 (July 1, 1966): 235–53; and Irving L. Markovitz, "The Political Thought of Blaise Diagne and Lamine Gueye: Some Aspects of Social Structure and Ideology in Senegal," *Présence africaine* 4, no. 72 (1969): 21–38.
  47. Séga Seckou Sagna, *La Casamance, l'Islam et la France* (Dakar: L'Harmattan Sénégal, 2017), 179–232. A *marabout* is a West African Islamic cleric.
  48. Vincent Foucher, "Church and Nation: The Catholic Contribution to War and Peace in Casamance (Senegal)," *Le fait missionnaire: Missions et sciences sociales* 13 (2003): 14.
  49. For more on the raiding Muslim marabouts, a.k.a. the Maraboutic Wars, see Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*; Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, esp. chap. 6; and Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*. On the spread of Islam in the Casamance, see also Frances Anne Leary, "Islam, Politics and Colonialism: A Political History of Islam in the Casamance Region of Senegal (1850-1914)" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1970); Peter Mark, "Economic and Religious Change among the Diola of Boulouf (Casamance), 1890-1940: Trade, Cash Cropping and Islam in Southwestern Senegal" (PhD diss., Yale University, 1976); and Paul Nugent, "Cyclical

- History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands: Refuge, Settlement and Islam from c. 1880 to the Present,” *Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 221–43.
50. Nugent, “Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands.”
  51. Daniel J. Gelo, as quoted in Imre Sutton, “Cartographic Review of Indian Land Tenure and Territoriality: A Schematic Approach,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 26, no. 2 (2002): 69. For more on North American indigenous spatial imagination in relation to paper maps, see Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 5–46.
  52. As explained in the introduction, “borderland” literature gained prominence in the 1920s with scholars of the U.S.-Mexico border like Herbert Eugene Bolton. See Bolton, *The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1921). Peter Sahlins’s *Boundaries*, about the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees, has also been important to more contemporary analyses of this literature. See Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
  53. Herbert Eugene Bolton, as quoted by Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (1999): 816. Though Adelman and Aron do not specifically cite which work of Bolton’s to which they are referring, it is believed to be *The Spanish Borderlands*.
  54. See Nugent, “Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands.”
  55. John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen, “Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays,” *American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (1999): 1229–34.
  56. Captain A. H. Kenney (British commissioner to the Boundary Commission of 1890) to G. T. Carter (administrator of The Gambia), December 18, 1890, MP 1-1 Papers Relating to the Boundaries of the Gambia Colony and Protectorate, Gambian National Record Service (hereafter GNRS).
  57. Sir S. Rowe to Sir H. T. Holland, October 22, 1887, in MP 1-1, GNRS. For the French reporting on the Boundary Commission, see Rapport sur les travaux exécutés par la Commission française de délimitation, June 5, 1891, 1F/0016, ANS.
  58. Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*; Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*; Mark, “Economic and Religious Change”; Leary, “Islam, Politics and Colonialism.”
  59. French and British boundary commissioners often referred to Combo as Sylla’s “country.” See, e.g., Kenney to Carter, December 18, 1890, as well as Carter’s subsequent report to the secretary of state for the colonies, December 1890, MP 1-1, GNRS.
  60. Kenney to Carter, December 18, 1890.
  61. Kenney to Carter, December 18, 1890.

62. The U.S. representative was the American Minister to Berlin, John A. Kasson. See Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The United States and Africa: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 133–34.
63. “The Mansion-House Banquet to Her Majesty’s Ministers,” *Times of London*, August 7, 1890, 6, Times Digital Archive.
64. “The Mansion-House Banquet.”
65. All borders are “arbitrary” and “artificial,” not just African borders. See Simon Katzenellenbogen, “It Didn’t Happen at Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in the Setting of Africa’s Colonial Boundaries,” in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*, ed. Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiawaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 21–34; and Paul Nugent, “Arbitrary Lines and the People’s Minds: A Dissenting View on Colonial Boundaries in West Africa,” in Nugent and Asiawaju, *African Boundaries*, 35–67.
66. For an introduction to the literature on colonial mapping practices, see Carter, *Road to Botany Bay*; J. B. Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” *Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization* 26, no. 2 (1989): 1–20; Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (New York: Guilford, 1992); Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geobody of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994); Barbara E. Mundy, *The Mapping of New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and the Maps of the Relaciones Geográficas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); D. Graham Burnett, *Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El Dorado* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); and James R. Akerman, ed., *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
67. In the case of Egypt, until Mitchell covers some of the military history of the 1882 British “occupation,” one almost forgets that behind every textbook, floor plan, and newspaper stood a Maxim gun, staring the colonial subject in the face. And behind the Maxim gun stood a British soldier, with the “remarkable self-certainty” that came from the backing of “the British public.” According to Mitchell, “This self-certainty was made possible by the enormous resources of the British Empire, including its new weaponry. It was a certainty that seemed to be generated in particular out of the coordination of these resources, by the modern means of transport and communication.” See Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 129. Portrayed as an entity backed up by an entire colonial system that ultimately meant violence for the colonized who refused to be “enframed,” the map, like the textbook and the school floor plan, did not look so benign.
68. On the “imperial gaze,” see Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*; Akerman, *Imperial Map*; Burnett, *Masters of All They Surveyed*; and Carter, *Road to Botany Bay*. On “riverscape,” see Cusack, *Riverscapes and National Identities*.

69. The bulletin of the Commercial Geography Society of Paris.
70. For more on the connections between “exploration,” cartography, and colonialism, see Achille Mbembe, “At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa,” trans. Steven Rendall, *Public Culture* 12, no. 1 (2000): 259–84; and V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
71. M. Lenoir, “M. Lenoir sur la Casamance,” lettre communiqué par M. Delor, Sédhiou, June 18, 1884, *Bulletin de la Société de géographie commerciale de Paris* (October 1883–October 1884): 617.
72. Joanna Davidson, *Sacred Rice: An Ethnography of Identity, Environment, and Development in Rural West Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
73. *Bulletin de la Société royale belge de géographie* 8 (1884): 696–97.
74. “Reis’s concession,” délimitation des frontières entre le Sénégal et la Gambie et entre le Sénégal et la Guinée Française, 10D1/0069, ANS; emphasis in the original.
75. “Reis’s concession.”
76. Henri Lefebvre, *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*, ed. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 187. Yi-fu Tuan also argues that space is more abstract than place. See Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 6.
77. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); and Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
78. Lefebvre, *State, Space, World*, 187.
79. Rapport annuel ensemble—1943, Rapport annuel du Commandant de Cercle, Ziguinchor, 2G 43-75, ANS.
80. Dividing the people of the Casamance for colonial extraction only reinforced a colonial policy of “divide and rule” that had been in effect since the Maraboutic Wars of the late nineteenth century. See Christian Roche, “Conquête et résistance des peuples de Casamance, 1850–1920” (PhD diss., Université de Lille, 1975), 14.
81. Gouverneur du Sénégal au gouverneur général, April 22, 1943, 11D1/0226, ANS.
82. The colonies “were supposed to pay for themselves,” however. See, e.g., Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 7.
83. Most of “Rhodesia” became what is now “Zimbabwe” upon independence in 1980.
84. Eric Worby, “Maps, Names, and Ethnic Games: The Epistemology and Iconography of Colonial Power in Northwestern Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 3 (September 1, 1994): 371.

85. Frederick Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective," *Journal of African History* 49, no. 2 (2008): 167–96; see also Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
86. Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
87. Estelle Patricia Raymonde Nicol, "A Separatist Issue in Post-colonial Africa: The Case of the Casamance (Senegal)" (PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 1997), 59–70.
88. Nicol, 66.
89. Nicol, 66.
90. "Rapport sur les travaux exécutés de 1938 à 1941, Service Géographique de l'AOF," 56, Tableau d'Assemblage des Cartes au 1,000,000 et 500,000 de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, 2G 41-02, ANS.
91. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 358. Senegal won its independence from France on April 4, 1960.
92. Marut, 358.
93. "Développement de la Casamance, lié à son autonomie" [Development of the Casamance, linked to its autonomy], Rapport de J. Malbraque sur la Casamance: nécessité et avantage de son autonomie, 1Z 0096, ANS.
94. See, e.g., "Schema routier de la Casamance," Affaires politiques et administratives: cartes et plans du Sénégal et de la Casamance, 11D1 0390, ANS.
95. Charpy, "Casamance et Sénégal," 490.
96. The *administrateur supérieur* of the Casamance thus stood between the French commandants de cercle and the governor of Senegal. For more on this relationship, see Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*; Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims"; and Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, "Les Joola, la Casamance et l'État (1890–2004): L'identification joola au Sénégal" (PhD diss., Université Paris Diderot—Paris VII, 2007).
97. Rapport de l'administrateur supérieur, 1938, 11 D 1 292, ANS.
98. "Casamance Info Center in Switzerland," 2001, p. 7, document from personal archives of Bertrand Diamacoune.
99. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*.
100. Epigraph source: Oumar Diatta, *La Casamance: Essai sur le destin tumultueux d'une région* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008), 33. Nouha Cissé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014. For more on Lycée Djignabo, see chap. 3 of this book; for more on Casa-Sports, see chap. 5.
101. Mamadou Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal: Le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries* (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 2001); Étienne Smith, "La nationalisation par le bas: Un nationalisme banal? Le cas de la wolofisation au Senegal," *Raisons politiques* 37, no. 1 (2010): 65–78.
102. As noted in the introduction, in his children's radio program as "Papa Kulimpi" (the name meant "bearded father" in Jola), Father Diamacoune

- referred to the “little Wolof, the little Serer” and the “little Toucouleur” as “strangers” who did not belong in the Casamance. Thus, he started trying to alienate northerners and instill hatred and distrust of them among Casamançais at a young age. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 96.
103. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, *Casamance: Pays du refus; Réponse à Monsieur Jacques Charpy* (Ziguinchor: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, 1995), 2; Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 40.
  104. On the role of the Catholic Church with Casamançais separatism, see Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 59–62.
  105. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 2.
  106. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism* (Paris: Présence africaine, 1962), 70.
  107. High-ranking NGO official from the Casamance, interview by author, Dakar, June 3, 2012; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014. For more on Senghor’s conception of a Black, federated, Francophone West African nation-state, see Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); and Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
  108. Marut, *Conflit de Casamance*, 63. On the “over-representation” of Jola in the MFDC, see 62–67.
  109. Senegalese journalist, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 2007.
  110. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Sindian Notables, group interview by author, Sindian, April 6, 2014; Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; senior MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014; Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 3.
  111. It already was an issue for the Gambian and Bissau-Guinean states, as the conflict often spilled over the international borders into southwestern Gambia and northwestern Guinea-Bissau. See Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, chap. 5, 8, 15.
  112. Western government official from the Casamance, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 27, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Sindian Notables, group interview by author, Sindian, April 6, 2014; Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; MFDC Bignona, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; senior MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014.
  113. Cusack, *Riverscapes and National Identities*.
  114. Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC and the Struggle for Independence in Casamance,” trans. Jonathan M. Sears, in *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, ed. Bruce Berman, Dickson

- Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: J. Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 231.
115. Again, see Mark, “Economic and Religious Change” and Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, in addition to Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, for more on precolonial commerce and the flexible nature of precolonial and colonial identity formation in the Senegambia. For other examples of flexible identity formation—in terms of gender as well as ethnicity—in West Africa, see Judith Byfield, *The Bluest Hands: A Social and Economic History of Women Dyers in Abeokuta (Nigeria), 1890–1940* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002); Byfield, “Unwrapping’ Nationalism: Dress, Gender, and Nationalist Discourse in Colonial Lagos” (Paper 30, Boston University African Studies Center, 2000), 1–21; Sandra E. Greene, *Gender, Ethnicity, and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast: A History of the Anlo-Ewe* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996); and Greene, *Sacred Sites*.
  116. Baum’s term in “The Emergence of a Diola Christianity,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 60, no. 3 (1990): 370. Thomas was the first Western scholar to publish a detailed ethnography of the Jola people. See Thomas, *Les Diola*.
  117. Thomas, foreword to Mark, *Wild Bull*, ix.
  118. “Senegalese colonialism” from press interview with Diamacoune in *Sud Hebdo*, February 1, 1990.
  119. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 2, 3.
  120. On this migration from Gabu and subsequent ethnic and cultural mixing, see Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*; Mark, “Portuguese” Style; Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*; and Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*.
  121. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 3.
  122. Diamacoune, 3.
  123. Nancy Peluso, “Whose Woods Are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia,” *Antipode* 27, no. 4 (1995): 384, 386.
  124. “An irresolvable internal contradiction.” *Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online*, s.v. “aporia,” accessed February 8, 2023, [www.merriam-webster.com](http://www.merriam-webster.com).
  125. Joel Wainwright and Joe Bryan, “Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize,” *Cultural Geographies* 16, no. 2 (2009): 153.
  126. Wainwright and Bryan, 153–54.
  127. As Wainwright and Bryan write, “Within this literature, indigenous cartography tends to be viewed as a practice of replacing bad colonial maps with good anti-colonial ones. . . . Even maps of indigenous lands may reproduce unequal social relations” (154–55).

## CHAPTER 2: THE RICE FIELD

Epigraph: Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance* (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 231. According to Diatta, with sloping rice fields, one first cultivates the bottom portion following the first rains, before it starts to flood. These parts of the field

produce the most rice. Thus, two interpretations of the proverb are logical. First, it speaks of an elderly man who dies, leaving the field to his children or to his younger brothers. There is nothing to complain about. Death starts where it must, like the farmer who starts to work his deepest rice fields. Second, the proverb speaks of the death of a rich man who supports others. The clan finds itself, in the same way, impoverished. Death took away the deep riches of the rice field: the richest man, the most valiant.

1. Jean-Claude Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 105; Ousmane Tamba, in René Capain Bassène, *Casamance: Récits d'un conflit oublié (1982–2014)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2015), 82.
2. Regarding the arms with which MFDC rebels initially fought the Casamance conflict and the casualties from the December 1983 attack, see Jacques Lacotte, "'Serious Violence' Reported in Casamance," *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), December 19, 1983, as well as the following articles from the dossier "Casamance Conflit" at Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar (hereafter ANS): "Menées subversives en Basse-Casamance: Des individus armés tentaient d'envahir Ziguinchor," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 19, 1983; Jules Charles Diallo, "Les affrontements en Casamance: 19 morts, 80 blessés, 100 arrêtés; Un feu nourri près de deux heures," unknown newspaper, December 1983 (this article noted four women killed among the attacking rebels); and Jules Charles Diallo, "Les affrontements en Casamance: Retour au calme à Ziguinchor," unknown newspaper, December 1983.
3. For a few examples of scholars and officials referring to "the Casamance question," see Lawrence S. Woocher, "The 'Casamance Question': An Examination of the Legitimacy of Self-Determination in Southern Senegal," *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 7 (2000): 341–80; and Andrew Manley, *Guinea Bissau / Senegal: War, Civil War and the Casamance Question* (New York: UNHCR, 1998).
4. As in other chapters, I capitalize "The Rice Field" only when I intend to draw attention to the ways in which the separatist movement reduced the diverse array of rice fields, and the identities surrounding them, into a monolithic, symbolic version of The Rice Field for Casamançais nationalism.
5. See the following Amnesty International reports: "Senegal: Torture, the Casamance Case," May 23, 1990; "Senegal: Mass Arrests and Torture; Most of the Detainees Appear to Be Prisoners of Conscience," June 1, 1994; *Senegal: Climate of Terror in Casamance* (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1998); and "Senegal: Putting an End to Impunity; A Unique Opportunity Not to Be Missed," April 2002. To be clear, both sides have perpetrated atrocities, as numerous oral history informants attested from personal experience; thus, the Senegalese Army was not the only guilty party.
6. Senegalese police had arrested Diamacoune (at Ziguinchor) and Sané (at Bignona) three to five days before the separatist march in Ziguinchor in December 1982. See Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, interview with Bassène, in *L'abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: Par lui-même et par ceux*

- qui l'ont connu* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013), 46; and Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 100.
7. "Casamance Independence Demanded, Reaction: Leader Demands Independence," translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, originally published in *Sud Hebdo* (Ziguinchor), February 1, 1990, 3–6.
  8. "Militaires tombés à Ziguinchor: La liste des victimes" and "Ziguinchor sous le Choc," Casamance Conflit, ANS, both articles recounting SAF casualties in the battle of Mandina Mancagne from August 19, 1997, in *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 24, 1997, p. 2. Another report published five years after the battle claimed that 26 SAF soldiers died in the battle: see Demba Ndiaye, "Mandina Mancagne, un village dans la guerre," *Radio France Internationale* (Paris), December 27, 2002, [http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/036/article\\_18908.asp](http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/036/article_18908.asp).
  9. The Jacques Lacotte *Agence France-Presse* report cited above notes that fifteen of the "raiders, including four women, had been killed while the security forces lost four men with another 20 wounded." The rice field south of Kandialang was not a battlefield as much as an obstacle. Its mud and shallow water presented an obstacle for SAF and the MFDC to go around rather than through. Getting stuck in the middle of this rice field would turn it into a killing field. Thus, most of the casualties associated with this rice field occurred on its edges, not in the middle of it, as each side fired across it.
  10. Ndiaye, "Mandina Mancagne."
  11. Ndiaye.
  12. Daniel Jatta, interview by author, Banjul, March 4, 2014; a Jola refugee from Fogy, interview by author, Banjul, March 14, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; man from Kandialang, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 18, 2014; Bintou and Basiru Tendeng, joint interview by author, Kandialang, April 21, 2014; high-ranking MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014.
  13. "Senegal," FAO rice information, FAO Corporate Document Repository, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, accessed on January 26, 2016, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4347e/y4347e1k.htm>.
  14. Joanna Davidson, "'We Work Hard': Customary Imperatives of the Diola Work Regime in the Context of Environmental and Economic Change," in "Guinea-Bissau Today," special issue, *African Studies Review* 52, no. 2 (September 2009): 119. Davidson, a cultural anthropologist, has written extensively on the subject of Jola rice production and environmental change in northwestern Guinea-Bissau, part of what Casamançais separatists considered the "Jola Republic." She cites Olga Linares for the claim that "archaeological evidence suggests that Diola have been practicing their trademark wet rice cultivation techniques in this region for at least a thousand years." But it is not clear what she means by "this region." Perhaps she means the broader Upper Guinea Coast, but the Jola are fairly recent

arrivals to the Lower Casamance. Other secondary literature concurs that they migrated en masse in the seventeenth century, fleeing the Mandé invasion of Gabu, a kingdom in contemporary eastern Guinea-Bissau. Their increasing presence in the Lower Casamance absorbed and displaced many Bainouk, considered the earliest known inhabitants of the Lower Casamance, as discussed in this chapter. For more on this Jola migration and ethnic mixing with the Bainouk, see Peter Mark, *“Portuguese” Style and Luso-African Identity: Precolonial Senegambia, Sixteenth–Nineteenth Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Peter Mark, *A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance since 1500* (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden GmbH, 1985). Robert Baum complicates this consensus somewhat with the claim that the Jola migration from Gabu is not certain and that it may have originated from a point farther south along the Upper Guinea Coast. See Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71–72. For more on the various types of rice agriculture across the broader region of West Africa, see Roland Portères, “Les Rizières de ruissellement en Casamance,” *Revue internationale de botanique appliquée et d’agriculture tropicale* 32, nos. 351–52 (January–February 1952): 34–37. For more on the links between environmental change and cultural change among the Jola of northwestern Guinea-Bissau, see Davidson, *Sacred Rice: An Ethnography of Identity, Environment, and Development in Rural West Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Davidson, “Of Rice and Men: Climate Change, Religion, and Personhood among the Diola of Guinea-Bissau,” *Journal of the Study of Nature, Religion, and Culture* 6, no. 3 (2012): 363–81; Davidson, “Basket Cases and Breadbaskets: Sacred Rice and Agricultural Development in Postcolonial Africa,” *Culture, Agriculture, Food & Environment* 34, no. 1 (2012): 15–32; and Davidson, “Cultivating Knowledge: Development, Dissemblance, and Discursive Contradictions among the Diola of Guinea-Bissau,” *American Ethnologist* 37, no. 2 (May 1, 2010): 212–26. For more on the link between climate change and the Casamance conflict, see Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*.

15. Robert M. Baum analyzes the few cases in which a woman personified the iconic Casamançais peasant, most famously in the case of Aline Sitoé Diatta, in Robert Baum, *West Africa’s Women of God: Alinesitoué and the Diola Prophetic Tradition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016).
16. Christian Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920* (Paris: Karthala, 1985), 99–103, 351–54.
17. For those interested in debates on the periodization of African history, see Richard Reid, “Past and Presentism: The ‘Precolonial’ and the Foreshortening of African History,” *Journal of African History* 52, no. 2 (July 2011): 135–55; Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*

- (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Mamadou Diouf, "Sortir de la parenthèse coloniale: Un défi fondateur pour les historiens africains," *Le Débat* 118, no. 1 (2002): 59–65; Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (December 1, 1994): 1516–45; John Lonsdale, Basil Davidson, and E. J. Hobsbawm, "States and Nations," *Journal of African History* 34, no. 1 (1993): 143–45; and John Lonsdale, "The Emergence of African Nations: A Historiographical Analysis," *African Affairs* 67, no. 266 (January 1, 1968): 11–28.
18. Louis-Vincent Thomas, "Les Diola d'antan: A propos des Diola 'traditionnels' de Basse-Casamance," in *Comprendre la Casamance: Chronique d'une intégration contrastée*, ed. François-George Barbier-Wiesser and Edgard Pisani (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 70, 74–77. Thomas was the first ethnographer of the Jola. The Jola "civilization of rice" was later analyzed in detail by Paul Pélissier. See Paul Pélissier, *Les paysans du Sénégal, les civilisations agraires du Cayor à la Casamance* (Saint-Yrieix, France: Imprimerie Fabrègue, 1966).
  19. Daniel Jatta, interview by author, Banjul, March 4, 2014.
  20. Rapport du Cdt de Cercle en réponse au télégramme-lettre no. 594 de M. l'Administrateur Supérieur, Papiers de Tété Diadihou, 1Z 0092, ANS.
  21. Baum, *West Africa's Women of God*, 27.
  22. Davidson, "We Work Hard," 130.
  23. Compte-Rendu, May 4, 1952, Papiers de Tété Diadihou, 1Z 0092, ANS; Olga F. Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production: The Jola of Casamance, Senegal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 23–27.
  24. Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*, 4–5.
  25. Linares explains how her argument brings together the analyses of Louis-Vincent Thomas, with his analysis of the metaphysical in Jola society, and Paul Pélissier, with his materialist analysis of Jola society. See Louis-Vincent Thomas, *Les Diola: Essai d'analyse fonctionnelle sur une population de Basse-Casamance*, Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire 55 (Dakar: Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 1958); and Pélissier, *Les paysans du Sénégal*.
  26. Nearly every informant with whom I spoke in the Casamance referred to the *kayendo*, considered a uniquely Jola instrument for rice cultivation—e.g., Daniel Jatta, interview by author, Banjul, March 4, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; MFDC Bignona, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014.
  27. Thomas, *Les Diola*, 43–44.
  28. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 29, 2014.
  29. Davidson, "We Work Hard," 125.
  30. Mandinka men typically do not contribute to rice cultivation, though their diet depends on rice. Instead, they farm peanuts and leave the rice production to the women. That is why "Mandinkization" has been tied to peanut cultivation. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Sindian Notables, group interview by author, Ziguinchor, Sindian, April 6, 2014; Nouha Cissé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 9,

- 2014; Abdoulaye Gassama, interview by author, Sindian, April 22, 2014; Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; Thomas, *Les Diola*; Péliissier, *Les Paysans du Sénégal*; Linares, *Power, Prayer and Production*, 172–203; Davidson, *Sacred Rice*.
31. Linares, *Power, Prayer and Production*, 17–23. Getting the brackish water out has become more of a concern with the increasing salinity of the Casamance River over the course of the past several decades, as discussed later in this chapter.
  32. Linares, 66–70; Davidson, “We Work Hard,” 125–26.
  33. Bassène, *Récits d'un conflit oublié*, 37.
  34. Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*, 65.
  35. Rapport du Cdt de Cercle en réponse au télégramme-lettre no. 594 de M. l'Administrateur Supérieur, May 26, 1922, and L'Administrateur du cercle de Ziguinchor à M. l'Administrateur Supérieur de la Casamance à Ziguinchor, May 27, 1922, Papiers de Tété Diadihou, 1Z 0092, ANS.
  36. For a discussion of the expansion of the family unit to the nation, see Anne McClintock, “Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family,” *Feminist Review*, no. 44 (July 1, 1993): 61–80.
  37. For a more detailed discussion of “space” and “place,” see the introduction of this book, which includes, among others, the work of Yi-fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Noel Castree, “Differential Geographies: Place, Indigenous Rights and ‘Local’ Resources,” *Political Geography* 23, no. 2 (February 2004): 133–67; Doreen B. Massey, *For Space* (London: SAGE, 2005); and Henri Lefebvre, *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*, ed. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
  38. There are distinct differences, however. For example, Mandinka men do not work in the rice fields; instead, they focus their labor on peanut production and leave rice production to the women. Nearly every oral informant I interviewed (out of 38 informants) confirmed this distinction. See, e.g., Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; village peasant in Fogny, interview by author, Niankite, April 3, 2014; Sindian Notables, group interview by author, Sindian, April 6, 2014.
  39. Jola refugee from Fogny, interview by author, Banjul, March 14, 2014.
  40. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014.
  41. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014.
  42. Nouha Cissé referred to the Casamance River as an *espace fédérateur*, a “federative space,” or a space that brought people from different parts of the Casamance together. See chap. 1 of this book. Nouha Cissé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014.
  43. Daniel Jatta, interview by author, Banjul, March 4, 2014.
  44. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 81–82. For other examples of precolonial and colonial West African societies where women played important political roles, see Judith A. Byfield, *The Great Upheaval: Women and Nation in Postwar*

- Nigeria* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2021); Nwando Achebe, *Female Monarchs and Merchant Queens in Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2020); Nwando Achebe, *The Female King of Colonial Nigeria: Ahebi Ugbabe*, ACLS Humanities E-book (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).
45. Byfield, *Great Upheaval*, 40, 45.
  46. Byfield, 83.
  47. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 6.
  48. Diamacoune often referred to the *nordistes* (northerners) as “strangers” and “invaders.” For examples, see Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, *Casamance: Pays du refus; Réponse à Monsieur Jacques Charpy* (Ziguinchor: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, 1995).
  49. Dominique Darbon, *L'administration et le paysan en Casamance: Essai d'anthropologie administrative* (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1988), 19. For more on the process of Mandinkization and the periodization starting with 1850, see Steven Thomson, “Revisiting ‘Mandingization’ in Coastal Gambia and Casamance (Senegal): Four Approaches to Ethnic Change,” *African Studies Review* 54, no. 2 (September 2011): 95–121; Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*; Péliissier, *Les Paysans du Sénégal*; and Thomas, *Les Diola*.
  50. On the process of Jola replacing the Bainouk in the Casamance, see chap. 1 of this book.
  51. Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*, 89. For more detail on the Mandinkization of the precolonial Middle Casamance, see Aly Dramé, “Migration, Marriage, and Ethnicity: The Early Development of Islam in Precolonial Middle Casamance,” in *New Perspectives on Islam in Senegal: Conversion, Migration, Wealth, Power, and Femininity*, ed. Mamadou Diouf and Mara A. Leichtman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 169–88.
  52. Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*, 58.
  53. Donald R. Wright, *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 139.
  54. Emmanuel Bertrand-Bocandé, *Carabane et Sédhiou: Des ressources que présentent dans leur état actuel les comptoirs français établis sur les bords de la Casamance*, *Moniteur du Sénégal*, no. 41 (1857), as cited in Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*, 43–44. For more on the history of West African rice cultivation, see Judith Ann Carney, *Black Rice: The African Origins of Rice Cultivation in the Americas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Edda L. Fields-Black, *Deep Roots: Rice Farmers in West Africa and the African Diaspora* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Walter Hawthorne, *Planting Rice and Harvesting Slaves: Transformations along the Guinea-Bissau Coast, 1400–1900* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003); and Davidson, *Sacred Rice*.
  55. Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*, 158.
  56. Darbon, *L'administration et le paysan en Casamance*, 200.
  57. Darbon, 201.

58. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 51.
59. Darbon, *L'administration et le paysan en Casamance*, 24.
60. Péliissier, *Les Paysans du Sénégal*, 799–800.
61. Peter Mark also notes this change and the subsequent regression for women's public participation. See Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 83.
62. Linares, *Power, Prayer, and Production*, 147.
63. On the reference to “paths of accommodation,” see David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
64. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 96; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Wolof man from the Oussouye area of the Casamance, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 12, 2014.
65. For more on the complex, ambiguous, and somewhat puzzling religious identity of the Casamance, according to the MFDC, see chap. 4 of this book.
66. Darbon notes, “Les groupements mandingue, bien que moins anarchiques que ceux de leurs voisins diola, ne sont pas comparables aux sociétés politiquement structurées de la zone nord. L'unité politique se situe ici au niveau de la communauté villageoise quasi autonome. En effet, même si historiquement l'ensemble des groupes mandingue a été unifié, la structure sociale de base reste le village.” Darbon, *L'administration et le paysan en Casamance*, 37.
67. See photo in Peter da Costa's article “Senegal: Casamance Quandary,” *Africa Report* (Paris), March 1, 1993, 59.
68. Affaires politiques et administratives: Casamance, 1914–1924, 11D1 0224, ANS.
69. Affaires politiques et administratives.
70. On land tenure during the colonial period in the Casamance, see “Rizières en litige,” 1922–1953, Papiers de Tété Diadhiou, 1Z 0092, ANS.
71. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 81–83.
72. Maturin Diatta Senghor (nephew of Aline Sitoé Diatta), interview by author, Kabrousse, March 2014.
73. Rapport politique annuel 1942, pp. 59–60, Colonie du Sénégal, 2G 42-01, ANS.
74. Rapport politique annuel, 60.
75. Rapport politique annuel, 61; and Abdoulaye Bamba Diallo, “Histoire Aline Sitoé: Mourir à Tomboctou,” *Magazine: Jeunesse, Culture et Loisirs*, (Dakar), 1983, 11, Casamance Conflit, ANS.
76. “Aline Sitoé décédée au Mali en 1944,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), October 11, 1983, 2, Casamance Conflit, ANS.
77. Diamacoune Senghor, “Message de la Reine Aline Sitoé Diatta,” in Bassène, *Labbé*, 129.
78. Diamacoune, 141.
79. For a comprehensive treatment of these prophetesses, see Baum, *West Africa's Women of God*.

80. Diamacoune, "Message," 142, 143.
81. Diallo, "Histoire Aline Sitoé," 11.
82. "Les faces cachées de l'histoire du Sénégal," *Sud-Weekend* (Dakar), March 20, 1999, 2, Casamance Conflit, ANS. *Sud-Weekend* is an independent daily focusing on news and issues from southern Senegal.
83. McClintock, "Family Feuds," 62.
84. For more on this student strike and the death of Idrissa Sagna, see chap. 4 of this book.
85. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*. On the subject of female nudity to compel political action in West Africa, see Naminata Diabate, "Re-imagining West African Women's Sexuality: Jean Pierre Bekolo's *Les Saignantes and the Mevoungou*," in *Development, Modernism, and Modernity in Africa*, ed. Augustine Augwuele (New York: Routledge, 2011), 166–81.
86. Seynabou Male Cissé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 11, 2014.
87. For Frederick Cooper's discussion of the colonial and postcolonial "gatekeeper state" in Africa, see Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5–6.
88. Christian Roche, *Le Sénégal à la conquête de son indépendance, 1939–1960: Chronique de la vie politique et syndicale, de l'Empire français à l'indépendance* (Paris: Karthala, 2001).
89. "Senegal Asks Aid for 4-Year Plan: \$400,000,000 Program Set—Premier Sees Johnson Today on Economy," *New York Times*, April 5, 1961, 3.
90. "Les Journées du Développement de la Région de Casamance," *Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar), February 8, 1961, 4; parenthetical comment in the original.
91. Hassane Dramé, "Organisations paysannes et dynamique de changement en milieu rural Casamançais (Sénégal)," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2005): 253–81.
92. Hassane Dramé, "Décentralisation et enjeux politiques: L'exemple du conflit casamançais (Sénégal)," *Bulletin de l'APAD* 16 (1998), para. 22, <http://apad.revues.org/538>. An article recently published by Séverine Awenengo Dalberto complicates this interpretation. See Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, "Hidden Debates over the Status of the Casamance during the Decolonization Process in Senegal: Regionalism, Territorialism, and Federalism at a Crossroads, 1946–62," *Journal of African History* 61, no. 1 (March 2020): 67–88.
93. For more on the *indigénat* and the Four Communes, see, in addition to chap. 4 of this book, Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); and Roche, *Le Sénégal*.
94. MFDC, "'La voix de la Casamance' . . . une parole diola," ed. Dominique Darbon, *Politique Africaine* 18 (1985): 134.
95. MFDC, 125.
96. Email communication with Mamadou "Nkrumah" Sané, May 16, 2023.
97. Emile Badiane dossier, Personnalités, ANS.

98. Makhily Gassama, ed., *Emile Badiane: Le paysan, l'éducateur, l'homme d'état* (Dakar: Abis Editions, 2013).
99. MFDC, "La voix de la Casamance," 133.
100. MFDC, 134.
101. For more on Dia's alleged attempted "coup," see Adama Baytir Diop, *Le Sénégal à l'heure de l'indépendance: Le projet politique de Mamadou Dia (1957-1962)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007); Magatte Lô, *Sénégal: L'heure du choix* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1986); Jean-Luc Martineau, "Mamadou Dia, Léopold Sédar Senghor: La rupture du 17 décembre 1962" (master's thesis, Bordeaux 3, 1987).
102. Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*, 7.
103. Rapport de J. Malbrancque sur la Casamance: Nécessité et avantage de son autonomie, p. 1, 1Z 0096, ANS.
104. This moral economy was based on "the subjective criteria of equity and exploitation, honour and shame, identity and alienation on which people act, if within strong structural constraints." See Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London: Currey, 1991), 9.
105. Rapport du Cdt de Cercle en réponse au télégramme-lettre no. 594 de M. l'Administrateur Supérieur, May 26, 1922, Papiers de Tété Diadiou, 1Z 0092, ANS.
106. Davidson, "We Work Hard."
107. On the "confusing" aspect of Senegalese land tenure law, see Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 184-92.
108. Ansoumana Abba Bodian to commander of the Gendarmerie Nationale of Ziguinchor regarding "problème des emmurés vivants de Kadior, Ziguinchor, Casamance," March 25, 1976, private archive of Ansoumana Abba Bodian.
109. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 70.
110. On the MFDC equating the French and Senegalese as "colonizers" in the Casamance, see the MFDC document "La voix de la Casamance," esp. the section titled "Le colonialisme Sénégalais," 130-31.
111. Jola expatriate from Fogny living in The Gambia, interview by author, Banjul, March 14, 2014.
112. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 6. Diamacoune likely employed the term *inalienable*, which is the same word in English and French, from Thomas Jefferson's "Declaration of Independence," to assert a degree of similitude to the cause of the American patriots.
113. Diamacoune, 21.
114. Diamacoune, 7, 10-13, 17, 23, 35, 37, 38.
115. MFDC, "La voix de la Casamance," 130.
116. On the distinction between "the modern MFDC" or "the contemporary MFDC" and "the historic MFDC" or "the original MFDC" of the late 1940s and early 1950s, see chap. 3 of this book.

117. MFDC, “La voix de la Casamance,” 134.
118. “Senegal Receives Chinese-Built Dam,” *Xinhua* (Beijing), October 22, 1988.
119. “Senegal Receives Chinese-Built Dam.”
120. “Barrage d’Affiniam: Enjeux et Perspectives,” June 2013, p. 1, professional archive of Bilaly Keita, director of the dam of Affiniam.
121. The twentieth century was not the first century to display links between climate change and the activities of West Africans. See George E. Brooks, “Western Africa, c. 1630–1860: An Era of Droughts, Famines, Warfare, and Slaving,” chap. 5 in *Western Africa to c. 1860 A.D.: A Provisional Historical Schema Based on Climate Periods* (Bloomington: African Studies Center, University of Indiana, 1985). For more on climate change and the cultural identity of the Jola in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, see the works of Joanna Davidson cited previously in this chapter.
122. Abdoulatif Diop, *Bocandé: L'éternelle légende* (Dakar: Fama Editions, 2012), 25.
123. Davidson, “We Work Hard,” 120.
124. Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; senior MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014; Youssouph Coly, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014; Landing Diédhiou and Siaka Diédhiou, interview by author, M’lomp, April 23, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014.
125. Peter da Costa, “Casamance under Siege,” *West Africa* (London), January 28–February 3, 1991, 100–102.
126. Lolo Badji (president of the Association of the Parents of the Students of Affiniam), interview by André Badji, Affiniam, October 10, 2014.
127. Pirogue operators, group interview by André Badji, Affiniam, October 10, 2014. A *pirogue* is a kind of dugout canoe used for water transportation across the Senegambian region.
128. “Chinese Technicians Expected Soon,” translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, originally published in *Le Soleil* (Dakar), March 16, 1974, 3.
129. Da Costa, “Casamance under Siege,” 102.
130. In addition to numerous press accounts referring to the current status of the conflict by this phrase, see Jean-Claude Marut, “A l’Ouest, quoi de nouveau? Les obstacles à la paix en Casamance,” *Les cahiers d’Outre-Mer* 64, no. 255 (2011): 363–76; Vincent Foucher, “On the Matter (and Materiality) of the Nation: Interpreting Casamance’s Unresolved Separatist Struggle,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (2011): 82–103; and Martin Evans, “‘The Suffering Is Too Great’: Urban Internally Displaced Persons in the Casamance Conflict, Senegal,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 1 (2007): 60–85.
131. “Seynabou Male Cissé: Mobilizing Women to Make Peace,” 30 at 30 collection, American Jewish World Service, accessed February 10, 2016, <https://ajwsw.org/stories/seynabou-male-cisse/>.

132. Seynabou Male Cissé, letter to the government of Senegal and the MFDC from Le comité des femmes pour la paix en Casamance, date unknown, Archives du Diocèse de Ziguinchor.
133. Seynabou Male Cissé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 11, 2014.
134. *Yassa poisson* is fish yassa. Yassa sauce is a lemon, mustard, and spice-based sauce with sautéed onions. It is a favorite dish all over Senegal, especially in the Casamance. Thus, sometimes it is referred to as “Jola poisson.”

### CHAPTER 3: THE FOREST

Epigraph: Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Joola de Casamance* (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 197. According to Diatta, this proverb alludes to the suffering men experience during initiation in the sacred forest. In the old days, the men to be initiated had no idea what was going to happen to them before the initiation began. Thus, the young men were eager to go into the sacred forest. If they had known of the ordeal they would endure in the sacred forest, few of them would have been eager for the initiation: few would volunteer to do it. As for the women, few of them would have become wives and mothers if they knew the pain that they would endure.

1. According to Paul Diédhiou, there are questions about the authenticity of this “sacred forest,” as there may not have been a fetish, or spirit shrine, to go with it until the December 1982 separatist meeting, i.e., separatism appears to have produced the shrine, not the other way around. As such, this “sacred forest” serves as an example of how Casamançais nationalists constructed “place” to suit their needs. See Paul Diédhiou, *L'identité joola en question: La bataille idéologique du MFDC pour l'indépendance* (Paris: Karthala, 2011), 317–27.
2. Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; senior MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014. On Senegalese security forces infiltrating and threatening separatist meetings in Ziguinchor in the early 1980s, see chap. 5 of this book.
3. Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014.
4. Various MFDC testimonies, “Part II: La naissance d'Atika,” in René Capain Bassène, *Casamance: Récits d'un conflit oublié (1982–2014)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2015), 79–94.
5. Jean Girard, *Genèse du pouvoir charismatique en Basse Casamance (Sénégal)* (Dakar: Institut fondamental d'Afrique noire, 1969), 89–105.
6. Christian Roche's *Histoire de la Casamance* became popular with the Casamançais nationalist elite. See Christian Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920* (Paris: Karthala, 1985); Peter Geschiere and Jos van der Klei, “La relation état-paysans et ses ambivalences: Modes populaires d'action politique chez les Maka (Cameroun) et les Diola (Casamance),” in *L'Etat contemporain en Afrique*, ed. Emmanuel Terray (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), 297–340; Vincent Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims: Education, Migration and the Birth of Casamançais Nationalism (Senegal)” (PhD diss., School of

- Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002), 231; Bertrand Diamacone, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014.
7. A former senior Senegalese government official, who was also a Jola from the Lower Casamance, said that to understand the separatist movement, “one must understand what takes place in the Sacred Forest.” Interview by author, Bignona, April 2006.
  8. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
  9. Thaddeus Sunseri, “World War II and the Transformation of the Tanzanian Forests,” in *Africa and World War II*, ed. Judith A. Byfield et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 240.
  10. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 2. For more on state “fixing,” see Raymond B. Craib, *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
  11. I place the words *secure* and *pacify* in quotation marks here because the colonial conquest was not very secure or peaceful for those being pacified. For a few Senegambian examples, see Martin A. Klein, *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum, 1847–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), chap. 7; Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*; David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), chap. 3; and in the Algerian context, Benjamin Claude Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). On European colonizers “creating” the Casamance, see chap. 1 of this book.
  12. For more on the need for colonial order, see Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
  13. Louis-Vincent Thomas, *Les Diola: Essai d’analyse fonctionnelle sur une population de Basse-Casamance*, Mémoires de l’Institut Français d’Afrique Noire 55 (Dakar: Institut Français d’Afrique Noire, 1958), 21; emphasis in original.
  14. In addition to chap. 4 of this book, see Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*.
  15. Sunseri, “Transformation of the Tanzanian Forests,” 240.
  16. Sunseri, 240.
  17. Note au sujet de la réorganisation du service de l’Agriculture au Sénégal, Note #280, December 15, 1927, Correspondance divers 1922–1944, 10D4 0018, Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar (hereafter ANS).
  18. Affaires économiques—rapports forestiers, 11D1 0360, ANS; see, e.g., “Inspection forestière de Casamance,” Rapport Annuel 1943, signed by Inspecteur Adjoint des Eaux, Forêts et Chasses and Chef de l’Inspection forestière de la Casamance, Pierre Grosmaire; and note dated April 16, 1960, from Grosmaire to the Ministre de l’Economie Rurale et la Coopération on the subject of “Caoutchouc de Lianes de Casamance.”
  19. “Développement de la Casamance, lié à son autonomie,” rapport de J. Malbranque sur la Casamance, p. 19, 1Z 0096, ANS.

20. The word *exploitation* can take on a sinister moral value, but I do not use it here to suggest a moral value to this process but rather to show that the goal of classifying and preserving land was to benefit businesses in France. I also use it because that is the term colonial officials used. It is not my term; it was their term. For example, see “Inspection forestière de Casamance,” Rapport Annuel 1942 and Rapport Annuel 1953, as well as a memorandum dated March 16, 1937, from the governor of Senegal to the administrateur supérieur de la Casamance et al. concerning “Réglementation forestière,” Affaires économiques—rapports forestiers, 11D1 0360, ANS.
21. James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), x. Many other scholars of the Casamance have noted the acephalous nature or the absence of states in precolonial Jola society. See Peter Mark, *A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance since 1500* (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden GmbH, 1985); Robert Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
22. Scott, *Art of Not Being Governed*, x, xi.
23. See the sections on climate change and the Affiniam dam in chaps. 1 and 2 of this book.
24. Daniel Jatta, interview by author, Banjul, March 4, 2014.
25. Affaires économiques—rapports forestiers, 11D1 0360, ANS.
26. Affaires économiques—rapports forestiers, 11D1 0360, ANS.
27. Le Gouverneur des Colonies to Monsieur l’Administrateur Supérieur de la Casamance et al. on the subject of “Mesures à prendre en vue de prévenir le déboisement du Sénégal,” circulaire, May 23, 1935, Affaires économiques—rapports forestiers, 11D1 0360, ANS.
28. Gouverneur General de l’A.O.F. to Monsieur le Gouverneur des Colonies du Groupe regarding “Responsabilité pénale des collectivités indigènes en matière forestière,” circulaire, August 31, 1938, Affaires économiques—rapports forestiers, 11D1 0360, ANS.
29. Gouverneur General de l’A.O.F. to Monsieur le Gouverneur des Colonies du Groupe.
30. Rapport Annuel 1942, Affaires économiques—rapports forestiers, 11D1 0360, ANS.
31. Rapport Annuel 1942. Grosmaire refers to the forest covering seven-tenths of the surface in the “country” of the Casamance, not Senegal overall.
32. For more on these intense debates that produced the nation-states of West and Central Africa, as well as Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, see Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial*

- Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Christian Roche, *Le Sénégal à la conquête de son indépendance, 1939–1960: Chronique de la vie politique et syndicale, de l'Empire français à l'indépendance* (Paris: Karthala, 2001); and Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
33. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York: Times Books, 1992), chap. 6 and chap. 7, esp. pp. 162–63.
  34. Séverine Awenengo Dalberto's dissertation focused on these events in this time period, and her 2020 article in *The Journal of African History* adds important detail and context to this claim. See Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, "Les Joola, la Casamance et l'État (1890–2004): L'identisation joola au Sénégal" (PhD diss., Université Paris, Denis Diderot—Paris VII, 2007); and Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, "Hidden Debates over the Status of the Casamance during the Decolonization Process in Senegal: Regionalism, Territorialism, and Federalism at a Crossroads, 1946–62," *Journal of African History* 61, no. 1 (March 2020): 67–88.
  35. I thank Jacob Krell for this reference to the French belief in technocracy in the period following the Second World War, especially after the events of May 1968 in the streets of Paris. For more on the history of technocracy in France, see Richard F. Kuisel, *Ernest Mercier: French Technocrat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
  36. Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, introduction and chap. 8.
  37. Circulaire No. 337 à Tous les Responsables des Centres Régionaux d'Information, Objet: Arbre de l'Indépendance, June 14, 1960, Ministère de l'Information de la Radiodiffusion, 11D1 0360, ANS.
  38. Circulaire No. 3910 Le Ministre de l'Economie Rurale et de la Coopération aux Gouverneurs, Chefs de Région, Commandants de Cercle, et Les Maires, Objet: Semaines Forestières, June 10, 1960, pp. 1–2, 11D1 0360, ANS.
  39. Report from G. de Santerre, le Commandant de Cercle de Ziguinchor, to le Ministre de l'Enseignement Technique, June 22, 1960, 11D1 0360, ANS.
  40. No. 3910, June 10, 1960, p. 1, 11D1 0360, ANS.
  41. On the "imperial gaze," see chap. 1 of this book.
  42. "Classement et Déclassement du Domaine Forestier," circulaire, June 16, 1960, Le Ministre de l'Economie Rurale et de la Coopération aux Gouverneurs, p. 1, 11D1 0360, ANS.
  43. "Classement et Déclassement du Domaine Forestier," p. 2; emphasis mine.
  44. "Classement et Déclassement du Domaine Forestier," pp. 2–3; all ellipses in this quotation are in the original.
  45. On the "fragments" of the nation, see Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

46. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*. Mark confirms what Robert Harms had claimed: that the African rubber market crashed following the entry into the world market of rubber plantations in South America and Southeast Asia. See Robert W. Harms, *Games against Nature: An Eco-cultural History of the Nunu of Equatorial Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 181–84; Sunseri, “Transformation of the Tanzanian Forests,” 249; and J. Forbes Munro, “British Rubber Companies in East Africa before the First World War,” *Journal of African History* 24 (1983): 369–79.
47. See, e.g., the arguments of Jules Florent Malbranque in “Développement de la Casamance,” esp. pp. 4–5.
48. “Caoutchouc de Lianes de Casamance,” April 16, 1960, p. 1, 11D1 0360, ANS.
49. Firestone Rubber Corporation of Akron, Ohio, extracted rubber from the forests of Liberia. See Adell Patton, “Civil Rights in America’s African Diaspora: Firestone Rubber and Segregation in Liberia,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 49, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 319–38.
50. One must remember, however, that Senegal at the time was part of Vichy France. Thus, Grosmaire’s argument appears to crumble. I thank Peter Mark for this insight.
51. CFA stands for Communauté Financière Africaine, a currency guaranteed by the French franc that was introduced in French Equatorial Africa and French West Africa during the colonial era and continues to be used by the independent Francophone countries. Representatives at the Bretton Woods Conference created the CFA franc on December 26, 1945, “to cushion the colonies from a strong devaluation of the *franc*.” For more details, see “A Brief History of the CFA Franc,” *African Business Magazine* (London), February 19, 2012, <http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/uncategorised/a-brief-history-of-the-cfa-franc/>.
52. “Caoutchouc de Lianes de Casamance,” p. 2.
53. “Caoutchouc de Lianes de Casamance,” p. 3; emphasis in the original. Also Ministre de l’Economie Rurale et de la Coopération du Sénégal to the Directeur de la Société BATA, April 27, 1960, Objet: Commercialisation du Caoutchouc de Casamance, 11D1 0360, ANS.
54. Emmanuel Kreike notes that “colonial conservation measures—for example, establishing national parks and forest and game reserves—sought not only to remove people from an environment but also to safeguard conservation areas from human encroachment.” Kreike, *Re-creating Eden: Land Use, Environment, and Society in Southern Angola and Northern Namibia* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004), 1. For more on colonial attempts to exclude human beings—especially indigenous human beings—from particular environmental spaces, see Jane Carruthers, *The Kruger National Park: A Social and Political History* (Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: University of Natal Press, 1995); Richard Grove, “Colonial Conservation, Ecological Hegemony, and Popular Resistance: Toward a Global Synthesis,” in *Imperialism and the Natural World*, ed. John M. MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University

- Press, 1990), 15–50; John M. MacKenzie, *The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation, and British Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); and Roderick P. Neumann, *Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). For a similar argument in relation to indigenous people in North America, see Karl S. Hele, ed., *The Nature of Empires and the Empires of Nature: Indigenous Peoples and the Great Lakes Environment* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2013).
55. “Classement et Déclassement du Domaine Forestier,” p. 3.
  56. Göran Hydén argued that the failure of postcolonial African states to “capture” their peasantry led to cracks in national social cohesion and consequently to weakened state structures. Hydén, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
  57. “Classement et Déclassement du Domaine Forestier,” pp. 6, 8.
  58. William Fox, *A Brief History of the Wesleyan Missions on the Western Coast of Africa* (London: Aylott and Jones; J. Mason, 1851). On the discourse surrounding the “evolution” needed for people from the indigénat to assume the rights and responsibilities of citizens, see Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, chap. 1.
  59. Prosper Michel Akanni, “Racisme et régionalisme: Sont à extirper de l’Afrique Noire,” *Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar), January 25, 1961, 1, 9.
  60. “Classement et Déclassement du Domaine Forestier,” pp. 8, 10.
  61. As noted in chap. 2, *Quatre Communes* is translated from French into the “Four Coummunes”: Dakar, Saint-Louis, Rufisque, and Gorée. Alioune Badara M’Bengue, “Le B.D.S. et les régions déshéritées,” *La Condition Humaine: Organe central du Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (Dakar), December 30, 1955, 1, 3–4; Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, chap. 1.
  62. Mamadou Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal: Le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries* (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 2001).
  63. For a discussion of what I mean by *mapping* and *counter-mapping*, see the introduction to this book.
  64. Ferdinand de Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity: Power and Secrecy in Casamance, Senegal* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 34.
  65. “Casamance Independence Demanded, Reaction,” *Sud Hebdo* (Ziguinchor), February 1, 1990.
  66. Interview with Diamacoune, *Sud Hebdo*, February 1, 1990.
  67. Mamadou Nkrumah Sané et al., *Casamance Kunda: Ce que nous attendons de la Casamance indépendante* (Lyon, France: Editions artisanales C. de Ramaix, 1995), 42.
  68. Sané et al., *Casamance Kunda*, 53. Sané et al. wrote: “The existence and the relatively large number of ‘sacred’ forests and places, beyond the mystical character attributed to them, play an important role in protecting the environment in the Casamance. Our country, once independent, will have

- to ensure, by law or regulation, a quality of life founded on a development policy integrating, in a harmonious fashion, an ecological dimension we learned, of course, from the Ancestors but also conforming to the commitments we intend to make to the International Community.” *Casamance Kunda*, 53.
69. De Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*, 8.
  70. De Jong, 3–4.
  71. On the process of colonial border-making between Senegal and the Gambia, see Paul Nugent, “Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands: Refuge, Settlement and Islam from c. 1880 to the Present,” *Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 221–43.
  72. On the gendered “fatherland,” see Léopold Sédar Senghor, *Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism* (Paris: Présence africaine, 1962), 23. *La verte Casamance* means “the green Casamance.” It is a common expression in the Casamance to distinguish the green landscape of the Casamance from the rest of Senegal.
  73. Jeremy Foster illustrates the power of this move in the South African colonial context. See Jeremy Foster, *Washed with Sun: Landscape and the Making of White South Africa* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).
  74. Diamacoune, as quoted by Mamadou Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC and the Struggle for Independence in Casamance,” trans. Jonathan M. Sears, in *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, ed. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: J. Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 223. See Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, *Casamance: Pays du refus; Réponse à Monsieur Jacques Charpy* (Ziguinchor: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, 1995), 62.
  75. Diamacoune needed these three primary ethnic groups to patch together La Grande Casamance “from the Atlantic to the Falémé.” See Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, multiple references, starting with p. 2; Jean-Claude Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 40.
  76. On the “fragments of the nation,” see Chatterjee, *Nation and Its Fragments*.
  77. See, e.g., Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 2–3.
  78. Diamacoune, as quoted by Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal,” 223.
  79. For a good discussion of the relationship between the local and the global (which makes nationalism possible) in Casamançais religious ritual, see de Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*, 14–16.
  80. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 62.
  81. Robert Baum, Jean-Claude Marut, and Vincent Foucher have done excellent work on the role of the Catholic Church and Casamançais identity. In his doctoral thesis, Marut shows how the Catholic Diocese of Ziguinchor contributed to Diamacoune’s geography of the Casamance “from the Atlantic to the Falémé.” See Marut, “La question de Casamance (Sénégal):

- Une analyse géopolitique” (PhD diss., Université de Paris 8, 1999); Robert M. Baum, “The Emergence of a Diola Christianity,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 60, no. 3 (1990): 370–98; and Vincent Foucher, “Church and Nation: The Catholic Contribution to War and Peace in Casamance (Senegal),” *Le fait missionnaire: Missions et sciences sociales* 13 (2003): 11–40.
82. Thomas Hodgkin notes that religious leaders were particularly well-suited to lead nationalist movements: “The prophets have awakened men’s minds to the fact that change can occur; and the ablest of them, like their European prototypes, have shown themselves wholly capable of constructing a myth, a literature and an organisation.” Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York: New York University Press, 1957), 114.
  83. On the awasena path of Jola traditional religion, see Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, 36; and Robert M. Baum, *West Africa’s Women of God: Aline-sitoué and the Diola Prophetic Tradition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 3.
  84. I am not asserting an innate quality of Protestantism here. Rather, I refer to the earlier vernacularization of the liturgical language as a result of the Reformation and the consequent Protestant tradition of scriptural exegesis allowing adherents of the faith to read, question, interpret, and test scripture and church dogma on their own.
  85. On the role of print-capitalism in imagining nations via vernacular languages, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), esp. chap. 3: “The Origins of National Consciousness.”
  86. For examples of African nationalists who used nonwritten means of “imagining the nation,” see Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Marissa J. Moorman, *Intonations: A Social History of Music and Nation in Luanda, Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008); and Marissa J. Moorman, *Powerful Frequencies: Radio, State Power, and the Cold War in Angola, 1931–2002*, illustrated ed. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019).
  87. Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939–1958* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005), 3; and Kelly M. Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
  88. Daniel R. Magaziner, *The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968–1977* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010).
  89. De Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*, 7.
  90. On this point, among others, see Peter Mark, *The Wild Bull and the Sacred Forest: Form, Meaning, and Change in Senegambian Initiation Masks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*; and Sandra E. Greene, *Sacred Sites and the Colonial Encounter: A History*

*of Meaning and Memory in Ghana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

91. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London: Currey, 1991), 270.
92. On the inability of Islam and Christianity to sweep away traditional religions in the Casamance, see Baum, “Emergence of a Diola Christianity,” 370.
93. For a recent analysis of the religious identities of the Casamance conflict, see Robert Baum, “Religious Roots of the Casamance Conflict and Finding a Path towards Its Resolution,” *Cadernos de estudos africanos*, no. 42 (May 25, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.4000/cea.6673>.
94. Vincent Foucher, “La guerre des dieux? Religions et séparatisme en Basse Casamance,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2005): 364.
95. Foucher, “Church and Nation,” 33.
96. Foucher, “Church and Nation,” 13–19.
97. These divisions became apparent during the 1955 visit of Lamine Guèye to the area around Bignona during the election campaign for the Territorial Assembly. See Affaires politiques—incidents politiques sanglants du 23 janvier 1955 sur la route de Bignona—Conséquence politique guérilla SFIO-BDS, 11D1/0188, ANS; and chap. 4 of this book.
98. Foucher, “La guerre des dieux,” 372; Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 59–60.
99. See Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 6–7.
100. Foucher, “La guerre des dieux,” 370.
101. Baum, “Emergence of a Diola Christianity,” 374.
102. Baum, 374.
103. MFDC partisan, personal testimony, in Bassène, *Récits d'un conflit oublié*, 51.
104. E.g., Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, 36; Baum, *West Africa's Women of God*, 3.
105. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014.
106. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014.
107. De Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*, 74.
108. On the difference between the internal “jihad of the *nafs*” and the external jihad “of the sword” in the colonial Senegalese context, see Cheikh Anta Mbacké Babou, *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 4–5.
109. The Second Vatican Council, convened by Pope John XXIII in 1962 and running until 1965, became known for liberalizing and modernizing the Catholic religion, e.g., authorizing the conduct of Mass in vernacular languages instead of Latin. For its influence on Casamançais nationalism, see Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 60, 95. For its influence on other African nationalisms, see Magaziner, *Law and the Prophets*, 81, 83–84.
110. Mary Lonbe, “Palabres avec le Greffier No. 8: Non! Ma religion ne me désafricanise pas!,” *Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar), January 4, 1961. In 1961, Le Greffier (“the Clerk”), Mary Lonbe, published a series of interviews with young Senegalese men in *Afrique Nouvelle*, an “Hebdomadaire de l’Afrique

- francophone” and a publication favorable to the church, on the meaning of independence. This was one article in the series.
111. “Assimilate! Don’t be assimilated!” In other words, Africans needed to assimilate on their own terms and in their own interests . . . not those of the colonizer.
  112. Senghor, *Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism*, 107.
  113. Foucher, “Church and Nation,” 24.
  114. Foucher, 24–27.
  115. Chatterjee, *Nation and Its Fragments*, 5.
  116. On “traditional religion,” see Michael Lambert, “Violence and the War of Words: Ethnicity v. Nationalism in the Casamance,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 68, no. 4 (1998): 585–602; and Foucher, “Church and Nation.”
  117. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*; Mark, *Wild Bull*; Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*; Baum, *West Africa’s Women of God*; de Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*. Joanna Davidson has made the most recent contribution to this literature with her book on religion and rice among the Jola of Guinea-Bissau. See Joanna Davidson, *Sacred Rice: An Ethnography of Identity, Environment, and Development in Rural West Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
  118. De Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*, 34. For a literary example of sacred beliefs related to silkcotton trees from another part of West Africa, see Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (New York: Anchor Books, 1994), chap. 6.
  119. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 79–80. Mark’s description of spirit shrines in the Buluf area of the Casamance is in line with the author’s own observations of spirit shrines in the Fogny and Kassa areas. Again, the key is not their uniformity but rather the diversity of the forms these shrines take.
  120. Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, 36; Baum, *West Africa’s Women of God*, 3.
  121. Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, 71, 73. Lacking clues from a *griot* tradition like that of the Mandinka, Casamançists appear divided over whether the Jola migrated into the Lower Casamance from the Upper Guinea Coast to the south or from the kingdom of Gabu, a Mande province to the southeast, generally the eastern part of modern Guinea-Bissau. See Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*, 30–32; Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 31; and Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, 71–72.
  122. E.g., the Jola spoken in Fogny (generally north of Bignona) is hardly intelligible to the Jola spoken in Casa (generally west of Ziguinchor), 30 to 40 miles (48 to 64 kilometers) to the southwest. The historical trend has been toward greater unity of language groups in the region, away from a history of greater linguistic diversity. Thus, one can surmise that if Jola from Fogny and Casa find it difficult to communicate now, they probably did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well. Peasant woman working as cook/maid, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 10, 2014. See also Thomas’s foreword to Mark, *Wild Bull*, ix: “One cannot speak of the Jola except

in the plural. . . . Each [group] has appreciable sociocultural and linguistic differences, as well as obvious antagonisms. But all of them, conscious of belonging to a common group, know how to close ranks and present a unified front to foreign aggressors.”

123. Alice Manga, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 18, 2014; Ousmane Karifa Diatta, interview by author, Diembereng, April 5, 2014; and two anonymous informants, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 21, 2014. Other scholars have compiled the details on these ceremonies. I am more concerned with the ways separatists used these ceremonies to construct a monolithic version of the Sacred Forest to which all Casamançais could relate.
124. Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade*, 101–3.
125. Daniel Jatta, interview by author, Banjul, March 4, 2014; Jola refugee in The Gambia, personal interview, March 14, 2014, Banjul; Bertrand Diamacoune, personal interview, April 4, 2014, Kande; The Notables of Sindian, group interview, April 6, 2014, Sindian; Maturin Diatta Senghor, personal interview, April 11, 2014, Kabrousse; Ansoumana Abba Bodian, personal interview, April 19, 2014.
126. Mark, *Wild Bull*, 55.
127. Louis-Vincent Thomas, “Bukut chez les Diola-Niomoun,” *Notes africaines* 108 (October 1965): 97. Peter Mark describes the same ceremony—same place and same time—in *Wild Bull*, 36–37.
128. Mark, *Wild Bull*, 3–4, 149.
129. Mark, *Wild Bull*; de Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*.
130. Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*, 80.
131. Ousmane Karifa Diatta, interview by author, Diembereng, April 5, 2014. To be clear, the French also recruited Senegalese men to fight in the First World War as well as in colonial wars all over the French Empire, such as Algeria and Vietnam. But Jola women did not establish their own sacred forests until the 1940s. See de Jong, *Masquerades of Modernity*, 47.
132. Baum, *West Africa's Women of God*, 12–15.
133. On the inability of Jola men to stop the colonial conquest, see Baum, *West Africa's Women of God*, 60: “Male elders and priests of war shrines, and shrines associated with township or quarter associations proved unable to contain or repel the foreign presence.”
134. Seynabou Male Cissé, letter to Government of Senegal and the MFDC from Le comité des femmes pour la paix en Casamance, date unknown, Archives du Diocèse de Ziguinchor.

#### CHAPTER 4: THE SCHOOL

Epigraph: Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance* (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 89–90. Thanks to Sean Lee and Olivier Schouteden for help in translating this proverb from the French. The proverb suggests that if a child has been rejected, one cannot blame him or her for bad behavior.

1. A *boubou* is an outfit—typically consisting of pants and a long tunic—often worn by Senegalese (and other West Africans) of both genders, though women may wear a wraparound skirt instead of the pants.
2. Liste des proviseurs, Archives du Lycée Djignabo, Ziguinchor. Sow is typically a Wolof family name in Senegal. Casamançais commonly referred to people from northern Senegal by the French term *les nordistes*, i.e., “the northerners.” Sow served as the principal of Djignabo from 1977 to 1980.
3. The international financial institutions made the crisis more acute by imposing new structural adjustment policies in the mid-1970s. See Jean-Claude Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 87–91.
4. This narrative of events surrounding the 1980 student strike at Lycée Djignabo and the death of Idrissa Sagna is taken from Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, *Casamance: Pays du refus; Réponse à Monsieur Jacques Charpy* (Ziguinchor: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, 1995), 42; Vincent Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims: Education, Migration and the Birth of Casamançais Nationalism (Senegal)” (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002), 271–73; Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, “Les Joola, la Casamance et l’État (1890–2004): L’identification joola au Sénégal” (PhD diss., Université Paris, Denis Diderot—Paris VII, 2007), 356–59; and Odile Journet, “Demain, les femmes? Son fagot de bois a casse la veranda de la maison,” in *Comprendre la Casamance: Chronique d’une intégration contrastée*, ed. François-George Barbier-Wiesser and Edgard Pisani (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 339–40.
5. The student strike was caught up in larger politics involving the entrenched mayor of Ziguinchor, a Toucouleur named Mamadou Abdoulaye Sy, against the leftist teachers’ union sympathetic to the striking students. Three teachers and union members were abducted and beaten by “adversaries of the strike,” most likely men sent by the mayor. Among the teachers abducted was Nouha Cissé, who later became the principal of Lycée Djignabo and the president of the soccer club Casa-Sports. See Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” 271–73.
6. Father Diamacoune often referred to this discourse of betrayal as the “*phénomène de rejet du Sénégalais*” (phenomenon of rejection from the Senegalese), e.g., Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 17.
7. Bertrand Diamacoune said, “Sometimes, if the Southerners [i.e., Casamançais] win, [the Senegalese] make rectification by manipulating things so that the Southerners lose.” Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014.
8. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 27.
9. Diamacoune, 27, 42.
10. Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” 271–73.
11. Awenengo Dalberto, “Les Joola, la Casamance et l’Etat,” 407.
12. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 42.

13. No one was ever charged or prosecuted for Diatta's death, officially ruled as a suicide. Diamacoune claimed that French intelligence agents killed Diatta to begin the attrition of MFDC leadership, later fulfilled by the deaths of Emile Badiane and Ibou Diallo in the early 1970s. See Awenengo Dalberto, "Les Joola, la Casamance et l'État," 407; and Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, "Hidden Debates over the Status of the Casamance during the Decolonization Process in Senegal: Regionalism, Territorialism, and Federalism at a Crossroads, 1946–62," *Journal of African History* 61, no. 1 (March 2020): 67–88.
14. French colonial officials dubbed the class of men who benefited from colonial education and spoke French "*les évolués*" (the evolved). I join other scholars of the Casamance in referring to the 1949–1954 MFDC as the "historic MFDC" or "original MFDC" and the MFDC begun by Mamadou "Nkrumah" Sané in 1982 as the "modern MFDC" or "contemporary MFDC." Further discussion of the choice of this name occurs later in the chapter.
15. I thank Mike Reimer for bringing my attention to the concept of historical "articulation." See Stuart Hall, "On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall," ed. Lawrence Grossberg, *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10, no. 2 (1986): 53. On "leapfrogging legacies" in colonial history, Frederick Cooper writes that leapfrogging involves "claiming that something at time A caused something in time C without considering time B, which lies in between." See Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 17–18.
16. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," esp. chap. 2 and chap. 3.
17. For what I mean by "space-place," see the introduction and chap. 5 of this book.
18. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006); Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2001); Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims"; Rachel Kantrowitz, "So That Tomorrow Would Be Better for Us: Developing French-Funded Catholic Schools in Dahomey and Senegal, 1946–1975" (PhD diss., New York University, 2015); Martha Wilfahrt, "The Historic Origins of Public Goods: Local Distributional Politics in Rural West Africa, 1880–Present" (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2015); Kelly M. Duke Bryant, *Education as Politics: Colonial Schooling and Political Debate in Senegal, 1850s–1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015); Heather J. Sharkey, *Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
19. Céline Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance: Rythmes et logiques (1860–1960)" (PhD diss., Université de Paris, Denis Diderot—Paris VII 2008), 46.

20. Labrune-Badiane, 47.
21. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 36, 98–101.
22. Pierre Englebert, *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 156–60.
23. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims."
24. As explained earlier in this book, the Islamo-Wolof model meant a national identity based on Islam and Wolof (an ethnic group found primarily in northern Senegal) ethnicity. See Mamadou Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal: Le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries* (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 2001).
25. In addition to Labrune-Badiane and Foucher, see Awenengo Dalberto, "Les Joola, la Casamance et l'État"; Elizabeth Ann Foster, *Faith in Empire: Religion, Politics, and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880–1940* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); and Lacy Ferrell, "Building for Students: School Design and Educational Priorities in Colonial Ghana," *Journal of West African History* 5, no. 2 (Fall 2019): 1–27.
26. See, e.g., Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*; and James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
27. A recent article by Séverine Awenengo Dalberto provides nuance to this statement. Awenengo Dalberto shows that Senghor enticed Badiane and other regional leaders to join the BDS by assuring them that "legitimate regionalism" short of autonomy would be accommodated. See Awenengo Dalberto, "Hidden Debates," 78.
28. Mamadou Diouf, "Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC and the Struggle for Independence in Casamance," trans. Jonathan M. Sears, in *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, ed. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: J. Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 218–39.
29. Étienne Smith, "Merging Ethnic Histories in Senegal: Whose Moral Community?," in *Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa*, ed. Derek R. Peterson and Giacomo Macola, *New African Histories* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 213–32. See also Peterson and Macola's introduction.
30. Julie MacArthur notes Steven Sack's notion of "territoriality" as being fundamental to the "spatial turn" in history. See Julie MacArthur, *Cartography and the Political Imagination: Mapping Community in Colonial Kenya*, *New African Histories* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 16, citing Robert Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
31. See Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 80–83; and Makhtar Diouf, *Sénégal: Les ethnies et la nation* (Geneva: UNRISD; Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1994), 140–47.
32. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 82.
33. Fanny Colanna, *Instituteurs algériens, 1883–1939*, as quoted in Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 57.

34. Based on photographs of these schools and the author's personal experiences in them since 2005, admittedly well after the end of colonialism in Senegal. See also Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 58–61.
35. Labrune-Badiane, 58.
36. Peter Mark, *"Portuguese" Style and Luso-African Identity: Precolonial Senegambia, Sixteenth–Nineteenth Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); George Brooks, *Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender, and Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003); Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 198–202.
37. Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 198.
38. Labrune-Badiane, 201–2.
39. Governor Jubelin au ministre de la Marine, lettre no. 88, March 23, 1829, ANSOM, dossier Sénégal, 2796/1, as quoted by Papa Ibrahim Seck, *La stratégie culturelle de la France en Afrique* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), 19.
40. E.g., Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 36.
41. Céline Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State? School, State and Society in Casamance (19th–20th Centuries)," in *Schools and National Identities in French-Speaking Africa: Political Choices, Means of Transmission, and Appropriation* (London: Routledge, 2020), 44, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429288944>.
42. Labrune-Badiane, 44.
43. Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*, 12.
44. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 84.
45. Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 46.
46. Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 168.
47. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 84.
48. Foucher, 85.
49. Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 47.
50. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 85.
51. Doudou Sarr, interview by Céline Labrune-Badiane, Bignona, October 7, 2004, as quoted in Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 46.
52. Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 47.
53. Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 188–96.
54. Audition d'Alpha Bodian, chef de canton des Djougouttes Sud, dans le cadre de la grève scolaire de Balingore, le 4 décembre 1958, 11D1/0178, Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar (hereafter ANS), as quoted in Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 194.
55. Rapport d'inspection, par l'inspecteur des écoles Arnaud (1923), 1G9, ANS, as quoted in Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 191.

56. Sénégal, Cercle de Ziguinchor, Rapport annuel 1932, 2G32(106), ANS, as quoted in Labrune, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 191.
57. Labrune-Badiane, "Processus de scolarisation en Casamance," 194.
58. Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 48. For more on "Greater France" or the "French Union" after 1945, see Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); and Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).
59. Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 48.
60. Makhily Gassama, ed., *Emile Badiane: Le paysan, l'éducateur, l'homme d'état* (Dakar: Abis Editions, 2013).
61. Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 110–14.
62. Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 48.
63. "Une école est inaugurée dans la joie à Bona en Casamance," *Paris-Dakar* (colonial newspaper), November 19, 1954.
64. Labrune-Badiane, "Conditional Belonging to the Senegalese Nation-State," 49.
65. Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Wilder, *Freedom Time*; Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*.
66. "Urban" is a relative term here. In 1995, the population of Ziguinchor was 148,831. Barry Turner, ed., *The Statesman's Yearbook 2001: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 1334.
67. Based on the author's numerous visits to Ziguinchor since 2005.
68. Literacy rates from figures published by the Republic of Senegal in 1996, provided by Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 82.
69. On the Islamization of the Casamance, see Paul Nugent, "Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands: Refuge, Settlement and Islam from c. 1880 to the Present," *Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 221–43; Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal*; Peter Mark, *A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance since 1500* (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden GmbH, 1985); Charlotte A. Quinn, *Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and European Expansion* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972); and Frances Anne Leary, "Islam, Politics and Colonialism: A Political History of Islam in the Casamance Region of Senegal (1850–1914)" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1970).
70. Rate of education figures from Makhtar Diouf, *Sénégal*, 142–43.
71. Foucher notes the "disastrous effect on education in Casamance" of the 1905 law passed by the French Parliament separating the activities of church and state, which required the progressive departure of Christian mission schools from France's colonies. Colonial officials moved "slowly" to "fill the gap left by the departing missions." Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims," 84.

72. Vincent Foucher, "On the Matter (and Materiality) of the Nation: Interpreting Casamance's Unresolved Separatist Struggle," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (2011): 90.
73. Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*, 3–15.
74. Falola, 3–15.
75. Wilder, *French Imperial Nation-State*.
76. Here Davidson is paraphrasing Nkrumah's famous nationalist maxim with biblical allusion: "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all will then be added unto you." See Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 162.
77. Gorée is a small island near the Port of Dakar. It was one of the Quatre Communes (Four Communes), discussed in chap. 3.
78. Sebikotane is about 8 miles (13 kilometers) east of Rufisque, another of the Quatre Communes. See fig. I.1.
79. Gassama et al., *Emile Badiane*, 34.
80. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 123–24.
81. One of the best examples of these rivalries took place between Senegal's Senghor and Côte d'Ivoire's Houphouët-Boigny. For more, see Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*; and Wilder, *Freedom Time*.
82. For more on the "Islam-Wolof model" of the Senegalese nation, see Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal*. For more on these anticolonial jihad leaders, see David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); Robinson, *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The Western Sudan in the Mid-nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Robinson, "Revolutions in the Western Sudan," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall Lee Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 131–52; Cheikh Anta Mbacké Babou, *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Michael A. Gomez, *Pragmatism in the Age of Jihad: The Pre-colonial State of Bundu*, African Studies Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Sean Hanretta, *Islam and Social Change in French West Africa: History of an Emancipatory Community* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
83. To this day, before departing on a trip to Dakar or some other part of northern Senegal, Casamançais often say, "I'm going to Senegal." Recent Senegalese policy decisions have reinforced this notion that the Casamance and Senegal are "foreign" to one another, e.g., the decision to force air travelers from the Casamance to Dakar International Airport to complete paperwork and pass through immigration, along with foreign travelers. See Lamine Sagna, "Les voyageurs venant de la Casamance se rebellent," *LAS*, July 2, 2013, republished on Senepus.com, <https://www.senepus.com/article/les-voyageurs-venant-de-la-casamance-se-rebellent>.

84. On the distinctions between “historical actors” and “historical narrators,” see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 2, 23.
85. Joäl (pronounced “zho-ahl”) is on the Petite Côte, the Senegalese coastline running south of the Cap Vert Peninsula, upon which Dakar is located. For the information on the seminary at Ngasobil, see Jacques Louis Hymans, *Léopold Sédar Senghor: An Intellectual Biography* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), 9; and Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 22, 25, 41, 151.
86. Hymans, *Senghor*, 13.
87. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *Liberté* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964), 87.
88. Hymans, *Senghor*, 13.
89. Louis-Vincent Thomas, “Une idéologie moderne: La négritude, essai de synthèse psycho-sociologique,” *Revue de psychologie des peuples* 4 (1963): 394.
90. Awenengo Dalberto, “Les Joola, la Casamance et l’Etat,” 199–200.
91. Amadou Clédor Sall (former minister), “A l’ami qui nous a quittés,” in “Spécial Emile Badiane,” special edition, *Mo-rom*, Bignona, December 1973, as quoted in Gassama et al., *Emile Badiane*. *Mo-rom* is a socioeconomic journal edited by the party of L. S. Senghor, Union Progressiste Sénégalaise.
92. According to the testimonies of Mamousse Diagne and Moustapha Niasse (former prime minister of Senegal) in Gassama et al., *Emile Badiane*, 18–19.
93. Podor is in the Senegal River valley, on the border with Mauritania. See fig. I.1.
94. “Emile Badiane: 1972 1980 [sic], huit ans déjà,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 25, 1980.
95. Ibou Diallo, “Un grand acte de foi et de courage: Le mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance,” *La Condition Humaine: Organe central du Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (Dakar; BDS newspaper), February 28, 1950; Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” chap. 3; Awenengo Dalberto, “Les Joola, la Casamance et l’Etat,” 201–8; Catherine Boone, *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 111–12.
96. Diamacoune, “Entretien du 13 mai 2005,” in René Capain Bassène, *L’abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: Par lui-même et par ceux qui l’ont connu* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2013), 39–40.
97. Léopold Sédar Senghor, “La condition de notre evolution: Réforme de l’enseignement,” *La Condition Humaine: Organe central du Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (Dakar), February 11, 1948.
98. Senghor would, however, leave the SFIO to form his own party before 1948 ended. For some of the best academic historical treatments of this period in Casamançais political history, see Christian Roche, *Le Sénégal à la conquête de son indépendance, 1939–1960: Chronique de la vie politique et syndicale, de l’Empire français à l’indépendance* (Paris: Karthala, 2001); Awenengo Dalberto, “Les Joola, la Casamance et l’Etat”; and Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims.”
99. Senghor, “La condition de notre evolution.”

100. For what I mean by “diffusionist,” see W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 1–16; and George Basalla, “The Spread of Western Science,” *Science* 156 (1967): 611–22.
101. Awenengo Dalberto, “Hidden Debates,” 76–82. For more on the Lebu ethnic group, see chap. 5.
102. Yaya Jaata, “Debate, Education May Defuse Casamance Split,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, originally published in French (French title not available) as “Casamance: You Said Northern and Southern!,” *Fagaru* (Dakar), February 1, 1990, 5.
103. Derek Peterson and Giacomo Macola, “Introduction: Homespun Historiography and the Academic Profession,” in Peterson and Macola, *Recasting the Past*, 5.
104. Peterson and Macola, 5.
105. Mohamed Lamine Manga, *La Casamance dans l’histoire contemporaine du Sénégal* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012), 27, citing Vincent Foucher, “Les évolués, la migration, l’école: Pour une nouvelle interprétation de la naissance du nationalisme casamançais,” in *Le Sénégal contemporain*, ed. Momar-Coumba Diop (Paris: Karthala, 2002), 400.
106. Peterson and Macola, 5. Also see the reference to a classic work of precolonial African history, B. A. Ogot, *History of the Southern Luo: Migration and Settlement* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).
107. For examples in English, see the oral histories collected, recorded, transcribed, and preserved at the Gambian National Center for Arts and Culture in Banjul. For more information see “Safeguarding Gambia, Casamance and Guinea-Bissau’s Oral Histories: The Oral History Archive at Fajara, The Gambia (EAP536),” Gambian National Center for Arts and Culture, Banjul, Digitization Project led by Toby Green for the British Library, <https://eap.bl.uk/project/EAP536>.
108. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 2. I quote the word “defiance” here because of the subtitle of Diamacoune’s essay, *Pays du refus*.
109. On “writing back” against hegemonic histories, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
110. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 152.
111. For details on this confrontation, see Manga, *La Casamance dans l’histoire contemporaine du Sénégal*, 107–10; Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” 147; and Awenengo Dalberto, “Les Joola, la Casamance et l’Etat,” 236.
112. Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). For a good analysis of the scholarly discussion catalyzed by White’s book, see Gregory Mann, “An Africanist’s Apostasy: On Luise White’s ‘Speaking with Vampires,’” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 41, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 117–21.

113. Pape Sow, "Le chef de l'état demain à Bignona pour l'anniversaire de la mort d'Emile Badiane," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 21, 1973, and "Emile Badiane: 1972–1980, huit ans déjà," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 25, 1980, both articles from "Personnalités: Emile Badiane," ANS; Gassama et al., *Emile Badiane*, 87. What I have translated and shortened to "the Ministry of Education" was, in French, *le Ministère d'Enseignement technique et de la Formation des Cadres*.
114. "Emile Badiane: 1972–1980."
115. Emile Badiane, speech to the Senegalese National Assembly, 1966, "Personnalités: Emile Badiane," ANS.
116. Anderson argued that the nation is "an imagined political community" because "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.
117. Casamançais member of civil society working in peace process, interview by author, Dakar, June 3, 2012. For discussion of an "alternative history" of decolonization in Senegal by which the Casamance may have emerged from colonialism as a separate entity from Senegal, see Awenengo Dalberto, "Hidden Debates."
118. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism* (Paris: Présence africaine, 1962); Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 40–49.
119. Senghor, *Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism*, 63–69. For scholarship on the link made by early African nationalists between the pre-colonial African state and modernity, see Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*.
120. Senghor, *Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism*, 41.
121. On the formation of African nations through the "bundling" of ethnic groups, see Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London: Currey, 1991), 270.
122. Cooper, *Africa since 1940*; Davidson, *Black Man's Burden*; Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), chap. 4.
123. Emile Badiane, speech to the president and government of Zaire, May 20, 1972, Kinshasa, "Personnalités: Emile Badiane," ANS; Aly Kheury N'Daw, "Funérailles nationales ce matin pour Emile Badiane: Sa dernière interview," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 23–24, 1972, "Personnalités: Emile Badiane," ANS.
124. "Emile Badiane: Le dernier hommage," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 26, 1972, "Personnalités: Emile Badiane," ANS.
125. Manga, *La Casamance dans l'histoire contemporaine du Sénégal*, 203–6.
126. As quoted in Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 41–42.
127. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*. To be clear, "silencing the past" refers to Trouillot's words, not those of the separatists. But the meaning is the same for both.

128. Diamacoune Senghor, interview by Bassène, in *Labbé*, 36–37.
129. Senghor, interview by Bassène, 68. The phrase “people without history” harkens to some of the European characterizations of African histories emerging from the colonial era, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover Publications, 1956); and Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965).
130. “The Conquest and Resistance of the Peoples of the Casamance, 1850–1920.”
131. “History of the Casamance: Conquest and Resistance, 1850–1920.” Christian Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920* (Paris: Karthala, 1985).
132. This previous French scholarship included works focused on the Jola by Louis-Vincent Thomas and Jean Girard. See, e.g., Louis-Vincent Thomas, *Les Diola: Essai d'analyse fonctionnelle sur une population de Basse-Casamance*, Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire 55 (Dakar: Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, 1958); and Jean Girard, *Genèse du pouvoir charismatique en Basse Casamance (Sénégal)* (Dakar: Institut fondamental d'Afrique noire, 1969).
133. On “the recipe” for Casamançais nationalism, see Séverine Awenengo Dalberto, “Usages de l'histoire et mémoires de la colonie dans le récit indépendantiste casamançais,” *Outre-mers: Revue d'histoire* 98, no. 368 (2010): 137–57.
134. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 96.
135. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 2, 23.
136. “Djignabo Bassène, le capitaine des Séléki,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), March 20, 1999.
137. “Djignabo Bassène.”
138. “Djignabo Bassène.”
139. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 23.
140. Mark, “Portuguese” Style; Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
141. On schools imposing order and discipline on students, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*; and Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
142. Bertrand Diamacoune claimed that his older brother looked to him for instruction on “traditional” matters in the village, the things that determined whether one was a “true Jola.” Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014. Bertrand died on July 22, 2014. “Bertrand Diamacoune est mort,” Seneweb.com, July 22, 2014, [http://www.seneweb.com/news/Necrologie/bertrand-diamacoune-est-mort\\_n\\_131171.html](http://www.seneweb.com/news/Necrologie/bertrand-diamacoune-est-mort_n_131171.html).
143. For more on these “sacred forest” rituals, see chap. 3.
144. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*; Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 34.

145. Dorothy and Jean-Claude Sambou, interview by author, Youtou, March 31, 2014; Saly Diatta, interview by author, Thionk-Essyl, April 24, 2014; Malamine Badji, interview by author, Niankite, April 3, 2014; Landing and Siaka Diedhiou, interview by author, Thionk-Essyl, April 24, 2014; Basse and Mame Tendeng, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014; Aroky Diedhiou, interview by author, M'lomp, April 23, 2014; Alice Manga, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 18, 2014.
146. For more on the capacity of peasant, subaltern, or ordinary actors to exert power in meaningful ways, see James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985); and James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
147. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 232, referring to G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), par. 175, pp. 117–18.
148. On the need for a “vernacular language” and ultimate sovereignty to the nation and not to the Church for imagining the nation, see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 83–111.
149. Anderson, 83–111.
150. On Nkrumah’s “seek ye first the political kingdom . . .,” see Ali Al’Amin Mazrui and Christophe Wondji, eds., *Africa since 1935* (London: Heinemann Educational Books; Berkeley: University of California Press; Paris: UNESCO, 1993), 105–26.
151. Maramé Guèye, “Urban Guerrilla Poetry: The Movement Y’En a Marre and the Socio-political Influences of Hip Hop in Senegal,” *Journal of Pan African Studies* 6, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 22–43.
152. John Lonsdale, “States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey,” *African Studies Review* 24, no. 2/3 (June–September 1981): 140.
153. Göran Hydén, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed*.

#### CHAPTER 5: THE STADIUM

Epigraph: Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance* (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 32. According to Diatta, this proverb is based on the Jolas’ most popular sport, wrestling. Sometimes the strongest wrestlers can be defeated by weaker wrestlers, so one must not judge by appearances. Rather, one must enter the ring and confront one’s opponent face-to-face. As Diatta explains, it is above all when the situation is critical that one reveals one’s true value.

1. “JA-Casa dos à dos: Second manche dimanche prochain,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 4, 1980, p. 1, Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar (hereafter ANS).
2. “Ils ont gagné la Coupe,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 9–10, 1980, p. 19, ANS.

3. Former Casa-Sports committee member in Dakar, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014; C. M. Koume, "Une finale a oublier," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 11, 1980, p. 19, ANS.
4. *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 13, 1980, p. 1, ANS.
5. "La finale de la honte" and "JA 1, Casa 0: Le football trahi," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 11, 1980, ANS.
6. Childhood friend of Bocandé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 25, 2014; Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014; Laye Diaw, interview by author, Dakar, May 1, 2014; Abdoulatif Diop, *Bocandé: L'éternelle légende* (Dakar: Fama Editions, 2012), 33–35.
7. "Morning Briefing: The Phillies' Victory Was the Answer to a Prayer," *Los Angeles Times*, October 14, 1980, p. D2, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. In addition to coverage of the Philadelphia Phillies baseball team, this article contains a brief paragraph on the repercussions of the controversial soccer match in Senegal.
8. "Les images de la finale," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), August 14, 1980, p. 10, ANS.
9. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 14, 2014. Bertrand was involved with the MFDC in various ways but most recently as chair of the MFDC Contact Group, until his death in 2014.
10. Christian Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920* (Paris: Karthala, 1985), 16. For more details on the history of Aline Sitoé Diatta, see chap. 2 of this book. Kabrousse is a village in the far south-west corner of the Casamance, adjacent to the Senegalese border with Guinea-Bissau.
11. There was no such thing, however, as "the Casamance" in 1645, from where Diamacoune began his historical narrative. See Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, "Le message de la reine Alinsitoë," Archives de la Chambre de Commerce, Dakar (hereafter ADCC).
12. Diamacoune, "Le message."
13. A few of the Africanists noting the nexus of soccer and politics include Phyllis Martin, *Leisure and Society in Colonial Brazzaville*, African Studies Series 87 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890–1945* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001); Peter Alegi, *African Soccerescapes: How a Continent Changed the World's Game* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010); and Susann Baller, "Urban Football Performances: Playing for the Neighbourhood in Senegal, 1950s–2000s," *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 84, no. 1 (2014): 17–35.
14. See, e.g., Judith A. Byfield, *The Bluest Hands: A Social and Economic History of Women Dyers in Abeokuta (Nigeria), 1890–1940* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002); Marissa J. Moorman, *Intonations: A Social History of Music and Nation in Luanda, Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008); Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through*

- Popular Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939–1958* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005); and Mike McGovern, *Unmasking the State: Making Guinea Modern* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
15. I capitalize “The Stadium” here—as elsewhere throughout this chapter—to denote separatist attempts to construct a monolithic, homogenized place where the Casamançais nation was defined by reference to particular cultural values, memories, and histories. For an illuminating discussion of landscape, history, and memory in relation to West African space and place, see Sandra E. Greene, *Sacred Sites and the Colonial Encounter: A History of Meaning and Memory in Ghana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).
  16. On performing the nation, see Kelly M. Askew, *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
  17. Before explaining why the Casamance needed stadiums to take up some of its “free space,” former colonial official J. Malbranque appealed to the urban planning philosophies of Le Corbusier, the famous French intellectual considered by James C. Scott to be one of the earliest authors of “seeing like a state.” In addition to Scott’s *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), see “Rapport de J. Malbranque sur la Casamance: Nécessité et avantage de son autonomie,” Dakar, 1939, p. 12, 1Z 0096, ANS. Casa-Sports’ opponent in the 1980 Senegalese Cup final, Jeanne d’Arc, was a club started by French missionaries in Dakar in 1921. See Makhtar Diouf, *Sénégal: Les ethnies et la nation* (Genève: UNRISD, 1994), 119.
  18. On the force of arms ultimately guaranteeing the entire colonial project, see Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 129.
  19. Alegi, *Soccerscapes*, 1.
  20. Robert Baum claims that “wrestling could be considered a means of socialization of Diola [Jola] youth into the ways of the warrior.” See Baum’s “Shrines, Medicines, and the Strength of the Head: The Way of the Warrior among the Diola of Senegambia,” *Numen* 40, no. 3 (September 1, 1993): 277. Girls and young women wrestled primarily in Kassa—the area of the Casamance centered on Oussouye, west of Ziguinchor to the Atlantic coast. Casamançais wrestling champion, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 12, 2014; Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014. For more on the changes that colonialism brought to precolonial wrestling in Africa, see Matthew Carotenuto, “Crafting Sport History behind Bars: Wrestling with State Patronage and Colonial Confinement in Kenya,” *History in Africa: A Journal of Method* 43 (2016): 289–321; and Carotenuto, “Grappling

- with the Past: Wrestling and Performative Identity in Kenya,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 30, no. 16 (2013): 1889–902.
21. The historically higher population density of European societies provides a demographic explanation for this distinction. See John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–2.
  22. Alegi, *Soccerscapes*, 1–2.
  23. Alegi, 2.
  24. For an excellent summary of this evolution and Africa’s unique contributions to the sport of soccer, see the first two chapters of Alegi, *Soccerscapes*.
  25. The French-British agreement of August 10, 1889, and the French-Portuguese Convention of May 12, 1886, delineated the northern and southern borders of the Casamance, with the Atlantic Ocean serving as the western limit. The eastern border of the Casamance, however, has never been equally clear. Most scholars define it by the north-south course of the Gambia River, which defines the eastern end of the strip of Senegal separated from the rest of the country by the Gambia. For more on the early colonial “pacification”—an ironic term since it was seldom peaceful—of the Casamance, see Roche, *Histoire de la Casamance*.
  26. “Rapport de J. Malbranque,” 15. On the title page of this document, Malbranque claimed that he was an “Academy Officer” who was the “Former Inspector for the Ministry of Labor” as well as a “Former Special Advisor in French West Africa.”
  27. This, at least, was the notion implied by colonialists like Malbranque and by nationalists like Senghor and Guinean leader Sékou Touré. Touré contended that “colonialism [betrayed] its intentions in the organization and nature of the education which it claims to dispense in the name of some humanism or other. . . . It had to satisfy its needs for junior staff, clerks, book-keepers, typists, messengers, etc. The elementary character of the education dispensed bears sufficiently eloquent witness to the object in view, for the colonial power took great care, for example, not to set up real administrative colleges for young Africans which might have trained genuine executives, or to teach the real history of Africa and so forth.” See Touré, “The Political Leader Considered as the Representative of a Culture,” in *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856–1970: Documents on Modern African Political Thought from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. J. Ayodele Langley (London: R. Collings, 1979), 605–6.
  28. Fair, *Pastimes and Politics*, 240.
  29. On the seriousness with which colonial officials viewed sports, see Fair, 240.
  30. Alegi, *Soccerscapes*, 22.
  31. Alegi, 22; emphasis added.
  32. Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, “Senegal,” in *West African States: Failure and Promise; A Study in Comparative Politics*, ed. John Dunn, African Studies 23 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 185.

33. “Résolution adoptée à l’issue du rassemblement,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 28, 1982, p. 4, ANS.
34. Ousseynou Faye, “Sport, argent et politique: La lutte libre à Dakar (1800–2000),” in *Le Sénégal contemporain*, ed. Momar-Coumba Diop (Paris: Karthala, 2002), 311–12. Female circumcision has not been universal in the Casamance, but it has been performed in the past and remains common in isolated areas.
35. Nicholas Loomis, “Pro Wrestling, Senegal Style,” *New York Times*, May 25, 2012, B9.
36. I continue to place the word *traditional* within quotation marks when it precedes the word *wrestling* in reference to contemporary wrestling in Senegal because, as this chapter shows, it has changed significantly over the course of the colonial and postcolonial periods. Thus, Senegalese wrestling today is quite different from that practiced before the colonial period. Calling it “modern Senegalese wrestling” might be more accurate. But most observers continue to refer to it as “traditional wrestling.” As noted above, Matt Carotenuto makes the same argument for contemporary wrestling in Kenya. See Carotenuto, “Crafting Sport History behind Bars” and “Grapppling with the Past.”
37. J. V. Faye, “La lutte traditionnelle: Son importance, sa signification en fonction des éthos et des habitus ethniques au Sénégal” (master’s thesis, Sciences et techniques de l’activité physique et du sport [STAPS], Dakar, Institut national supérieur de l’Éducation populaire et du Sport [INSEPS], 1984); Faye, “Sport, argent et politique,” 312; Loomis, “Pro Wrestling, Senegal Style,” B9.
38. Faye, “Sport, argent et politique,” 311–12.
39. Serigne Mour Diop, *La lutte sénégalaise* (Dakar: Editions Vives Voix, 2014), 10–11. For more on Emile Badiane and the rest of the nationalist generation in Senegal (including the Casamance), see chap. 4 of this book.
40. Diop, *La lutte sénégalaise*, 8.
41. Nouha Cissé (the president of Casa-Sports), interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014; Nouha Cissé, interview by Jean-Claude Marut, Ziguinchor, February 26, 2015.
42. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Ansoumana Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014.
43. Casa-Sports supporter, in René Capain Bassène, *Casamance: Récits d’un conflit oublié* (1982–2014) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2015), 39.
44. Louise Badiane is now an associate professor of anthropology and the coordinator of African studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts. I thank her for this insight about the stadium meetings on “white plastic chairs.” I thank Mostafa Minawi for the insight on the common experience of social gatherings on “white plastic chairs” across much of the developing world.

45. Louise Badiane, phone interview by author, April 6, 2011.
46. Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; MFDC leader, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014. I provide more detail on the 1982 march later in this chapter. Vincent Foucher and Paul Diédhiou also note the separatists' move from the soccer stadium to Diabir. See Vincent Foucher, "La guerre des dieux? Religions et séparatisme en Basse Casamance," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2005): 376; and Paul Diédhiou, *L'identité joola en question: La bataille idéologique du MFDC pour l'indépendance* (Paris: Karthala, 2011), 330.
47. Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; MFDC leader, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014; along with Vincent Foucher, "Cheated Pilgrims: Education, Migration and the Birth of Casamançais Nationalism (Senegal)" (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002), 263.
48. Northerners were referred to as *nordistes* in the Lower Casamance. On the complexity and ambiguity of Senegalese land tenure laws, see Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 189; and Linda J. Beck, *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 182–86. Jola claims to land held allegedly for generations were problematic, at best. See Paul Nugent, "Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands: Refuge, Settlement and Islam from c. 1880 to the Present," *Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 221–43.
49. Ansoumana Abba Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014.
50. In his 170-page response to the testimony of French historian Jacques Charpy during the 1993 ceasefire, Diamacoune wrote, "France wants to integrate by force this beautiful and rebel Casamance into a colonial and neocolonial Senegal, which was the right hand of the colonizer shown to be more colonial than the white colonizer." See Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, *Casamance: Pays du refus; Réponse à Monsieur Jacques Charpy* (Ziguinchor: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, 1995), 155.
51. Ansoumana Abba Bodian private archive, Ziguinchor. In particular, see letter from Bodian to the commander of the Gendarmerie Nationale in Ziguinchor on "Problème des emmurées vivant de Kadior, Ziguinchor, Casamance," March 25, 1976; letter from Assane Diabate (Bodian's attorney) on "Population de Kadior c. Socitour," April 15, 1978; Bodian to the minister of education on "Demande de remboursement pour mes droits suspendues depuis le 03/01/1983," November 27, 1995; and finally, Bodian to Kalidou Diallo (minister of education), July 7, 2008, on Bodian's "suspended rights." For his MFDC activities, the Senegalese government sentenced Bodian to five years of prison on January 3, 1983. Bodian, one of the leaders of the fateful march that began the Casamance conflict, also appears in Father

- Diamacouné's *Pays du refus*, 54, 71, as well as the works of other Casamance scholars.
52. Ansoumana Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014.
  53. Abdou Elinkine Diatta to René Capain Bassène, in *L'abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: Par lui-même et par ceux qui l'ont connu* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013), 98–99.
  54. For an excellent analysis of this expatriate Casamançais community in Dakar and its ties to the separatist movement, see Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims.”
  55. Former Casa-Sports committee member in Dakar, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014.
  56. Pierre Senghor (alias), interview, Ziguinchor, March 2000, as interviewed and cited by Foucher in “Cheated Pilgrims,” 275.
  57. Travelers from the Casamance and other parts of the Senegalese “periphery” often assert they are traveling to “Senegal” when they depart for the Dakar–Saint Louis–Diourbel triangle, perceived by many as the Islamo-Wolof “center” of Senegal. For more on the “Islamization” of the Senegalese nation, see Mamadou Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal: Le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001); Mamadou Diouf, “Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC and the Struggle for Independence in Casamance,” trans. Jonathan M. Sears, in *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, ed. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: J. Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 218–39; and Étienne Smith, “La nationalisation par le bas: Un nationalisme banal? Le cas de la wolofisation au Sénégal,” *Raisons politiques* 37, no. 1 (2010): 65–78.
  58. Former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014.
  59. Former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014; Sindian Notables, group interview by interview, April 6, 2014.
  60. Former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014; MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014.
  61. For an introduction to the immense literature on British soccer hooliganism, one could start with Tom Gibbons, Kevin Dixon, and Stuart Braye, “‘The Way It Was’: An Account of Soccer Violence in the 1980s,” *Soccer & Society* 9, no. 1 (January 2008): 28–41.
  62. Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” 250. Though the majority of the Lower Casamance is Muslim, the Casamance is known for its palm wine libations drunk mostly by Catholics and animists and used in various ritual ceremonies. For more on the Islamization of the Casamance, see Frances Anne Leary, “Islam, Politics and Colonialism: A Political History of Islam in the Casamance Region of Senegal (1850–1914)” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1970); Peter Mark, “Economic and Religious Change among

- the Diola of Boulouf (Casamance), 1890–1940: Trade, Cash Cropping and Islam in Southwestern Senegal” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1976); Peter Mark, *A Cultural, Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance since 1500* (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden GmbH, 1985); and Séga Seckou Sagna, *La Casamance, l’Islam et la France* (Dakar: L’Harmattan Sénégal, 2017).
63. On a cassette tape of Casa-Sports fans’ songs, Bocandé was referred to as “Bocandé Esamay,” likening the striker to a panther in Jola. Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” 250.
  64. *Kelumak* was the creation of Mamadou “Nkrumah” Sané, the founder, along with Father Diamacoune, of the MFDC. See Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims,” 247.
  65. Diop, *Bocandé*, 30.
  66. Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014.
  67. Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014; Ansoumana Bodian, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 19, 2014; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 29, 2014; and Thérance Senghor, in Diop, *Bocandé*, 31. Many residents of Matam would likely find it amusing that Matam was considered a part of “the Casamance,” but several MFDC members claimed to me that it was.
  68. *Car rapides* are usually old “bread trucks” in poor condition, often painted various bright colors, with ties to one of Senegal’s Sufi Muslim orders, and typically not all that rapid. *Pirogues* are canoe-like watercraft, often painted in bright colors in a similar fashion to the car rapides.
  69. Former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014.
  70. *Jaraaf* means “royal representative” in Wolof.
  71. Laye Diaw, interview by author, Dakar, May 1, 2014. See Jean-Claude Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 95–96. Diamacoune also asserted that “Wolof” is often synonymous with Senegalese and ‘Jola’ with Casamançais.” Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 41.
  72. Laye Diaw, interview by author, Dakar, May 1, 2014.
  73. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014; Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; and Diop, *Bocandé*, 30.
  74. Childhood friend of Bocandé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 25, 2014. Father Diamacoune often used the French expression *ras-le-bol* to express the feeling of being “fed up with” or “tired of” northern Senegalese domination. See, e.g., Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, starting on p. 27. Literally, the phrase describes a bowl so flush with liquid that one more drop will spill over the edge, so it signifies a tipping point of sorts. Also see Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 79.

75. Mémorandum de la LD/MPT, p. 13, as cited by Mohamed Lamine Manga, *La Casamance dans l'histoire contemporaine du Sénégal* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012), 226–27.
76. Childhood friend of Bocandé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 25, 2014.
77. Childhood friend of Bocandé, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 25, 2014.
78. Serer and Jola have considered themselves “cousin” ethnic groups, based on the common myth of a split between two sisters migrating from the ancient Mali Empire. For more on this *cousinage*, see Ferdinand de Jong, “A Joking Nation: Conflict Resolution in Senegal,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2005): 389–413; and Étienne Smith, “La nation ‘par le côté’: Le récit des cousinages au Sénégal,” *Cahiers d'études africaines* 184, no. 4 (2006): 907–65.
79. Amnesty International, *Senegal: Climate of Terror in Casamance* (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1998).
80. Jacques Lacotte, “‘Serious Violence’ Reported in Casamance,” *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), December 19, 1983.
81. Mark Hann, Dominique Chev e, and Cheikh T. Wane, “‘Tying Your Ngemb’: Negotiating Identity in Senegalese Wrestling,” *Ethnography* 22, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 396–410.
82. Diop, *La lutte s n galaise*, 12.
83. Faye, “Sport, argent et politique,” 312.
84. For more detail on the origins and etymology of *mbapat* and *laamb*, see Faye, esp. 312, 318.
85. For more on the “Islamolo-fization” of the Senegalese nation, see Diouf, *Histoire du S n gal*; and  tienne Smith, “La nationalisation par le bas: Un nationalisme banal? Le cas de la wolofisation au S n gal,” *Raisons politiques* 37, no. 1 (2010): 65–78.
86. Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians*; Foucher, “Cheated Pilgrims.” For a few examples of the literature on “counter-mapping,” see Julie MacArthur, *Cartography and the Political Imagination: Mapping Community in Colonial Kenya*, New African Histories (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016); Nancy Peluso, “Whose Woods Are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia,” *Antipode* 27, no. 4 (1995): 383–406; and Joel Wainwright and Joe Bryan, “Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize,” *Cultural Geographies* 16, no. 2 (2009): 153–78.
87. Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 4, 2014; representatives from Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014; senior MFDC official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014. These separatists claimed that instead of referring to *laamb* as “la lutte libre,” it should be called “la lutte truqu e,” literally translated as “tricked wrestling” but suggesting what one might call in English

- a “thrown” or “fixed” match. This term also used by Ngoumbane Khoulé, the “champion of Thiès,” protesting “Mafioso-like” practices (*les pratiques mafieuses*) of certain laamb wrestlers and their agents in 1958. See interview with Koulé, *Paris-Dakar*, January 20, 1958, 2, as quoted by Faye, “Argent, sport et politique,” 321–23.
88. “Double Lesse, un champion aux multiples facettes,” Kaay Xool, March 27, 2009, <https://www.au-senegal.com/Double-Lesse-un-champion-aux.html?lang=fr>.
  89. “Double Less frôle la bronze,” *Le Soleil* (Dakar), July 20, 1980, p. 19, ANS.
  90. This famous match recently received even greater attention in the Senegalese press following the deaths, within a few months of each other, of Guèye and Sakho. See, e.g., Abubakr Diallo, “Sénégal: Mbaye Guèye / Double Less, l’ultime combat,” Afrik.com, September 6, 2021, <https://www.afrik.com/senegal-mbaye-gueye-double-less-l-ultime-combat>.
  91. O’Brien, “Senegal,” 185–86.
  92. See chap. 3, n. 51.
  93. Diop, *La lutte sénégalaise*, 12.
  94. Vincent Foucher, “Senegal: The Resilient Weakness of Casamançais Separatists,” in *African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine*, ed. Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 171–97.
  95. Faye, “Argent, sport et politique,” 315; emphasis mine.
  96. “Toutes les provinces sénégalaises ont célébré dans l’allégresse les Fêtes de l’Indépendance,” *Dakar-Matin*, April 5–6, 1961, ANS; Mark Hann, “Sporting Aspirations: Football, Wrestling, and Neoliberal Subjectivity in Urban Senegal” (PhD diss., Amsterdam Institute of Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, 2018), 111–16.
  97. Henri Lefebvre, *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*, ed. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 168. For more on spatial theory in African history, see Allen M. Howard and Richard M. Shain, eds., *The Spatial Factor in African History: The Relationship of the Social, Material, and Perceptual* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), esp. Howard’s comprehensive chapter, “Nodes, Networks, Landscapes, and Regions: Reading the Social History of Tropical Africa 1700s–1920,” 21–141.
  98. Emphasis in the original.
  99. Lefebvre, *State, Space, World*, 170, 171.
  100. Raymond B. Craib, *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 4.
  101. Massey, *For Space*, 9.
  102. Massey, 9; Lefebvre, *State, Space, World*, 170.
  103. Massey, *For Space*, 9–10.
  104. Since the Casamance conflict intensified in 1990, the Senegalese government and the MFDC have signed numerous ceasefires but no definitive peace accord. In addition to these two parties to the conflict, Senegalese civil society and international state and nonstate actors have tried to broker peace, with no permanent success.

105. Baller, "Urban Football Performances," 18.
106. Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal*; Diouf, "Between Ethnic Memories and Colonial History in Senegal."
107. Baller, "Urban Football Performances," 22–23.
108. Former Casa-Sports official in Dakar, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014.
109. Local tour guide, interview by author, Diembereng, April 5, 2014.
110. Villagers in Fogny blamed Salif Sadio for bringing the conflict to them in 2006.
111. Sindian Notables, group interview by author, Sindian, April 6, 2014.
112. Diamacoune to Bassène, May 13, 2005, in Bassène, *Labbé*, 72.
113. Diamacoune, *Pays du refus*, 22, 25, 27.
114. On Bocandé as "the emblem of the Casamance," see Diop, *Bocandé*, 25, 31.
115. Laye Diaw referred to Bocandé as *un homme d'état*, "a man of the state." Laye Diaw, interview by author, Dakar, May 1, 2014.
116. On politicians currying favor with soccer players, coaches, fans, and officials, see Baller, "Urban Football Performances," 32.
117. Bocandé personified a mixed, ambiguous cultural identity in many ways. He came from mixed parentage, incorporating ethnicities (including Jola) from Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Senegal. His paternal grandfather came from the region of Nantes in France, where Bocandé is a common surname, which may have expedited his acquisition of a visa to play in Europe following the FSF sanction in 1980. See Diop, *Bocandé*, 15. Emmanuel Bertrand-Bocandé, France's colonial administrator in the Casamance in the mid-nineteenth century, has been credited with spreading French influence in the Casamance at the expense of the Portuguese. See Mark, *Basse Casamance since 1500*; and Robert Baum, *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
118. Bocandé's biographer, Abou Latif Diop, and various news sources put the number at 23 goals for Bocandé's award-winning season in the French Ligue 1. But FC Metz's website profile puts the number at 25. See Diop, *Bocandé*, 14, as well as the FC Metz Club website, accessed June 11, 2023, <https://www.fcmetz.com/bocande-jules>.
119. Diop, *Bocandé*, 59; Bertrand Diamacoune, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Bignona chapter of the MFDC, group interview by author, Bignona, April 24, 2014.
120. "Le 22, Bocandé jouera sa partition," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 21, 1995; Jacques Moundour Diouf, "Méga concert pour la paix à Ziguinchor: Les cœurs seront en fête ce soir," *Le Soleil* (Dakar), December 28, 1995. Bocandé organized this "concert for peace" in Casa-Sports' home stadium of Aline Sitoé Diatta, demonstrating the multiple identities possibly imagined in the stadium.
121. Kéba Coma and Modou Camara, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 24, 2014. Camara and Coma were guarding Bocandé's grave throughout my research visit in spring 2014.

122. Loomis, "Pro Wrestling, Senegal Style," B9.
123. Faye, "Sport, argent et politique," 320.
124. Tyson was known to enter the arena in a robe made of material from an American flag while his supporters around the stadium waved American flags and held up posters of his spiritual guide, Baye Niass, of the majority Tijaniyya (a Sufi Muslim order). See Diop, *La lutte sénégalaise*, 20–21, 26.
125. Loomis, "Pro Wrestling, Senegal Style," B9.
126. Faye, "Sport, argent et politique," 331. Confirmed by numerous oral informants in the Casamance and other parts of Senegal, including Bertrand Diamacoune, individual statement to author, Ziguinchor, March 28, 2014; Sindian Notables, group statement to author, Sindian, April 6, 2014; senior MFDC official, individual statement to author, Ziguinchor, April 25, 2014.
127. Observations based on fieldwork during the Festival des Rizières (Festival of the Rice Fields) in Kabrousse, April 2014. Asked whether young boys could opt out of wrestling during the festival, several informants replied, "That is unimaginable."
128. Dodou Diop, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 12, 2014; two midlevel MFDC officials, interview by author, Ziguinchor, April 1, 2014; young Jola man, interview by author, M'longp, April 23, 2014.
129. Observations as a spectator at wrestling matches in Kabrousse during the Festival of the Rice Field, April 11, 2014.
130. On the links between the present and the distant past, see Robert M. Baum, "Shrines, Medicines, and the Strength of the Head: The Way of the Warrior among the Diola of Senegambia," *Numen* 40, no. 3 (September 1, 1993): 274–92.
131. For more on what I mean by the term *space-place*, see introduction.
132. Faye, "Sport, argent et politique," 337.
133. Former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014; André Badji, email to author, October 27, 2014.
134. Former Casa-Sports official, interview by author, Ziguinchor, March 20, 2014.
135. Lefebvre, *State, Space, World*, 170.

#### CONCLUSION

Epigraphs: Nazaire Diatta, *Proverbes Jóola de Casamance* (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 373–74. According to Diatta, Kátunga and Jímeeteru are known as the oldest couple in the region of Diembering, near the mouth of the Casamance River. They live in the village of Buyuii. In all village palavers, one addresses one's words to Kátunga. In his response making reference to the past, he can only turn toward his wife, as old as him, to hear her testimony. Her testimony never contradicts his. Their opinion is one and the same. Citing this proverb regarding two persons means that two always agree. They never contradict each other, even if one must confirm an enormity, i.e., a "big one," for the other. In a similar sense, the proverb can mean that one calls into question the confirmation

of another's random opinion, especially without independent means of verification. Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 29.

1. See also Jean-Claude Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes* (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 347–48.
2. Former MFDC combatant, in René Capain Bassène, *Casamance: Récits d'un conflit oublié (1982–2014)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2015), 284.
3. For Sagna's biography, see Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 397.
4. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 4.
5. Carola Lentz, "The 2010 Independence Jubilees: The Politics and Aesthetics of National Commemoration in Africa," *Nations and Nationalism* 19, no. 2 (2013): 217–37.
6. Despite the name, French colonial authorities recruited *tirailleurs sénégalais* from all over French West Africa, not just from what became the modern nation-state of Senegal. For more on these colonial troops and their families, see Myron J. Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann; London: J. Currey, 1991); Jean-Yves Le Naour, *La honte noire: L'Allemagne et les troupes coloniales françaises, 1914–1945* (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 2003); Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Sarah Zimmerman, *Militarizing Marriage: West African Soldiers' Conjugal Traditions in Modern French Empire* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2020); and Sarah Zimmerman, "Mesdames Tirailleurs and Indirect Clients: West African Women and the French Colonial Army, 1908–1918," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 44, no. 2 (2011): 299–322.
7. Judith A. Byfield, *The Bluest Hands: A Social and Economic History of Women Dyers in Abeokuta (Nigeria), 1890–1940* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002); Judith Byfield, "'Unwrapping' Nationalism: Dress, Gender, and Nationalist Discourse in Colonial Lagos" (paper 30, Boston University African Studies Center, 2000), 1–21; Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
8. Marut, *Le conflit de Casamance*, 30.
9. Marut, 347, 351.



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# Index

Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations.

- 1970s, 3–4, 8, 33, 66, 85–91, 93, 160–61, 168, 229n2  
1980s, 8, 66, 109, 123–24
- Adelman, Jeremy, 41, 202n53  
*administrateur supérieur*, 205n96  
Affiniam dam, 88–89, 90–91  
Africa Cup of Nations (CAF), 173  
African borders: and the British-French  
Boundary Commission, 42–44, 55, 75, 202n59, 242n25; colonial creation of, 7, 42–44, 102; as inviolable, 7–8, 22; precolonial, 41; violence and, 44  
agriculture: and agrarian socialism, 83; colonial views of, 44; and education, 131; festivals tied to, 157, 250n127; forest, 98–99, 104, 107; investment in, 90; market vs. subsistence, 10, 74–75, 99. *See also* rice  
Akanni, Prosper Michel, 107  
Alegi, Peter, 158–59  
alternative modernity, 116  
Anderson, Benedict, 116, 144, 169; on imagining the nation, 14, 18, 73, 156, 182, 183, 237n116; on “print-capitalism,” 18, 112, 156, 183; on secularism, 112, 113; on William Ponty school, 136–37  
Angolan identity, 18  
Archives Nationales du Sénégal, 23  
Aron, Stephen, 41, 202n53  
*Art of Not Being Governed, The* (Scott), 100  
Atika (warrior), 6, 180  
*awasena*, 112, 114. *See also* traditional religions  
Awenengo Dalberto, Séverine, 22–23, 125, 126, 215n92, 221n34, 231n27
- Badiane, Emile, 23, 83, 84, 102, 125, 132, 143; background of, 138; on the Casamance, 144–45; commemoration of, 146, 160, 182; death of, 143, 144, 145–46, 147, 230n13; Father Senghor on, 143–44, 146, 147, 230n13; government posts of, 144; President Senghor and, 83, 138, 140, 144, 145, 146, 231n27; as teacher, 138  
Badiane, Louise, 161, 243n44  
Badji, Lolo, 90–91  
Badji, Sidy, 6, 113, 180  
Bainouk people, 35, 37, 38, 39; in Casamance region, 35, 36, 37, 38, 57, 58, 73–74, 210n14; decline in numbers of, 73–74, 77; mapping, 36, 48, 49, 49  
Balanta people, 58  
Balla Gaye 2, 28–29, 174–75  
Baller, Susann, 170–71  
Bamba, Amadou, 137  
baobab, 110  
Barr, Juliana, 188n30  
Barreto, Honorio Pereira, 31  
Barry, Boubacar, 196n6  
Bassène, Aloendisso, 80  
Bassène, Djignabo, 98, 148  
Bassène, Marcel, 4  
Bassène, René Capain, 24, 70, 146–47  
Baum, Robert, 113, 116, 177, 224n81; on Jola migration, 199n22, 210n14; on traditional religions, 114, 117, 228n133; on women, 118, 210n15; on wrestling, 241n20  
beauty, extraction and, 44–45  
Belize, indigenous land rights in, 60  
belonging, 11, 29, 61, 70–71, 109–11, 167

- Berlin Conference (1884–85), 7, 17, 40, 42, 43, 61, 203n62
- Berman, Bruce, 216n104
- Bertrand-Bocandé, Emmanuel, 39, 66, 74, 249n117
- Biafra, 22
- Bignona, 130, 132, 143
- “Black Man’s Burden,” 102, 135–36
- Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), 139, 140, 144, 146, 231n27
- Bocandé, Jules-François, 164, 246n63, 249n115, 249n118, 250n121; concert for peace organized by, 249n120; cultural identity of, 173–74, 249n117; funeral of, 172–73, 174; referee kicked by, 153, 154, 157; sanctions on, 155, 173, 174; stadium named after, 161, 182
- Bodian, Alpha, 131
- Bodian, Ansoumana Abba, 23, 86, 95–96, 162, 244n51
- bois sacré*. *See* “sacred forest”
- Bolton, Herbert Eugene, 41, 202n53
- borderlands, 41, 188n30, 202n52
- borders: arbitrary nature of, 43–44, 110, 203n65; of Casamance, as ambiguous, 11, 55–57, 191n60, 242n25; of Casamance, Catholic Church influencing, 55, 114, 224n81; of The Gambia, 2, 7, 8, 42, 136; of Senegal, 7–8, 42–44, 56, 61, 78–79, 97. *See also* African borders
- boubou*, 229n1
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 14
- boxing, 157, 158, 160
- British colonialism, 35, 37; and the British-French Boundary Commission, 42–44, 55, 75, 202n59, 242n25; in Egypt, 203n67; French opposition to, 38
- British-French Boundary Commission, 42–44, 55, 75, 202n59, 242n25
- British traders, 36
- Brunot, Richard, 78
- Bryan, Joe, 59, 60–61, 207n127
- bukut*, 27, 117–18, 119, 238n143. *See also* The Forest
- Byfield, Judith, 183
- Cacheu River, 32, 35, 38, 196n5
- Cairo Declaration, 7–8, 22
- Camara, Mamadou, 174, 250n121
- capitalist production. *See* production
- Carabane, 39, 129
- Carotenuto, Matt, 243n36
- car rapides*, 246n68
- cartography. *See* counter-mapping; discursive mapping; mapping
- Casa, 172, 241n20
- Casamançais: colonial maps erasing, 45, 47; divided by colonial powers, 204n80; education of, by *nordistes*, 131–32; hospitality of, 149; as less “evolved,” 107, 131; as naturally rebellious, 148, 149, 181; party representing interests of, 138–39; Senegal as foreign to, 58, 110–11, 137, 140, 149, 186n4, 234n83, 245n57; Senegalese history ignoring, 126, 127, 163. *See also* Casamançais identity; ordinary Casamançais
- Casamançais Environmental Charter, 109
- Casamançais identity, 2, 11–12, 33, 181–82; and the “Casamanqués,” 19; of elites, 19, 83, 112, 124–25, 181, 182; ethnicity and, 20, 21, 56–58, 76–77, 111, 165–66; Mandinka and, 76; and natural environment, 9–11, 14, 16–17, 109–10; and “ordinary” Casamançais, 14–15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 33, 61, 93; palm wine’s role in, 100–101; and Senegalese identity, 14–15, 17, 76, 173; and the Senegalese other, 11–12, 14, 17, 59, 109, 110–11, 116, 164, 169; soccer and, 156–57, 164, 168, 171–72, 177–78; vs. “strangers,” 21, 55, 76–77, 85, 90, 110, 162, 205n102, 213n48; urban vs. rural perceptions of, 24–25; wrestling and, 28, 157, 159, 166–67, 168, 172, 176–77
- the Casamance, 1, 2, 4; *administrateur supérieur* of, 205n96; as backwater, 131; Bainouk in, 35, 36, 37, 38, 57, 58, 73–74, 210n14; as borderland, 7, 35–36, 40, 41, 44; borders of, as ambiguous, 11, 55–57, 191n60, 242n25; borders of, Catholic Church influencing, 55, 114, 224n81; cercles of, in French administration, 51–52; climate change affecting, 89–90; colonial creation of, 33–34, 36, 43–44, 45–48, 50, 52–55, 97, 181; cultural mixing in, 27, 32, 35, 36, 38, 40, 55, 57, 58, 111, 198n18; etymology of, 31, 32; food of, 26–27, 34–35, 67–70, 75; as *forêt classée*, 99, 101; French residents of, 53; “frontiers” of, 111; high education levels of, 127–28; history

- of, 140–41, 146–47, 148, 237n127; independence of, as unrealistic, 91; languages of, 125; merchant class of, 36; as “natural,” 33, 37, 110–11; natural environment of, 9–11, 33, 44–45, 61, 109–11; *nordistes* buying up land in, 3, 9, 69, 86–87, 122, 161–62, 244n48; origins of, 26; as “pagan,” 176; power of marabouts from, 175–76; as rice basket of Senegal, 65, 66, 83; rubber production in, 104–6; Senegal as opposed to, 3–4, 17, 33, 110–11, 156; tourism in, 85–86; as uniquely Senegalese, 165; women of, fleeing to Dakar, 9, 80. *See also* Casamance River; education in the Casamance
- Casamance conflict: 1990 intensification of, 66, 109, 118, 140, 148; animals affected by, 92; and antiseparatists, 14–15; casualties of, 6, 23, 29, 63–64, 96, 148, 152, 166, 185n1, 208n5, 209n8, 209n9; ceasefires in, 6, 23, 179–80, 187n27, 248n104; colonial roots of, 1, 7–8, 10, 26, 29; elites at center of, 124–25; environmental disaster and, 8, 89–90, 189n41; ethnicity and, 20; and flag removal, 5–6, 95–96; length of, 6–7; vs. other West African conflicts, 185n1; outside support in, 21–22; as “performance” of secessionism, 22–23, 194n106; refugees from, 184; rice production threatened by, 65; spatial origins of, 15; spiritual aspects of, 68, 109–16, 118–19; territorial ambiguity of, 11; weariness with, 179–80; women’s experience of, 25, 82, 91–93, 184. *See also* peace
- Casamance: Pays du refus* (Senghor), 23, 28, 55–56, 141, 149, 216n112, 236n108
- Casamance: Récits d’un conflit oublié (1982–2014)* (Bassène), 24
- Casamance River, 10, 11, 13; beauty of, 44–45; counter-mapping of, 31–34, 55–57, 58–61; economic extraction and, 44–45; European incursions up, 35; geography of, 34; importance of, 31–32, 34–35, 198n17; mapping of, 26, 31–32, 33–34, 36, 36–37, 42–45, 54–55, 61; MFDC knowledge of, 31; as natural link, 54; salinization of, 89, 212n31; trade along, 26, 34, 35–36, 37–40, 44, 47, 54. *See also* The River
- “Casamanqués,” 19
- Casa-Sports (soccer club), 28, 91, 169; 1979 Senegalese Cup won by, 164–65; at 1980 Senegalese Cup, 153–56, 165–66, 171, 172, 241n17; fans, at international matches, 177–78; fans, carrying weapons, 164; vs. Jeanne d’Arc, 28, 153–55, 154, 155; matches, separatism at, 164–66; origins of, 160; Senegalese security infiltrating, 163, 171; separatism and, 28, 155, 156–57, 160–61, 163–64, 171–72
- Catholic Church, 12–13, 23, 112–13; and the Africanization of Catholicism, 112–13, 115–16; and borders of Casamance, 55, 114, 224n81; Jola people and, 114; MFDC ceasefire and, 179, 187n27; missionary education and, 112, 116, 128, 129–30, 132, 134, 151, 233n71; Second Vatican Council of, 115, 226n109; and state, divisions between, 129–30, 233n71. *See also* Christianity
- Catholic Diocese of Ziguinchor, 23, 24
- ceasefires, 6, 23, 179–80, 187n27, 248n104
- Césaire, Aimé, 138
- CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine), 222n51
- Charpy, Jacques, 23, 244n50
- Chatterjee, Partha, 116, 150–51
- Christianity, 72; and Islam, coexisting, 77; and Islamic majority, 112; Jola converts to, 114; missionary education and, 112, 116, 128, 129–30, 132, 134, 151, 233n71; Protestant, 112, 225n84; racism in, 199n23; syncretistic, 112, 114. *See also* Catholic Church
- circumcision, 27, 117–18, 119, 238n143; female, 243n34
- Cissé, Nouha, 55, 91, 212n42, 229n5
- climate change, 69, 87, 88–91, 93, 209n14, 217n121
- cognitive maps, 12, 191n63
- Colanna, Fanny, 128
- Colonial Geographical Service, 53
- colonial mapping, 12, 15, 26, 29, 42–44, 61; Africans influencing, 61; “the Casamance” introduced by, 67; conflicts over, 78–79; of rivers, 26, 32, 33–34, 36–37, 40–41, 42–50, 61, 181; as violence, 203n67
- colonial soldiers, 228n131
- colonial stadium, 157, 158–60. *See also* The Stadium

- colonization: and academic constructs, 50; Berlin Conference and, 7, 17, 40, 42, 43; Casamance region created by, 33–34, 36, 43–44, 45–48, 50, 52–55, 97, 181; “civilizing mission” of, 100, 113, 130, 138, 157, 158; colonial agency and, 67; and colonial conflict, 37–38, 41; colonial subjects and, 49–50, 129; colonies funding, 204n82; commodification and, 45–50; and decolonization, 50; direct vs. indirect rule in, 39; and “discovery,” 196n8; education supporting, 124, 125–26, 137, 242n27; extractive, 44–50, 97, 98–99, 104, 181, 204n80; and forest classification, 98–102, 119; Islamization and Mandinkization linked to, 73, 76; nationalism stemming from, 79, 98, 137; and postcolonial indigenous rights, 59–61; and the postcolonial nation-state, 15–16, 67, 102–8, 126–27, 133–37; and religion, generally, 115–16; resistance to, 33, 80–82, 98, 123–24, 136–37, 148–49, 157–59, 181, 228n133; rice fields and, 66, 67, 78–79, 93; river mapping and, 26, 32, 33–34, 36–37, 40–41, 42–50, 61, 181; violence of, 203n67, 219n11; women’s roles under, 72. *See also* colonial mapping; French colonialism; Portuguese colonialism
- Coma, Kéba, 250n121
- Combo, 42, 75, 202n59
- Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA), 222n51
- “Condition of Our Evolution: Teaching Reform, The” (Senghor), 139
- “Conquête et résistance des peuples de Casamance, 1850–1920” (Roche), 148
- conservation, colonial, 99, 222n54
- Cooper, Frederick, 50, 82–83, 230n15
- Coppet, Marcel de, 78
- cosmology: Jola, rice in, 26–27, 67–68, 70, 90, 93; Jola, the Sacred Forest in, 112; modern secular, 151; of The School, 151
- Costa, Peter da, 90, 91
- Cote d’Ivoire, 185n1
- counter-mapping, 2, 12, 14–15, 17, 29, 181; antiseparatist, 14–15, 17, 24–25, 29, 33–34, 61, 119–20, 167, 181–83; definition of, 15; by elites, 17, 18–19, 24, 57–61, 108–12, 119; of The Forest, 109–16, 119–20; indigenous, 59–61, 207n127; of The River, 31–34, 55–57, 58–61; and spatial history, 15–17; of The Stadium, 167
- Cresswell, Timothy, 11
- Dagorne, Victor, 39
- Dakar, 133, 135, 160
- Dakar-Ziguinchor ferry, 182
- Daly, Samuel Fury Childs, 22
- Damas, Léon, 138
- dams, 88–89, 90–91
- Darbon, Dominique, 84, 214n66
- Davidson, Basil, 135–36, 234n76
- Davidson, Joanna, 68, 69, 90, 209n14, 227n117
- de Certeau, Michel, 14
- decolonization, 50
- Deets, Mark, 9, 190n48
- deforestation, 100, 101, 110–11
- De Jong, Ferdinand, 109, 110, 112, 116
- de l’Isle, Guillaume, 36, 36–37
- Demba Diop Stadium, 164–65, 167–68, 173
- Deschamps, Hubert, 49
- desertification, 8, 87, 89, 93, 110–11, 189n41
- de Vries, Lotje, 22
- Dia, Mamadou, 83, 84–85, 136
- Diabir, 161, 163; sacred forest meetings near, 5–6, 57, 58, 63, 95–96, 114, 161, 166
- Diadhiou, Tété, 149
- Diallo, Ibou, 102, 125, 132, 145, 147, 230n13
- Diamacoune, Bertrand, 25, 229n7, 238n142; on borders of the Casamance, 55; death of, 180; forest initiation of, 114, 192n65; on the FSF, 155; MFDC roles of, 240n9; nonelite status of, 149–50; on rice, 71
- Diamacoune, Father. *See* Senghor, Augustin Diamacoune
- Diamacoune, Mathieu, 138–39
- Diatta, Abdou Elinkine, 162–63
- Diatta, Aline Sitoé, 28, 72, 181, 182, 183, 210n15; Senghor on, 80, 81–82, 155–56
- Diatta, Benjamin, 123
- Diatta, Nazaire: on children, 121, 228; on confirming past events, 178, 250–51; on forest initiations, 95, 218; on rice fields, 63, 207–8; on water, 30, 196; on wrestling, 1, 153, 185, 239
- Diatta, Oumar, 55, 59
- Diatta, Victor, 102, 123–24, 147, 230n13
- Diaw, Laye, 165, 173, 249n115

- Diédhiou, Paul, 218n1, 244n46
- Diémé, Ismaila Magne, 113
- Diémé, Mamadou, 4
- Dieng, Mbaye Gueye, 175
- Diop, Abou Latif, 249n118
- Dior, Lat, 98, 137
- Diouf, Abdou, 77, 81, 82
- Diouf, Mamadou, 20, 57, 108, 110, 116, 125
- discourse of grievance, 8, 10, 181; The Forest in, 27, 119; in history education, 126–27; Sagna's death as, 122, 123–24, 229n6; school closures fueling, 135; spatial aspects of, 10–11, 14, 15, 26, 182; The Stadium in, 169–70
- “discovery” of places, 196n8
- discursive mapping, 11–12, 17, 25–26, 31–32, 33–34, 119–20, 182–83; belonging and, 11, 29, 61, 70–71, 109–11, 167; by indigenous people, 59–60; and territoriality, 40–41
- Double Less, 28, 29, 167, 168, 169, 174, 248n90
- drought, 8, 89, 90–91, 189n41
- Dutch traders, 36
- École Normale William Ponty, 136–37, 138, 141
- education: colonial infiltration via, 129; colonial intentions for, 124, 125–26, 137, 242n27; of elites, 10, 27, 79, 112, 124–25, 127, 129, 132, 151–52; in French language, 125, 129, 135; gender and, 92, 129, 130, 132, 151, 152; hierarchical nature of, 128; infrastructure for, 129–30, 131–32; by missionaries, of nationalists, 19, 27, 112, 126, 141, 151, 152; nationalism and, 124, 125, 126–27, 135–40, 150–52; power conferred by, 149–50, 151–52; reform, 139; rural, 130–31, 135; Senegalese history in, 126–27, 135–40; spread of, 129; and territorial identity, 127, 133; traditional, as family-based, 150–51, 152; Western, and production, 124–25, 135, 139, 150–51. *See also* education in the Casamance; The School
- education in the Casamance: colonial, 127–33, 233n71; literacy rates and, 127, 133–34; national history in, 126–27, 135–40; by *nordistes*, 131–32; postcolonial, 133–35
- Egypt, 18, 183, 203n67
- elites, 132, 151–52; at center of conflict, 122, 124–25; colonists creating class of, 129, 138–39; counter-mapping by, 17, 18–19, 24, 57–61, 108–12, 119; forest classification by, 104; histories written by, 135; and ordinary people, 18–19, 24–25, 33, 61, 84, 94, 119–20, 126, 150, 156, 167; “Portuguese,” 128; rivalries between, 8, 137, 145, 234n81; schooling of, 10, 27, 79, 112, 124–25, 127, 129, 132, 151–52; speaking for peasants, 82, 181–82
- Emitai (Supreme Being), 68, 117
- Englebert, Pierre, 22, 23, 125
- environmental protection, 103, 109–10, 223n68. *See also* natural environment
- Esukolal, 4
- ethnicity: and ethnic groups of Senegal, 13, 20, 32, 37; European fascination with, 37; and The Forest, 111; and Jola tribalism, 56, 111; and language, 125; production mapped onto, 48, 48–50, 49; and rice production, 71, 77–78; wrestling and, 160. *See also specific ethnic groups*
- ethnocartography, 50, 60
- ethnographic order, 97, 98
- évolués* (evolved men), 124, 132, 135, 230n14. *See also* elites
- extraction: beauty and, 44–45; colonization and, 44–50, 97, 98–99, 104, 181, 204n80; labor, 49, 55, 98, 99
- Fahmy, Ziad, 18, 19, 183
- Fair, Laura, 158
- Falola, Toyin, 129–30
- family, traditional education and, 150–51
- famine, 8, 189n41
- Farim, 31, 196n5
- farming. *See* agriculture; rice
- Faye, Ousseynou, 168, 177
- Fédération Sénégalaise de Football (FSF), 155
- female circumcision, 243n34
- Fernandez, Álvaro, 32
- Ferrell, Lacy, 125
- filhos de terra* (sons of the land), 36
- Firestone Rubber Corporation, 222n49
- “First Plan for the Development of Senegal” (Dia), 83, 84
- fish, 26, 34, 35, 94, 218n134
- Floup. *See* Jola people
- Fogny, 42, 90–91, 132–33, 185, 249n110

- food, 26–27, 34–35, 67–70, 75. *See also* rice
- The Forest, 5, 6, 9–10, 11, 27; Casamançais unity and, 114; classification of, 98–102, 103–8, 119, 220n20; cutting in, 101; and deforestation, 100, 101, 110–11; development of, as concept, 12, 108–16; exploitation of, 27, 99, 101, 108–9, 220n20; fires in, 101, 106; as gendered, 119; male initiation in, 12, 27, 109, 117, 218, 238n143; as monolith, 27, 114; moral character of, 109; ordinary Casamançais and, 119–20; palm wine and, 100–101; as place vs. space, 100, 108–16, 119–20; reforestation of, 100, 103; as refuge for outlaws, 100; and religious syncretism, 112–13, 114–15; rubber production and, 104–6; and “scientific forestry,” 98–99, 104; in Senegalese nationalism, 102–8; shrines in, 9, 12, 27, 109, 111–12, 114, 116–18, 151, 218n1, 227n119, 228n133; social training in, 117–18; tree planting in, 102–3; women’s rites in, 117, 118–19, 228n131
- forêt classée* (classified forest), 98–102, 119. *See also* The Forest
- Foster, Elizabeth, 125
- Foster, Jeremy, 224n73
- Foucher, Vincent, 22–23, 29, 126, 224n81; on Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, 142; on Casa-Sports, 163, 244n46; on education, 125, 127–28, 130, 135, 233n71; on Islam, 40, 113; on separatists’ ties to Senegal, 168
- Fouladou, 78–79
- Fox, William, 199n23
- la frappe* (the punch), 160, 167
- French colonialism: and the British-French Boundary Commission, 42–44, 55, 75, 202n59, 242n25; and Casamance River, 44–45, 50; CFA used by, 222n51; and colonial soldiers, 228n131; and colonial subjects, 49–50, 129; Diatta’s resistance to, 80; educational system of, 127–33; Fr. Senghor’s experience of, 88; history of, 50, 51–52, 53, 53–54; indirect rule and, 39; intensification of, 66, 67; Jola resistance to, 66, 80–81, 148–49; labor and, 49, 55, 98; mapping Casamance, 36, 36–37, 48, 48–50, 49, 53, 53–54; and neocolonial companies, 104, 106; Portuguese and, 35, 37–40, 78–79, 200n32, 249n117; rubber production and, 47, 104–6; separation of church and state in, 130, 233n71; technocracy of, 102
- French language, teaching of, 125, 129, 135
- French Socialist Party, 123, 139
- French traders, 36, 39, 74
- French Union Territorial Assembly, 83, 140
- frontiers, 41
- Fula people, 90, 111
- Futa Jallon Plateau, 34
- Gabu, 210n14, 227n121
- The Gambia: borders of, 2, 7, 8, 42, 136; implicated in conflict, 6, 59, 106n111, 187n27; MFDC support from, 21; refugees in, 184
- Gambian National Record Service, 23
- Gambia River, 32, 37, 38, 45–47
- Geertz, Clifford, 179
- Gelo, Daniel J., 40–41
- gender: and education, 92, 129, 130, 132, 151, 152; forest initiations and, 12, 27, 109, 117, 218, 238n143; and nationalism, 151; and palm wine, 72; proverb on, 30, 196; rice fields and, 26–27, 69, 72–73, 74–75, 87–88, 92, 211n30; and wrestling, 28, 176–77
- geographic order, 97–98
- Girard, Jean, 96, 238n132
- Gorée, 38–39, 136, 234n77
- Gray, Christopher, 12
- “Greater France,” 132
- Greene, Sandra E., 192n63
- grievance. *See* discourse of grievance
- Grosmaire, Pierre, 101–2, 104–6, 222n50
- Guèye, Lamine, 83, 102, 138, 139–40, 143, 226n97
- Gueye, Mbaye, 167–68, 248n90
- Guinea, colonial, 18, 78–79
- Guinea-Bissau, 196n1; attacking MFDC, 30–31; implicated in conflict, 6, 59, 106n111, 187n27; MFDC support from, 21; refugees in, 184
- Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces (GBAF), 30
- Hämäläinen, Pekka, 41
- hank* (common residence), 70
- Harms, Robert, 222n46
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 150, 238n129
- Histoire de la Casamance: Conquête et résistance, 1850–1920* (Roche), 148–49

- history: African, disregard of, 138, 238n129, 242n27; elite vs. peasant, 181–82; and “homespun historians,” 140–42, 146–47, 149, 152; modern secularism shaping, 151; “people without,” 147, 238n129; Senegalese, Casamançais omitted from, 126, 127, 140–41, 163; spatial turn in, 231n30
- Hodgkin, Thomas, 225n82
- Holy Ghost Fathers, 129, 130, 137
- “homespun historians,” 141–42, 146–47, 149, 152
- Houphouët-Boigny, Felix, 102, 136, 145, 234n81
- hybridity, 34–35, 41, 73–74; identity and, 41, 74, 173; spatial, 16, 111
- Hydén, Göran, 223n56
- identities: hybrid, 41, 74, 173; multiplicity of, 76, 77, 173; and space-place, 87–88, 170–72, 177–78, 181. *See also* Casamançais identity
- ideologies of space, 169
- imagining the nation, 144, 237n116; in early postcolonial period, 135–36; at Lycée Djignabo, 91, 126, 127, 133, 147–49, 151–52; nonprint means of, 183–84; by ordinary Casamançais, 124, 125, 152, 156; space as means of, 14, 17–18, 68–70, 152, 182, 184; through The Stadium, 156, 159, 161, 169–70, 172, 178
- independence, 50, 82–83, 102–3
- indigénat*, 83
- indigenous people: counter-mapping by, 59–61, 207n127; erasure of, 41
- Indonesia, forest mapping in, 59–60
- Information Revolution, 184
- initiations. *See* The Forest
- intermarriage, 77
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 9
- Islam: in the Casamance, 113; and Christianity, coexisting, 77; as dominant Senegalese religion, 108, 112; jihad in, 115; Jola converting to, 40, 74, 112, 113; and marabout raiders, 40, 42, 75; Muslim schools and, 130, 134; palm wine and, 101, 164; syncretistic, 112; and trade, 73, 74
- Islamization, 66, 67, 73, 76, 93
- Jaata, Yaya, 140–41
- Jackson, Robert, 190n48
- Jacobs, Janice, 190n48
- Jaraaf (soccer club), 164–65, 246n70
- Jeanne d’Arc (soccer team), 28, 153–55, 154, 155, 172, 241n17
- Joël, 137, 235n85
- joblessness, 9
- Jola language: dialects of, 117, 227n122; and etymology of “Casamance,” 31, 32; sung at Casa-Sports, 164
- Jola people, 3, 35, 37; ascendancy of, 38; Christian, 113–14, 134; colonial views of, 98; cosmology of, 26–27, 67–68, 70, 90, 93, 112; cultural association of, 4; egalitarianism of, 128, 142, 220n21; fleeing French control, 40; labor culture of, 70, 86; land tenure among, 70, 77, 88, 244n48; literacy of, 127–28, 133–34; in Lower Casamance, 77; marabouts raiding, 40, 42, 75; market production of, 39; migrations of, 35, 199n22, 209n14, 227n121, 247n78; Muslim, 40, 74, 112, 113; name of, 39; in neighboring nations, 184; oral histories of, 142; and sacred forests, 9–10; Serer as “cousins” to, 166, 247n78; as stateless, 100, 220n21; subgroups of, 39, 57–58, 59, 117, 227n122; traditional religion of, 9–10, 112, 113, 114–19; tribalism and, 56–57, 78; and Wolof, conflicts between, 78; women’s leadership and, 119; wrestling, 185, 239, 241n20. *See also* Mandinkization; rice
- Jola proverbs, 1, 30, 63, 95, 121, 153, 179, 185
- “Jola Republic,” 20, 21, 56, 209n14
- Jubelin, Jean, 129
- Jubilee celebrations, 19–20, 183
- Jules-François Bocandé Stadium, 161
- juridical space, 97, 103–4, 108
- Kaba, Foday, 40, 42, 75, 78
- Kabrousse, 80, 240n10
- Kadior, 86, 162
- kahat*, 27, 117. *See also* The Forest
- Kandialang, rice field south of, 64–65, 65
- kankaran* (Mandinka ceremony), 118
- Kasson, John A., 203n62
- kayendo*, 69, 211n25
- Kelumak* (journal), 4, 164, 246n64
- Kenney, Arthur Herbert, 42–43, 44
- Kenya: Luo history in, 142; Mau Mau conflict in, 86, 216n104; postcolonial, 15–16; religion in, 113
- Khoulé, Ngoumbane, 248n87
- Kolda, 130, 133–34

- Koonjaen people, 117  
 Kreike, Emmanuel, 222n54
- laamb* (traditional wrestling), 159–60, 166–67, 243n36; Casamançais version “purer” than, 167, 247n87; non-Dakarais challengers in, 168; social performance via, 174–77
- Labbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: Par lui-même et par ceux qui l'ont connu* (Bassène), 24
- labor: extraction, 49, 55, 98, 99; gendered division of, 27, 72–73, 74–75; peasant, in rice fields, 62, 84–85; shortages, 72; sports and, 158; “work associations” and, 70
- Labrune-Badiane, Céline, 125, 129, 131–32, 133
- Lambin, Pierre, 149
- lançados* (Portuguese settlers), 36
- land: conflicts over, 78–79; Jola attitudes toward, 70, 77, 88, 216n112, 244n48; national domain law and, 3, 9, 69, 86–87, 90, 122, 161–62; tenure, generally, 79, 161–62, 244n48. *See also specific places*
- land mines, 6, 64–65, 94
- landscape, 14
- leapfrogging, 124, 230n15
- Lebu people, 140, 159–60
- Le Corbusier, 241n17
- Lefebvre, Henri, 16, 47–48, 169, 170
- legibility, 97, 99–100
- Lenoir, Alfred Hippolyte, 44, 45
- Lentz, Carola, 19–20, 183
- Léopold Sédar Senghor National Stadium, 177
- Liberia, 185n1, 222n49
- Linares, Olga, 68, 74, 76, 77, 209n14, 211n25
- literacy rates: in the Casamance, 127, 133–34; and “print-capitalism,” 18, 112, 156, 184; in Senegal, generally, 127–28, 133–34, 134
- the local, 15, 29, 33, 94, 119–20, 127, 132, 152
- Lonbe, Mary, 115, 226n110
- Lonsdale, John, 86, 113, 152, 216n104
- Louda, 78
- Lower Casamance, 4, 34, 56; ethnicity in, 38, 39, 41, 48, 48–50, 49, 57, 72–78, 199n22, 209n14, 227n121; Islam in, 40, 73; as Jola territory, 56, 57, 72, 77, 100, 111; literacy in, 127–28; rice production in, 64, 68–69, 72–78, 90, 93–94, 209n14
- Lumleys Auctioneers, 46
- la lutte*. *See* wrestling
- Lycée Djignabo, 134, 229n2; imagining the nation at, 91, 126, 127, 133, 147–49, 151–52; multiethnicity and, 126; namesake of, 148; physical plant of, 133; shift in student demographics of, 151, 152; student strike at, 82, 121–24, 134, 147, 149, 152, 229n5; as symbol of Casamance, 147–49; violence at, 121–24
- MacArthur, Julie, 15–16, 18, 231n30
- Macola, Giacomo, 126, 141, 142
- Malbranque, Jules Florent, 53, 86, 99, 158, 241n17, 242n26, 242n27
- Male Cissé, Seynabou, 82, 91, 92–93
- Mali Federation, 56, 102–3, 133, 145
- Mancagne people, 58
- Mandé peoples, 32, 210n14
- Mandina Mancagne, 6, 63, 64–65, 209n8, 209n9
- Mandina Mandioka, 30
- Mandinka Empire, 7, 39
- Mandinka people: ascendancy of, 38, 58; Balla Gaye 2 from, 29; as Casamançais, 76, 111; education among, 134; gendered work among, 72–73, 211n30; peanuts and, 72–73, 74–75, 76, 77, 78, 211n30, 212n38; raids by, 40; religious custom of, 117, 118; social structure of, 214n66
- Mandinkization, 27, 75–76; the Bainouk under, 73–74; colonization and Islamization linked to, 73, 76; and gender roles, 27, 72–73, 74–75, 76, 79, 211n30, 212n38; and genetic mixing, 77; and Jola identity, 76, 77; and peanut production, 72–73, 74–75, 76, 77, 78, 211n30, 212n38; rice fields and, 66, 67, 93; social change effected by, 75–76
- Mané, Ansumana, 30
- Manga, Mohamed, 142, 146, 165
- Manjak people, 58
- mapping: the Casamance River, 26, 31–32, 33–34, 36, 36–37, 37, 42–45, 54–55, 59, 61, 181; definition of, 11; economic order and, 44, 45–46; ethnicity and production, 48, 48–50, 49; indigenious, 12, 15–16, 26, 41, 59–61, 207n127; postcolonial, 11–12, 15–16, 17, 33, 50–55, 60–61, 103–8; in pursuit of

- peace, 183; resource, 59–60; violence stemming from, 166–67, 180. *See also* counter-mapping; discursive mapping
- Maraboutic Wars, 78, 204n80
- marabouts*, 40, 42, 75, 175
- Mark, Peter, 113, 116, 117, 200n27, 214n61; on *bukut*, 118, 228n127; on cultural transformation, 38; on rubber market, 222n46; on spirit shrines, 227n119
- Marut, Jean-Claude, 15, 23, 126, 189n41, 224n81; on colonial maps, 53; on the Jola, 56; on peace, 184; on rice, 75
- mass arrests, 64
- Massey, Doreen B., 16, 170
- Matam, 55–56, 191n60, 246n67
- material and metaphysical, fusion of, 68–69, 76, 93, 110
- material culture, 128
- Mau Mau conflict, 86
- mbapat* (freestyle wrestling), 159, 166–67
- M'Baye, Joseph, 103–4, 106, 107–8, 111
- McClintock, Anne, 82
- media, nationalism and, 18–19
- “media-capitalism,” 18
- men: initiation of, in the forest, 12, 27, 109, 117, 218, 238n143; in peanut fields, 72–73, 74–75, 79; in rice fields, 27; wrestling, 176–77
- metaphysical and material, fusion of, 68–69, 76, 93, 110
- methodology, 23–28
- métissage* (cultural mixing), 36
- missionary education, 112, 116, 128, 129–30, 132, 134, 151, 233n71
- Mitchell, Timothy, 203n67
- M'Lomp, 78
- Monument aux Morts, 183
- Moorman, Marissa J., 18
- Mo-rom* (journal), 235n91
- Mouvement Autonome de Casamance (MAC), 140
- Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC): 1982 march of, 5–6, 95–96, 161, 166, 187n15, 244n46, 244n51; arrests of members of, 64; ceasefires, 6, 23, 113, 179–80, 187n27, 248n104; Dia claimed by, 84–85; discursive mapping by, 11, 14, 108–16; ethnicity and, 21, 56–59, 161; factions of, 23, 180, 187n27; GBAF attacking, 30–31; leaders of, as schoolteachers, 125–26, 132, 138; Mandinkization and, 77; original vs. modern, 5, 123–24, 126, 127, 142–43, 145–46, 186n12, 230n14; origins of, 2, 4–5, 187n14, 230n14, 246n64; outside support for, 21; peace talks with, 6, 9, 170, 179–80; peasants as portrayed by, 62, 66–67, 84–85, 181–82; religious diversity among, 113–14, 226n97; “sacred forest” created by, 218n1; as “terrorists,” 22; weapons for, 6, 30; Ziguinchor attack planned by, 63–64
- mysticism, 148, 175–76
- Napoleonic Wars, 38, 200n32
- the nation: colonial understandings of, 37; commemorating, 183; and localities, 112, 113; moral claim to building, 127; schooling and, 124, 125–27, 133, 135, 151. *See also* imagining the nation; the state
- National Center for Arts and Culture, 23, 24
- national domain law, 3, 9, 69, 86–87, 90, 122, 161–62
- national geo-body, 17
- nationalism: African, 17–18, 19–20; clergy leadership and, 225n82; as cultural artefact, 182; echo chambers of, 150, 152; and education, generally, 124, 125, 126–27, 135–40, 150–52; gender and, 151; increase in, 184; media's role in, 18–19; and missionary education, 19, 27, 112, 126, 141, 151, 152; nonelite roles in, 18, 124, 149–50; separatism as type of, 20–21; space and, generally, 16–20, 24, 29, 102, 110, 169–70, 180–82, 183–84; tree planting and, 102–3
- natural environment: and Casamançais nationalism, 9–11, 14, 16–17, 109–10; as challenge to colonists, 98; ideology of interaction with, 68; rendered as place, 191n57
- navétanes* (youth soccer teams), 170–71
- Ndiaye, Demba (journalist), 65
- Ndiaye, Demba (soccer player), 165
- Ndiaye, Ibrahima, 40
- Ndiaye, Mbehr, 174–75
- Ndiaye, Tanor, 165
- négritude*, 83, 136, 138
- Néma Stadium, 160–61, 163
- neoliberalism, 8–9, 67, 122, 184, 229n2
- Nicaragua, indigenous land rights in, 60
- Nicol, Estelle, 50

- Nigeria, 22, 183, 185n1  
 Nioumoun, *bukut* in, 118  
 Nkrumah, Kwame, 7–8, 136, 151, 186n2, 234n76  
*nordistes*: definition of, 186n4, 229n2, 244n48; Father Senghor on, 3–4, 122, 205n102, 213n48; instilling hatred of, 205n102; land bought up by, 3, 9, 69, 86–87, 122, 161–62, 244n48; as “strangers,” 90, 110, 162, 205n102, 213n48  
 Northern Rivers area, 196n6  
 Nugent, Paul, 188n30
- O’Brien, Donal B. Cruise, 159, 168  
 Ogot, Bethwell, 142  
 Olympic Games, 167  
 oral histories, 12, 15; anonymous, 25; Casa-Sports in, 171–72; complementing spatial history, 24; of Djignabo, 149; of women, 25, 150  
 order: colonial, types of, 97–98; economic, 44; mapping as creation of, 11, 41, 44–45, 97–98; schools imposing, 125–26, 149  
 ordinary Casamançais, 14–15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24–25; counter-mapping by, 14–15, 17, 24–25, 29, 33–34, 61, 119–20, 167, 181–83; definition of, 19; vs. elites, 18–19, 24–25, 33, 61, 84, 94, 119–20, 126, 150, 156, 167; Guèye and Seck rejected by, 140; imagining the nation, 124, 125, 152, 156; local scope of, 15, 29, 33, 94, 119–20, 127, 132, 152; and The River, 33, 61; as Senegalese, 14–15, 156–57, 167, 180; Senghor weaponizing, 66–67, 81, 86–87, 122, 142, 181–82; and The Stadium, 156, 167  
 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 7–8, 22, 193n81  
*Oryza glaberrima* (red or African rice), 74  
*Oryza sativa* (Portuguese or white rice), 74  
 Oussouye, 172
- palm oil, 39  
 palm tree, 110–11  
 palm wine, 72, 100–101, 164, 245n62  
 Papa Kulimpi. *See* Senghor, Augustin  
 Diamacoune  
 Park, Mungo, 37, 37  
 peace: ceasefires and, 6, 23, 179–80, 187n27, 248n104; concert for, 249n120; mapping in pursuit of, 183; spaces and places of, 180, 184; talks and MFDC, 6, 9, 170, 179–80; women mobilizing for, 82, 91–93, 119  
 peanuts: Mandinka production of, 72–73, 74–75, 76, 77, 78, 211n30, 212n38; men cultivating, 72–73, 211n30; and peanut oil, 39; resisting production of, 76, 77–78; vs. rice, 72–73, 74–75, 77–78, 79, 211n30, 212n38; and rubber production, 104, 105  
 peasants: agency of, 62, 100; “capture” of, 223n56; evicted from forests, 99; land seized from, 86–87, 90; in MFDC rhetoric, 62, 66–67, 84–85, 181–82; rice, essentialized, 66, 67, 84; women personifying, 210n15. *See also* ordinary Casamançais  
 Péliissier, Paul, 75–76, 211n18, 211n25  
 Peluso, Nancy, 59–60  
 performing secessionism, 22–23, 194n106  
 Peterson, Derek, 126, 141, 142  
 pirogues, 91, 217n127, 246n68  
 place: definition of, 16, 169; difference located in, 110; hybridity of, 16, 111; iconic nature of, 11, 16–17, 23; and space, coexistence of, 169–70; and space-place dialectic, 11–12, 16–17, 110, 170, 181. *See also specific places*  
 Platform of Women for Peace in the Casamance, 82, 91–92  
 Podor, 138, 235n93  
 political power: education and, 125–26, 127, 140, 149–50, 242n27; ethnocartography and, 50; nationalism as route to, 17; rumor and, 143–47; spiritual capital and, 119  
 Popular Rural Schooling program, 130  
 “Portuguese” (merchant class), 36, 40, 128, 200n27  
 Portuguese colonialism, 31–32, 35–36, 38; and the French, 35, 37–40, 78–79, 200n32, 249n117; and rice, 74  
 postcolonial mapping, 11–12, 15–16, 17, 33, 50–55, 60–61, 103–8  
 postcolonial nation-state, 15–16, 67, 102–8, 126–27, 133–37  
 power. *See* political power  
 “print-capitalism,” 18, 112, 156, 183–84  
 production: agricultural shifts and, 74, 75, 76, 104–6; mapped onto ethnicity, 48, 48–50, 49; property rights and, 59–60, 162; and state spatial practices, 44–48, 54–55, 97–99, 108; and Western

- education, 124–25, 135, 139, 150–51.  
*See also* The Forest; rice
- property rights, 59–60, 162
- Protestantism, 112, 225n84
- ras-le-bol*, 165, 173, 246n74
- rebels, typology of, 21
- “regionalism,” 107, 231n27
- Reis’s Concession, 45, 45–47, 46, 48
- religion: “Africanization” of, 112–13, 115–16;  
 in African nationalisms, 112–13; Casamance divided by, 113–14, 226n97;  
 and nationalist clergy, 225n82; and palm wine, 245n62
- Reno, William, 21–22
- Rhodesia, 50, 204n83
- rice: Aline Sitoé Diatta and, 80–82; “civilization of,” 35, 67, 71–72, 73, 211n18;  
 community built by, 67, 69–70;  
 cultivation, process of, 69–70, 207–8;  
 and environmental change, 88–91, 93, 209n14; importation of, 75; mapping, 49;  
 palm wine associated with, 72, 100; vs. peanuts, 72–73, 74–75, 77–78, 79, 211n30, 212n38; “rain-fed,” 66;  
 sack vs. paddy, 71; as sacred, 68; Senegalese independence and, 83, 84–85;  
 as staple, 26–27, 62, 65–66, 67–68, 70, 72, 74; trade, 26, 39, 74;  
 types of, 74; as unifying factor, 70–71, 73;  
 in Upper Guinea Coast generally, 72; war threatening production of, 65
- The Rice Field, 10, 11, 26–27, 64, 147; as Casamance, 71, 73, 85;  
 conflicts over, 78–79; dams threatening, 88–89;  
 development of, as separatist symbol, 66–67, 68–69, 81–82, 93, 208n4;  
 in the early republic, 82–85; flexibility of, as symbol, 93;  
 gender and, 26–27, 69, 72–73, 74–75, 87–88, 92, 211n30;  
 and Jola cosmology, 26–27, 67–68, 70, 90, 93;  
 and other agricultural spaces, 71–72;  
 in proverbs, 207–8; shrines in, 68;  
 as symbol of peace, 92–93; vs. tourism, 87;  
 violation of, 88
- The River, 13, 26; counter-mapping, 31–34, 55–57, 58–61;  
 ethnic diversity masked by, 57–59;  
 and Jola leadership, 57, 59; as place, 61;  
 precolonial, 34–41; as source of life, 34–35;  
 as unifying space, 55, 212n42; “waves” of, 58.  
*See also* Casamance River
- les Rivières du Sud, 26, 32, 196n6; the Casamance as distinct from, 50;  
 changing European presence on, 37–38;  
 geography of, 33, 34
- Robert Delmas Stadium, 160, 163, 166
- Robinson, David, 76
- Roche, Christian, 85, 96, 148–49
- Rodney, Walter, 198n18
- Roth, Richard, 190n48
- Royal Belgian Geographical Society, 45
- rubber, 46, 47, 104–6, 222n46, 222n49
- rumor, power of, 144
- rural development, 104
- Sack, Steven, 231n30
- “sacred forest,” 5–6, 9–10, 190n51;  
 authenticity of, 218n1; in Casamançais spirituality, 27, 77, 109, 110–12, 114–19, 218, 219n7;  
 development of, as concept, 12, 108–16;  
 environmental protection and, 103, 109–10, 223n68;  
 meetings in, 5–6, 57, 58, 63, 95–96, 114, 161, 166, 218n1.  
*See also* The Forest
- Sadio, Salif, 113, 179; ceasefire declared by, 179, 180, 187n27;  
 in combat, 30–31, 180, 195n106, 249n110
- safoul*, 186m10
- Sagna, Augustin, 13
- Sagna, Idrissa, 82, 121–24, 134, 147, 149
- Sagna, Léopold, 180
- Sagna, Robert, 115
- the Sahel, 8
- Sahlins, Peter, 202n52
- Sajous, Albert, 48, 48–49, 49
- Sakho, Mamadou Lamine. *See* Double Less
- Sakho, Omar. *See* Balla Gaye 2
- Salisbury, Marquess of (Robert Cecil), 43
- Sall, Amadou Clédor, 138
- Sall, Macky, 173, 179
- Sambou, Vieux Faye, 113
- Sané, Mamadou “Nkrumah,” 2, 3, 113, 180;  
 arrest of, 5, 64, 187n16, 208n6;  
 on Badiane, 146; Badji and, 6; *Casamance Kunda* by, 223n68;  
 early life of, 2; Father Senghor meeting, 2, 4–5;  
 on The Forest, 109;  
 on the MFDC, 186n12; MFDC cofounded by, 2, 4–5, 187n14, 230n14, 246n64;  
 nickname of, 186n2
- Sané, Mariama, 4
- Sant’Egidio, 179, 187n27
- Sarr, Bakary, 153–54, 154, 155, 171

- Sarr, Doudou, 130–31
- Schama, Simon, 14
- Schmidt, Elizabeth, 18
- Schomerus, Mareika, 22
- The School, 11, 27, 91; contesting the nation in, 126, 127, 147, 149, 151–52; cosmology of, 151; discipline imposed by, 149; as gendered place, 140, 141; “men of letters” in, 124–25, 129, 135; nationalism propagated in, 124–25, 149, 151–52; as place of unity, 139. *See also* Lycée Djignabo
- schools: closure of, 135; founding of, 129–30, 132–33, 232n34; public support of, 130–31, 132–33
- schoolteachers. *See* teachers
- scientific forestry, 98–99
- Scott, James C., 97, 98, 100, 241n17
- Sebikotane, 136, 234n78
- secessionism, performing, 22–23, 194n106
- Secessionism in African Politics* (de Vries, Englebert, and Schomerus), 22–23
- Seck, Assane, 83, 140, 141, 143
- Second Vatican Council, 115, 226n109
- Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), 123, 139, 140, 141, 235n98
- secure space, 97–98, 158
- Sédhiou, 38, 74; as Mandinka territory, 77; reforestation camp in, 103; school at, 129, 138
- Sékou Touré, Ahmed, 102, 145, 242n27
- Séléki, 148
- Senegal: administrative reforms by, 53, 53–55; benefits of participation in, 106–7, 168; borders of, 7–8, 42–44, 56, 61, 78–79, 97; Casamançais heroes claimed by, 182; as colonizer of Casamance, 81, 84–85, 87, 88, 93, 109–11, 122, 126–27, 143, 162; dams built by, 88–89; ethnic groups of, 13, 20–21, 32, 37, 48–50, 145; financial crisis of, 122; flags of, removed, 5–6, 95–96, 161, 166, 187n15, 244n46; foreign assistance for, 83; as foreign to Casamançais, 3–4, 17, 58, 110–11, 137, 140, 149, 186n4, 234n83, 245n57; French historians of, 148, 238n132; gendarmes of, killed, 6, 63, 96, 166; hegemonic history of, 137, 142; independence of, 50, 66, 82–83, 102–4, 144, 146, 205n91; “Islamization” of, 57, 112, 113, 116, 119, 125, 127, 142, 167, 170, 231n24; literacy in, 127–28, 133–34, 134; postcolonial reduction of, 56; poverty in, 175; spatial regimes of, 96, 106–8; teaching history of, 126–27, 135–40. *See also nordistes*
- Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF), 6, 30, 64
- Senegalese Cup: 1979, 164–65; 1980, 153–56, 165–66, 171, 172, 241n17
- Sénégalité, 108, 113, 116, 170
- the Senegambia, 2, 61, 189n40
- Senegambia Confederation, 8
- Senghor, Augustin Diamacoune, 2, 5, 61, 138–39; 1980 chamber of commerce speech of, 79–80, 81–82, 155–56, 166; on Aline Sitoé Diatta, 80, 81–82, 155–56; arrest of, 5, 12–13, 64, 208n6; on Badiane, 143–44, 146, 147, 230n13; on borders of Casamance, 54, 55–56; on Casamançais archives, 146–47; on Casamançais identity, 9–10, 12, 57–59; on Casamance for the Casamançais, 149; and the “Casamanqués,” 19; on Casa-Sports, 172; and Catholic Church, 12–13, 23; on colonialism of Senegal, 10, 244n50; death of, 180; early life of, 2–3, 88; on ethnic groups of Casamance, 3–4, 57–59, 224n75, 246n71; on flag-removal demonstration, 187n15; on The Forest, 12, 109, 110–12, 151; as “homespun historian,” 127, 141, 142–43, 146–47, 149, 181; independence declared by, 66, 216n112; on land seizures, 86–87, 216n112; MFDC cofounded by, 2, 4–5, 187n14, 230n14, 246n64; moderation of separatism of, 193n89; names of, 186n2, 186n6, 195n108, 205n102; on *nordistes*, 3–4, 122, 205n102, 213n48; ordinary Casamançais weaponized by, 66–67, 81, 86–87, 122, 142, 181–82; radio program of, 3–4, 205n102; *ras-le-bol* used by, 246n74; on rice peasants, 66, 84, 87, 88; on The River, 33; on Sagna’s death, 122–24; Sané meeting, 2, 4–5; stadium speech of, 162–63; uncle of, 88; uninitiated status of, 12, 114–15, 150, 192n12; on Victor Diatta, 123–24, 230n13
- Senghor, Léopold, 3, 33, 56, 83, 85, 102, 137, 143, 186n2, 235n98; accused of burning archives, 147; on Africanizing religion, 115–16, 227n111; Badiane and, 83, 138, 140, 144, 145, 146, 231n27; Casamançais allies of, 139–40,

- 145; Catholic identity of, 112, 113; at Double Less–Gueye match, 167–68; early life of, 137–38; on education, 139; on jihad, 115; on *négritude*, 138; presidency of, 137, 144, 145; rivalries of, 137, 145, 234n81; at Senegalese Cup matches, 164–66; on Sénégalité, 108, 170
- separatist movements, 21–23. *See also* Casamance conflict
- Serer language, 167
- Serer people, 114, 166, 247n78
- Service of Waters, Forests, and Hunting, 101–2
- shrines: changes in, over time, 118; colonial resistance at, 228n133; diversity of, 27, 117, 227n119; forest, 9, 12, 27, 109, 111–12, 114, 116–18, 151, 218n1, 227n119, 228n133; in rice fields, 68; women's, 118–19
- Sierra Leone, conflict in, 185n1
- silkcotton trees, 104, 105, 117
- slavery, 72, 180–81
- Smith, Étienne, 126
- soccer, 28, 153–55, 154; and 1979 Senegalese Cup, 164–65; and 1980 Senegalese Cup, 153–56, 165–66, 171, 172, 241n17; as colonial sport, 157, 159, 171–72; resistance through, 158–59; riots, 155, 155; Senegalese national team, 177; separatism and, 28, 155, 156–57, 160–61, 163–64, 171–72; social relations performed via, 157, 169, 170–71; youth teams, 170–71. *See also* Casa-Sports (soccer club)
- socialism, 83, 123, 139
- social relations: colonial, 60, 157, 207n127; in rice fields, 79, 90; and social space, 16, 79; in stadiums, 157, 169, 170–71, 174–77
- Socitour, 86, 87, 162
- Soninke Empire, 7
- sources, 23–25
- Southern Rivers. *See* les Rivières du Sud
- Sow, Mouhammadou “London,” 121–22, 229n2
- space: and capitalist production, 45–48, 97–98; contested development of, 29; definition of, 16; fetishizing, 14; ideologies populating, 169; juridical, 97, 103–4, 108; as means of imagining the nation, 14, 17–18, 68–70, 152, 182, 184; as more abstract than place, 204n76; multiplicity and, 170; and nationalism, generally, 16–20, 24, 29, 102, 110, 169–70, 180–82, 183–84; natural vs. abstract, 47–48; politics of, 16, 24, 59–60, 169–70; productive, 47–48, 97–98; secure, 97–98, 158; social, 16; and space-place dialectic, 11–12, 16–17, 110, 170, 181; and spatial organization, 26–28; and the spatial turn in history, 231n30. *See also specific spaces*
- spatial history, 1, 8, 14, 181–82; counter-mapping and, 15–17; oral histories complementing, 24
- spatial transgression, 11
- sports: agricultural festivals and, 157, 159; colonial view of, 157, 158, 241n21; governing, 157, 158, 242n21; Lebu rules for, 160; precolonial, 28, 157; and resistance, 158–59, 163. *See also* soccer; wrestling
- The Stadium, 11, 12, 13, 26, 28, 91, 147, 241n15; as contested space, 159, 161, 163–64, 166–68, 171–72, 178; imagining the nation through, 156, 159, 161, 169–70, 172, 178; as meeting place, 160–63, 243n44; ordinary Casamanchais and, 156, 167; as place of unity, 178; as space vs. place, 169–70; vs. stadiums, 13–14, 172; violence dissipated in, 168–69; wrestling in, 166–69. *See also* colonial stadium
- the state: church and, separation of, 130, 233n71; education as access to, 128; education serving, 126, 135–36; as expression of the nation, 145; indigenous counter-mapping and, 59–61; production and, 44–48, 54–55, 97–99, 108; “seeing like,” 100, 241n17; space made abstract by, 47–48, 54–55; spatial regimes imposed by, 47–48, 50–55, 51–53, 96, 99–102, 108; teachers as agents of, 125–26; as vassal of business, 48. *See also* the nation
- “strangers,” 21, 55, 76–77, 85, 90, 110, 162, 205n102, 213n48
- structural adjustment policies, 8–9, 122, 229n2
- student strike, 82, 121–24, 134, 147, 149, 152, 229n5
- Sud-Weekend*, 215n82
- Sunseri, Thaddeus, 98–99

- Sy, Mamadou Abdoulaye, 229n5  
 Sylla, Foday, 40, 42–44, 61, 75, 78, 181, 202n59  
 syncretism, 112, 113, 114–15
- Tall, Umar, 137  
 taxation, 48, 55, 78, 133  
 teachers: colonizers positioned as, 128; lack of, 129, 131–32; MFDC leaders as, 125–26, 132, 138; nationalist, 123, 124; as state agents, 125–26; student strike supported by, 229n5  
*téranga* (hospitality), 184  
 territoriality, 40–41, 127, 133, 231n30  
*terroir*, 14, 192n69  
 Thomas, Louis-Vincent: on *bukut*, 117–18; on the “civilization of rice,” 26, 67, 72, 211n18; on Jola people, 58, 207n116, 211n18, 211n25, 227n122, 238n132; on order, 97–98  
 Tirailleurs Sénégalais, 183, 251n6  
 Toucouleur people, 3, 55, 76–77, 90, 205n102  
 Touré, Baba, 154  
 tourism, 85–86  
 trade, 45–47; on Casamance River, 26, 34, 35–36, 37–40, 44, 47, 54; Islam and, 73, 74; rice, 26, 39, 74  
 traditional education, 150–51, 152  
 traditional religions, 77, 112–13, 114–16; Bertrand Diamacoune and, 114, 149–50; denigration of, 11; modernizing via, 116; separatism revitalizing, 118; women in, 118–19. *See also* shrines  
 tree planting, 102–3  
*la tribune Katanga*, 164  
 Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, 142, 237n127  
 Tuan, Yi-fu, 16, 204n76  
 Tyson, Mike, 250n124
- Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, 235n91  
 unity: Casamance River as place of, 55, 212n42; The Forest as place of, 114; The School as place of, 139; The Stadium as place of, 178  
*uti possidetis*, 7–8
- van der Klei, Jos, 96  
 La Verte Casamance, 110, 171, 177, 224n72  
 Vichy regime, 102, 222n50  
 Vieira, João Bernardo “Nino,” 30, 196n1  
 “La voix de la Casamance” (MFDC), 31, 84, 88
- Wade, Abdoulaye, 151  
 Wainwright, Joel, 59, 60–61, 207n127  
*Warfare in Independent Africa* (Reno), 21–22  
 water, women and, 196  
 Weitzberg, Keren, 15, 16, 18  
 White, Louise, 144  
 Wilfahrt, Martha, 20  
 Winichakul, Thongchai, 8, 17  
 Wolof Empire, 7, 39  
 “Wolofization,” 55, 57  
 Wolof language, 167  
 Wolof people, 36, 37, 37, 60, 108, 200n38; indirect rule through, 39; and Jola, conflicts between, 78; *laamb* and, 167; land bought by, 86–87, 90; as “strangers,” 3, 55, 76–77, 90, 205n102, 246n71
- Womack, Scott, 190n48  
 women: conflict as experienced by, 25, 82, 91–93, 184, 209n9; education of, 92, 129, 130, 132, 151, 152; excluded from politics, 79, 82, 92, 119, 214n61; and female circumcision, 243n34; forest rites of, 117, 118–19, 228n131; Mandinkization affecting, 27, 72–73, 74–75, 76, 79, 211n30, 212n38; mobilizing for peace, 82, 91–93, 119; oral histories of, 25, 150; personifying Casamançais peasants, 210n15; political action of, 80–82, 91–92, 151; in rice fields, 27, 72, 74–75, 87–88; symbolic roles of, 82; and water, 196; as wives and mothers, 218; workday of, 72; wrestling, 28, 176, 176, 241n20
- Worby, Eric, 50  
 work associations, 70  
 World Bank, 9  
 World Cup (2002), 174  
 World War I, 130, 228n131  
 World War II, 118  
 wrestling, 28–29, 157, 158, 159–60, 241n20; and Casamançais identity, 28, 157, 159, 166–67, 168, 172, 176–77; Casamançais style as “purer,” 167, 247n87; as combat, 159, 166; as expected male activity, 177, 250n127; matches, announcing, 185; mysticism and, 175–76; non-Dakarois challengers in, 168; prizes, 168, 174–75; proverbs, 153, 239; and Senegalese nationalism, 168–69; social relations performed via, 174–77; stadiums, 176; “traditional,”

- 159–60, 243n36; as true Casamançais sport, 172; women and girls, 28, 176, 176; women singing during, 176, 177
- Wunder, John R., 41
- yassa*, 94, 218n134
- Yékini, 28, 174, 175
- Y en a marre* demonstrations, 151
- Ziguinchor (Casa): administrative region of, 54; assault on, 63–64; *bukut* in, 117; founding of, 31, 35, 196n5; French control of, 40, 128; as invincible, 31; land seizures in, 3, 86; literacy in, 127–28, 133–34, 134; Monument aux Morts in, 183; *nordiste* mayor of, 3, 9; population of, 233n66; schools founded in, 129, 130, 133; student strike in, 82, 121–24, 134, 147, 149, 152, 229n5; tree planting in, 103
- Zimbabwe, 50, 204n83
- zones of contact, 41

